Re: [agi] Conway's Game of Life and Turing machine equivalence
On 10/7/07, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: This is having the unfortunate side-effect that as each point is presented, you are interpreting it and (especially) running on ahead with it in directions that do not have any relation to my argument. 'Running ahead' part can be incorrect if starting point (my interpretation of given single point) is incorrect, in which case this single point should be corrected, and 'running ahead' part ignored, so it in itself doesn't have any weight. You are still to point at what's wrong with any given interpretation I wrote. Whole point of extracting small simple statements is in that they can be quickly iterated up to agreement, establishing common ground. But you usually end up saying it contradicts my whole paper and giving another summary which is not constructive and wastes your time. -- Vladimir Nesovmailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=50885572-001884
Re: [agi] Conway's Game of Life and Turing machine equivalence
It's probably worth pointing out that Conway's Life is not only Turing universal but that it can host self-replicating machines. In other words, an infinite randomly initialized Life board will contain living creatures which will multiply and grow, and ultimately come to dominate the entire board, as the self-replicating molecules in Earth's primeval oceans gave rise to biological life, which drastically changed the character of the whole planet. In other words, the large-scale character of *any* sufficiently large Life board will be determined by the properties of the self-replicating patterns (which are a rare class (to begin with!), and overlap the Turing-universal ones). It remains to be seen whether replicating Life patterns could evolve to become intelligent. Josh - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=50889022-004e1e
Re: [agi] Conway's Game of Life and Turing machine equivalence
On 10/7/07, J Storrs Hall, PhD [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [rest of post and other recent ones agreed with] It remains to be seen whether replicating Life patterns could evolve to become intelligent. No formal proof, but informally: definitely no. Our universe has all sorts of special properties that make intelligence adaptive, that Conway's Life doesn't have. Intelligence would be baggage in that universe; best survivors will be bacterialike fast self-replicators (maybe simpler than bacteria for all I know: it might turn out to be optimal to ditch general assembler capability). - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=50894984-7e6166
Re: [agi] Conway's Game of Life and Turing machine equivalence
On 10/7/07, Russell Wallace [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 10/7/07, J Storrs Hall, PhD [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [rest of post and other recent ones agreed with] It remains to be seen whether replicating Life patterns could evolve to become intelligent. No formal proof, but informally: definitely no. Our universe has all sorts of special properties that make intelligence adaptive, that Conway's Life doesn't have. Intelligence would be baggage in that universe; best survivors will be bacterialike fast self-replicators (maybe simpler than bacteria for all I know: it might turn out to be optimal to ditch general assembler capability). Well, given that it's Turing complete, it should have all forms of intelligent entities too (probably including us), they just may be non-trivial to observe. -- Vladimir Nesovmailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=50895299-720166
Re: [agi] Conway's Game of Life and Turing machine equivalence
On 10/7/07, Vladimir Nesov [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Well, given that it's Turing complete, it should have all forms of intelligent entities too (probably including us), they just may be non-trivial to observe. Oh potentially yes, they just won't spontaneously evolve from the primordial slime the way we did in our universe. - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=50915446-d03a59
Re: [agi] Conway's Game of Life and Turing machine equivalence
That's interesting perspective - it defines a class of series generators (where for example in GoL one element is the whole board on given tick) that generate intelligence through evolution in time-efficient way, and poses a question: what is the simplest instance of this class? On 10/7/07, Russell Wallace [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 10/7/07, Vladimir Nesov [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Well, given that it's Turing complete, it should have all forms of intelligent entities too (probably including us), they just may be non-trivial to observe. Oh potentially yes, they just won't spontaneously evolve from the primordial slime the way we did in our universe. - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?; -- Vladimir Nesovmailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=50918942-7c6072
Re: [agi] Conway's Game of Life and Turing machine equivalence
On 10/7/07, Vladimir Nesov [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: That's interesting perspective - it defines a class of series generators (where for example in GoL one element is the whole board on given tick) that generate intelligence through evolution in time-efficient way, and poses a question: what is the simplest instance of this class? If we accept Occam's razor plus some form of anthropic reasoning, we could conjecture that our universe is the simplest instance of this class, since if there were a simpler one we would (with high probability) have found ourselves in that universe rather than this one. (Mental health warning: the above is hopefully-amusing philosophical conjecture only, and should not be confused with science.) - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=50920825-d14632
Re: [agi] Conway's Game of Life and Turing machine equivalence
I'm not convinced, primarily because I would have said the same thing about actual bacteria vs humans if I didn't have the counterexample. One human generation time is 100,000 bacteria gen times -- and it only takes about 133 generations of bacteria to consume the the entire mass of the earth, if they could. Josh On Sunday 07 October 2007 10:57:41 am, Russell Wallace wrote: On 10/7/07, J Storrs Hall, PhD [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [rest of post and other recent ones agreed with] It remains to be seen whether replicating Life patterns could evolve to become intelligent. No formal proof, but informally: definitely no. Our universe has all sorts of special properties that make intelligence adaptive, that Conway's Life doesn't have. Intelligence would be baggage in that universe; best survivors will be bacterialike fast self-replicators (maybe simpler than bacteria for all I know: it might turn out to be optimal to ditch general assembler capability). - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?; - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=50927602-423edb
Re: [agi] Conway's Game of Life and Turing machine equivalence
On Sunday 07 October 2007 01:55:14 pm, Russell Wallace wrote: On 10/7/07, Vladimir Nesov [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: That's interesting perspective - it defines a class of series generators (where for example in GoL one element is the whole board on given tick) that generate intelligence through evolution in time-efficient way, and poses a question: what is the simplest instance of this class? If we accept Occam's razor plus some form of anthropic reasoning, we could conjecture that our universe is the simplest instance of this class, since if there were a simpler one we would (with high probability) have found ourselves in that universe rather than this one. (Mental health warning: the above is hopefully-amusing philosophical conjecture only, and should not be confused with science.) This is the same kind of reasoning that leads Bostrom et al to believe that we are probably living in a simulation, which may be turned off at any ti - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=50927912-b9a98e
Re: [agi] Conway's Game of Life and Turing machine equivalence
It depends on acceptance of self-sampling assumption (SSA), which is a rather arbitrary thing: why for example it's considered plausible to see yourself selected from set of all humans, and not for example all primates or all same-gender-humans? I only see it possible to select worlds where some kind of mind invariant is preserved, although I'm not yet sure how to define this same-mind equivalence class. But given that, probably simplicity of out world in this sense (in conjunction with definition of human's mind equivalence class) plays a role in universal prior of our world. On 10/7/07, Russell Wallace [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 10/7/07, Vladimir Nesov [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: That's interesting perspective - it defines a class of series generators (where for example in GoL one element is the whole board on given tick) that generate intelligence through evolution in time-efficient way, and poses a question: what is the simplest instance of this class? If we accept Occam's razor plus some form of anthropic reasoning, we could conjecture that our universe is the simplest instance of this class, since if there were a simpler one we would (with high probability) have found ourselves in that universe rather than this one. (Mental health warning: the above is hopefully-amusing philosophical conjecture only, and should not be confused with science.) - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?; -- Vladimir Nesovmailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=50929239-144a0d
Re: [agi] Conway's Game of Life and Turing machine equivalence
On 10/7/07, J Storrs Hall, PhD [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I'm not convinced, primarily because I would have said the same thing about actual bacteria vs humans if I didn't have the counterexample. Granted, all I have is armchair reasoning, and it's certainly not unreasonable for you to fail to be convinced by such. It'd be more solid if we could throw some experimental evidence into the mix. Modern algorithms on modern hardware should be able to run a self-replicating creature in Conway's Life, perhaps a big enough population of them to get some sort of idea of some of the evolutionary pathways; anyone reading this in the mood for a fun challenge? :) I did once download and run an evolutionary CA someone wrote, that allowed various shortcuts to cram a self-replicator into a few tens of cells, with extraneous mutation and death functions. Had a spare Pentium box around at the time, so I ran it for 6 months, got some results the programmer hadn't anticipated. Not in the direction of intelligence alas. - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=50930439-12be0e
Re: [agi] Conway's Game of Life and Turing machine equivalence
RESTORE OCT-2007.SAV On 10/7/07, J Storrs Hall, PhD [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: This is the same kind of reasoning that leads Bostrom et al to believe that we are probably living in a simulation, which may be turned off at any ti Exactly :) - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=50931028-192d3e
Re: [agi] Do the inference rules of categorical logic make sense?
Edward W. Porter wrote: So is the following understanding correct? If you have two statements Fred is a human Fred is an animal And assuming you know nothing more about any of the three terms in both these statements, then each of the following would be an appropriate induction A human is an animal An animal is a human A human and an animal are similar It would only then be from further information that you would find the first of these two inductions has a larger truth value than the second and that the third probably has a larger truth value than the second.. Edward W. Porter Porter Associates 24 String Bridge S12 Exeter, NH 03833 (617) 494-1722 Fax (617) 494-1822 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Actually, you know less than you have implied. You know that there exists an entity referred to as Fred, and that this entity is a member of both the set human and the set animal. You aren't justified in concluding that any other member of the set human is also a member of the set animal. And conversely. And the only argument for similarity is that the intersection isn't empty. E.g.: Fred is a possessor of purple hair. (He dyed his hair) Fred is a possessor of jellyfish DNA. (He was a subject in a molecular biology experiment. His skin would glow green under proper stimulation.) Now admittedly these sentences would usually be said in a different form (i.e., Fred has green hair), but they are reasonable translations of an equivalent sentence (Fred is a member of the set of people with green hair). You REALLY can't do good reasoning using formal logic in natural language...at least in English. That's why the invention of symbolic logic was so important. If you want to use the old form of syllogism, then at least one of the sentences needs to have either an existential or universal quantifier. Otherwise it isn't a syllogism, but just a pair of statements. And all that you can conclude from them is that they have been asserted. (If they're directly contradictory, then you may question the reliability of the asserter...but that's tricky, as often things that appear to be contradictions actually aren't.) Of course, what this really means is that logic is unsuited for conversation... but it also implies that you shouldn't program your rule-sets in natural language. You'll almost certainly either get them wrong or be ambiguous. (Ambiguity is more common, but it's not exclusive of wrong.) - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=50932465-797f53
Re: [agi] Conway's Game of Life and Turing machine equivalence
William Pearson wrote: On 07/10/2007, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I have a question for you, Will. Without loss of generality, I can change my use of Game of Life to a new system called GoL(-T) which is all of the possible GoL instantiations EXCEPT the tiny subset that contain Turing Machine implementations. As far as I am concerned it is not that simple. Turing completeness has nothing to do with any particular implementation of a TM in that system. It is a property of the system. [other stuff snipped] Will, This is factually incorrect. Please refer to the work done on Turing machine implementations in Game of Life. The Turing Machine implementation was just that: arrange the cells in the right way and it is possible to build a Turing machine. Arrange them differently, and it is impossible. For example, just one cell in the wrong state in one of those TM implementations, and the whole TM just explodes into chaos. The TM implementation not only has no relevance to the behavior of GoL(-T) at all, it also has even less relevance to the particular claims that I made about GoL (or GoL(-T)). If you think the TM implementation does impact it, you should demonstrate exactly how. Richard Loosemore - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=50936374-9ecb0f
Re: [agi] Do the inference rules of categorical logic make sense?
On 10/7/07, Charles D Hixson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: ... logic is unsuited for conversation... what a great quote - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=50946633-33f0fb
Re: [agi] Conway's Game of Life and Turing machine equivalence
Imagine a skin of self-reinforcing patterns. A simple version would be immune to a change in any one cell, more complicated versions would automatically replicate to repair damage involving two, three, four, or more cells. Inside, complicated structures could replicate without being all that concerned about the bacteria-like or prion-like replication going on outside. Simple patterns from the outside could break through the skin sometimes by overwhelming numbers, and act as a source of outside randomness. Imagining such a system that also splits itself in half every so often, preferably without clobbering its own siblings, is left as an exercise to the human reader. Post-humans may imagine a heterogeneous collection of such systems that communicate with one another (like neurons) or provide what we might call structural support, replicate sexually on a larger scale, and eventually evolve to be as intelligent as we are. Of course, since the board is infinite and randomized to begin with, such intelligent collections exist from the first moment. The eventually-dominant type of collection might be more intelligent than I am, so it's hard for me to say exactly what it might be like. Charles Griffiths J Storrs Hall, PhD [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I'm not convinced, primarily because I would have said the same thing about actual bacteria vs humans if I didn't have the counterexample. One human generation time is 100,000 bacteria gen times -- and it only takes about 133 generations of bacteria to consume the the entire mass of the earth, if they could. Josh On Sunday 07 October 2007 10:57:41 am, Russell Wallace wrote: On 10/7/07, J Storrs Hall, PhD wrote: [rest of post and other recent ones agreed with] It remains to be seen whether replicating Life patterns could evolve to become intelligent. No formal proof, but informally: definitely no. Our universe has all sorts of special properties that make intelligence adaptive, that Conway's Life doesn't have. Intelligence would be baggage in that universe; best survivors will be bacterialike fast self-replicators (maybe simpler than bacteria for all I know: it might turn out to be optimal to ditch general assembler capability). - Be a better Globetrotter. Get better travel answers from someone who knows. Yahoo! Answers - Check it out. - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=50949188-0c0917
Re: [agi] Do the inference rules of categorical logic make sense?
Charles, What you said is correct for most formal logics formulating binary deduction, using model-theoretic semantics. However, Edward was talking about the categorical logic of NARS, though he put the statements in English, and omitted the truth values, which may caused some misunderstanding. Pei On 10/7/07, Charles D Hixson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Edward W. Porter wrote: So is the following understanding correct? If you have two statements Fred is a human Fred is an animal And assuming you know nothing more about any of the three terms in both these statements, then each of the following would be an appropriate induction A human is an animal An animal is a human A human and an animal are similar It would only then be from further information that you would find the first of these two inductions has a larger truth value than the second and that the third probably has a larger truth value than the second.. Edward W. Porter Porter Associates 24 String Bridge S12 Exeter, NH 03833 (617) 494-1722 Fax (617) 494-1822 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Actually, you know less than you have implied. You know that there exists an entity referred to as Fred, and that this entity is a member of both the set human and the set animal. You aren't justified in concluding that any other member of the set human is also a member of the set animal. And conversely. And the only argument for similarity is that the intersection isn't empty. E.g.: Fred is a possessor of purple hair. (He dyed his hair) Fred is a possessor of jellyfish DNA. (He was a subject in a molecular biology experiment. His skin would glow green under proper stimulation.) Now admittedly these sentences would usually be said in a different form (i.e., Fred has green hair), but they are reasonable translations of an equivalent sentence (Fred is a member of the set of people with green hair). You REALLY can't do good reasoning using formal logic in natural language...at least in English. That's why the invention of symbolic logic was so important. If you want to use the old form of syllogism, then at least one of the sentences needs to have either an existential or universal quantifier. Otherwise it isn't a syllogism, but just a pair of statements. And all that you can conclude from them is that they have been asserted. (If they're directly contradictory, then you may question the reliability of the asserter...but that's tricky, as often things that appear to be contradictions actually aren't.) Of course, what this really means is that logic is unsuited for conversation... but it also implies that you shouldn't program your rule-sets in natural language. You'll almost certainly either get them wrong or be ambiguous. (Ambiguity is more common, but it's not exclusive of wrong.) - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?; - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=50965360-951ab5
