Former Bin Ladin 'Bodyguard' Recalls Al-Qa'ida Figures, Views East Africa Bombings London Al-Quds al-Arabi in Arabic 28 Mar 05 p21
[Part 9 of a series of interviews with Nasir Ahmad Nasir Abdallah al-Bahri, alias Abu-Jandal, formerly the "personal guard" of Al-Qa'ida leader Usama Bin Ladin, by Khalid al-Hammadi in Sanaa; date not given: "The Inside Story of Al-Qa'ida, as Told by Abu-Jandal (Nasir al-Bahri), Bin Ladin's Personal Guard (9); Abu-Zubaydah Was No Leading Member of the Organization and Was Running a Guesthouse for Material Benefits; Al-Qa'ida's Leadership Structure Egyptian; Bin Ladin's Ties With Mullah Omar Strengthened After Arab Mujahidin Checked Advance of Tajik Commander Ahmed Shah Masoud"] In this episode, Abu-Jandal speaks about several influential figures in Al-Qa'ida and their role in the Organization in addition to other events he had witnessed in Afghanistan. Abu-Ubaydah al-Banshiri [Al-Hammadi] Abu-Ubaydah al-Banshiri, the military commander of Al-Qa'ida Organization, became very famous in Africa until he drowned in Lake Victoria. What do you know about him and what role did he play in Africa? [Al-Bahri] Abu-Ubaydah al-Banshiri, may God have mercy on his soul, was not known to me personally. However, I heard the Egyptian comrades speak about him. They spoke well of him and praised him. They used to say that he was a first-rate military man. He was named Al-Banshiri after the well known Banshir Valley in northern Afghanistan and he was connected with the northern Afghan commander Ahmed Shah Masoud who was assassinated two days before the 9/11 events. Abu-Ubaydah al-Banshiri was one of the old Arab mujahidin in Afghanistan and he took part in the first battle in which the Arab mujahidin in Afghanistan participated. It was the battle of Gagi. Some of our men described him as a Gagi companion, in allusion to the prophet's companions during the battle of Badr, the first battle in Islam. Abu-Ubaydah al-Banshiri was deputy to Usama Bin Ladin before Abu-Hafs al-Masri. His ferry capsized in Lake Victoria and he drowned. May God have mercy on his soul. Abu-Ubaydah was far-sighted. He concentrated on Africa in General and on the Horn of Africa in particular and used to say: The United States will certainly control the Horn of Africa and therefore, we must establish a Horn of Africa close to the Arabian Peninsula. He had a far-reaching plan, beginning with Somalia, which he wanted to make a base for the Arab mujahidin, spreading jihad ideas from there, given that it was an open country in which the Arabs used to move about using only their ordinary identity cards without encountering anyone to ask them about their nationality or anything else. It was easy to enter Somalia. The Al-Qa'ida Organization mujahidin did not enter Somalia after the United Sates did. Indeed, the Al-Qa'ida Organization mujahidin were already there when the United States entered because they had a program and camps and a vision to unify the country. They aspired to make of Somalia a stronghold for them close to the Arabian Peninsula because the brothers in the Al-Qa'ida had an aim to liberate the Arabian Peninsula later on. [Al-Hammadi] Did Abu-Ubaydah al-Banshiri play a big role in Africa? [Al-Bahri] Abu-Ubaydah was in effect the general field commander in the Horn of Africa. He used to discuss events and developments with Usama Bin Ladin on a daily basis. Abu-Ubaydah was the supervisor of the activities in the Horn of Africa from Uganda to Somalia and from Kenya to the Horn of Africa and Sudan. All these areas were under his supervision. [Al-Hammadi] Does this mean that he was the mastermind, and that he played the main role in the attack against the two US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam? [Al-Bahri] Yes, he had a big role in planning and implementing these two operations. He was the executive commander of these two attacks. [Al-Hammadi] Did Al-Banshiri propose the attacks against these two embassies? [Al-Bahri] As far as I know, he had the intention to let the Al-Qa'ida Organization hit the two embassies and to let the Egyptian Jihad organization do the job. However, the brothers in the Al-Qa'ida Organization objected. They objected to the idea of bombing the two embassies because they considered Kenya an important passageway to Somalia and they did not want it closed. How could they close this passageway? How could they enter Somalia then? Therefore, at the beginning the brothers in the Al-Qa'ida did not want to do that so that they might not invite Kenya's wrath against them. However, eventually, when restrictions imposed on them increased and after they left Somalia, they decided to carry out the two attacks. That was in 1998. Bin Ladin and Al-Zawahiri [Al-Hammadi] What do you know about the first meeting between Usama Bin Ladin and Al-Zawahiri and how were they able to come together and how were they brought together despite their divergent ideological upbringing? [Al-Bahri] I do not know the details but I know that there were numerous closed sessions and meetings between the leadership of the Al-Qa'ida Organization and the leadership of the Egyptian Jihad Organization. These meetings took place when I was in Afghanistan and during my work as a bodyguard for Usama Bin Ladin. I did not interfere in this and I did not try to know what was going on despite my closeness to Usama Bin Ladin. However, we knew that there were intentions to unify efforts and effect a union. I remember that these contacts and meetings began in 1997 and even before that. There were coordination of operations, logistical support, and joint implementation of some operations in and outside of Afghanistan. There were Al-Qa'ida Organization elements fighting within the ranks of the Jihad Organization and members of the Jihad Organization were fighting in the Al-Qa'ida Organization ranks. [Al-Hammadi] What about the bombing of the Egyptian embassy in the Pakistani capital Islamabad, was it the doing of the Al-Qa'ida Organization or the Jihad Organization or was it a joint operation? [Al-Bahri] We understood from the Egyptian Jihad Organization members when they talked about this issue that the Egyptian Islamabad embassy bombing was a retaliatory attack because of what the Egyptian Government had done to those who implemented it, in terms of the dishonor and torture to which they had been subjected in Egyptian jails. They took revenge by bombing the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad. Two persons carried out the attack. One of them entered the embassy with a Samsonite briefcase and opened the embassy gate and the other drove into the embassy with a Hilux pickup vehicle. I think this operation was carried out without informing the general commander of the Egyptian Jihad Organization. Therefore, the Al-Qa'ida Organization had no connection with this operation. Had it known about the plan, it would not have allowed it, given that Pakistan was still the most important passageway for the Al-Qa'ida Organization from and into Afghanistan. Moreover, the Al-Qa'ida Organization had good relations with the Pakistani Islamic organizations and it was not in Al-Qa'ida's interest to harm them in their own country. Abu-Zubaydah [Al-Hammadi] Then how do you explain the arrest of Abu-Zubaydah in Islamabad and what about his role in the Al-Qa'ida Organization? [Al-Bahri] Abu-Zubaydah played no role in the Al-Qa'ida Organization. He was arrested in Pakistan, as I heard later. He had a guesthouse in the Pakistani capital Islamabad and he used to receive and give accommodation to Arab Mujahidin. His only job was to serve the mujahidin and he was not affiliated with the Al-Qa'ida Organization or other organizations. I remember that the Al-Qa'ida Organization coordinated with him to receive the sick or the wounded from the Arab brothers and treat them in Pakistan, or to complete security papers and ensure transportation and communication and means of movement. He used to offer these services in exchange for material benefits. This house or guesthouse was opened for commercial and material purposes. In all cases, he was not a member of the Al-Qa'ida Organization. [Al-Hammadi] Do you believe that Al-Zawahiri played an important role in Al-Qa'ida Organization? [Al-Bahri] After joining Al-Qa'ida Organization, he played a major and important role. He became the number-two man in the organization. [Al-Hammadi] It is known that from the beginning, the leadership of Al-Qa'ida Organization belonged to Usama Bin Ladin because he was the founder and financier. What was the nature of the leading members who were lower than him in rank? [Al-Bahri] The majority of the leadership structure after Usama Bin Ladin was Egyptian. There was also a Mauritanian member. As for the ordinary members and elements, the ratio varied. At the beginning and for some time the Saudis formed the biggest percentage. Then the situation began to change every now and then with the Saudis or Yemenis taking the lead. At a certain training course, you find most of the recruits Yemenis. The next course you will find most of the attendees Saudis with few Yemenis, and so on. Some of the classes did not have a majority of Saudis or Yemenis but a mixture of men from various countries. I am speaking of course of individuals who received training at the Al-Qa'ida Organization camps. But it is difficult to say that they were active Al-Qa'ida members. [Al-Hammadi] What do you know about Muhammad Atif? Was he really the man responsible for the military wing in Cairo? [Al-Bahri] Muhammad Atif is himself Abu-Hafs al-Masri. All I know about him is that he was deputy of Usama Bin Ladin and responsible for the Military Committee. Whether he was a leader or responsible for the military command in Cairo, I do not know. [Al-Hammadi] Do you know him personally? How was his character? [Al-Bahri] Yes, I know him. He was a serious-minded man, a disciplined man. He was not the gregarious type who could live with the young mujahidin and understand and solve their problems and address their concerns, like Usama Bin Ladin. Perhaps this was due to his military position in the organization and his military circumstances and his monitoring of events. His work and activities sometimes compelled him to avoid people and keep away from others. Sometimes we only saw him once a week or once in two weeks, either during prayers or during feasts. Many of the young mujahidin liked his character, may God have mercy on his soul. He was a first-rate sportsman and he loved horsemanship but was not as good a horseman as Usama Bin Ladin. He was a professional volleyball player. Whenever we had to play volleyball we used to place Usama Bin Ladin in one team and Abu-Hafs in the other team because they were skillful and tall. Sulayman Abu-Ghayth [Al-Hammadi] How did the Kuwaiti national, Sulayman Abu-Ghayth, suddenly become one of the leaders of Al-Qa'ida and the official spokesman of the Organization? What do you know about him? [Al-Bahri] I do not know Sulayman Abu-Ghayth personally and I had had no relations with him. I first heard about him when he gave a Friday sermon in Kuwait and spoke about Usama Bin Ladin and defended him and about the Al-Qa'ida Organization and the mujahidin in Afghanistan. He attacked the United States and its allies, and incited the youths against the United States. As far as I can remember, the sermon was made in the late 1990's. He was immediately arrested and was stopped from preaching. He no longer could tolerate his conditions in Kuwait and he thought Kuwait was no longer suitable for him. He decided to take his wife and children and travel to Afghanistan after coordinating with the brothers there to receive him. Sulayman Abu-Ghayth is a book-learned man, with a strong line of reasoning and eloquence. Because he was from the Arabian Peninsula, he was placed in such a position and he had priority over others. Therefore, he was chosen the official spokesman of the Al-Qa'ida Organization. [Al-Hammadi] Do you not believe that he had already been a member of Al-Qa'ida when he was still in Kuwait, or did the harassment he faced in Kuwait compel him to escape from his exasperating conditions and join Al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan? [Al-Bahri] I think that the harassment he faced in Kuwait and the ban on his sermons there made him go to Afghanistan and officially join the Al-Qa'ida Organization. I heard that he had been one of the previous members of the organization, that he participated in the initial Afghan Jihad period, and that he participated in jihad in Bosnia and supported the Chechen cause. [Al-Hammadi] After the bombing of the two US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998, US planes bombed the Al-Qa'ida camps in Afghanistan. How were the Americans able to define the location of these camps? Were there spies? [Al-Bahri] The Al-Qa'ida camps in the Khowst region were established in 1989 and they were located among many Afghan villages. To specify and monitor them was very simple because they were established on a specific location with facilities, depots, and restaurants. There was active traffic for logistics and for the arrival and departure of trainers, as well as smuggling routes and so on. Therefore, to acquire such information was not impossible or difficult. [Al-Hammadi] You were a witness to this US air strike. What was the size of the damage and the number of casualties in the camp because of the US strike? [Al-Bahri] Yes, I was a witness to this event. I was working as a personal bodyguard with Usama Bin Ladin. The night of the strike, I moved with him from Qandahar to Kabul. The next day, they attacked these camps thinking that Bin Ladin and his guards were in the Khowst camps. One night before the bombing, Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin decided to go to the Khowst camps. When we left Qandahar toward Khowst, the Americans were able to know our destination through the Afghan cook who was working with us. Later on, we discovered that he was a US intelligence agent and had been recruited by force to monitor the movements of Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin. He confessed that he had informed the Americans that Usama Bin Ladin was on his way to the Al-Qa'ida camps in Khowst. I remember that when we reached a crossroads between Khowst and Kabul in the Wardak Province, Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin said: Where do you think, my friends, we should we go, to Khowst or Kabul? We said we would go to Kabul in order to visit our comrades at the front there. He said: With God's help, let us go to Kabul. We arrived in Kabul and the US attack against the Khowst camps occurred the next day. It was a concentrated bombardment. Each house was hit by a missile but they did not destroy the camps completely. They hit the kitchen of the camp, the mosque, and some bathrooms. Six men were killed: A Saudi, an Egyptian, an Uzbek, and three Yemenis. Six were also wounded. I believe that 75 missiles were fired at the camp in this operation. The number of missiles that we counted all over Afghanistan were 50 but, god be praised, the damage they left was much less than their actual destructive power. Al-Qa'ida and Taliban [Al-Hammadi] Was there security cooperation and coordination between the Taliban Government security apparatus and its counterpart in the Al-Qa'ida Organization? [Al-Bahri] Yes, there was strong cooperation and coordination between them. Expertise and instructors were exchanged between the two. I recall that when spies on the Al-Qa'ida Organization were discovered or when there were attempts to assassinate Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin, joint investigations and interrogations were held with the perpetrators. The Arab mujahidin used to interrogate the spies in the presence of the Afghan security officers from the Taliban centers. After the interrogations, the suspects would be referred to the Taliban Movement and it would decide what to do with them and whether or not to imprison them in its jails. [Al-Hammadi] What kind of life did the Al-Qa'ida leaders who were working under Usama Bin Ladin live? Were they given salaries and privileges like the military services officers in regular armies? [Al-Bahri] They had no privileges but there were something like a salary called "Monthly Stipend." This was only for the married men to spend on their families. These payments ranged between $50 and $120 according to the size of the family. However, this payment was not given to every one. Some of the Al-Qa'ida members and leaders were well to do and their houses were better furnished than Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin's house. This stipend was not used for an easy living or to buy luxury items but to have the basic necessities of life. Life there was simple and all were equal in terms of living standard. As for the unmarried men, they used to eat whatever food they found available at the Al-Qa'ida camps and in other places where Al-Qa'ida centers could be found. [Al-Hammadi] Where did the Al-Qa'ida married men send their children for education, given that the medium of instruction was not Arabic? [Al-Bahri] Educating the children was the biggest problem for the Arab brothers in Afghanistan because of the language barrier. However, the brothers overcame this difficulty, thanks to the presence of some Arab brothers who volunteered for this. At the beginning, old style classes were opened and the children were taught Koran, the tradition of the prophet, the Arabic language, and certain lessons in public morals. The teachers were Arabs from the Al-Qa'ida members. Finally a school was established for all the children of the Arab brothers in Afghanistan with scientific methods of teaching in various subjects. This covered the elementary period because the school was established within a short time. The children were taught many things, combining religious and modern lessons. [Al-Hammadi] What about the unmarried men from the Al-Qa'ida? How did they spend their life in Afghanistan? [Al-Bahri] The unmarried men had plenty of spare time. They were assigned one of three jobs: Training in the camps, fighting at the front, or staying near Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin to guard him. The latter was a small force and was ready to do battle at any moment. Arabs and Afghan People [Al-Hammadi] Were the Al-Qa'ida Arabs able to mix with the Afghans when they were in Afghanistan under the Taliban rule, given the religious and ideological closeness of the two sides? [Al-Bahri] Yes, they lived in a normal manner and realized some fusion with them, even though they maintained their character and upbringing. Some of them were successful in this regard through commercial dealings with the Afghan traders and intermarriages between Arabs and Afghans. Many young Arabs married Afghan women. Some Afghans liked to give their daughters in marriage to Arabs but some others expressed reservations in this matter. [Al-Hammadi] Was the number of marriages between Arabs and Afghans considerable? [Al-Bahri] I do not remember any cases where Arab women married Afghans. As for the Arabs who married Afghan women, the number was not bad but not large either. Most of the marriages were successful. [Al-Hammadi] How did the Afghans look at the Al-Qa'ida Arab members? [Al-Bahri] The Afghan people are generous and courageous. They do not forget the good deeds of others and were not ungrateful. Therefore, they considered the Arab Mujahidin the grandsons of the companions of the prophet. They respected and honored them. Honoring guests in general was one of the traits of the Afghans, and the Arabs and mujahidin were held in high esteem. They used to say: These Arabs came from the end of the world to contribute toward the establishment of our state. They considered their respect for the Arabs to be gratitude and a duty. Under the Taliban Government, there were no class or ethnic differences. They respected the Arabs because the Arabs also respected Afghans and appreciated them. There were many points of convergence between Arabs and Afghans because of the same religion and faith. The Arabs' contribution to the Afghan jihad and their courage were appreciated by the Afghans. This reflected on their treatment of the Arabs who settled in Afghanistan and was demonstrated by the Afghan people's acceptance of them. Mullah Omar [Al-Hammadi] How did the relationship between the Al-Qa'ida Organization and the Afghan Taliban Movement begin and develop? [Al-Bahri] The relationship began after Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin traveled from Jalalabad to Qandahar and after his meeting with Mullah Muhammad Omar at Qandahar Airport. They held talks there after the first attempt to assassinate Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin in Jalalabad. Mullah Muhammad Omar received news through the Taliban intelligence that certain individuals arrived in Afghanistan for the purpose of liquidating Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin. Acting on the basis of his religious zeal, Mullah Omar sent a helicopter for Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin in Jalalabad and asked him to come to Qandahar. When he arrived at Qandahar Airport Mullah Omar informed him of the subject and there was long discussion between them. Mullah Muhammad Omar then proposed to Usama Bin Ladin to move to Qandahar with all the Arab families to settle there because it was safer than Jalalabad. Usama Bin Ladin and his companions then moved to Qandahar, which was considered Talabani's stronghold, and settled there. Relations then began between the Mullah and the Shaykh but the relationship was strengthened and consolidated after the advance of the Afghan commander Ahmad Shah Masoud toward Kabul and after Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin alerted the Arab mujahidin in Afghanistan to defend Kabul. They played a great role in defending it and in repulsing the Masoud forces, given their good military experience. During that time the blood of the Arabs and Afghans was spilled at the Afghan fronts and this was an important factor in strengthening the relationship and bolstering links between the Al-Qa'ida Organization and the Taliban Movement and their leaderships. [Al-Hammadi] How did the relationship develop between Usama Bin Ladin and Mullah Muhammad Omar? [Al-Bahri] The relationship between Mullah Muhammad Omar and Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin began as a result of the two sides' agreement in terms of religion and ideology. Mullah Muhammad Omar had his own idea about jihad and he used to hear about the battles of the Arab mujahidin in the Gagi area and their battles in Jalalabad and during his meetings with Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin and the prolonged sessions of talks between the two. This had a great effect on strengthening their relations. Moreover, the enemy of both was the same. They agreed on the same enemy; namely, the United States. Mullah Muhammad Omar used to say that the United States wanted to strike at Taliban not because of Usama Bin Ladin but because it wanted to strike at Afghanistan to drive out the Taliban Government from the country because it was implementing the Islamic sharia law in the country and because of US fear of the Islamic trend. Thus, the two sides, Mullah Muhammad Omar and Usama Bin Ladin, agreed on the same ideological principles and the same enemy; namely, the United States. Indeed, the United States treated the Al-Qa'ida and Taliban issues as one issue and considered them the same because of the same religion. The United States did not fight them because of their military strength but because of their intellectual and ideological beliefs. [Al-Hammadi] Some sources said that one of the causes for strengthening the relationship between Usama Bin Ladin and Mullah Muhammad Omar was a marriage between the two sides. How true is this? [Al-Bahri] This is not true, because there were no marriages between Usama Bin Ladin and Mullah Muhammad Omar. Mullah Muhammad Omar did not give his daughter in marriage to Usama Bin Ladin and Usama Bin Ladin did not give any of his daughters in marriage to Mullah Muhammad Omar and nothing of this kind happened between the other leaders on both sides. What was described as a marriage between the two sides to strengthen relations between them was absolutely untrue. [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> DonorsChoose. A simple way to provide underprivileged children resources often lacking in public schools. Fund a student project in NYC/NC today! http://us.click.yahoo.com/EHLuJD/.WnJAA/cUmLAA/TySplB/TM --------------------------------------------------------------------~-> -------------------------- Want to discuss this topic? 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