Re: MetaCPAN is quickly becoming the de-facto interface to CPAN

2011-08-28 Thread Aristotle Pagaltzis
* Shlomi Fish shlo...@shlomifish.org [2011-07-29 13:25]:
 One reason I have not converted wholesale to metacpan is
 because it redirects all http:// requests to https:// . Very
 annoying.

http://www.imperialviolet.org/2010/06/25/overclocking-ssl.html

In January this year (2010), Gmail switched to using HTTPS for
everything by default. Previously it had been introduced as an
option, but now all of our users use HTTPS to secure their email
between their browsers and Google, all the time. In order to do
this we had to deploy *no additional machines* and *no special
hardware*. On our production frontend machines, SSL/TLS accounts
for less than 1% of the CPU load, less than 10KB of memory per
connection and less than 2% of network overhead. Many people
believe that SSL takes a lot of CPU time and we hope the above
numbers (public for the first time) will help to dispel that.

If you stop reading now you only need to remember one thing:
*SSL/TLS is not computationally expensive any more*.

[…]

Also, don't forget that we recently deployed encrypted web search
on https://encrypted.google.com. Switch your search engine!


Re: MetaCPAN is quickly becoming the de-facto interface to CPAN

2011-08-28 Thread Arthur Corliss

On Sun, 28 Aug 2011, Aristotle Pagaltzis wrote:


http://www.imperialviolet.org/2010/06/25/overclocking-ssl.html

   In January this year (2010), Gmail switched to using HTTPS for
   everything by default. Previously it had been introduced as an
   option, but now all of our users use HTTPS to secure their email
   between their browsers and Google, all the time. In order to do
   this we had to deploy *no additional machines* and *no special
   hardware*. On our production frontend machines, SSL/TLS accounts
   for less than 1% of the CPU load, less than 10KB of memory per
   connection and less than 2% of network overhead. Many people
   believe that SSL takes a lot of CPU time and we hope the above
   numbers (public for the first time) will help to dispel that.

   If you stop reading now you only need to remember one thing:
   *SSL/TLS is not computationally expensive any more*.

   [?]

   Also, don't forget that we recently deployed encrypted web search
   on https://encrypted.google.com. Switch your search engine!


These comments are pretty funny once you consider that you're making a
secure connection to an independent party who has a commercial and
fiduciary responsibility to exploit every bit of data you give them.

With friends like Google protecting your information, who needs 
encryption?  ;-)


--Arthur Corliss
  Live Free or Die


Re: MetaCPAN is quickly becoming the de-facto interface to CPAN

2011-08-28 Thread Aristotle Pagaltzis
* Arthur Corliss corl...@digitalmages.com [2011-08-28 19:55]:
 On Sun, 28 Aug 2011, Aristotle Pagaltzis wrote:
 http://www.imperialviolet.org/2010/06/25/overclocking-ssl.html
 
In January this year (2010), Gmail switched to using HTTPS for
everything by default. Previously it had been introduced as an
option, but now all of our users use HTTPS to secure their email
between their browsers and Google, all the time. In order to do
this we had to deploy *no additional machines* and *no special
hardware*. On our production frontend machines, SSL/TLS accounts
for less than 1% of the CPU load, less than 10KB of memory per
connection and less than 2% of network overhead. Many people
believe that SSL takes a lot of CPU time and we hope the above
numbers (public for the first time) will help to dispel that.
 
If you stop reading now you only need to remember one thing:
*SSL/TLS is not computationally expensive any more*.
 
[…]
 
Also, don't forget that we recently deployed encrypted web search
on https://encrypted.google.com. Switch your search engine!

 These comments are pretty funny once you consider that you're making
 a secure connection to an independent party who has a commercial and
 fiduciary responsibility to exploit every bit of data you give them.

 With friends like Google protecting your information, who needs
 encryption?  ;-)

   --Arthur Corliss
 Live Free or Die

Right, so just let everyone in any coffee shop or any other open network
you connect to sniff all your traffic.

Did you have an actual point?

Regards,
-- 
Aristotle Pagaltzis // http://plasmasturm.org/


Re: MetaCPAN is quickly becoming the de-facto interface to CPAN

2011-08-28 Thread sawyer x
On Sun, Aug 28, 2011 at 9:41 PM, Lyle webmas...@cosmicperl.com wrote:

 On 28/08/2011 19:30, Aristotle Pagaltzis wrote:

 * Arthur Corlisscorliss@digitalmages.**com corl...@digitalmages.com
  [2011-08-28 19:55]:

 With friends like Google protecting your information, who needs

 encryption?  ;-)

--Arthur Corliss
  Live Free or Die

 Right, so just let everyone in any coffee shop or any other open network
 you connect to sniff all your traffic.

 Did you have an actual point?


 I always find it amusing when comments against google seem to get at
 people. After all, Google is just another Microsoft :P


You clearly misunderstood Aristotle. He doesn't care about a comment against
Google, and I'm sure he has no special affinity towards it. He simply had a
good remark on a discussion of the effectiveness and CPU costs of SSL
encryption and it was ignored with a completely irrelevant comment.

Google might be another Microsoft, it might be worse, but it is *irrelevant*
to the question of SSL security and the costs of enabling it by default.

Aristotle, for what it's worth, I've learned that people always want to have
their say, even if in an inappropriate time. Such as the politician, who
when asked what do you think about the current financial crisis? will
answer: I think the weather is excellent, and golf sounds like a wonderful
idea! :)


Re: MetaCPAN is quickly becoming the de-facto interface to CPAN

2011-08-28 Thread Arthur Corliss

On Sun, 28 Aug 2011, Aristotle Pagaltzis wrote:


Right, so just let everyone in any coffee shop or any other open network
you connect to sniff all your traffic.

Did you have an actual point?


Yep, but it appears you completely missed it.  I use encryption all the
time, but outside of authentication its merit is questionable when it
concerns information that is a) public information (especially in the
context of published open source) and b) information going to an 
untrustable third party like Google.


Personally, I have no use for metacpan, and don't care what they do.  But as
a general operating principle, I like to use the appropriate tools where
they're *appropriate*.  I expect my bank's websites to be fully SSL, I
expect my on-line brokerage's sites to be fully SSL.  But what exactly is
the risk with a search engine of a highly specialized and highly public
information?  I fail to see the benefit, and I tend towards paranoia
naturally.

OSS is about freedom  choice.  As long as users have a choice (an
alternative to metacpan) feel free to force your preferences on the users.
But in the unfortunate circumstance where metacpan becomes the only choice
it'd be nice if the maintainers try to be a little less dogmatic about it.
They should be inclined towards maximum accessibility, not maximum
pedagoguery.

I know I didn't get the memo but I think someone did claim that metacpan 
was the de facto interface these days...


--Arthur Corliss
  Live Free or Die


Re: MetaCPAN is quickly becoming the de-facto interface to CPAN

2011-08-28 Thread Eric Wilhelm
# from sawyer x
# on Sunday 28 August 2011 12:03:

a discussion of the effectiveness and CPU costs of SSL encryption

I didn't think it was a question of CPU speed anytime in the past 
decade.  How does a proxy cache encrypted data?

Atwood's Law of Computer Latency:
  Processor cycles, storage density, and network bandwidth are
  increasing, faster than the speed of light is getting faster.

--Eric
-- 
Insert random misquote here
---
http://scratchcomputing.com
---


Re: MetaCPAN is quickly becoming the de-facto interface to CPAN

2011-08-28 Thread Arthur Corliss

On Sun, 28 Aug 2011, sawyer x wrote:


You clearly misunderstood Aristotle. He doesn't care about a comment against
Google, and I'm sure he has no special affinity towards it. He simply had a
good remark on a discussion of the effectiveness and CPU costs of SSL
encryption and it was ignored with a completely irrelevant comment.

Google might be another Microsoft, it might be worse, but it is *irrelevant*
to the question of SSL security and the costs of enabling it by default.


My humor was perhaps too subtle, since you didn't get the relevance of my
reply.  Google switching to SSL by default is as pointless as metacpan.  In
the former case it's the protection of delivery to/from an entity that
not only doesn't have your best interest at heart, but has a business built
on exploiting *your* information for *its* benefit.  Utterly pointless.

In the latter case you have a search engine whose use is basically the
retrieval of information based on *published* open source software, and
highly published at that, given the world-wide replication of CPAN itself.
What exactly is metacpan protecting?  Is it that embarrasing that programmer
Joe can't remember what module function foo was defined in?  Can someone
really derive significant benefit from witnessing Harry browse the API for
WWW:Retrieval::LOLCats or what have you?

So, regardless of the incremental costs of implementing SSL, *why* is the
mandatory use of SSL even considered intelligent, rational, or any other
way beneficial?  I wasn't going to get involved in this thread, but the
Google bait was too spot on to ignore.

--Arthur Corliss
  Live Free or Die


Re: MetaCPAN is quickly becoming the de-facto interface to CPAN

2011-08-28 Thread Arthur Corliss

On Sun, 28 Aug 2011, Eric Wilhelm wrote:


I didn't think it was a question of CPU speed anytime in the past
decade.  How does a proxy cache encrypted data?


Bringing up proxies is an excellent point.  While most proxies do support
SSL tunnelling, this does make the request uncacheable since the proxy never
knows anything about the connection outside of the host  port it's
tunnelling to.

I run a proxy cluster myself, and I do force caching of search engine
responses for a short window (typically on the order of a few hours), and it
does tend to pay off, especially when notable events occur in the world.
Obviously, SSL bypasses the cache altogether.  And I can only get away with
this because the businesses I support all want the same safe levels
applied to all requests, so I don't have to worry about inappropriate
content in some people's results.

Which brings to mind yet another point:  for those of us providing content
filtering services via proxies SSL is a huge problem.  The only good
solution is to do transparent interception of SSL connections with your
proxies serving up a private CA-signed certificate using wild cards, but
that requires installing your private CA's root certificate on all clients,
and even then there's clients that that still won't work on.  Never mind
that the concept of spoofing external organization certificates is 
insanely dangerous in its own right.


--Arthur Corliss
  Live Free or Die


Re: MetaCPAN is quickly becoming the de-facto interface to CPAN

2011-08-28 Thread Arthur Corliss

On Sun, 28 Aug 2011, Arthur Corliss wrote:

snip


Which brings to mind yet another point:  for those of us providing content
filtering services via proxies SSL is a huge problem.  The only good
solution is to do transparent interception of SSL connections with your
proxies serving up a private CA-signed certificate using wild cards, but
that requires installing your private CA's root certificate on all clients,
and even then there's clients that that still won't work on.  Never mind
that the concept of spoofing external organization certificates is insanely 
dangerous in its own right.


I'm going to preemptively qualify this brain dump as relevant to the
metacpan debate because I would consider metacpan's content, search results,
etc., to be highly cacheable.  Moreso than a general purpose engine like
Google, metacpan's results would tend to be more applicable to multiple
users' searches.  And yet the whole SSL-only mindset would hamper an
individual network operator's ability to control and shape its network.

Hopefully no one misconstrues this as me being against SSL sites, I'm
extremely in favor of them, particularly with organizations hosting my
sensitive information.  I only think metacpan should offer both HTTPS and
HTTP interfaces.  Let those ultra-paranoids among us use the HTTPS, and the
rest of us HTTP.

--Arthur Corliss
  Live Free or Die


Statistics::R comaint to FANGLY

2011-08-28 Thread Brian Cassidy
Hello list,

Hopefully a PAUSE admin is listening. I would like to have Florent
Angly added as comaint to Statistics::R (and Statistics::R::Bridge). I
had taken over the module from GMPASSOS a while back, but have been
unable to do any work on it of late. Florent Angly (CPAN ID: FANGLY)
has agreed to step in and continue the work.

Unfortunately, I am unable to grant him comaint as GMPASSOS retains
the primary maintainer-ship.

Thanks in advance,

-- 
Brian Cassidy (brian.cass...@gmail.com)


Module::Build::Tiny

2011-08-28 Thread Aristotle Pagaltzis
Hi,

I find this module intriguing.

In my understanding, the complexity of Module::Build piled up
because the same tool tries to cover both installation and
authoring use cases.

I believe the Dist::Zilla approach is a better way to take care
of authoring: a separate toolchain that can be as complex as the
author would prefer. The installer can then be trivial, as indeed
it should; as well as pure Perl – as indeed, it should.

So Dist::Zilla plus the *idea* of Module::Build::Tiny seem to
fulfil the original concept of Module::Build better than that
module itself ever has.

But is the implementation up to par?

Essentially: if I’m using Dist::Zilla for authoring, what regular
features not explicitly mentioned in MBT’s POD would I have to
avoid? Do things like optional or build-/test-only deps work?
(I’d assume these do.) Or can I assume that everything will work
unless otherwise pointed out?

I could answer this for myself if I had *exact* understanding of
how much of the work falls upon the .PL at install time, and how
many of the toolchain features are implemented in the CPAN client
and thus unaffected by MBT’s minimalism.

So the answer to that is what I’d like.

(I’d also be interested in whether any omissions mentioned in the
POD are design choices or the idea is to add them in the future,
and which if so.)

Regards,
-- 
Aristotle Pagaltzis // http://plasmasturm.org/