[peirce-l] Re: Peirce and knowledge

[Clark Goble]

On Sep 28, 2006, at 10:56 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Thanks for the reference to Timothy Williamson. I do not see any direct connection to Peirce Note I wasn't pushing for a direct connection.  Far from it.  More the idea that knowledge is a basic cognitive state.  However I think Peirce clearly is an externalist although one can certainly talk about internalism in his discussions.  Although I personally tend to see a lot of the externalist/internalist debate largely a semantic one.  (i.e. they are debates over what certain terms mean and whether they can in their meaning be divided into external and internal components)  I don't find that particular linguistic approach to philosophy helpful myself and like how Chomsky handles things - talking about mental states and then adding a superscript to be just those that are internal.  (i.e. avoiding the semantic debate within philosophy entirely) In terms of Peirce I think the issue is less about mind than about the sign and internal and external aspects of the sign.  In terms of mind proper I think assigning the issue of internalism to Peirce is difficult since I don't see a huge difference between Peirce's view of mind and say Davidson's anomalous monism.  But that means that translating mental states or descriptions into physical ones that would make the internal/external divide meaningful is near impossible. But in terms of knowledge proper I wasn't really pushing to equate Williamson and Peirce.   I think Williamson's view ends up being idiosyncratic and hard to accept.    --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com