Re: [EM] Markus Manipulability

2002-02-03 Thread Markus Schulze

Dear Mike,

you wrote (2 Feb 2002):
 Markus wrote (2 Feb 2002):
  Due to Nurmi and Bartholdi, the more information you need
  about the opinions of the voters resp. the more accurate this
  information must be to be able to calculate a strategy, the less
  vulnerable to strategies the used election method is. To my
  opinion, this argument by Nurmi and Bartholdi is plausible.

 When academic authors write about methods with regard to strategy,
 they tend to speak of vulnerability to strategy. Strategy is
 taken to mean offensive strategy, by which someone is manipulating
 the method.

 It's (almost) common knowledge on this list that strategy is
 important as an undesirable _need_ for voters, rather than as
 a manipulation opportunity. However that's something that most
 academic authors, and those who worship them, remain ignorant of.

 When there's a problem with offensive strategy, the problem is
 the problem that that offensive strategy causes for others, the
 defensive strategy dilemma that it causes for them.

 I'm almost certain that it was Nurmi who, in one of his books or
 articles, rated the methods on their vulnerability to strategy.
 IRV rated best or near best in that regard, because offensive
 strategy is difficult in IRV. But what good does that do, when
 defensive strategy is necessary in IRV, regardless of whether or
 not anyone is using offensive strategy?

 Is it possible that the academics  their loyal are unaware that
 Plurality has a strategy problem not because someone can offensively
 manipulate it, but because Plurality forces voters to use a drastic
 defensive strategy, a kind of strategy needed to protect a sincere
 CW, or to enfore majority rule?

 With any non-probabilistic voting system, a majority can get their
 way about something that they all agree on. If there's an alternative
 that they all want to win, they can make it win. If there's an
 alternative that they all want to lose, they can make it lose.
 The former is usually easy, but the latter, with most methods,
 can require members of that majority to vote something else over
 their favorite.

 Strategy that's needed to protect the win of a sincere CW, or to
 enforce majority rule--I call that defensive strategy. It's the
 old lesser-of-2-evils problem, and it's the reason why most of
 us want a better voting. And still the academics  their obedient
 copiers don't seem to understand that, and still consider
 strategy problem to mean vulnerability to manipulation.

When the strategists use a strategy as a reaction to the voting
behaviour of their opponents then they never know whether their
own strategy is offensive or defensive because they never
know whether the voting behaviour of the opponents is sincere or
insincere. Actually, for the strategy to work it is irrelevant
whether the voting behaviour of the opponents is sincere or
insincere. Therefore, it doesn't make much sense to differ
between offensive strategies and defensive strategies and
to say that the first kind of strategies should be as difficult
as possible and the second kind of strategies should be as simple
as possible.

Markus Schulze




[EM] 02/03/02 - STV for Candidate Lists:

2002-02-03 Thread Donald Davison

02/03/02 - STV for Candidate Lists:

Dear Adam,
You wrote:  While it [Party List] is not quite as efficient in making
every vote elect a representative as STV is, it is highly proportional,
highly democratic, and extremely simple to implement and understand. 

Donald:  While I agree to the good things you say about Party List, it does
have a number of faults.

One: Its high proportionality is only for party.

Two: The voter is not allowed to cross party lines.

Three: The order of the candidate list of each party is suspect.

The mathematical correct way to determine the order of candidates for a
party would be to use STV, but then why not use STV for the entire election
and drop Party List?
Yes indeed, why not?

Regards, Donald





[EM] Newcomers Claim New Orleans Runoff

2002-02-03 Thread DEMOREP1

D- A report from the real political land about a top 2 runoff election.

Any CW in the 48 percent of the votes NOT for the top 2 ???  

Only the Shadow knows !!!

--

Newcomers Claim New Orleans Runoff

By JANET McCONNAUGHEY
  
NEW ORLEANS (AP) - Two men who had never run for office, a cable executive 
and the police chief, led 13 opponents in Saturday's primary for mayor to 
reach the March 2 runoff. 

With 432 of 442 precincts - 98 percent - reporting, Cox Cable executive Ray 
Nagin had 36,396 votes, or 28 percent. Richard Pennington, on leave as 
superintendent of police, had 30,300 votes, or 24 percent. 

``This is about New Orleans growing,'' Nagin, 45, told his supporters. ``It's 
about one of the greatest cities in America finally waking up and saying, 
`We're sick and tired, and sick and tired of the same old politics.''' 

Nagin's self-financed grassroots campaign had no backing from any of New 
Orleans political organizations. However, he was endorsed by the city's daily 
newspaper, The Times-Picayune, and two weekly tabloids - Gambit, the free 
alternative paper, and Louisiana Weekly, a paper aimed at black readers 

Pennington, 54, in a speech claiming the second spot, said security would 
continue to be part of his campaign. ``The Super Bowl is here; this is a safe 
city,'' he said. 

State Sen. Paulette Irons had 23,529 votes, or 18 percent. Councilmen Jim 
Singleton and Troy Carter had 16,619 and 13,335 votes, or 13 and 10 percent. 

Opponents said both men were too close to Mayor Marc Morial, who could not 
run for a third term. Pennington was recruited and appointed by the mayor; 
Nagin's partners in the New Orleans Brass hockey team are friends of 
Morial's. 

Each says Morial will not influence his decisions if he is elected. 

Pennington had been expected to make the cut. But nobody else - except 
candidates and their partisans - would predict his opponent. 

A referendum on raising the city's minimum wage to $6.15 an hour, $1 above 
the national minimum, also was on the ballot. It passed, but legal challenges 
are certain. 

With 98 percent of the precincts reporting, the vote was 70,635 yes to 41,330 
no, a 63 percent to 37 percent split. 

``The business and social leaders of New Orleans have gotten by for decades 
by giving the citizens and workers promises and parades, and now the voters 
have clearly said `Enough! We want real jobs with real wages,''' said Wade 
Rathke, chief organizer of Local 100 of Service Employees International 
Union. 

The mayor's race got off to a late start after Morial mounted a campaign to 
lift the city's two-term limit. Voters soundly rejected the bid in October 
and the field of candidates ballooned. 

Pennington, who has widespread name recognition as a popular reformer - he is 
credited with cleaning up a corrupt police department - was among the late 
entries. 

Irons, 48, had been the only major aspirant before the third-term referendum. 
But she was hurt by Pennington's candidacy - and the revelation that a 
brother described in campaign ads as a victim of ``violence in the streets'' 
actually died in a shootout with police after a robbery. 

Singleton, 68, has spent 24 years on the City Council. His age has been 
portrayed as a drawback for a high-profile job. 

Troy Carter, 38, elected to the council in 1994, has become a successful 
businessman in recent years. 

Term limits keep both Singleton and Carter from running again for council.




Re: [EM] 02/03/02 - STV for Candidate Lists:

2002-02-03 Thread Adam Tarr

At 06:17 AM 2/3/02 -0500, Donald Davison wrote:

One: Its high proportionality is only for party.

How else do you define proportionality?  You can't define it on a 
per-candidate basis; candidates are either 100% elected or 100% un-elected..

Two: The voter is not allowed to cross party lines.

True, this is a weakness, without a doubt.

Three: The order of the candidate list of each party is suspect.

Only slightly suspect.  Think of Open List this way: once you have 
determined how many seats a party gets, you re-apply those votes in a SNTV 
election within the party to find which candidates take the seat.  While 
SNTV is not the best way to do things (STV is likely better) the distortion 
is not terribly bad.

The mathematical correct way to determine the order of candidates for a
party would be to use STV, but then why not use STV for the entire 
election and drop Party List?

Well, in essence I agree with you.  However, there are practical reasons to 
do otherwise:

- Open party list can be implemented on even the most primitive voting 
equipment.

- Open party list ballots are as easy to tally as plurality, single-winner 
ballots are.  STV Ballots could be a nightmare to tally if used for, say, 
the 52 California representatives to congress.

- Open party list is extremely simple to use, and in fact the voter need 
not distinguish it from SNTV in order to vote in an effective 
fashion.  Moreover, while STV becomes unwieldy when the number of seats 
available becomes very large, Open List stays very easy to use.

- Its simplicity can make it easier to push its adoption.

But are you asking me whether STV is better for multi-winner 
elections?  Yes, sure it is.  Although I think you need to give the voters 
a crutch by allowing the to mix party lists into their vote list, or it 
becomes too much of a pain in a large district.

-Adam




[EM] Kuro5hin discussion on Political Parties

2002-02-03 Thread Rob Lanphier

Hi all,

The discussion site Kuro5hin is running an article entitled Are Political
Parties Inherently Undemocratic?, which laments about the fact that we
have political parties in the U.S., despite George Washington's desire not
to have them.  The article is here:

http://www.kuro5hin.org/story/2002/2/2/214045/7030

I've already posted a reply to this, and I encourage you all to do the
same.

Rob

Rob Lanphier
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.eskimo.com/~robla




Re: [EM] World Series and EC

2002-02-03 Thread Anthony Simmons

 From: Adam Tarr [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Subject: Re: [EM] World Series and EC

 But most importantly, I think the analogy is a poor one,
 because we expect and desire this inconsistency in
 baseball, and sports in general.  Not only is the World
 Series inconsistent due to the multi-game format (why not
 just play one 60 inning game over a few days?) but scoring
 is made erratic by the inning breakdown in games (why not
 just give a team 27 outs in a row to each team?)

 These erratic effects are by design.  We say may the best
 team win because, on some level, we are aware that they
 may not.  This uncertainty is part of the excitement of
 sports: sports are filled with surprising heroes and
 storybook last-second wins.  This is the stuff of dreams
 and it sells tickets.


After having thought about this some, it's occurred to me
this is an important observation.  Margins of victory tend to
be much greater in the electoral college than in the popular
vote.  Usually, anyway; it didn't seem to work out that way
in 2000.  In elections, proportional representation is a
reasonable ideal.  In sports, it's the opposite.  We don't
want a compromise outcome in which all of the teams agree on
a proportional scheme that distributes the championship
evenly.  One appealing situation is teams that are evenly
matched enough that we can't predict the winner, and a method
of scoring that makes a decisive victory possible anyway, by
amplifying small fluctuations in performance.

In elections, we want chance eliminated because it doesn't
reflect the underlying reality of popular choice.  We want
other irregularities (elimination of popular candidates in
the first round of IRV, etc.) for the same reason.  In
sports, we want small differences accentuated.

This reinforces the similar effect of districts (and their
counterpart, a series of games) in sports and elections.
Except that the effect is desirable in one case and a
hindrance in the other.


 These are NOT properties I want in an election method.  I
 do not want any fringe, Cinderella candidate to be able
 to capture the presidency on any given November.  I do
 not want to see hope spring eternal for the American
 Nazi party.  I want boring, predictable elections where
 the best candidate wins.

 -Adam




[EM] 02/02/02 - Alexander, don't get stuck in a `Time Warp':

2002-02-03 Thread Anthony Simmons

 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Donald Davison)
 Subject: [EM] 02/02/02 - Alexander, don't get stuck in a `Time Warp':

 If you are of normal intelligence, then sometime in you
 life you will come full circle and return to IRVing.  Most
 do, but some get stuck in a `Time Warp' and never get
 beyond the mire of the ABC methods.  A few of the people
 on this backwater EM list are suffering that condition,
 which should make you feel at home for now.  `Me thinks'
 they like the way these three methods deceive the voters.

That sounds familiar, that story about how only
stupid people are unable to see the superiority
of IRV.  Except that in the version I heard, a
child watching the procession shouts Irving
isn't wearing any clothes!