As Eugene suggestions, the accommodation by use of lights for Muslim cabbies 
who objected to transporting visible liquor had every prospect of success.  
Even airport officials agreed that it was an ingenious solution.  It would have 
been seamless and invisible, as the dispatcher would flag over a taxi without 
the light for those transporting liquor, so that the passenger would not be 
inconvenienced or even realize what had happened.  And this accommodation was 
abandoned, not because of any concrete showing that it caused any problems for 
passenger, but by the confession the airport commission's spokesman, because of 
a "public backlash" of emails and telephone calls.  The spokesman said that 
"the feedback we got, not only locally but really from around the country and 
around the world, was almost entirely negative.  People saw that as condoning 
discrimination against people who had alcohol."  And not only did the airport 
commission then revoke the accommodation, it began to treat the Muslim cabbies 
even more harshly.  Where previously the punishment for refusing a fare was to 
be sent to the end of the line (which was a financial hardship because the wait 
might be for additional hours), now the commission would suspend or revoke the 
cab license.  It is impossible, in my view, to understand the chain of 
circumstances as anything other than antipathy toward Muslims - and the tenor 
of the "public backlash" makes that even more obvious.

The Somali cab driver episode is described in the introduction to an empirical 
study that Michael Heise and I have currently submitted to law reviews, finding 
that, holding all other variables constant, Muslims seeking religious 
accommodation in the federal courts are only about half as successful as 
non-Muslims.  A draft of the piece is on SSRN at:  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1917057

Greg

Gregory Sisk
Laghi Distinguished Chair in Law
University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minnesota)
MSL 400, 1000 LaSalle Avenue
Minneapolis, MN  55403-2005
651-962-4923
gcs...@stthomas.edu
http://personal.stthomas.edu/GCSISK/sisk.html<http://personal2.stthomas.edu/GCSISK/sisk.html>
Publications:  http://ssrn.com/author=44545

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Tuesday, March 06, 2012 12:28 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Requirement that cabbies transport alcohol = "tiny burden"?

                My sense is that the system would work better than Steve 
thinks, since I suspect that it would be rare that six cabbies in a row will 
have this objection.  It's true that, at least according to 
http://www.startribune.com/462/story/709262.html, most cabbies in Minneapolis 
are Somalis, and "many of them" are Muslims (by which the story likely means 
observant Muslims).  But my guess is that no more than a third or so will 
likely have this objection, and that most will take whatever fares they want.  
This might be why the Minneapolis Metropolitan Airports Commission was indeed 
planning to institute a color-coded light scheme (see the story linked to 
above); it would be interesting to see if this was tried and what the results 
were.  I realize that it's speculation both ways, but, especially given that 
Minnesota courts take a Sherbert/Yoder view of the state religious freedom 
provision, I would think that the burden would be on the government to try 
something and show it fails.

                On the other hand, I'm not sure how one can get to the 
conclusion that this is a "tiny burden" on the cabbies.  Apparently the cabbies 
believe their religion bars them from transporting alcohol; that may seem 
unreasonable to us, but our judgment about reasonableness shouldn't matter for 
substantial burden purposes.  And if the claim is that the burden is "tiny" 
because they can just "get a different job," I just don't see how this can be 
so, especially given cases such as Sherbert:  For many unskilled immigrants, 
there are very well-paying jobs out there, especially in this economy.  Perhaps 
the burden might be justified, but how can we really say that it's "tiny"?

                Eugene

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Steven Jamar
Sent: Tuesday, March 06, 2012 10:14 AM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: Israeli Postal Workers Object to Delivering New Testaments

It is hard to set up such a system for cab drivers -- think of cabbies waiting 
at an airport where 6 in a row refuse passengers based on their possession of a 
bottle of wine.  It may be a longish wait or even a very long wait for the 
non-discriminating cabbie.  Or just hailing one on the street -- where would 
the sign be displayed?  When would the discussion take place?  How?
Tiny burden on those cabbies, it seems to me.  And if they can't abide by the 
rules, get a different job.
Public accommodations and public services just should not allow that sort of 
accommodation when the service is being denied to others -- it is burdening 
others based on difference of religion -- for the provision of a public service.

Many accommodations that might seem easy from the outside turn out not to be so 
easy.  Of course some accommodations are in fact quite easy and not as 
burdensome as some people (often employers) think they will be.

In practical areas one should not be quite confident in the ease of applying a 
seemingly "principled" disctinction.

Steve
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