Re: Video Mules: (Was: Re: Psuedo-Private Key (eJazeera) )
At 10:23 AM 11/24/2002 -0600, Neil Johnson wrote: (Referring to previous thread about capturing video.) As I sit here looking at a 64 MB SD Card that I just picked up for $28 at my local Wally World, I was wondering why it (or it is larger capacity brethren) couldn't be used to record video and then (after appropriate protection) swallowed. Because there's no particularly good reason? :-) Because you can hide it well enough on your person, either hidden or else in plain sight disguised as a coat button or a fake police badge or a Peace Sign or Off the Pigs button? Because if you're in a situation where there's a real threat of this, you're probably much better off doing some kind of radio relay so that the surviving members of your cadre can upload the data, either plaintext, encrypted, or stegoed? Mules are trying to transmit atoms, not bits, and if you're trying to transmit bits, there are lots of ways to transmit bits. Some of the memory flake formats are really pretty thin and hidable, though the rotating disk versions aren't as easily concealed. But if you can do the mechanicals do make memory safely and recoverably swallowed, you can probably do the mechanicals to fit a backup storage system in your belt buckle or shoe-phone.
Re: Video Mules: (Was: Re: Psuedo-Private Key (eJazeera) )
At 10:12 PM 11/24/02 +0100, Eugen Leitl wrote: On Sun, 24 Nov 2002, Tyler Durden wrote: I believe Daniel Hillis (or was it Jaron Lanier?) inserted time-capsule information into a cockroach's DNA and released it into the Boston subways. He calculated that this would be the way to preserve information for the longest period of time. Sounds like a gedankenprank that neither are capable of doing without extra training. Especially since they probably haven't tested it by catching, grinding, and sequencing more roaches. This assumes the insert doesn't result in negative fitness (could very well be, if the insert kills a gene). Also, a fitness-neutral insert is likely to be lost, or severely garbled. I hope very much he used a really good redundant encoding. Either the message is neutral, and encoded with lots of redundancy (because its going to be changed at the standard 1-in-a-thousand-base mutation rate, and not selected for) or the message is beneficial and is maintained by natural selection. The latter being tough to do, your best hope is an error correcting code. If the message is maladaptive (other than taking up space on the chromo, which for many critters isn't a big hassle) you're fucked.
Re: Video Mules: (Was: Re: Psuedo-Private Key (eJazeera) )
On Sun, 24 Nov 2002, Morlock Elloi wrote: Isn't all snail mail already irradiated ? Then soon. It's not, because electron accelerators are a) expensive b) tend to damage mail. Besides, the few ug or ng dry DNA in the microdot is not a living being. It can remain readable at ridiculously high dosages.
Re: Video Mules: (Was: Re: Psuedo-Private Key (eJazeera) )
couldn't be used to record video and then (after appropriate protection) swallowed. Eventually this will happen. Maybe a video recorded into a DNA of a bacteria synthesized in a portable device (diamond age, anyone ?) Ne protocols will be required (if I infect this east coast girl, how long it will take for the message to get to south africa ?) Which will have interesting consequences. For the time being the state is comfortable sifting through wired internet (after winning the crypto war) and listening to airwaves. Maybe body-size state-inspected condoms will be required at all public places. = end (of original message) Y-a*h*o-o (yes, they scan for this) spam follows: Yahoo! Mail Plus Powerful. Affordable. Sign up now. http://mailplus.yahoo.com
Re: Video Mules: (Was: Re: Psuedo-Private Key (eJazeera) )
This assumes the insert doesn't result in negative fitness (could very well be, if the insert kills a gene). If the information is the history of human civilization, that may very well end up being information of great negative fitness! (We shall see...) Actually, from what I understand, there are huge swathes of every creature's genetic code made up of useless information. Some of these areas are apparently extremely old and do not change very often...as I remember Hillis (the guy who started Thinking Machines and is currently working on the Decamillineal clock) identified such an area in the cockroaches DNA and had the info inserted there. (Our own DNA has apparently a lot of junk also, as well as fragments of various encounters we've had over the aeons...there are apparently significant chunks of various viruses' DNA in there and other stuff...) Also, a fitness-neutral insert is likely to be lost, or severely garbled. I hope very much he used a really good redundant encoding. Although some things in a cockroach change pretty often (here in New York we are breeding a variety of extremely manueverable cockroaches), the DNA of the cockroach I think is extremely stable overall (aren't they like 100s of millions of years old?) _ The new MSN 8: advanced junk mail protection and 2 months FREE* http://join.msn.com/?page=features/junkmail
Re: Psuedo-Private Key (eJazeera)
Tyler Durden wrote: [...] Let's say I've been coerced into revealing the private key to a certain encrypted message. And now, of course, the authorities use that key and open the message, and see the contents (let's assume they are picture of a demonstration or whatever). WOULDN'T IT BE NICE...If the original encrypted message actually had TWO messages inside it, both very similar. In this example, one of the messages is the incriminating pictures of the demonstration, the other is pictures of Pam Anderson or whatever. AND, this double message has two private keys associated with it: one corresponds to the Pam Anderson photos, the other corresponds to the Demonstration photos. When coerced, I give up the key that opens the Pam Anderson photos (while hopefully annhilating the Incriminating photos). Of course, there's no way the authorities know that there was another message (not if done very cleverly...Pam Anderson photos might be a little obvious) that they destroyed when they used the fake Private Key. Does this exist? Would it be difficult? Yes it exists. It's called deniable encryption. Two-level deniable encryption is not hard, but it usually involves increases in data size. There is some stuff about this in Crypto and Eurocrypt reports. Steganography and steganogaphic filing systems can do something similar, but the increase in message size tends to be larger. I am developing a form of deniable encryption (as part of m-o-o-t) that works slightly differently and does not involve message-size increases - in fact it it decreases message size. It's grammer-based and works a bit like this: A sentence is parsed, and eg a noun is encoded as a number relating to one of a publicly shared dictionary of nouns. This number is then encrypted. Decrypting with a random key will give a noun in that position in the sentence in all possible decryptions, and a good proportion of all randomly keyed decryptions will apparently make sense. There is a lot more involved, so eg both parties can give out the same false key, and so eg the same nouns used more than once in a message will decrypt to identical nouns in decryptions, as well as notions of closeness in the words used in a typical message, but I have done both the theoretical unicity calculations and some practical tests, and it works for email-length messages. The main implementation problems I have are coding time and that the only parser that works well enough is proprietary. If anyone else is working on something similar I would like to know. I'm probably not a cypherpunk, more a privacy avocate, but I do write code. :) -- Peter Fairbrother
Re: Psuedo-Private Key (eJazeera)
Variola wrote... What's missing? What part of your threat model didn't they consider? Well, that the recipient of the message may not be on their own machine (not running Rubberhose), etc... Stego your activist photos into kiddie porn which is stegoed into random plaintext cover images. When they discover your thoughtcrime, they stop looking. I thought about this, but it has some problems in some cases. For one, if I know they are looking for (say) a simple text list, and I want them to get their list (so to speak), I will need to hide the list in a simple text list, and this doesn't sound very stego-friendly. In addition, they may not know that there's some stego in that photo NOW, but they'll hold on to the evidence for later. And one day they may have reason to check for more. It's better, then, to have the option of having the data be destroyed if the fake key is used. Gotta hide the tools, too, BTW, since you can assume They know how they are used. I don't know if the CIA advised the chinese underground on this re Pink Triangle or whatever. Else mere possession of the thing (like owning a one-hole glass flute with a faucet screen occluding the hole) makes you doubleplus unperson. Yes, this I think is the rub. Of course, the encrypt and decrypt programs could be different, with the decryption program showing no hint of the fact that two keys could be used for the same message (one of which leading to the false data). But that's only good for non-savvy typesimages smuggled out of banana republics and so on. I need to dig into my theory, but of course it would be nice if some messages so encrypted were reverse-compatible with existing systems (in other words, if I sent a message so encrypted to old PGP software, both keys will work just fine to decrypt that message). I don't consider this too likely, but I'll have to dig into the nitty-gritty of PGP to see. But if this were possible, it would solve that issue. Nobody would ever know if the user were even aware of this dual encryption. --- Got Aerosil? What the heck is Aerosil? Is that like UBIK? _ Tired of spam? Get advanced junk mail protection with MSN 8. http://join.msn.com/?page=features/junkmail
Re: Psuedo-Private Key (eJazeera)
hi, I had suggested the same for an encryption product called digisecret,this is what they had to say. Here is an example where hiding cipher text in cipher text is ideal.. DigiSecret currently does not use assymmetric algorithms. Besides this the introduction of this technique will mean that the secret police will also know about this fact, so the person's harrowing experience with the secret police will just be doubled: first they will obtain the fake password and then the real one. Also it would not be hard to track it on the algorithm diciphering level and to understand that the message is not real. Regards Data. __ Do you Yahoo!? Yahoo! Mail Plus Powerful. Affordable. Sign up now. http://mailplus.yahoo.com
Psuedo-Private Key (eJazeera)
Sorry to be a blabbermouth folks, but this one is interesting. Delete anything I've written in the last two days if ya' want. Here's something I've been thinking about for various reasons. I'm assuming this doesn't exist yet, but it's such an interesting idea I'm tempted to brush the dust off my C programming books... Here's what I 'want': Let's say I've been coerced into revealing the private key to a certain encrypted message. And now, of course, the authorities use that key and open the message, and see the contents (let's assume they are picture of a demonstration or whatever). WOULDN'T IT BE NICE...If the original encrypted message actually had TWO messages inside it, both very similar. In this example, one of the messages is the incriminating pictures of the demonstration, the other is pictures of Pam Anderson or whatever. AND, this double message has two private keys associated with it: one corresponds to the Pam Anderson photos, the other corresponds to the Demonstration photos. When coerced, I give up the key that opens the Pam Anderson photos (while hopefully annhilating the Incriminating photos). Of course, there's no way the authorities know that there was another message (not if done very cleverly...Pam Anderson photos might be a little obvious) that they destroyed when they used the fake Private Key. Does this exist? Would it be difficult? _ Protect your PC - get McAfee.com VirusScan Online http://clinic.mcafee.com/clinic/ibuy/campaign.asp?cid=3963
Re: Psuedo-Private Key (eJazeera)
Quoting Tyler Durden [EMAIL PROTECTED]: WOULDN'T IT BE NICE...If the original encrypted message actually had TWO messages inside it, both very similar. In this example, one of the messages is the incriminating pictures of the demonstration, the other is pictures of Pam Anderson or whatever. Does this exist? Would it be difficult? Rubberhose by Julian Assange, Ralf P. Weinmann and Suelette Dreyfus http://www.rubberhose.org/ Rubberhose transparently and deniably encrypts disk data, minimising the effectiveness of warrants, coersive interrogations and other compulsive mechanims, such as U.K RIP legislation. Rubberhose differs from conventional disk encryption systems in that it has an advanced modular architecture, self-test suite, is more secure, portable, utilises information hiding (steganography / deniable cryptography), works with any file system and has source freely available. Currently supported ciphers are DES, 3DES, IDEA, RC5, RC6, Blowfish, Twofish and CAST. -- Keith Ray [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- OpenPGP Key: 0x79269A12
Re: Psuedo-Private Key (eJazeera)
From what I can grok this is not what I was looking for, but it IS a valuable tool. What I'm talking about, I think, would be better in certain scenarios, as a rubber-hose-holder can be made to THINK they have the real data, whereas in reality they have a clever fake. (eg, instead of the real Cypherpunks wanted list, they have Tim May's fake one...of course, another possibility would be to have a big jpg of a hand with middle finger extended...) More than this, they will have unknowingly destroyed the real data. (Perhaps a 3rd key is needed that DOESN'T destroy the original data, just 'hides' it a la Rubberhose.) And of course, we'd like to be able to do this on a message-by-message basis. From: Keith Ray [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Psuedo-Private Key (eJazeera) Date: Wed, 20 Nov 2002 10:49:43 -0600 Quoting Tyler Durden [EMAIL PROTECTED]: WOULDN'T IT BE NICE...If the original encrypted message actually had TWO messages inside it, both very similar. In this example, one of the messages is the incriminating pictures of the demonstration, the other is pictures of Pam Anderson or whatever. Does this exist? Would it be difficult? Rubberhose by Julian Assange, Ralf P. Weinmann and Suelette Dreyfus http://www.rubberhose.org/ Rubberhose transparently and deniably encrypts disk data, minimising the effectiveness of warrants, coersive interrogations and other compulsive mechanims, such as U.K RIP legislation. Rubberhose differs from conventional disk encryption systems in that it has an advanced modular architecture, self-test suite, is more secure, portable, utilises information hiding (steganography / deniable cryptography), works with any file system and has source freely available. Currently supported ciphers are DES, 3DES, IDEA, RC5, RC6, Blowfish, Twofish and CAST. -- Keith Ray [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- OpenPGP Key: 0x79269A12 _ Tired of spam? Get advanced junk mail protection with MSN 8. http://join.msn.com/?page=features/junkmail
Re: Psuedo-Private Key (eJazeera)
On Wed, 20 Nov 2002, Tyler Durden wrote: to have a big jpg of a hand with middle finger extended...) More than this, they will have unknowingly destroyed the real data. (Perhaps a 3rd key is needed that DOESN'T destroy the original data, just 'hides' it a la Rubberhose.) The question I've seen asked about this is then -- how do you get them to stop beating you? If they know you might have some number of duress keys, one of which might undetectably hide the data, what stops them from beating you until 1) you give them a key that shows them what they want to see 2) you die Maybe this isn't that different from the ordinary unencrypted case, where if they don't find it on your HD they can accuse you of burying disks in the backyard or something. Or is the goal protecting the data and not protecting your life? -David
Re: Psuedo-Private Key (eJazeera)
Well, the basic idea is to co-encrypt some fake data that looks like the real data, so that when they find it (using the key to the fake data of course) they'll figure you gave them the real key, because they won't know that there ever was a fake key leading to fake data. (And I suppose there's no reason not to allow for mutliple batches of fake data that get encrypted along with the real data.) And depending on the situation, the key-holder will decide whether to give them a key that destroys the real data, or that doesn't (and hides it). In some situations, the fake data could be something completely innocuous and unrelated to what they were looking for, or in other cases it could look like what they were looking for albeit with doctored information. From: dmolnar [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Tyler Durden [EMAIL PROTECTED] CC: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Psuedo-Private Key (eJazeera) Date: Wed, 20 Nov 2002 15:49:55 -0500 (EST) On Wed, 20 Nov 2002, Tyler Durden wrote: to have a big jpg of a hand with middle finger extended...) More than this, they will have unknowingly destroyed the real data. (Perhaps a 3rd key is needed that DOESN'T destroy the original data, just 'hides' it a la Rubberhose.) The question I've seen asked about this is then -- how do you get them to stop beating you? If they know you might have some number of duress keys, one of which might undetectably hide the data, what stops them from beating you until 1) you give them a key that shows them what they want to see 2) you die Maybe this isn't that different from the ordinary unencrypted case, where if they don't find it on your HD they can accuse you of burying disks in the backyard or something. Or is the goal protecting the data and not protecting your life? -David _ Tired of spam? Get advanced junk mail protection with MSN 8. http://join.msn.com/?page=features/junkmail
Re: Psuedo-Private Key (eJazeera)
At 02:19 PM 11/20/02 -0500, Tyler Durden wrote: From what I can grok this is not what I was looking for, but it IS a valuable tool. What's missing? What part of your threat model didn't they consider? What I'm talking about, I think, would be better in certain scenarios, as a rubber-hose-holder can be made to THINK they have the real data, whereas in reality they have a clever fake. (eg, instead of the real Cypherpunks wanted list, they have Tim May's fake one...of course, another possibility would be to have a big jpg of a hand with middle finger extended...) More than this, they will have unknowingly destroyed the real data. (Perhaps a 3rd key is needed that DOESN'T destroy the original data, just 'hides' it a la Rubberhose.) Stego your activist photos into kiddie porn which is stegoed into random plaintext cover images. When they discover your thoughtcrime, they stop looking. Gotta hide the tools, too, BTW, since you can assume They know how they are used. I don't know if the CIA advised the chinese underground on this re Pink Triangle or whatever. Else mere possession of the thing (like owning a one-hole glass flute with a faucet screen occluding the hole) makes you doubleplus unperson. --- Got Aerosil?
Re: eJazeera?
On Sun, Nov 10, 2002 at 03:44:53PM -0500, Tyler Durden wrote: (snip) Other methods seek to eliminate the need for various levels of pre-knowledge between Bob and Alice, and to also stave off the round up scenario where a large group is examined and cleansed of all electronica, before data can make it onto the public net. (Less likely in US now, but easily possible elsewhere). I don't think you can rule that out in the US -- seems to have been happening a lot in recent times, the pigs corral a large group, keep them stationary for some time, possibly with mass arrest following. -- Harmon Seaver CyberShamanix http://www.cybershamanix.com War is just a racket ... something that is not what it seems to the majority of people. Only a small group knows what its about. It is conducted for the benefit of the very few at the expense of the masses. --- Major General Smedley Butler, 1933 Our overriding purpose, from the beginning through to the present day, has been world domination - that is, to build and maintain the capacity to coerce everybody else on the planet: nonviolently, if possible, and violently, if necessary. But the purpose of US foreign policy of domination is not just to make the rest of the world jump through hoops; the purpose is to faciliate our exploitation of resources. - Ramsey Clark, former US Attorney General http://www.thesunmagazine.org/bully.html
Re: Photos in transport plane of prisoners: Time for eJazeera?
On Sun, 10 Nov 2002, Adam Shostack wrote: A full police state can't prevent anything, it can just make some things less common. For example, samizdat in the USSR still got copied and passed around. Drug use is a problem in US prisons. Etc. that kind of info can be limited by simply shooting everyone who was close enough to take pictures. No other military personell are going to risk taking more. Drugs are different than info. there's real cash transfered, so guards can quadruple their paychecks in a week. But maybe that's a hint on how to keep info flowing :-) Patience, persistence, truth, Dr. mike
Re: eJazeera?
Other methods seek to eliminate the need for various levels of pre-knowledge between Bob and Alice, and to also stave off the round up scenario where a large group is examined and cleansed of all electronica, before data can Live streaming is out of question as it would make detection trivial (not with triangulation but by looking at the live video.) So the mode would be 1) capture 2) move to the edge of the arena 3) stream via standardised protocol using (camouflaged) 8 3db omni stick antenna. Do this in AP mode. 4) go to 1 Relayers could just point their 18 dB dishes from places as far as 3-4 miles and capture (3). You can bet that every single news crew would be also dishing for signal. The countermeasure would be jamming 2.4 GHz, but this just means positioning (2) farther away. = end (of original message) Y-a*h*o-o (yes, they scan for this) spam follows: U2 on LAUNCH - Exclusive greatest hits videos http://launch.yahoo.com/u2
Re: eJazeera?
At 12:44 PM -0800 11/10/02, Tyler Durden wrote: The methods can be various, but the easiest one was (I think) described by Tim May. Bob and Alice are pre-known to each other. Bob holds a camera, Alice has a Wi-Fi enabled laptop operational in her knapsack. After Bob takes the photos/video, he transfers the images to ALice, who walks off and moves the data to a secure and public site. FWIW - I saw a TV transmitter kit in Fry's for $28. It takes input from Camcorders and broadcasts it on channel 3 or 4. (It is low power so it comes under FCC part 15 regulations.) If you give one of these to the camera holder, and one or more others have receivers/recorders, you have a simple, cheap, off the shelf system. Cheers - Bill - Bill Frantz | The principal effect of| Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | DMCA/SDMI is to prevent| 16345 Englewood Ave. [EMAIL PROTECTED] | fair use. | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA
eJazeera?
Well, the rason d'etre of 'eJazeera' as I see it is primarily for publically-taken photos and videos to be quickly gypsied away from their port of origination (ie, the camera that took them), so that they can eventually make it into a public place on ye old 'Net. The enabling technology as I see it here is802.11b, Wi-Fi. A typical scenario is the case of public demonstrations where the local authorities are called in, and where they get, shall we say, a little overzealous. In many such cases (here, New York City, Here, USA, and there--China, etc...), such authorities will attempt to confiscate devices that could have captured the events or captured the perpetrators (and their badge numbers, if applicable) in photo or video. The ultimate aim of eJazeera is to make even the thought of capturing such video non-existent, due to the commonplace practices outlined in an eJazeera-type document (or eventually tribal knowledge). Short of that, it is of course in itself desirable for such events to get onto the public 'Net. The methods can be various, but the easiest one was (I think) described by Tim May. Bob and Alice are pre-known to each other. Bob holds a camera, Alice has a Wi-Fi enabled laptop operational in her knapsack. After Bob takes the photos/video, he transfers the images to ALice, who walks off and moves the data to a secure and public site. Other methods seek to eliminate the need for various levels of pre-knowledge between Bob and Alice, and to also stave off the round up scenario where a large group is examined and cleansed of all electronica, before data can make it onto the public net. (Less likely in US now, but easily possible elsewhere). ALso to be addressed in the document are (possibly) suggested technologies, down to the actual gadgets and manufacturers, and recommended spacial resolutions vs distances in order to record, say, badge numbers and facial features. Also, powering requirements won't hurt, as well as suggested methods for mitigating power issues. (Hey--this might be way beyond what's needed or desirable, butI still think like an engineer). In a reasonably just world, such images might be used in he short run to prosecute those that overstepped their legal bounds. Inthe long run, the commonplace practice of uploading such images should act as a deterrent to such overzealousness. As it turns out, however, those POWs being transported were photographed in such a way as to not need something like eJazeera (unless the scope as I imagine it is broadened...is it worthwhile to consider the robust creation of image links etc... on the 'Net?). -TD From: Major Variola (ret) [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Photos in transport plane of prisoners: Time for eJazeera? Date: Sat, 09 Nov 2002 17:53:48 -0800 At 08:32 PM 11/9/02 -0500, Tyler Durden wrote: So I'm still playing with the idea of a publically-accessible document that outlines the strategies, technologies, aims and requirements for somehow uploading images and data to public repositorioes. Such a document should enumerate the threat model and describe how each threat is resisted, or not. Specific use-cases can be written: the GI who took the picture; the photo-developer-tech who kept copies; the bored netop who intercepted the pix; an activist who is under insert type surveillance. Anyone interested? And what does it mean (if anything) to do this within the context of the Cypherpunk list? Dis be da place, at least for talk :-) _ Help STOP SPAM with the new MSN 8 and get 2 months FREE* http://join.msn.com/?page=features/junkmail
Re: eJazeera?
As always, standards are driven by the mass-market and the mass market is already speaking on this one. In 18 months time there will be no difference between mobile phones cheap digital cameras - all but the cheapest phones will come with built-in cameras. Its almost certain that these devices will have GPS location, and probable that they will have Bluetooth as well. 802.11 less likely because of power consumption - possible that there will be little base stations to go Blt - WiFi so the Bluetooth becomes a wireless drop cable. Realtime video isn't on the horizon unless someone pulls a lot of bandwidth out of the bag, as ever network speeds grow more slowly than processing power. So effectively everybody will be walking around with the ability to take timestamped photos and transmit them. BrinWorld arrives, at least in public places. No policeman gets to bludgeon a demonstrator unrecorded ever again - expect them to wear visors and helmets increasingly often, and to remove the identifying marks from uniforms (as, or course, riot cops and vigilantes have been doing for decades) The authorities will be able to take down the cell networks - though they won't be able to do that without causing some publicity. They won't be able to confiscate all phones from everyone who is walking the street. Presumably in high-security situation (like interviews with presidents or rides on torture planes) phones can be removed from visitors but they will be rare. Mobile phones are now so ubiquitous that taking them away has come to seem as odd as asking visitors to remove their shoes or to wear face masks. Ken Brown Tyler Durden wrote: Well, the rason d'etre of 'eJazeera' as I see it is primarily for publically-taken photos and videos to be quickly gypsied away from their port of origination (ie, the camera that took them), so that they can eventually make it into a public place on ye old 'Net. The enabling technology as I see it here is802.11b, Wi-Fi. A typical scenario is the case of public demonstrations where the local authorities are called in, and where they get, shall we say, a little overzealous. In many such cases (here, New York City, Here, USA, and there--China, etc...), such authorities will attempt to confiscate devices that could have captured the events or captured the perpetrators (and their badge numbers, if applicable) in photo or video. The ultimate aim of eJazeera is to make even the thought of capturing such video non-existent, due to the commonplace practices outlined in an eJazeera-type document (or eventually tribal knowledge). Short of that, it is of course in itself desirable for such events to get onto the public 'Net.
Re: eJazeera?
As always, standards are driven by the mass-market and the mass market is already speaking on this one. In 18 months time there will be no difference between mobile phones cheap digital cameras - all but the cheapest phones will come with built-in cameras. hate to bud in but ... it is the cheap phones plans that actually capitalize on the camera phones. In Japan the easy example is J-Phone. They couldn't migrate to 3G or upgrade to full 2.5G, so they put out really, really cheap camera phones (subsidized with rebates to make them practically free) and captured the teen market. In the US (as seen by TO-Mobiles extremely cheap new camera phone currently being hocked in the US for a carrier that had to be rebranded in order to now be sold off), this approach will be picked up by more and more of the discount carriers (including pay as you go schemes) - especially as rates are whatever the carrier want to make them for data. Its almost certain that these devices will have GPS location, and probable that they will have Bluetooth as well. 802.11 less likely because of power consumption - possible that there will be little base stations to go Blt - WiFi so the Bluetooth becomes a wireless drop cable. The GPS locators all come pre-built in to the newer phones in Asia and Europe are heading to the US quicker then you can say government ailout -- now whether the carrier's announce this feature and/ or the crack sales staffs at their stores know about them or not is irrelevant. Just getting a Cingular or ATT Wireless carrier or salesperson to acknowledge that you can flip chips from their phones to other phones is impossible, (based on extensive personal research in the DC and NYC areas) as they won't or don't understand the concept - but that doesn't mean it can't and isn't being done. Wi-Fi doesn't exist yet, but it is being experimented on and will come as bandwidth use picks up, in order to cash in on VoIP schemes (especially since this use - voice or not - could be labeled as data and carriers could price at will and this would make up for the lost money from the flat rate pricing wars). Realtime video isn't on the horizon unless someone pulls a lot of bandwidth out of the bag, as ever network speeds grow more slowly than processing power. Actually in Asia (notably Korea and Japan) it works as well as internet RealPlayer streaming video (in Japan, KDDI's flips from 2.5 to 3G without a hitch and when going from 3 to 2.5G presents just a short time lag in time - think of the buffering on RealPlayer - NTT DoCoMo's all 3G video works pretty flawlessly, but has certain area restrictions that they're working on correcting). Europe's lagging a bit, but several government EU loans are subsidizing infrastructure costs and new intra-carrier arrangements are helping them move towards video-capability by years end (at least in the bigger cities). In the US the bandwidth is being sat on by carriers, as most carriers own it already (remember the 3G Auctions a few years ago?) they just don't have the money to roll-out a new infrastructure at the moment our government doesn't look ready to subsidize a complete infrastructure redo like the French, German, Swedish (et al). As soon as the telcos see a money making app they'll be on it quicker then you could imagine -- and with several foreign carriers looking for investments in the US mobile market in Q1 2003, it could be a lot sooner then anyone thinks. ;~) e So effectively everybody will be walking around with the ability to take timestamped photos and transmit them. BrinWorld arrives, at least in public places. No policeman gets to bludgeon a demonstrator unrecorded ever again - expect them to wear visors and helmets increasingly often, and to remove the identifying marks from uniforms (as, or course, riot cops and vigilantes have been doing for decades) The authorities will be able to take down the cell networks - though they won't be able to do that without causing some publicity. They won't be able to confiscate all phones from everyone who is walking the street. Presumably in high-security situation (like interviews with presidents or rides on torture planes) phones can be removed from visitors but they will be rare. Mobile phones are now so ubiquitous that taking them away has come to seem as odd as asking visitors to remove their shoes or to wear face masks. Ken Brown Tyler Durden wrote: Well, the rason d'etre of 'eJazeera' as I see it is primarily for publically-taken photos and videos to be quickly gypsied away from their port of origination (ie, the camera that took them), so that they can eventually make it into a public place on ye old 'Net. The enabling technology as I see it here is802.11b, Wi-Fi. A typical scenario is the case of public demonstrations where the local authorities are called in, and where they get, shall we say, a little overzealous. In many such cases (here, New York City
Re: eJazeera?
All you need is 1. A few activists incl. a few to capture the content (eg, videographer, photographer) who are willing to carry a few extra pounds 2. Someone to pony up the equiptment (some of which must be treated as expendable) 3. Someone to set up test the rig with the deployees. Depending on your circles, you may find each of these types in different abundances. The enabling technology as I see it here is802.11b, Wi-Fi. A typical scenario is the case of public demonstrations where the local authorities are called in, and where they get, shall we say, a little overzealous. In many such cases (here, New York City, Here, USA, and there--China, etc...), such authorities will attempt to confiscate devices that could have captured the events or captured the perpetrators (and their badge numbers, if applicable) in photo or video.
Re: eJazeera?
3) stream via standardised protocol using (camouflaged) 8 3db omni stick antenna. Do this in AP mode. Camoflaging this in the obvious place we note that our metallicized underwear provides a nice ground plane reflector, adding a db or two.
Re: eJazeera?
On Monday 11 November 2002 15:38, Major Variola (ret) wrote: 3) stream via standardised protocol using (camouflaged) 8 3db omni stick antenna. Do this in AP mode. Camoflaging this in the obvious place we note that our metallicized underwear provides a nice ground plane reflector, adding a db or two. Hey, that's a _good_ idea! And we can get side shielding by sticking the antenna between a fat guy's ass cheeks. The Fedz might notice that he's always keeping his butt pointed in one direction, but maybe that's normal at these events. -- Steve FurlongComputer Condottiere Have GNU, Will Travel Vote Idiotarian --- it's easier than thinking
Re: Photos in transport plane of prisoners: Time for eJazeera?
Any wide-dissemination system must be distributed. Usenet used to fill this role, but due to aggregation of major nodes and feeds it is not that any more. Anything on the web has fixed pointers and already is or soon will be become chokable. I'd be surprised if there is no development in progress to install real time packet sniffin' and droppin' silicon on major exchange nodes, remotely loaded with patterns that identify the undesireables. Suddenly you get disappeared and invisible. Forget crypto and stego - it's not happening for the critical mass. Bootleg entertainment exchange P2P software offers some window, but it is progressively being hamstringed with TOS agreements and upcoming metered access (pay per Gb), and once freebies are gone, how many will bother to maintain and develop P2P networks for the old fashioned purpose of political activism ? We need to look beyond internet as it is today. = end (of original message) Y-a*h*o-o (yes, they scan for this) spam follows: U2 on LAUNCH - Exclusive greatest hits videos http://launch.yahoo.com/u2
Re: Photos in transport plane of prisoners: Time for eJazeera?
On Sat, Nov 09, 2002 at 08:10:22PM -0800, Mike Rosing wrote: | As long as there are people in the military who are willing and able to | inform us on what they are *really* doing, we actually can feel pretty | comfortable with their missions. It's gonna take a full polilce state | to prevent the dissemination of this kind of info. A full police state can't prevent anything, it can just make some things less common. For example, samizdat in the USSR still got copied and passed around. Drug use is a problem in US prisons. Etc. Adam -- It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once. -Hume
Re: Photos in transport plane of prisoners: Time for eJazeera?
On Sat, 9 Nov 2002, Major Variola (ret) wrote: Specific use-cases can be written: the GI who took the picture; the photo-developer-tech who kept copies; the bored netop who intercepted the pix; an activist who is under insert type surveillance. Anyone interested? And what does it mean (if anything) to do this within the context of the Cypherpunk list? Dis be da place, at least for talk :-) If you can actually build links between service personell and the public, you don't need a document that says how to do shit. You use what ya got and ship the best you can do out to the real world. As long as there are people in the military who are willing and able to inform us on what they are *really* doing, we actually can feel pretty comfortable with their missions. It's gonna take a full polilce state to prevent the dissemination of this kind of info. Having known safe places and methods to send the info so the sender is always anonyomous is hard. Trash bags in parks isn't such a bad method :-) Patience, persistence, truth, Dr. mike
Re: Photos in transport plane of prisoners: Time for eJazeera?
Here's the URL, I haven't noticed it in this message thread yet: http://www.artbell.com/letters88.html -- gbn On Sat, Nov 09, 2002 at 08:32:18PM -0500, Tyler Durden wrote: The subject line says it all, if one remembers Variola's clever dare. As far as I'm concerned, this big brother bullshit should work two ways: any tyrrany should expect that any public actions will make it onto the net somewhere. Of course, one day they'll probably begin a set of countermoves, but think of it like a chess match. ...
Re: Photos in transport plane of prisoners: Time for eJazeera?
At 08:32 PM 11/9/02 -0500, Tyler Durden wrote: So I'm still playing with the idea of a publically-accessible document that outlines the strategies, technologies, aims and requirements for somehow uploading images and data to public repositorioes. Such a document should enumerate the threat model and describe how each threat is resisted, or not. Specific use-cases can be written: the GI who took the picture; the photo-developer-tech who kept copies; the bored netop who intercepted the pix; an activist who is under insert type surveillance. Anyone interested? And what does it mean (if anything) to do this within the context of the Cypherpunk list? Dis be da place, at least for talk :-)
Photos in transport plane of prisoners: Time for eJazeera?
The subject line says it all, if one remembers Variola's clever dare. As far as I'm concerned, this big brother bullshit should work two ways: any tyrrany should expect that any public actions will make it onto the net somewhere. Of course, one day they'll probably begin a set of countermoves, but think of it like a chess match. So I'm still playing with the idea of a publically-accessible document that outlines the strategies, technologies, aims and requirements for somehow uploading images and data to public repositorioes. (DAMN I'm typing like shit...must be that Chimay beer I was drinking.) The most obvious target app is large public demonstrations where video/film is likely to be confiscated. Anyone interested? And what does it mean (if anything) to do this within the context of the Cypherpunk list? And if there's interest, how do we proceed? As an engineer (well, until very recently!), a drill-down approach seems good: Start with an outline (I can take a stab at that), and then after the outline is agreed upon, send out the sections for various individuals to work. After the first draft of the document is finished, then the whole thing is somehow re-worked by all concerned. Of course, I would think it's not necessary for everyone to agree on every section or every word...different sections can contain contradicotory information...I see no real problem with that, except if PR is a consideration (in the end, this should be basically a cookbook...the users can decide upon which recipes thery want to use). Oh, and open issues are perfectly fine, and if well-identified can be a strength to a document. Of course, when I look at this email later I may regret that I sent it out before coming down from the Belgian high. I'm hoping, however, that this will be because I started a ball rolling that SHOULD be rolling, and that I would have not set to rolling had it not been for the good ole' Chimay trappists. So now to click the send button and YAH! From: Major Variola (ret) [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [Anonymity, Blacknet, Mil secrecy] Photos in transport plane of prisoners Date: Fri, 08 Nov 2002 14:52:06 -0800 Note that the Cypherpunks Image/Postscript Document Examination Laboratories should be able to amplify some of the (US; the unPOWs are black-bagged) faces in the pix.. Pentagon Seeks Source of Photos By PAULINE JELINEK Associated Press Writer WASHINGTON (AP)--The Pentagon was investigating Friday to find out who took and released photographs of terror suspects as they were being transported in heavy restraints aboard a U.S. military plane. Four photographs of prisoners--handcuffed, heads covered with black hoods and bound with straps on the floor of a plane _ appeared overnight on the Web site of radio talk show host Art Bell. ``Anonymous mailer sends us photos taken inside a military C-130 transporting POWS,'' the headline said. http://www.ocnow.com/news/newsfd/shared/news/ap/ap_story.html/Washington/AP.V7764.AP-Guantanamo-Pris.html _ MSN 8 with e-mail virus protection service: 2 months FREE* http://join.msn.com/?page=features/virus
