> From:          [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Tom Walker)

> Max Sawicky wrote,
> 
> >It is one thing to say that overtime is bad for the
> >following economic reasons and we would like
> >to discourage it.  It is another to put a social
> >price tag on overtime.  The latter would suggest
> >the proper sort of tax.
> 
> I still get the feeling that you are using a conventional definition of
> overtime -- hours in excess of a _fixed_ standard. 

If you want to use a variable standard, that
hardly simplifies things.

> >It would be helpful to know three things:  what sort
> >of trade-off obtains between overtime and extra jobs,
> >the values placed on one less and one extra hour,
> >respectively, by the person working overtime and the
> >person working 'undertime,' and the social costs of
> >the additional hour of undertime.   We were talking 
> >about accounting, after all, which implies close
> >quantification of these things.
> 
> 1. I don't think it's useful to try to calculate the specific trade-off
> between overtime and extra jobs. In terms of accounting standards, this
> would be a diversion. Look at how depreciation is accounted for -- by
> _convention_, not by empirical analysis. Can you or anyone say how the
> conventional schedules of depreciation compare with actual depreciation? Of

Actually there's a good bit of research on this.
Obviously the theories are not perfect, but they
at least provide a mechanism for calculating
something.

> course not. Actual depreciation depends on so many variables that it
> couldn't realistically be calculated (except by the divine calculator,
> perhaps). By the same token, a tax on overtime would establish a convention
> based on a hypothetical trade-off, not a measured trade-off. 

If you don't know the trade-off, then you don't
know what the tax should be.  The tax becomes
arbitrary.  At least a debateble method provides
a debatable design for a tax.

> 2. the subjective values placed on overtime and undertime by the worker is
> also a diversion. These can best be left to collective bargaining and
> individual choice over actual hours of work and rates of compensation
> *within a framework of social accounting for the overhead costs*. That way

I fail to see how cost exists outside of choice.
The myriad moving parts of the economic machine
each have subjective bases for dealing with each
other.

> if you want to work longer hours for more pay and an employer is willing to
> pay you the rate you require, so be it -- provided you or your employer
> aren't being subsidized for that arrangement.

This begs the question of the tax.

> 3. again, like depreciation, the social costs would be determined by
> convention. Close quantification in accounting doesn't require a strict
> homomorphism between the inputs and "objective reality". The whole long

Certainly we end up with rules of thumb
to get things done, and these often grate
against their motivating principles, when
we have such principles.  What are they,
in this case?  What is the basis for the
conventions?

>  .  .  .
> >The first of these items seems pretty difficult to figure.
> >The second could be derived by standard micro methods,
> >and the third also seems within reach though its precise
> >calculation could be all over the lot, depending on
> >methods employed.
> 
> 1. agreed, but not necessary.
> 2. perhaps, but again, not necessary.
> 3. yes, but precise calculation not necessary.

Accounting without calculation.  Give me some
time to get my arms around that one.

MBS



===================================================
Max B. Sawicky            Economic Policy Institute
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http://tap.epn.org/sawicky

Opinions above do not necessarily reflect the views
of anyone associated with the Economic Policy
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