Kirsti Määttänen
Wed, 27 Sep 2006 01:29:56 -0700
A tenaciously held belief is still social, as any habit is. Yet the social is excluded from the method of tenacity. What you believe by tenacity may also be social and learned, or perhaps social and instinctive, but believed in because you simply continue to believe in it, regardless of others' beliefs.
The ordering of the methods seems to me to be based on a progressively broadening social conception:
1 You believe what you believe.
2 You believe what you are forced by social power to believe or can force on others to believe.
3 You believe what you take to be intrinsically believable to believe in.
4 You believe what self-correcting conduct informed by observation and experience leads you to believe in.
A tenaciously held belief is still social, as any habit is. Yet the social is excluded from the method of tenacity. What you believe by tenacity may also be social and learned, or perhaps social and instinctive, but believed in because you simply continue to believe in it, regardless of others' beliefs. Authority is a social method for compelling belief. Peirce also describes the movement from authority to a priori as the opening of a broader social outlook, which becomes yet broader in the scientific method.
Surely Peirce is not implying a historical progression, a kind of a modified, more social version of Hobbes, of humans capable of tenacious belief, who become capable of believing others' beliefs only through imposed authority? I agree with Kirsti that the goodness of the method is what determines order, not historical development. Still, one could argue that the development of modern philosophy involved the replacement of scholastic authority as method with a priori, in turn displaced by method of science. But who then would the pre-medieval tenacious be? Or one could take Peirce's 5.564 statement introduced here by Joe as developmental, but would it be an individual's development or that of history?
Let me try this for fun. If one did attempt to look at these methods as evolutionary-historical development, which, again, I don't take to be Peirce's point, one could reverse the order completely and see it regressively as: 1 the wild human mind emerging alive in its landscape in omnivorous observation and learning, in participation-art-science, until, 2 fascinated by its own products, it holds them/itself as its own mirror, domesticating itself, and 3 invents and imposes an authority structure made in its human mind-image abstraction, personified by a king, written by scribes, and executed by institutionalized warriors, and...eventually, 4 the modern era introduces Isolatoism, as Melville called it in Moby Dick, the tenacious Ahabian self, severed from the common continent of humanity and nature, whose tenacity results ultimately in diabolic unmediated fusion with its object, tethered to it by the line of its monomaniacal thought: The ghost in the rational-mechanical megamachine that is modern nominalized consciousness, tenaciously opening and reopening Pandora's Box whatever it might bring, idealizing it as science and civilization.
Ishmael survives in Moby Dick, because he is able to re-grasp 1 through Queeqeg, the wild human mind. Peirce's philosophy does something similar, harpooning the Leviathan of modern consciousness in the process. Sorry if this seems too metaphoric and obscure.
Cheerily,
Gene