[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
Patrick, List, Patrick wrote the 28 June: I like to start out from Peirce's definition of the real as that object for which truth stands I could not find this definition in the CP... could you tell from where you got it? I found this one, closely related: CP 1.339 [...] Finally, the interpretant is nothing but another representation to which the torch of truth is handed along; and as representation, it has its interpretant again. Lo, another infinite series. (I imagine that Lo is So) Thanks Claudio --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
Claudio, Patrick, list,
That object for which truth stands doesn't sound fully like Peirce. But
Peirce did say that truth is of a predicate, proposition, assertion, etc. ; a
true predicate corresponds to its object. Inquiry seeks to arrive at true signs
about the real.
66~~~ ('A Sketch of Logical Critics', EP 2.457-458, 1911) ~~~
To say that a thing is _Real_ is merely to say that such predicates as are
true of it, or some of them, are true of it regardless of whatever any actual
person or persons might think concerning that truth. Unconditionality in that
single respect constitutes what we call Reality.[---] I call truth the
predestinate opinion, by which I ought to have meant that which _would_
ultimately prevail if investigation were carried sufficiently far in that
particular direction.
~~99
Lots of Peirce quotes on truth and reality are at
http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/dictionary.html
Lo is an old-fashioned word, now generally obsolete, used to attract
attention or express wonder or surprise, and now used with at least some
quaintness of effect. It now seems oftenest encountered in the phrase Lo and
behold. The Online Etymology Dictionary says
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?search=losearchmode=none that lo is from
Old English _la_, exclamation of surprise, grief, or joy, influenced in M.E. by
_lo!_, short for _lok_ look! imperative of _loken_ to look.
Best, Ben
- Original Message -
From: Claudio Guerri [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Thursday, June 29, 2006 10:25 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
Patrick, List,
Patrick wrote the 28 June:
I like to start out from Peirce's definition of the real as that object for
which truth stands
I could not find this definition in the CP... could you tell from where you got
it?
I found this one, closely related:
CP 1.339 [...] Finally, the interpretant is nothing but another representation
to which the torch of truth is handed along; and as representation, it has its
interpretant again. Lo, another infinite series.
(I imagine that Lo is So)
Thanks
Claudio
---
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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
It is found in How to Make Our Ideas Clear: The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain reality. CP 5.407 Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: Claudio Guerri [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Thursday, June 29, 2006 9:25 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help! Patrick, List, Patrick wrote the 28 June: I like to start out from Peirce's definition of the real as that object for which truth stands I could not find this definition in the CP... could you tell from where you got it? I found this one, closely related: CP 1.339 [...] Finally, the interpretant is nothing but another representation to which the torch of truth is handed along; and as representation, it has its interpretant again. Lo, another infinite series. (I imagine that Lo is So) Thanks Claudio --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.3/374 - Release Date: 6/23/2006 -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.3/374 - Release Date: 6/23/2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
May be way out of school here, but what is the ultimate fate of opinion, representation: ultimate merger with what is represented? Isn't all mind evolving toward matter, all sporting ultimately destined to end? -Original Message- From: Joseph Ransdell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, June 29, 2006 1:40 PM To: Peirce Discussion Forum Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help! It is found in How to Make Our Ideas Clear: The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain reality. CP 5.407 Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: Claudio Guerri [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Thursday, June 29, 2006 9:25 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help! Patrick, List, Patrick wrote the 28 June: I like to start out from Peirce's definition of the real as that object for which truth stands I could not find this definition in the CP... could you tell from where you got it? I found this one, closely related: CP 1.339 [...] Finally, the interpretant is nothing but another representation to which the torch of truth is handed along; and as representation, it has its interpretant again. Lo, another infinite series. (I imagine that Lo is So) Thanks Claudio --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.3/374 - Release Date: 6/23/2006 -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.3/374 - Release Date: 6/23/2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
It is found in How to Make Our Ideas Clear: The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain reality. CP 5.407 Joe Ransdell Dear Folks, Thanks for all the discussion of real, true and existence. I take the above quote to mean that truth (or the lack of it) is a property of opinions and real (or the lack of it) is a property of the objects to which those opinions (signs) refer. An opinion that is true represents an object that is real. But what is the relation between real and existance? Can a first (such as a quality) whose mode of being is mere potential (not actual) be in itself real? A quality embodied in a real object I agree is real, but I remain puzzled as to the reality of qualites as mere firsts. I guess what I wondering is whether Peirce equates the real soley with what actually exist or whether real can also be applied to mere firsts. I suppose one could use Peirce's above definition of real to apply to mere qualities (as firsts). For example, if one were to express a true opinion as to what potential qualities might be realized in objects or what the character of those qualities might be, those qualities (as the hypothetical objects of those opinions) would be real.One could also express false opinions regarding mere qualities (how many there are and their nature) in which case the qualities referred to would not be real. And if the immediately above interpretation of real is correct (as I now think it is) then I would say that real is a property of all modes of being (potential, actual and general). To be, is to be real. However true or false is a property only of thought. Unreal is a property only of objects that are falsely represented. Anything that has potential or actual being is real but we can mis-represent or falsely represent both qualities and objects and to the extent that that either is falsely represented (or interpreted) that quality or object is not real. So, for example, hallucinations are real but they are falsely interpreted and the objects they are thought to represent by the person experiencing the hallucination are not real. Similarly possible objects do not necessarily exist but if truly (faithfully) represented then they are real. All potentially possible objects (truly represented) are real but impossible objects are not. And so on... I think that sovles the problem for me. My basic conclusion is that all modes of being are real. An object need not exist to be real but it must be possible. Some representations are true and some are false. Objects represented are real or false to the extent the representation is true. I wanted to make sure I had an understanding of real, true and actual that allowed for all sorts of conceptions including lies, illusions, contradictory statements, and mere potential states of affairs. I think the above does it but would welcome errors being pointed out. Cheers, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
So it would seem, according to Peirce -- at first. But upon reflection, what could that possibly mean? Since it is supposed to be something that comes about only asymptotically, which is to say, not at all, it doesn't seem to make much difference one way or the other, does it? Then, too, there is the further consideration that no sooner is one question definitively answered -- supposing that to be possible -- than that very answer provides a basis for -- opens up the possibility of -- any number of new questions being raised. Of course they may not actually be raised, but we are only speculating about possibilities, anyway, aren't we? And isn't sporting something that might very well happen, though of course it need not, so that the possibly is always there, and the absolute end of all is not yet come to be?. So . . . not to worry (in case the coming about of the absolute end of it all depresses you): it won't be happening. But if, on the other hand, your worry is because it won't happen, I don't know what to say that might console you except: Make the best of it! (Of course there may be a flaw in my reasoning, but if so please don't point it out!) Did you ever read Italo Calvino's _Cosmicomics_, by the way? 135 pages of utterly incomprehensible cosmological possibilities! Calvino must have been insane. How could a person actually write, and quite skillfully, a 135 page narrative account of something that only seems to make sense, sentence by sentence, and actually does seem to at the time.even while one knows quite well all along that it is really just utter nonsense! Back to Peirce. I suspect he thought all along of this grand cosmic vision that seems to entrance some, repel others, but leave most of us just dumbstruck when pressed to clarify it, as being the form which the dialectic of reason takes -- in Kant's sense of transcendental dialectic, in which reason disintegrates when regarded as anything other than merely regulative -- in his modification of the Kantian view. The equivalent of a Zen koan, perhaps. Peirce says that God's pedagogy is that of the practical joker, who pulls the chair out from under you when you start to sit down. Salvation is occurring at those unexpected moments -- moments of grace, I would say -- when you find yourself rolling on the floor with uncontrollable laughter! (Peirce didn't say that, but he might have.) Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: Michael J. DeLaurentis [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Thursday, June 29, 2006 1:42 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help! May be way out of school here, but what is the ultimate fate of opinion, representation: ultimate merger with what is represented? Isn't all mind evolving toward matter, all sporting ultimately destined to end? -Original Message- From: Joseph Ransdell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, June 29, 2006 1:40 PM To: Peirce Discussion Forum Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help! It is found in How to Make Our Ideas Clear: The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain reality. CP 5.407 Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: Claudio Guerri [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Thursday, June 29, 2006 9:25 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help! Patrick, List, Patrick wrote the 28 June: I like to start out from Peirce's definition of the real as that object for which truth stands I could not find this definition in the CP... could you tell from where you got it? I found this one, closely related: CP 1.339 [...] Finally, the interpretant is nothing but another representation to which the torch of truth is handed along; and as representation, it has its interpretant again. Lo, another infinite series. (I imagine that Lo is So) Thanks Claudio --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.3/374 - Release Date: 6/23/2006 -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.3/374 - Release Date: 6/23/2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.3/374 - Release Date: 6/23/2006 -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.3/374 - Release Date: 6/23/2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help! ...real-reality... truth...
operty of all modes of being (potential, actual and general). To be, is to be real. However true or false is a property only of thought. Unreal is a property only of objects that are falsely represented. Anything that has potential or actual being is real but we can mis-represent or falsely represent both qualities and objects and to the extent that that either is falsely represented (or interpreted) that quality or object is not real. So, for example, hallucinations are real but they are falsely interpreted and the objects they are thought to represent by the person experiencing the hallucination are not real. Similarly possible objects do not necessarily exist but if truly (faithfully) represented then they are real. All potentially possible objects (truly represented) are real but impossible objects are not. And so on... I think that sovles the problem for me. My basic conclusion is that all modes of being are real. An object need not exist to be real but it must be possible. Some representations are true and some are false. Objects represented are real or false to the extent the representation is true. I wanted to make sure I had an understanding of real, true and actual that allowed for all sorts of conceptions including lies, illusions, contradictory statements, and mere potential states of affairs. I think the above does it but would welcome errors being pointed out. Cheers, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] __ Información de NOD32, revisión 1.1632 (20060629) __ Este mensaje ha sido analizado con NOD32 antivirus system http://www.nod32.com --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
Michael said: [MD:] Haven't had the pleasure of Calvino's Cosmicomics, [but] I like the antidotal sound of it [cure for hyper-seriousness]. The asymptotic/singularities of beginnings and endings in continuous processes challenge all systems that allow for them, and do make for pretzelian thought-processes. But I note that the final chapter of David Deutsch's very creative The Fabric of Reality: The Science of Parallel Universes and Its Implications is titled The Ends of the Universe, which posits an asymptotic end of the universe(s) [actually, a sort of coming together of all the infinite parallel quantum universes a la Wheeler and co], which in part prompted the parallel question on the denouement in Peirce's cosmology. But, you're right, Joe: I think I'll retreat to Calvino. I never really recovered from trying to conceptualize the cosmological stew that preceded the sporting emergence of Firstness. RESPONSE: [JR:] Well, I'm not sure what the moral of it is supposed to be, Michael. I put all that down rather impulsively, not thinking much about what might justify it or what it might imply. In retrospect I think that what I was doing was trying to re-express what I thought Peirce was expressing in the following passage from the MS called Answers to Questions Concerning my Belief in God which Harshorne and Weiss published in the Collected Papers, Vol. 6: ==QUOTE PEIRCE 508. Do you believe Him to be omniscient? Yes, in a vague sense. Of course, God's knowledge is something so utterly unlike our own that it is more like willing than knowing. I do not see why we may not assume that He refrains from knowing much. For this thought is creative. But perhaps the wisest way is to say that we do not know how God's thought is performed and that [it] is simply vain to attempt it. We cannot so much as frame any notion of what the phrase the performance of God's mind means. Not the faintest! The question is gabble. 509. Do you believe Him to be Omnipotent? Undoubtedly He is so, vaguely speaking; but there are many questions that might be put of no profit except to the student of logic. Some of the scholastic commentaries consider them. Leibnitz thought that this was the best of all possible worlds. That seems to imply some limitation upon Omnipotence. Unless the others were created too, it would seem that, all things considered, this universe was the only possible one. Perhaps others do exist. But we only wildly gabble about such things. ==END QUOTE= [JR:] But wildly gabbling doesn't necessarily mean utterly senseless, as I was exaggeratedly construing it, but might only mean that what we are saying or thinking becomes seriously and irremediably incoherent at times to a degree which tends toward being utterly so even though it can always be presumed to have coherence to some degree even if only imperceptibly so at that time. And we may very well have as much coherence in our lives as we require -- or even more than we require, developed out of fear of not having enough -- which can send us on a path toward a precipice of disaster: unintended self-destruction by fanaticism. As animals go, we are extraordinarily proficient by nature at multi-tasking, though the various other species of animals exhibit many different degrees and types of multi-tasking behavior as well, but none apparently equal to even a very simply developed human being. And that is the same thing as the ability to cope with a correspondingly complex incoherence in experience with which the multi-tasking process is as if designed to cope. In other words, incoherence is a part of what we need because it is what we are equipped to cope with to an astonishingly high degree at times. Now, Peirce was a profoundly self-confident person in spite of his experience of the seeming radical senselessness of certain aspects of his life and the course of his experience, where nothing ever seemed to go right or as he could reasonably have expected it to go (or so it must have seemed, again and again), and so I can quite easily imagine there being more than a few occasions when he found himself laughing wildly while rolling around on the floor after yet another of God's practical jokes on him. That is how he impresses me as a person: I can imagine him capable of that (or its equivalent, of course). I do not picture him as an unhappy man. And that reminds me that I want to reassure all devotees of Italo Calvino that when I say he must have been insane, that is meant in the sense that, by ordinary human standards, he can only appear that way, as any authentic genius will appear. Geniuses are not to be confused with people with very high IQs. And it is always possible that the wildest of gabble conveys as much of the truth of the matter in question as our lot to be able to discover. So I don't know whether you should abandon your
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
Interesting remarks, including but not limited to those by Peirce. Maybe I should add that I find it difficult to believe that anyone has actually been able to read all of the way through Calvino's practical joke of a book! It's also difficult to believe that anyone eats all the way through a rich, multi-layered Italian pastry. And yet, we do (usually). Kidding aside, I have literally no idea why Joe says it's difficult to believe that anybody could read all the way through it. Too much coherence? Too much mix of coherence and incoherence? Now, it's fun to try to work a certain amount of seeming incoherence into one's writing. Conversations, for instance, don't have to be written as give take where speakers understand or even address each other's previous remarks in any direct way. It's a literary technique, or challenge, which one sees here and there. _Teitlebaum's Window_ by Wallace Markfield has some of it. Some of the conversations in _Mulligan Stew_ by Gilbert Sorrentino. In real life, of course, that kind of talk is often motivated by evasiveness. One year at a Thanksgiving dinner, a relative asked a question about another relative, a question which those of us in the know didn't want to answer. So I answered that the reason why the relative in question had gone to California (we're in NYC), was in order to buy some shoes. There followed about an hour's worth of purposely non-responsive conversation by all the relatives, both those in the know and those not in the know (conversation which really confused some of the non-family guests), which was really jokes, puns, whatever we could muster. But the point wasn't incoherence, but, instead, unusual coherences intensified and brought into relief against the lack of some usual kinds of coherence. Years ago I read a newspaper column doing this, by Pete Hamill of all people, and it was really pretty funny. Also don't miss _t zero_ with The Origin of Birds. Best, Ben - Original Message - From: Joseph Ransdell [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Thursday, June 29, 2006 11:13 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help! Michael said: [MD:] Haven't had the pleasure of Calvino's Cosmicomics, [but] I like the antidotal sound of it [cure for hyper-seriousness]. The asymptotic/singularities of beginnings and endings in continuous processes challenge all systems that allow for them, and do make for pretzelian thought-processes. But I note that the final chapter of David Deutsch's very creative The Fabric of Reality: The Science of Parallel Universes and Its Implications is titled The Ends of the Universe, which posits an asymptotic end of the universe(s) [actually, a sort of coming together of all the infinite parallel quantum universes a la Wheeler and co], which in part prompted the parallel question on the denouement in Peirce's cosmology. But, you're right, Joe: I think I'll retreat to Calvino. I never really recovered from trying to conceptualize the cosmological stew that preceded the sporting emergence of Firstness. RESPONSE: [JR:] Well, I'm not sure what the moral of it is supposed to be, Michael. I put all that down rather impulsively, not thinking much about what might justify it or what it might imply. In retrospect I think that what I was doing was trying to re-express what I thought Peirce was expressing in the following passage from the MS called Answers to Questions Concerning my Belief in God which Harshorne and Weiss published in the Collected Papers, Vol. 6: ==QUOTE PEIRCE 508. Do you believe Him to be omniscient? Yes, in a vague sense. Of course, God's knowledge is something so utterly unlike our own that it is more like willing than knowing. I do not see why we may not assume that He refrains from knowing much. For this thought is creative. But perhaps the wisest way is to say that we do not know how God's thought is performed and that [it] is simply vain to attempt it. We cannot so much as frame any notion of what the phrase the performance of God's mind means. Not the faintest! The question is gabble. 509. Do you believe Him to be Omnipotent? Undoubtedly He is so, vaguely speaking; but there are many questions that might be put of no profit except to the student of logic. Some of the scholastic commentaries consider them. Leibnitz thought that this was the best of all possible worlds. That seems to imply some limitation upon Omnipotence. Unless the others were created too, it would seem that, all things considered, this universe was the only possible one. Perhaps others do exist. But we only wildly gabble about such things. ==END QUOTE= [JR:] But wildly gabbling doesn't necessarily mean utterly senseless, as I was exaggeratedly construing it, but might only mean that what we are saying or thinking becomes seriously and irremediably
[peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...
Jorge, We haven't understood the purpose of your post to Claudio. Would you be able to clarify it?. VTY, AlaseJorge Lurac [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:Claudio, List,Justa small bibliographic collaboration.Cheers,J. LuracClaudio Guerri [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Jorge, List,I think that (even if I don't know too much about the exact way in which Lacan "met" Peirce) there
is no discussion anymore that Lacan is LACAN after he included Peirce's proposal in his structuralistic approach to Freud. For the conceptual approach you can see "Des fondements s¨miotiques de la psychanalyse. Peirce apr¨s Freud et Lacan" by Michel Balat.Paris: L'Harmattan, 2000.There are 3 triads that are VERY profitable for applied semiotics, each one in it's one way is specific for different tasks:For 1nessFor 2ness For 3ness PeirceAlthusser
Lacan FirstnessTheoretical Practice Imaginary SecondnessEconomical Practice Real ThirdnessPolitical Practice Symbolic Since all signs are very complex signs always, we can not reduce everything only to the peircean-logical-aspects.In my view, there are also 3 logical sequences to begin researching on something:1. The logical approach: beginning by 1ness,possibility; then 2ness, actualization; and 3ness, law or necessity. 2. The study of a concrete case: beginning by Economical Practice(Which are theconcrete existent examples? for concrete things, or Which are
thebehaviors/performances?for abstract concepts); following Political Practice and finally Theoretical Practice. 3. The psychological approach: ("symbols grow"... also for the psychoanalyst) beginning by the Symbolic aspect through the significant... I will avoid here more details because it is not my competence... but it works wonderful... I can tell...Applied semiotics is accepting to put our feets in the muddy earth... and get dirty!!! All this is not ment as a peircean review. At the same time a thank Ransdell (specially for the List) and others for their "clean" and very necessary work.Best Claudio- Original Message - From: Jorge Lurac To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Saturday, June 24, 2006 4:00 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...Claudio, listI find at least curious the mention of Lacan as a backing for to discuss the Peirce's triadic conception, Claudio. You should remember he was a Peirce's scholar and some of its more important seminars were presented by F. Recanati.J. Lurac---Message from peirce-l forum to
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