[peirce-l] Re: Peirce and knowledge
On Sep 28, 2006, at 10:56 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:Thanks for the reference to Timothy Williamson. I do not see any direct connection to PeirceNote I wasn't pushing for a direct connection. Far from it. More the idea that knowledge is a basic cognitive state. However I think Peirce clearly is an externalist although one can certainly talk about internalism in his discussions. Although I personally tend to see a lot of the externalist/internalist debate largely a semantic one. (i.e. they are debates over what certain terms mean and whether they can in their meaning be divided into external and internal components) I don't find that particular linguistic approach to philosophy helpful myself and like how Chomsky handles things - talking about mental states and then adding a superscript to be just those that are internal. (i.e. avoiding the semantic debate within philosophy entirely)In terms of Peirce I think the issue is less about mind than about the sign and internal and external aspects of the sign. In terms of mind proper I think assigning the issue of internalism to Peirce is difficult since I don't see a huge difference between Peirce's view of mind and say Davidson's anomalous monism. But that means that translating mental states or descriptions into physical ones that would make the internal/external divide meaningful is near impossible.But in terms of knowledge proper I wasn't really pushing to equate Williamson and Peirce. I think Williamson's view ends up being idiosyncratic and hard to accept. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Peirce and knowledge
On Sep 26, 2006, at 3:23 PM, Burke Johnson wrote:
Did Peirce ever give his own working definition of the word
knowledge?
I know that Peirce thought that our knowledge is fallible,
truth is
something we only approach in the long run, that scientific knowledge
has a social nature, etc., but, again, would anyone on the list
tell me
more about how you think he would define that concept?
Thanks in advance.
Burke Johnson
Check out the entry on Fallibilism in the Peirce Dictionary:
http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/fallibilism.html
There isn't an entry for knowledge but many of the quotes end up
getting at the point.
I'd add that I think knowledge for the individual in Peirce ends up
being that belief which we can't doubt which is thus a habit.
Knowledge in the sense of the community of inquirers is obviously a
bit more.
I'd add that this quote from CP 2.773 might be helpful as well.
Reasoning is a process in which the reasoner is conscious that a
judgment, the conclusion, is determined by other judgment or
judgments, the premisses, according to a general habit of thought,
which he may not be able precisely to formulate, but which he
approves as conducive to true knowledge. By true knowledge he means,
though he is not usually able to analyse his meaning, the ultimate
knowledge in which he hopes that belief may ultimately rest,
undisturbed by doubt, in regard to the particular subject to which
his conclusion relates. Without this logical approval, the process,
although it may be closely analogous to reasoning in other respects,
lacks the essence of reasoning. Every reasoner, therefore, since he
approves certain habits, and consequently methods, of reasoning,
accepts a logical doctrine, called his logica utens. Reasoning does
not begin until a judgment has been formed; for the antecedent
cognitive operations are not subject to logical approval or
disapproval, being subconscious, or not sufficiently near the surface
of consciousness, and therefore uncontrollable. Reasoning, therefore,
begins with premisses which are adopted as representing percepts, or
generalizations of such percepts. ('Dictionary of Philosophy and
Psychology' vol. 2, CP 2.773, 1902)
I'd add this one as well.
But since symbols rest exclusively on habits already definitely
formed but not furnishing any observation even of themselves, and
since knowledge is habit, they do not enable us to add to our
knowledge even so much as a necessary consequent, unless by means of
a definite preformed habit. ('Prolegomena to an Apology for
Pragmaticism', CP 4.531, 1906)
---
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[peirce-l] Re: SEED journal
On Sep 9, 2006, at 4:30 AM, Joseph Ransdell wrote:Here is the URL for the on-line journal SEED, which has a lot of papers by Peirceans: http://www.library.utoronto.ca/see/pages/SEED_Journal.htmlNote that Seed has a collection of science blogs that are quite good as well - especially some of the cognitive science ones. There are enough authors that the typical problem of blogging (you get busy for a few months or run out of creative ideas) doesn't affect things too much. I know several of the bloggers and we've discussed Peirce relative to cognitive science a fair bit.http://www.scienceblogs.com/ --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] RE: Peirce and Fuzzy Logic
On Jul 19, 2006, at 11:08 PM, Michael J. DeLaurentis wrote:Clark -- I can't do this justice since I'm leaving town shortly, but I'msure someone else will pick up on Peirce's Harvard lecture, in Reasoning andthe Logic of Things (RLT), on the logic of continuity, the chalk line on theblackboard, and those indefinite, ontologically vague [in the sense that"the boundary between the black and white is neither black, nor white, norneither, nor both. It is the pairedness of the two."] qualities, at spatialand temporal boundaries of emergence, not unrelated to the very briefexchange Joe and I had a week or so back on ontological/metaphysicalasymptotes, so to speak. The very fine introduction to RLT of Ketner andPutnam spells it out fairly succinctly. Thank you so much. I just placed an order for that collection. I unfortunately only have the Essential Peirce at home.Does he arrive at a scheme of fuzzy logic akin to Zadeh's?That is, even from my readings I can see how Peirce's thought entails fuzzy logic. Due to his doctrine of continuity and vagueness if nothing else. I just wasn't aware how explicit he made this logically.Clark --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Collier on Pragmatics
On Feb 2, 2006, at 3:37 AM, Konrad Talmont-Kaminski wrote: Clark, Glad you liked the paper. Hope you and the others on the list don't mind if I point out that the paper was co-written by John and myself, which explains the link not being for John's page. More importantly, I'd be curious to know why you thought the paper had anything in common with Derrida as no such comparison would have ever entered my mind. Indeed, if anything, I would have said that John and I were trying to save language, reference and truth from the depredations of the postmodernists. I am not sure if the other list members would be interested in any further exploration of that issue, however, so please judge whether to reply on-list or off. My apologies for not including your name. I'd just read a lot of John's posts here the years I've been reading (although sometimes I let the posts build up for a month and can only skim them) I'll try to make some comments, but alas my life has been quite busy the past few months so most posts I've made here have been of the hit and run variety. The reason I bring up Derrida is because I think many of the examples you gave in the paper are fairly similar to the demonstrative approaches that Derrida takes against Searle's Speech Acts in _Limited Inc._ Further I think that the most Peircean writing of Derrida, _On Grammatology_, is basically an extended argument that Husserl and others are doing an analysis of communication and other such matters in terms of a two-order logic whereas a three-order logic is what is necessary. I'd briefly discussed this at my blog in the context of the ontological difference of Heidegger and differance with Derrida. (They are related, but not identical notions) http://www.libertypages.com/clark/10698.html Most of it is simply quotations and it basically presumes familiarity with Heidegger and Derrida. Interestingly I passed your paper over to a friend of mine who is a Heidegger/Derrida scholar and he now plans to use it in his metaphysics class that he teaches. He was quite impressed. I really ought go through your paper and find examples of the arguments or at least demonstrations in Derrida's writings. I can't promise *when* I can do this though. I do think these comments near the end of your paper conveys the basic project of Derrida. The form of the utterance itself, inasmuch as it conveys information, depends on a classification that may, and usually does, depend on the interpretive context (at the very least it depends on which language is being spoken). So we cannot simply add the form together with the interpretive context to get the reference. Using our earlier metaphor, the reference as a target implies that it also constrains the aim, so it also constrains both the literal and pragmatic elements of interpretation. We cannot stress too strongly that the three elements cannot be analyzed independently and added together by pairs. As to the issue of postmodernism. I think the term ends up being rather unhelpful. I think that most of the Derrida as received in American universities bears little resemblance to his actual thought. Typically because those appealing to him have no grounding is technical philosophy - especially Heidegger, Husserl, Kant and others. Thus they turn him into a caricature. Of course in the case of Derrida I think he brought some of this on due to his experimental and largely demonstrative period after most of his main philosophical texts were completed by the early 70's. _Limited Inc._, while arguably one of his more important texts, is also not exactly the best way to come to Derrida and I can fully understand why it upset so many people. I think however that a very strong case can be made that Heidegger (and by extension Derrida who I don't take as really that far removed from Heidegger) is a scholastic realist not that far removed in certain ways from Peirce. (Which is not to downplay the important differences) But the idea that either Heidegger or Derrida are relativists who let language rule things too much seems hard to buy. Derrida in particular has attacked this view. In one interview (which I can't locate and have been looking for over some weeks) even characterized his philosophy as a kind of critique and attack on the linguistic turn in philosophy. Yet I think both offer something akin to what some term Peirce's semiotic realism. I'm still working through the main divides between the two myself. I think it gets into how the type-token is repeated. There is a thesis I have that goes through this with Peirce and Derrida but I've just not had the time this year to formulate my own views. (Although my inclination is to say that Derrida is focusing on one aspect of things to the detriment of other important matters) Clark Goble
[peirce-l] Collier on Pragmatics
Just a heads up to those interested. John Collier has up a very interesting paper on pragmatics. He notes that his approach is basically Peircean. Relative to the occasional discussion of Derrida's use of Peirce, I think that many of Collier's approaches and critiques can be seen in Derrida as well. (Although unfortunately Derrida wrote on this at a time when he was exploring writing and using a demonstrative style that antagonized most analytical philosophers - one can but wish he'd written in a more traditional style to cross the philosophical ocean in the 70's) Whoops, forgot the link: http://bacon.umcs.lublin.pl/~ktalmont/pdf/pragmatist%20pragmatics.pdf Clark Goble Lextek International (801) 375-8332 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: R: Re: NEW ELEMENTS (KAINA STOICHEIA) available at Arisbe
Sorry, I probably won't have time to follow up on my comments. So forgive me for doing what I all too often end up doing - the hit and run post. On Jan 24, 2006, at 7:35 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: It is intersting to notice that, while in science philosophy the role of persuasion is overlooked (as wrote Joseph ransdell, see below the I'm not entirely convinced this is true. I think Feyerbend, for all his controversy, can be read in much more conservative terms as focusing in on this very issue. I think Kuhn definitely moves towards it, for all of Kuhn's equivocations and problems. (IMO) I think that modern examples such as the debate over string theory, dark matter and even the big bang are best seen as the place of persuasion in science. (Although many scientists, perhaps under influence of Popper, would condemn them precisely because of this - well more string theory than dark matter and the big bang. But the big bang and dark matter issue is more a divide between the physical astronomers and the theoreticians) With regards to Peirce, I wonder how to consider the analysis of persuasion that Joseph brings up - especially considering that Peirce's ideal of science didn't really involve belief. I admit that's a view of science in Peirce I've long struggled with. But without belief, what is the role of persuasion? Clark Goble Lextek International (801) 375-8332 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
