I think these passages by Oudeyis 5/29 nicely capture some of the points we
have been discussing. Below them I include some passages from the Ilyenkov
book he refers to.
on 5/29 Oudeyis said:
"... there is no doubt that nature must also include that
which is beyond the observed and acted upon and that its existence is
important for the creation of a materialist ideology."
"... orthodox Marxists, including Lenin in his
earlier writings (prior at very least to his readings in Hegel in 1914 and
possibly as early as his article on Empirio-positivism), did indeed inherit
the classical materialist concept of the objectivity of nature in the
metaphysical sense of the essential being of nature; known, unknown,
whatever."
"Ilyenkov in the last paragraphs of chapter 8 of Dialectical
Logic summarizes the reasoning that is the basis of the concept of nature as
[existing - sg] prior to and independently of humankind."
back to Steve:
However, as I know we all agree, this is only the beginning of a
materialist ontology. How humans then go about transforming nature and
themselves in the process is the great challenge to observe, understand and
explain, and figures in the center of Marxist scholarship.
Here are some interesting paragraphs from the work by Ilyenkov that Oudeyis
mentions, which capture some of the points Oudeyis stresses. Thanks to
Oudeyis for referring us to it.
Ilyenkov himself provides relevant quotes from Marx and Engels on these
matters in this essay, entitled "The Materialist Conception of Thought as
the Subject Matter of Logic" from _Dialectical Logic: Essays on Its History
and Theory_, a book I look forward to seriously studying. The page numbers
are from my 1977 Progress edition, which I was lucky to get through the
internet last year. I corrected a couple scanning errors from the MIA version.
Copied from:
http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/essays/essay8.htm
from page 283:
"A consistently materialist conception of thought, of course, alters the
approach to the key problems of logic in a cardinal way, in particular to
interpretation of the nature of logical categories. Marx and Engels
established above all that [the] external world was not given to the
individual as it was in itself simply and directly in his contemplation,
but only in the course of its being altered by man: and that both the
contemplating man himself and the world contemplated were products of history."
from page 285:
"Psychological analysis of the act of reflexion of the external world in
the individual head therefore cannot be the means of developing logic. The
individual thinks only insofar as he has already mastered the general
(logical) determinations historically moulded before him and completely
independently of him. And psychology as a science does not investigate the
development of human culture or civilisation, rightly considering it a
premise independent of the individual."
from page 286-287:
"In labour (production) man makes one object of nature act on another
object of the same nature in accordance with their own properties and laws
of existence. Marx and Engels showed that the logical forms of man's action
were the consequences (reflection) of real laws of human actions on
objects, i.e. of practice in all its scope and development, laws that are
independent of any thinking. Practice understood materialistically,
appeared as a process in whose movement each object involved in it
functioned (behaved) in accordance with its own laws, bringing its own form
and measure to light in the changes taking place in it."
- Steve
<end>
********************************************************
On 5/29/2005 Oudeyis wrote:
Steve,
Well, now I know what comes after the <snip>.
First paragraph:
Oudeyis is saying nothing about what nature is, but rather is writing that
whatever understandings man has of nature are a function primarily of his
active interaction (his labour) with the natural conditions of his
existence. The difference between knowing what nature is (i.e. its
essential being or "nature" if you will) and having a working knowledge of
world conditions is all the difference between the treatment of nature in
Marxist and classical materialist theory. Now then, the only part of nature
humanity can know is that part of it with which he has some sort of
contact, and at least for Marxism, the only part of nature about which man
can develop theories of practice is that which he can or has changed in some
fashion. When it comes to explaining the practical foundation scientific
cosmology we argue that the theories regarding the behaviour of huge masses
of material over barely conceivable periods of time and spatial dimensions
are projections based more often as not on experimentation with some of the
very smallest of the universe's components; atoms, quarks, and so on).
Anyway, its hard to imagine how men would know things about which they have
absolutely no experience and how they would know how things work without a
working experience with them or with things like them. Divine revelation
perhaps? Finally, there is no doubt that nature must also include that
which is beyond the observed and acted upon and that its existence is
important for the creation of a materialist ideology. There are three ways
the "unknown" makes itself felt in material human experience:
1.The fact that human practice and the science that represents it in thought
is open ended or, better yet, appears to have no outward limits is a clear
indication of the existence of more to nature than that which is treated by
our current state of knowledge and practice.
2. The classic observations by Marx in the first chapter of German Ideology
(1845) and the Critique of Hegelian Philosophy (1844) that the physical and
sensual interface between man a nature in human labour is far more concrete
than can ever be represented by even the most developed dialectics. The
rational representation of men's activity in the world is then an inherently
uncompletable task.
3. Hegel in his discussion of being makes the point that the logical
formula A = A has no demonstrable correspondence with actual experience;
diversity is an inherent property of identity (Andy B. presents a pretty
thorough discussion on this in his The Meaning of Hegel, Chapter iv section,
" Diversity(essential Identity )" ). The whole basis of all rational
activity, all dialectics, conscious and unconscious, deliberated and
automatic, is the unity between the essential transitoriness of experienced
moments and the determination of identities; qualities, quantities, measure
and all the other things we have to "know" to develop a working model of the
world. It's the unity of logical categorization and the essential
temporality of immediate experience that fuels the dialectic and makes it so
important a tool for exploration of the unknown.
Second paragraph:
The clarification of what exactly is the significance of the *objective*
nature of nature is probably Ilyenkov's most important contributions to
Scientific Marxism. Indeed for orthodox Marxists, including Lenin in his
earlier writings (prior at very least to his readings in Hegel in 1914 and
possibly as early as his article on Emprio-positivism), did indeed inherit
the classical materialist concept of the objectivity of nature in the
metaphysical sense of the essential being of nature; known, unknown,
whatever. Ilyenkov in the last paragraphs of chapter 8 of Dialectical
Logic summarizes the reasoning that is the basis of the concept of nature as
prior to and independently of humankind. Here he distinguishes between Marx
and Engel's theories of human activity and Hegel's idealism by
recapitulating their description of man as a product and force of nature
that transforms nature into the instruments of his activity in appropriating
nature's goods and producing from them the means for the perpetuation of his
body organic and inorganic. Nothing could more clearly describe the
independence of abstract nature from the emergence of human activity in the
world. After all, if man has his origins in the development of the natural
world, then nature as a whole precedes and is a prerequisite for human
activity. Nature regarded abstractly cannot be described as a product of
human activity Then too, the laws and principles of nature whereby men
transform nature into the instruments and products of labour are hardly a
product of pure logic, of men's unfettered imagination. The laws of nature
as men know and accommodate their actions to them are firmly connected to
the physical and sensual properties of man the organism and to the natural
conditions he confronts in the course of his prosecution of labour activity.
Men do not produce in a vacuum which they then fill with ideas and concepts.
Nature is a partner with man in his determination and production of his
needs, and its presence is identifiable in all human activity in the world.
All these descriptions of nature relate directly to the interaction of man
with nature as a force of nature, and not one of these statements asserts
some sort of universal state of being for nature itself. The activist
interpretation of men's relation to the world first proposed by Kant,
further developed by Hegel and given a material natural interpretation by
Marx and Engels obviates all necessity to make broad ontological statements
about the world in order to realize the objects of theory.
with Regards,
Oudeyis
----- Original Message -----
From: "Steve Gabosch" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu>
Sent: Sunday, May 29, 2005 9:35 AM
Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics!
> If I am reading Oudeyis correctly, he is saying that nature is determined
> by human interaction with it; that nature is strictly a product of the
> unity of human purposive activity and natural conditions; and that nature
> is a function of human labour. If by "nature" we are only referring to
> that portion of reality that humanity consciously observes and/or acts
> upon, then Oudeyis successfully makes that point. But this conception of
> reality restricts nature to human experience, which can only be a subset
of
> nature. Nature must also include that which is beyond the observed and
> acted upon. The "unknown" - the not yet experienced - must also be taken
> into account in the creation of a materialist ontology.
>
> It is certainly true that humans only consciously experience that portion
> of nature they observe and/or act on through the lens of culture and the
> plethora of human activity, a key idea in Ilyenkov's concept of the
> ideal. But how humanity, through its social relations, activities,
> languages, etc. *subjectively* experiences nature (individually or
> collectively) is a different question than the *objective* nature of
nature
> itself. I can see little room for doubt that all these Marxists insisted
> upon making this fundamental distinction. They maintained that nature
> exists prior to and independently of humankind, holding the ontological
> view that nature also includes that which humankind has not yet - and may
> never - experience. I am aware of no evidence to support Oudeyis's claim
> that the conception of nature held by these classical Marxists was
> restricted to only that which humans have interacted with and/or laboured
on.
>
> - Steve
>
>
> At 07:09 AM 5/26/2005 +0200, Oudeyis wrote:
> >Marx and Engels adopted Hegel's activist determination of nature as
> >a product of the interaction of man with
> >nature (human purposive intervention in nature) , but revised it to
include
> >that human intervention as a force of nature rather than just an exercise
of
> >intellect. For Marx, Engels, and Lenin the objective, materialist
> >determination of the nature of nature must be regarded as strictly a
> >dialectical product of the unity of human practical activity with the
> >natural conditions that are the subject of that activity, i.e. as a
function
> >of human labour.
>
>
>
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