I would suggest you reread Madison's remonstrance on Religious freedom; one of the clear motivating factors for the establishment clause was to preclude the possibility that people would have to pay for other people's religion.  That was what was going on in Va and that, quite frankly, is what the voucher system is all about;  when tax money ends up in a religious school, it means that taxpayers of one faith are forced to support the religious schools of someone else.  Madison understood how deeply wrong, dangerous, and offensive that was.  I am surprised that you and Rick don't see this.

Paul Finkelman

Pybas, Kevin M wrote:
All of the comments are helpful, but let me raise another question that is akin to the one Rick raised.  He asked  
 
  
whether, why, and / or how these motivations, or the
undesirability of such strife should be used to supply the
Establishment Clause's enforceable content.
    

WIth regard to neutral aid programs (as the Court characterizes them), is it really religious strife that worries us?  In other words, in the context of the modern administrative state, are the conflicts over the funding of education, for example, whether it be vouchers or the type of aid at issue in Mitchell, really about religion, or religiously-motivated in any sense?  In other words, how do we tell the difference between religously-motivated political strife and ordinary political disagreements (I understand that the word "ordinary" may not he all that helpful, but hopefully you see what I mean.)  

 



________________________________

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] on behalf of Paul Finkelman
Sent: Wed 8/3/2005 5:08 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: religiously-motivated political strife


 
  

_______________________________________________ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.


-- 
Paul Finkelman
Chapman Distinguished Professor of Law
University of Tulsa College of Law
3120 East 4th Place
Tulsa, OK  74105

918-631-3706 (voice)		
918-631-2194 (fax)

[EMAIL PROTECTED]

_______________________________________________
To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see 
http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw

Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private.  
Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can 
read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the 
messages to others.

Reply via email to