http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htatrit/articles/20110814.aspx
Why 21st Century Warfare Is Different
August 14, 2011: After ten years of fighting, the war on terror has caused
51,600 American military casualties (6,200 dead and 45,400 wounded). This
includes a small number of CIA, State Department and other agency personnel.
Over 99 percent are Department of Defense. Not all the casualties were from
combat, with 21 percent of the deaths from non-combat causes. In World War
II that was 25 percent. Iraq fighting accounted for 71 percent of the deaths
and 70 percent of the wounded. Outside of Afghanistan and Iraq, operations
in dozens of other countries represented 2.5 percent of deaths, but about 71
percent of these were from non-combat causes.
The first 21st century war was quite different than the 20th century
conflicts. For one thing, far fewer Americans are being killed or wounded in
combat. And fewer and fewer of those who are wounded die. It's a continuing
trend. Last year, eight percent of the wounded died, compared to eleven
percent in 2009. There are several reasons for more troops surviving battle
wounds (and injuries from accidents). An obvious cause is body armor.
Improvements over the past decade, in terms of design and bullet resistance,
account for about 20 percent of the decline in casualties. There's a down
side to this, as the body armor is heavier and cumbersome. This reduces a
soldier's mobility, and increases casualties a bit (and saves some enemy
lives as well.)
Another major factor is medical care, which has gotten much better, quicker
and faster. Not only are procedures more effective, but badly wounded
soldiers get to the operating table more quickly. Medics now have
capabilities that, during Vietnam, only surgeons possessed. Movement of
casualties to an operating room is much faster now, partly because of better
transportation, but also because of more efficient methods, and operating
rooms that are placed closer to the battlefield.
Another major factor is the change in what caused casualties. Explosions
(like roadside bombs) are less likely to cause fatal wounds. For example,
currently 12.9 percent of bullet wounds are fatal, compared to 7.3 percent
for bombs and 3.5 percent for RPGs (and grenades in general). The enemy in
Afghanistan prefers to use roadside bombs, because U.S. troops are much
superior in a gun battle. All this contributed to the changing the ratio of
wounded-to-killed, that was 6-to-1 in Vietnam, to 10-1 now.
In Iraq and Afghanistan, there has also been a dramatic reduction in combat
deaths compared to Vietnam, and previous 20th century wars. The death rate
(adjusting for the number of troops involved) in Iraq was a third of what it
was in Vietnam. It's even lower in Afghanistan. There was such a massive
reduction in combat deaths that the percentage of deaths that were from
non-combat causes actually went up. For example, there were 47,359 (81.4
percent) combat deaths in Vietnam, and 10,797 (18.6 percent) from non-combat
causes. In Iraq it is 80 percent and 20 percent. In Afghanistan it is 70
percent and 30 percent. The ratio of dead to wounded is also different in
Iraq (1 dead for 7.2 wounded) compared to Afghanistan (1 dead for 8.1
wounded)
There are also differences in the types of casualties. For example, in
Vietnam, bullets caused 38 percent of the deaths. In Iraq, it was only 19
percent, and 27 percent in Afghanistan. The Iraqis are notoriously bad
shots, even though the urban battle space in Iraq was very similar to
Vietnam. There is more of a tradition of marksmanship in Afghanistan,
despite (or probably because of) the frequently longer distances involved.
The superior body armor has made life much harder for enemy marksmen, as
chest shots are now frequently useless and fatal head shots are very
difficult.
In Vietnam, 15.7 percent of U.S. combat deaths were caused by IEDs
(Improvised Explosive Devices), while in Iraq and Afghanistan it peaked at
about 60 percent, and then declined. Casualties were avoided, or made less
severe with the development of special armored vehicles (MRAPs) that reduced
the impact of the explosives. The roadside bomb is a much less effective
weapon, a loser's weapon, because it kills more civilians than enemy troops
and played a major role in turning the locals against the Iraqi terrorists
and Afghan Taliban.
Aircraft related deaths (from crashes) were 14.6 percent of the combat
fatalities in Vietnam, while it was only a few percent in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The current helicopters were built with Vietnam experience in
mind, and are more resistant to damage and safer to crash land in. Ground
vehicle related deaths were two percent in Vietnam, but more than double
that in Iraq and Afghanistan. Most of the ground vehicle deaths were
non-combat related. That's because from World War II to the present, the
U.S. armed forces put huge numbers of trucks and other vehicles on roads
(often poorly maintained, or shot up), at all hours, in all weather and with
drivers fighting fatigue. There being a war on, the vehicles often proceeded
at unsafe speeds.
What made the experience so different today, versus past wars? It was a
combination of things. The most important difference is that the troops in
Iraq and Afghanistan are fighting smarter. While the Vietnam era troops were
representative of the general population, the post-Vietnam era army is
all-volunteer and highly selective. The troops are smarter, healthier and
better educated than the general population. During the last three decades,
new attitudes have developed throughout the army (which always got most of
the draftees). The army, so to speak, has become more like the marines
(which was always all-volunteer, and more innovative as a result). This
ability to quickly analyze and adapt gets recognized by military historians,
and other armies, but not by the media. It also saves lives in combat.
This innovation has led to better training, tactics and leadership. Smarter
troops means smarter and more capable leaders, from the sergeants leading
fire teams (five men) to the generals running the whole show. Smarter troops
leads to tactics constantly adapting to changes on the battlefield. The
better tactics, and smarter fighting, has been the biggest reason for the
lower death rate.
Better weapons and equipment have made U.S. troops less vulnerable to
attack. GPS guided weapons have made the biggest difference. There are now
GPS guided bombs, shells and rockets. This enables troops to hit a target
with the first shot, and be closer to the explosion (the better to move
right in and take care of armed enemy survivors). Another benefit is much
fewer civilian casualties. In both Iraq and Vietnam, the enemy frequently
used civilians as human shields, and the better trained American troops were
able to cope with this in Iraq and Afghanistan.
And then there was night vision gear. This first appeared during Vietnam,
but in four decades, the stuff has gotten better, lighter and cheaper. Every
soldier has night vision now, as do most combat vehicles. There are also
better radios, better uniforms, even better field rations. It all made a
difference.
Then there was the Internet, which enabled the troops to get in touch with
each other. This made a big difference. Not just for the grunts, but also
for the NCOs and officers. Each community had different problems and
solutions. With the Internet, they could easily discuss the problems, and
quickly share the solutions. The troops did this by themselves, and it was
up to the military to play catch up. Life-saving tips are passed around with
unprecedented speed. This made a major difference in combat, where better
tactics and techniques save lives.
Computers and video games had an impact as well. The draft ended about the
same time that personal computers and video games began to show up. So there
have been three decades of troops who grew up with both. It was the troops
who led the effort to computerize many military activities, and video games
evolved into highly realistic training simulators. The automation eliminated
a lot of drudge work, while the simulators got troops up to speed before
they hit the combat zone. Computers also made possible doing things with
information, especially about the enemy, that was not possible before. A lot
of troops understand operations research and statistical analysis, and they
use it to good effect. Research has also shown that heavy use of video games
trains the user to make decisions faster. That's a lifesaver in combat.
UAVs and Trackers took a lot of the fog out of war. For nearly a century,
the troops on the ground depended on someone in an airplane or helicopter to
help them sort out who was where. In the last decade, the guy in the air has
been replaced by robots. UAVs, especially the hand held ones every infantry
company has, now give the ground commander his own recon aircraft. He
controls it, and it works only for him. Combat commanders now have a
top-down view of his troops, and the enemy. This has made a huge difference,
creating some fundamental changes in the way captains and colonels command
their troops. For higher commanders, the GPS transponders carried by most
combat vehicles, provides a tracking system that shows a real-time picture,
on a laptop screen, of where all your troops are. This takes a lot of
uncertainty out of command.
Living conditions enabled troops in combat to be more alert and effective.
Some civilians think air-conditioned sleeping quarters for combat troops,
and lots of other goodies in base camps, is indulgent. It is anything but.
Getting a good night's sleep can be a life-saver for combat soldiers, and AC
makes that possible. Showers, Internet links to home and good chow do
wonders for morale, especially for guys getting shot at every day. Good
morale means a more alert, and capable, soldier. The combat units often go
weeks, or months, without these amenities, but the knowledge that these
goodies are there, and eventually to be enjoyed, takes some of the sting out
of all the combat stress. The rate of combat fatigue in Iraq has been much
lower than in Vietnam, or any previous war.
The enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan was not as effective as the Vietnamese
were. The Taliban are more effective than the Iraqis, but not by much. All
this is partly this is due to cultural factors, partly because in Vietnam,
the North Vietnamese were sending trained soldiers south. The North
Vietnamese also had commandos ("sappers"), who, while small in number,
caused a lot of anxiety, and casualties, among U.S. troops. The irregular
(Viet Cong) troops in South Vietnam, were largely gone after 1968 (as a
result of the failed Tet Offensive), but even these fighters tended to be
more deadly than the average Iraqi gunman or Afghan warrior. The Iraqi
troops have had a dismal reputation for a long time, but they can still be
deadly. Just not as deadly as their Vietnamese counterparts. The lower
fighting capability of the Iraqis saved lots of American lives, but got far
more Iraqis (including civilians) killed. The Afghans have a more fearsome
reputation, but in practice they are no match for professional infantry. And
conventional wisdom to the contrary, they have been beaten many times in the
past. They are blessed, after a fashion, to live in the place that is not
worth conquering. So whoever defeats them, soon leaves.
Finally, there is the data advantage. The military (especially the army,
which has collected, since Vietnam, massive amounts of information on how
each soldier died) has detailed records of soldier and marine casualties.
The army, in particular, collects and analyzes this data, and then passes on
to the troops new tactics and techniques derived from this analysis. The
army restricts access to the data, as it can provide the enemy with useful
information on how effective they are. Some basic data is made public, but
the details will be a locked up for decade or more. Studying this data is a
full time job for many people in the military, and there is a constant
stream of suggestions resulting from this analysis, and those suggestions
often turn into yet another small decline in combat deaths.
<http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htatrit/articles/20110814.aspx>
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
------------------------------------
--------------------------
Want to discuss this topic? Head on over to our discussion list,
discuss-os...@yahoogroups.com.
--------------------------
Brooks Isoldi, editor
biso...@intellnet.org
http://www.intellnet.org
Post message: osint@yahoogroups.com
Subscribe: osint-subscr...@yahoogroups.com
Unsubscribe: osint-unsubscr...@yahoogroups.com
*** FAIR USE NOTICE. This message contains copyrighted material whose use has
not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. OSINT, as a part of
The Intelligence Network, is making it available without profit to OSINT
YahooGroups members who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the
included information in their efforts to advance the understanding of
intelligence and law enforcement organizations, their activities, methods,
techniques, human rights, civil liberties, social justice and other
intelligence related issues, for non-profit research and educational purposes
only. We believe that this constitutes a 'fair use' of the copyrighted material
as provided for in section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Law. If you wish to use
this copyrighted material for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use,'
you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.
For more information go to:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtmlYahoo! Groups Links
<*> To visit your group on the web, go to:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/
<*> Your email settings:
Individual Email | Traditional
<*> To change settings online go to:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/join
(Yahoo! ID required)
<*> To change settings via email:
osint-dig...@yahoogroups.com
osint-fullfeatu...@yahoogroups.com
<*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
osint-unsubscr...@yahoogroups.com
<*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
