|
Gary, Frances, and
list:
I can only say that I find
Frances's usage of words so idiosyncratic in sentence after sentence that I
cannot figure out any way to restate her view in sentences that make any sense
to me. I thought perhaps there might be some one misunderstanding that
would account for this in a systematic way, and guessed that it might be due
to taking the distinction between "sign" and "representamen" as a
distinction to be drawn within semiotic analysis, so that e.g. one can speak of
signs as if they are a special case of representamens, whereas in fact it
is a distinction between a vernacular term and a technical term which Peirce
used as a replacement for theoretical purposes and it makes no sense
to talk that way: if you are going to talk in semiotical terms using
"sign" that is okay; if you are going to talk instead using "representamen" that
is okay; but it is not okay -- because it makes no sense -- to try to talk
in semiotical terms using both. So maybe that mistake accounts
for the impenetrable prose in this particular message. Or maybe
it doesn't.
Perhaps a better explanation,
though, might be that Frances has followed a practice of accumulating
vocabulary from a variety of theoretical sources and
made the mistake of
thinking that one can treat every different technical term from whatever
theoretical source as adding a new conceptual element to an overall eclectic
theory of her own that simply combines all others indiscriminately, as is
suggested by her speaking at one point about something being "all in the
Morrisean pragmatic manner". I have noticed before that a lot of her
vocabulary is actually terminology that has been used in this or that other
theory rather than being the neologism it seems at first to be. If so this
is surely a mistake, certain to induce incoherence and, worse than that,
discourage critical thinking by causing an insensitivity to just such
incoherence since it is of her own intentional making (though with
unintended consequences of which she is not sufficiently aware).
Moreover, it is perhaps what encourages her to keep coming up with ever new
neologisms, without any tendency to explain what they mean, as if it ought to be
obvious what she means. But in fact it is not at all obvious what,
say, "tychastics" means even if one knows what "tychastic" means.
The move from an adverb or an adjective to a noun is not a trivial
move nor is it a move which necessarily results in a sentence that makes any
sense. I suggest that she should resolve to start to work at
stripping her terminology down to an absolute minimum of technical terms from
any source, even avoiding all but a minimum of Peirce's technical terms
when writing about Peirce. Just write in plain vernacular everyday English
as far as possible and do philosophy in that way for a while. Better to
have a few clear ideas than a vast quantity of confused ones, for philosophical
purposes, I should think.
Anyway, Frances, I'm not intending
to be discouraging but wanting to register strongly a belief that you are
defeating your purposes by this indulging this penchant for verbal
embellishments to no good purpose. The points you are wanting to make are
not going to be successfully made this way.
That's it, for what it's
worth. Gary, if you think I am wrong about this please say so straight
out. You are right to defend her against merely negative criticism
that is of no help, but isn't there something that needs to be dealt with here
by way of systematic correction?
Joe Ransdell
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Sunday, March 12, 2006 11:14
AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Design and
Semiotics Revisited (...new thread from "Peircean elements" topic)
Joe, Frances, list:
Joe,
thanks for your response as it points to an aspect of the cause of my
"strongly worded rhetoric," as Steven phrased it, which I did not address in
my comments to him and which I refrained from adding to those comments
precisely since you had not by then responded. As already noted, I would tend
to agree with you that anyone introducing unnecessary neologisms
"just adds one more
difficulty to understanding" what Peirce was saying.
However, some of
Frances' coinages past and present are in line with Peirce's
terminological practice. Consider, for example, this passage:
6.302 Three modes of evolution have thus been
brought before us: evolution by fortuitous variation, evolution by
mechanical necessity, and evolution by creative love. We may term them
tychastic evolution, or tychasm, anancastic evolution, or anancasm, and
agapastic evolution, or agapasm. The doctrines which represent these as
severally of principal importance we may term tychasticism, anancasticism,
and agapasticism. On the other hand the mere propositions that absolute
chance, mechanical necessity, and the law of love are severally operative in
the cosmos may receive the names of tychism, anancism, and
agapism So, for example, we have here agapasm (==agapastic
evolution], agapasticism (the doctrine of this) and agapism (the simple notion
of this).
In addition, while on the one hand Frances is here using
fewer of these coinages than in the past, terms like 'semiosic' are not
infrequently found in the semiotic literature (if not necessarily the
semeiotic). On the
other hand, 'semiosics' is not, and her use of such expressions seems
idiosyncratic and at least off-putting. Also, and as noted in much earlier
discussions, we already have a perfectly good term identifying the science,
indeed we have three terms, or at least spellings, viz., semeiotic, semiotic,
and semiotics (a number of scholars have taken to using the first spelling,
one of several Peirce used, to refer to the specifically Peircean version of
logic as semeiotic). On the other hand (I think I now have a three handed
beast here!) within her own revisionary project involving a consideration of
all possible arts and sciences, Frances apparently continues to find it
necessary to conceive terminology along the lines of the kinds of distinctions
Peirce is making in 6.302. But, again, I mainly agree with you, Joe, that less
of this is more, so that one would hope that new terminology would be rare and
to some significant purpose (whereas, again, 'semiosics' appears not to
be).
I too, as
mentioned, will take a closer look at Frances' post and in the light of your
earlier comments, while I look forward to reading
"exactly what [you
were] objecting to." I imagined that since her entire message concerned an
analysis of a fundamental thrust of Ben's tetrastic project, and that the
sign/representamen distinction might play a significant role in the discussion
of collateral knowledge, the status of the object, etc. that you were indeed
commenting in some way on Ben's theory. I see from your comments that you were
not.
Gary
Joseph Ransdell wrote:
Gary, Frances, and
list:
I think I was sloppy in my
statement, Gary, which was not intended as a general attack on Frances's
views but was a comment on what she is saying in a particular message.
I regret not making that clear. I could be mistaken about what was
happening that I was objecting to, too, but I need to reread the
message carefully and then if I still find it off the mark to state
exactly what I was objecting to, which I didn't do. In the meanwhile,
I agree with your admiration for her courage in putting up with a lot of
harsh criticism earlier on, in particular. Ben's view is another
matter altogether, and I said nothing about that. I do think it
is a mistake for her to indulge the tendency to introduce neologisms of her
own, though, when one of the main problems in interpreting Peirce has to
do with problems of terminology. Each new coinage just adds one
more difficulty to understanding what he is saying.
Joe
Ransdell ---
Message from peirce-l forum to
subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED]
No virus found in this incoming message.
Checked by AVG Free
Edition.
Version: 7.1.375 / Virus Database: 268.2.1/278 - Release Date:
3/9/2006
|
