Re: Re: Re: Marx's life and theory
Louis Proyect wrote: Leibniz and Whitehead are key to Harvey (while obviously having nothing to do with Marx) It's not obvious to me. Leibniz is part of the German idealist tradition sublated by Marx. The dialectical relation of "sublation" is not a relation of identity. That Whitehead's ontology, like Marx's, sublates Leibniz' doesn't mean that it is identical to Leibniz'. (Whitehead's ontology is not, by the way, a species of "holism" if you mean by this the idea of the "whole" as something apart from, independent of and superior to the individuals which compose it. In so far as part/whole relations are concerned, the identifying concept of Whitehead's ontology, as of Marx's, is "internal relations".) The Panglossian conclusion you attempt to foist on Harvey and Whitehead in this way is in fact more consistent with scientific materialism since the latter has no logical space for the idea of self-determination. Whatever is must be. As for Whitehead "obviously having nothing to do with Marx": "When we think of freedom, we are apt to confine ourselves to freedom of thought, freedom of the press, freedom for religious opinions. Then the limitations to freedom are conceived as wholly arising from the antagonisms of our fellow men. This is a thorough mistake. The massive habits of physical nature, its iron laws, determine the scene for the sufferings of men. Birth and death, heat, cold, hunger, separation, disease, the general impracticability of purpose, all bring their quota to imprison the souls of women and of men. Our experiences do not keep step with our hopes. The Platonic Eros, which is the soul stirring itself to life and motion, is maimed. The essence of freedom is the practicability of purpose. Mankind has chiefly suffered from the frustration of its prevalent purposes, even such as belong to the very definition of the species. The literary exposition of freedom deals mainly with the frills. The Greek myth was more to the point. Prometheus did not bring to mankind freedom of the press. He procured fire, which obediently to human purposes cooks and gives warmth. In fact, freedom of action is a primary human need. In modern thought, the expression of this truth has taken the form of 'the economic interpretation of history'." Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 66. Ted -- Ted WinslowE-MAIL: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Division of Social Science VOICE: (416) 736-5054 York UniversityFAX: (416) 736-5615 4700 Keele St. Toronto, Ontario CANADA M3J 1P3
Re: Marx's life and theory
Whitehead: "When we think of freedom, we are apt to confine ourselves to freedom of thought, freedom of the press, freedom for religious opinions. Then the limitations to freedom are conceived as wholly arising from the antagonisms of our fellow men. This is a thorough mistake. The massive habits of physical nature, its iron laws, determine the scene for the sufferings of men. Birth and death, heat, cold, hunger, separation, disease, the general impracticability of purpose, all bring their quota to imprison the souls of women and of men. This sounds like Malthus to me, not Marx. Louis Proyect (The Marxism mailing list: http://www.marxmail.org)
Re: Re: Marx's life and theory
Louis writes: This sounds like Malthus to me, not Marx. This must be the same hearing problem that led you mistakenly to attribute to Whitehead the Leibnizian theory of the 'best of possible worlds'. "the Malthusian Law, with its sociological consequences, is not an iron necessity. ... "In the first three hundred years of the slow development of the Feudal System after Charlemagne, we see a population barely gaining a livelihood by hard toil. This state of things exemplifies the application of Malthus' Doctrine in the primitive stages of civilization. The only way of coping with an increase in population was to cut down another forest, and arithmetically to add field to field, till fertile land was fully occupied. Also fertility became exhausted, so that until the close of the eighteenth century fallow fields bore witness to the iron limits that nature set to agriculture. The essence of technology is to enable mankind to transcend such limitations of unguided nature. For example, the rotation of crops, the scientific understanding of fertilizers and of genetics, have already altered the bounds set to food production. ... "Nature is plastic, although to every prevalent state of mind there corresponds iron nature setting its bounds to life. Modern history begins when Europeans passed into a new phase of understanding which enabled them to introduce new selective agencies, unguessed by the older civilizations. It is a false dichotomy to think of Nature and Man. Mankind is that factor *in* Nature which exhibits in its most intense form the plasticity of nature. Plasticity is the introduction of novel law. The doctrine of the Uniformity of Nature is to be ranked with the contrasted doctrine of magic and miracle, as an expression of partial truth, unguarded and uncoordinated with the immensities of the Universe." Adventures of Ideas, pp. 73-8 Ted -- Ted WinslowE-MAIL: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Division of Social Science VOICE: (416) 736-5054 York UniversityFAX: (416) 736-5615 4700 Keele St. Toronto, Ontario CANADA M3J 1P3
Re: Marx's life and theory
Whitehead: "Nature is plastic, although to every prevalent state of mind there corresponds iron nature setting its bounds to life. Modern history begins when Europeans passed into a new phase of understanding which enabled them to introduce new selective agencies, unguessed by the older civilizations. It is a false dichotomy to think of Nature and Man. Mankind is that factor *in* Nature which exhibits in its most intense form the plasticity of nature. Plasticity is the introduction of novel law. The doctrine of the Uniformity of Nature is to be ranked with the contrasted doctrine of magic and miracle, as an expression of partial truth, unguarded and uncoordinated with the immensities of the Universe." Adventures of Ideas, pp. 73-8 This sounds like Will and Ariel Durant. Louis Proyect Marxism mailing list: http://www.marxmail.org/
Re: Re: Marx's life and theory
Louis writes: This sounds like Will and Ariel Durant. This sounds like Louis Proyect. Ted -- Ted WinslowE-MAIL: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Division of Social Science VOICE: (416) 736-5054 York UniversityFAX: (416) 736-5615 4700 Keele St. Toronto, Ontario CANADA M3J 1P3
Re: Re: Marx's life and theory
Louis Proyect wrote: Whitehead: "Nature is plastic, although to every prevalent state of mind there corresponds iron nature setting its bounds to life. [snip] It is a false dichotomy to think of Nature and Man. Mankind is that factor *in* Nature which exhibits in its most intense form the plasticity of nature. Plasticity is the introduction of novel law. The doctrine of the Uniformity of Nature is to be ranked with the contrasted doctrine of magic and miracle, as an expression of partial truth, unguarded and uncoordinated with the immensities of the Universe." Adventures of Ideas, pp. 73-8 This sounds like Will and Ariel Durant. Uh -- Lou. Ted is a slippier customer than this and you can't debate him with only half your attention. You also should not be using this long passage from Whitehead in snippets. The whole of it as originally quoted by Ted is necessary for response. Iron laws, upper case Nature, "intense form of plasticity" may or may not sound like the Durants, but if it does the appearance is deceiving. For example the sentence, "Mankind is that factor *in* Nature which exhibits in its most intense form the plasticity of nature." I don't really care for Whitehead's way of putting it, but nevertheless it is pretty good Marxism. It says, for example, what Sam was trying to say when he blundered into the silliness of "penetration" needed for human survival. It also says something very like what Charles has been saying in reference to the relationship of the dialectics of nature and historical materialism. It is even a fairly good summary of Sebastiano Timpanaro's defense of the importance to Marxism of the results as well as the method of the physical and biological sciences. I'm convinced that Ted is wrong in some ways -- but he sure as hell is not wrong in ways that can be thrown off this simply. Carrol
Re: Re: Marx's life and theory
I'm convinced that Ted is wrong in some ways -- but he sure as hell is not wrong in ways that can be thrown off this simply. Carrol The problem with Whitehead (and Leibniz) and Harvey's appropriation of both thinkers is that there is no concept of contradiction, struggle, and--ultimately--revolution. Dialectics in Harvey's view amounts to systems analysis and this is not what Marx was about. In Leibniz there is little doubt about the self-regulating character of his cosmos, which amounts to a clock that the deity created and then walked away from. Whitehead belongs to another tradition, but it still amounts to the same thing. For example, when Whitehead writes, "Nature is always about the perpetual exploration of novelty," you lose the other side of the equation which is about crisis and destruction. History moves forward, but not in the linear fashion envisioned by thinkers such as Leibniz and Whitehead. This kind of dialectics owes more to Hegel than it does to Marx. Marx had to struggle not only with Hegel, but the entire philosophical tradition he is based on. History involves war and class oppression, which can often produce terrible upheavals that can throw mankind backwards, as Marx indicated in the Communist Manifesto. When I wrote my article on Harvey and Leibniz for O'Connor, I was forced to leave out a lot of my material on Whitehead. I don't think its worth discussing at any length but Whitehead is basically a theist. He may not believe that God split the Red Sea, but his attempt to wed science, metaphysics and religion is probably more dangerous when you get down to it. With Whitehead and Bergson, to a lesser extent, you get the last gasp of Western Philosophy trying to develop a metaphysical worldview. To Whitehead's credit, he largely stayed aloof from the great clashes of the 20th century even though logically he would have seemed logically to end up on the opposite side of the barricades from Marxism. From a class standpoint, he belongs to the grand tradition of Victorian progressives who sought a more civilized version of England than the one that existed. It is the world of the Bloomsbury group and Fabian socialism. In any case, if there is any confusion about what Marx stood for and what Whitehead stood for, I urge people to read Whitehead and not rely on dribs and drabs. He is a generally lucid writer and thinker and nowhere near as bad as somebody like Unamuno or other post-Nietzshean reactionaries. Louis Proyect Marxism mailing list: http://www.marxmail.org/
Re: Re: Re: Marx's life and theory
Louis Proyect wrote: For example, when Whitehead writes, "Nature is always about the perpetual exploration of novelty," you lose the other side of the equation which is about crisis and destruction. Agreed -- this fits my memory of Whitehead, whom I haven't read in almost 40 years. History moves forward, but not in the linear fashion envisioned by thinkers such as Leibniz and Whitehead. What you are saying here is that Whitehead believed in Progress -- and that the doctrine of Progress as developed in the 18th/19th centuries is metaphysical. I agree. (Ted might be able to argue against this -- but at least he has to argue and it gets us out of the unfruitful exchange of compliments.) . . . . Whitehead is basically a theist. He may not believe that God split the Red Sea, but his attempt to wed science, metaphysics and religion is probably more dangerous when you get down to it. Possibly -- but this is then a reason either to argue carefully or simply to ignore him. If his position is dangerous, it shouldn't be dismissed flippantly. And it is historically interesting that "the last gasp" (if that is the correct designation) of Western Philosophy should be an attempt to keep a grip on the content the sciences *and* on a sense of change (however unmarxian). With Whitehead and Bergson, to a lesser extent, you get the last gasp of Western Philosophy trying to develop a metaphysical worldview. To Whitehead's credit, he largely stayed aloof from the great clashes of the 20th century even though logically he would have seemed logically to end up on the opposite side of the barricades from Marxism. But as you and I both know (and I suppose Ted agrees) history does not follow propositional logic and all slippery slopes don't slip. Carrol From a class standpoint, he belongs to the grand tradition of Victorian progressives who sought a more civilized version of England than the one that existed. It is the world of the Bloomsbury group and Fabian socialism. In any case, if there is any confusion about what Marx stood for and what Whitehead stood for, I urge people to read Whitehead and not rely on dribs and drabs. He is a generally lucid writer and thinker and nowhere near as bad as somebody like Unamuno or other post-Nietzshean reactionaries. Louis Proyect Marxism mailing list: http://www.marxmail.org/
Re: Marx's life and theory (fwd)
Louis Proyect wrote: . For example, only 4 years ago Joel Kovel wrote a lengthy piece in CNS that argued that Marxism is weak on ecological questions because it lacks a spiritual dimension. I always have thought that the Unconscious was the Holy Ghost in 19th-c positivist disguise. That old reactionary jerk T.S. Eliot had an appropriate comment on such things in his reaction to Arnoldian attempts to make literature a substsitute for religion. I don't remember how he worded it, but the core idea was that if you rejected religion, then get on with it and don't moon about looking for substitutes. Spirituality is a more or less corrupted form of human social solidarity. Among the atomized individuals of capitalist society spirituality becomes absolutely corrupt. Carrol
Re: Marx's life and theory
Meanwhile, Lou: can we not distinguish Marx from Marxism here (as Marx did) and acknowledge at least the potential compatibility of Kovel and Foster's positions, given that Foster is interpreting Marx, as opposed to Marxism, which, by your reading, is the object of Kovel's criticism? Michael K. I am very strongly aligned with John on these questions. I view the re-integration of scientific materialism and historical materialism as key to developing an ecosocialist movement. This is in the spirit of Marx's original enterprise, which was closely linked in spirit to the work of Darwin and Wallace. As far as "Marx" versus "Marxism" is concerned, Kovel specifically states that the absence of spirituality is in his writings, not the movement that was launched on account of his writings. I haven't talked to Joel in a long time, but might run into him this weekend up at Bard College, where he teaches and where I am destined for a 35th anniversary reunion. Everybody else from the class of '65 settled down immediately after graduating, while I spent 35 years building up an FBI dossier. Oh well. Louis Proyect (The Marxism mailing list: http://www.marxmail.org)
Re: Marx's life and theory (fwd)
There are different meanings to the word "materialism" Please clearify what you mean. Rod Louis Proyect wrote: Carrol Cox: with any precision in *Poverty of Philosophy*; and (b) most of what I would think of as historical materialism can be defended independently of any particular view (pro or con or neutral) of the "dialectics of nature." Actually Marx was fully involved with the editing of Engels' "Dialectics of Nature" and wrote a chapter himself, according to John Bellamy Foster in "Marx's Ecology". One of the things that this book will do is open up a discussion about the role of materialism in Marx's thought. In the introduction John explains that Lukacs played a major role in delinking the scientific investigations from the rest of Marx's thought in order to privilege the notion of a purely social based materialism keyed to praxis. The Frankfurt School developed this notion in a more extreme fashion. Not only did they drop the materialism, they dispensed with the praxis as well. The concern with ecological questions has sort of forced a re-examination of the role of materialism, with people like John and Paul Burkett making an effort to place it back into its proper context. Then you have people, many of whom contribute to CNS, who see things in a Lukacs or Frankfurt context. For example, only 4 years ago Joel Kovel wrote a lengthy piece in CNS that argued that Marxism is weak on ecological questions because it lacks a spiritual dimension. Louis Proyect (The Marxism mailing list: http://www.marxmail.org) -- Rod Hay [EMAIL PROTECTED] The History of Economic Thought Archive http://socserv2.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/index.html Batoche Books http://Batoche.co-ltd.net/ 52 Eby Street South Kitchener, Ontario N2G 3L1 Canada
Re: Marx's life and theory
G'day Michael, Whilst I agree with you, I suppose Protestant 'Man' (and I still think Weber was on to something about the link between Protestantism and Capitalism - he just got it the wrong way 'round) would lay claim to spirituality, too - only it is a poor little thing between 'him' and Him, one that might be able to afford comfort, but it pays for the promise it proffers by truly smothering limitations to its social efficacy on this mortal coil. I'm not sure Marx came up empty on spirituality, either. I maintain that he never abandoned (or, at the very least, was never obliged to abandon) the human he sketched/assumed/promoted in his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts days. There was a creature who saw in its fellows great possibilities for joy and hope - possibilities that could unite them in great self-sacrifice for a world beyond clear imagining. And the fact is, Marx was ultimately a believer in people getting together to take big risks for unknowable ends (a revolutionary must be, doncha reckon?). Historical Materialism satisfactorily gets you to the conditions of possibility for such a turn of events, but it does not get you the turn itself. At that moment is needed (and thus assumed by the revolutionary) something invisible and all-powerful. Where reason must have told many a Petrogradian to avoid the Tsar's demonstrable fury, there marched many a Petrogradian - delighting in each other, in a not-quite-articulated common cause, and in the conviction something good must come of it all. I don't really know what that sudden decisively mobilising something is either. But I call it human, and feel obliged, for want of alternatives, to call it spiritual. And, for all the blessings I so complacently enjoy, I really would like to feel - just once - what Clara Zetkin's proud and resolute rabble (the real vanguard of 1917, for mine) must have felt then. It's in me, I'm sure, but somehow those conditions of possibility haven't hitherto obliged ... Yours soppily, Rob. . For example, only 4 years ago Joel Kovel wrote a lengthy piece in CNS that argued that Marxism is weak on ecological questions because it lacks a spiritual dimension. I always have thought that the Unconscious was the Holy Ghost in 19th-c positivist disguise. That old reactionary jerk T.S. Eliot had an appropriate comment on such things in his reaction to Arnoldian attempts to make literature a substsitute for religion. I don't remember how he worded it, but the core idea was that if you rejected religion, then get on with it and don't moon about looking for substitutes. Spirituality is a more or less corrupted form of human social solidarity. Among the atomized individuals of capitalist society spirituality becomes absolutely corrupt. Carrol There's a well-rounded conception of humanity for you. Tell that to the American Indians. And just how do you have spirituality, defined as a "corrupted form of human social solidarity", among the "atomized individuals of capitalist society"? Isn't the point that, given atomization, there is no spirituality/solidarity whatsoever? Are you trying to prove Kovel's point? Meanwhile, Lou: can we not distinguish Marx from Marxism here (as Marx did) and acknowledge at least the potential compatibility of Kovel and Foster's positions, given that Foster is interpreting Marx, as opposed to Marxism, which, by your reading, is the object of Kovel's criticism? Michael K.
Re: Re: Re: Marx's life and theory (fwd)
I wrote: actually, there are good reasons to avoid the terms historical materialism and dialectical materialism. They aren't Marx's terms. Mine replies: Really? Marx says in Preface to the French edition of Capital (Tucker ed, p.301) the following: "My DIALECTIC METHOD is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite.to hegel, the life process of the human brain, ie the proces of thiking, which, under the name of the idea", he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external,phenomenal form of the idea. With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought" "dialectical method" is different from both "dialectical materialism" and "historical materialism." "Marx's dialectical method" is also less ambiguous. I looked at the index of Tucker, Marx uses the concept "dialectic" in pp.68-69, 106-25, 301-2... read what I said above. . ops,I forgot to mention Engels' _Letters on historical Materialism_ written to to Joseph Bloch.. You may wish to consider Tucker p.760.. that's Engels, not Marx. Marx referred to his "materialist conception of history." More importantly, the terms have been much abused, at one point being reduced to "histomat" and "diamat" by Stalin's ideologists . true however If Stalin abused these terms, it has nothing to do with the conceptual validity of the terms as developed by Marx. we are dealing with MArx here not Stalin... I wasn't dealing with the "conceptual validity" of dialectical method. (I think that a dialectical and materialist approach to understanding the world is absolutely necessary.) I was instead dealing with the need for terms that hadn't been formalized and denatured by generations of epigones and anti-Marx types who apply "thesis/antithesis/synthesis" formulas in a mechanical way. BTW, some of the best stuff on dialectical method appears in Ollman's book ALIENATION and Lewins Lewontin's THE DIALECTICAL BIOLOGIST. I think it's important to distinguish between dialectical ontology, dialectical epistemology, and dialectical mode of presentation (though of course these are interrelated). Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://liberalarts.lmu.edu/~JDevine
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Marx's life and theory (fwd)
Carroll writes"
I blow hot and cold on the usefulness of the term "dialectical
materialism," but even when I warm to it I don't like to see it posited
as *the* philosophical basis for "historical materialism."
Right. "a" philosophical basis for Marx's materialist conception of
history makes more sense than "the" philosophical basis. (The notion of
there being only one ("the") philosophical basis of historical materialism
seems to come from Stalinist diamat itself.) Better, there was a
dialectical relationship between the two as Marx developed them, just as
there was a dialectical relationship between theory and empirical research
and between theory and practice...
Justin writes:
Even apart from the specific expressions, I'm with Carrol on this
one A credible case can be made that Marx consciously rehjected
philosophy and philosophical bases, regarding them as mere ideology, and
saw the materialist concetion of history as a partial substitute,
preserving what might be valuable in philosophy while explaining why it
was ideology. See Daniel Brudney's excellent recent book, Marx's Attempt
to Escape Philosophy. One might debate, of courese, how successful was
Marx's attempt to escape philosophy.
I think that Marx often used the word "philosophy" (or "Philosophy") to
refer to German idealist philosophy. According to Karl Korsch (if I
remember correctly), Marx wasn't against philosophy _per se_ as much
against the artificial divorce between philosophy and
empirical/scientific/practical thought. He wanted to merge philosophy and
what we call "social science."
In any event, the relationship between Marx and philosophy depends on one's
meaning of the word "philosophy."
Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://liberalarts.lmu.edu/~JDevine
Re: Re: Re: Re: Marx's life and theory (fwd)
Those interested in the issue of Naturdialectik or what has been known since Plekhanov as "Dialectical Materialism' may want to read my paper on 'Marx's Ecology: Synthesizing Dialectics of Praxis and Nature" at http://www.egroups.com/files/red-green/ To read it, you'll have to subscribe to the moderated, very low-volume Red/Green list, which can be done by clicking on the 'Subscribe' button. -Walt Sheasby In a message dated 5/24/00 7:57:26 AM Pacific Daylight Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: I wrote: actually, there are good reasons to avoid the terms historical materialism and dialectical materialism. They aren't Marx's terms. Mine replies: Really? true however If Stalin abused these terms, it has nothing to do with the conceptual validity of the terms as developed by Marx. we are dealing with MArx here not Stalin...
Re: Marx's life and theory
Here are two more texts from Marx (Tom Walker has them on his web site http://www.vcn.bc.ca/timework/dispose.htm) elaborating the idea of "free activity" and of "wealth" as "free time" for "the artistic, scientific etc. development of the individuals", "the free development of individualities". As do the other passages to which I've pointed, they involve an ontological idea of "freedom" (incorporating e.g. Hegel's ontological ideas of a "will proper" and a "universal will") that seems to me inconsistent with a scientific materialist ontology. How can such texts (found throughout Marx's writing) be made consistent with a scientific materialist interpretation of "the materialist conception of history" or, alternatively, with Justin's interpretive hypothesis that "historical materialism, construed as a view about the centrality of class and the economy in social explanation, is consistent with any ontological view - including Machean or Berkeleyan idealism, as the Empiocritics pilloried by Lenin argued--are [or?] none"? As I mentioned earlier, criticisms of scientific materialism that offer in its place what amounts to a "dialectics of nature" can be found in Whitehead (as an explicit criticism of Darwin's ontological premises, in *The Function of Reason*). Another such criticism is found in Husserl's phenomenology, particularly in *The Crisis of the Modern European Sciences*. *The Crisis* has been used as a basis for interpreting Marx e.g. in Karel Kosik's *Dialectics of the Concrete* and Enzo Paci's *The Foundation of the Sciences and the Meaning of Man*. Paci points to the close correspondence between Husserl and Whitehead. Ollman's *Alienation* has an appendix on Whitehead on "internal relations". "Time of labour, even if exchange value is eliminated, always remains the creative substance of wealth and the measure of the cost of its production. But free time, disposable time, is wealth itself, partly for the enjoyment of the product, partly for free activity which - unlike labour - is not determined by a compelling extraneous purpose which must be fulfilled, and the fulfilment of which is regarded as a natural necessity or a social duty, according to one's inclination. "It is self-evident that if time of labour is reduced to a normal length and, furthermore, labour is no longer performed for someone else, but for myself, and, at the same time, the social contradictions between master and men, etc., being abolished, it acquires a quite different, a free character, it becomes real social labour, and finally the basis of disposable time - the time of labour of a man who has also disposable time, must be of a much higher quality than that of the beast of burden." Marx *Economic Manuscript of 1861-63*, Marx-Engels Collected Works, vol. 32, p. 391 "The theft of alien labour time, on which the present wealth is based, appears a miserable foundation in face of this new one, created by large-scale industry itself. As soon as labour in the direct form has ceased to be the great well-spring of wealth, labour time ceases and must cease to be its measure, and hence exchange value [must cease to be the measure] of use value. The surplus labour of the mass has ceased to be the condition for the development of general wealth, just as the non-labour of the few, for the development of the general powers of the human head. With that, production based on exchange value breaks down, and the direct, material production process is stripped of the form of penury and antithesis. The free development of individualities, and hence not the reduction of necessary labour time so as to posit surplus labour, but rather the general reduction of the necessary labour of society to a minimum, which then corresponds to the artistic, scientific etc. development of the individuals in the time set free, and with the means created, for all of them. Capital itself is the moving contradiction, [in] that it presses to reduce labour time to a minimum, while it posits labour time, on the other side, as sole measure and source of wealth. Hence it diminishes labour time in the necessary form so as to increase it in the superfluous form; hence posits the superfluous in growing measure as a condition - question of life or death - for the necessary. On the one side, then, it calls to life all the powers of science and of nature, as of social combination and of social intercourse, in order to make the creation of wealth independent (relatively) of the labour time employed on it. On the other side, it wants to use labour time as the measuring rod for the giant social forces thereby created, and to confine them within the limits required to maintain the already created value as value. Forces of production and social relations - two different sides of the development of the social individual - appear to capital as mere means, and are merely means for it to produce on its limited foundation. In fact, however, they are the material conditions
Re: Re: Marx's life and theory
Ted: As I mentioned earlier, criticisms of scientific materialism that offer in its place what amounts to a "dialectics of nature" can be found in Whitehead (as an explicit criticism of Darwin's ontological premises, in *The Function of Reason*). It's interesting to compare David Harvey's "Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference" with Foster's "Marx's Ecology", both of which aim at a philosophical foundation for ecosocialism. Leibniz and Whitehead are key to Harvey (while obviously having nothing to do with Marx), while Foster tries to re-establish the philosophical traditions that Marx consciously identified with. Those traditions are the opposite of the kind of idealism that Leibniz and Whitehead exemplify. While Harvey is smitten by all of the "dialectics" at play in Leibniz and Whitehead, he seems to have lost track of the materialism that attracted Marx to figures like Epicurus and Bacon. I would also explain Harvey's brand of "brown Marxism" as related to the kind of placid "holism" of Leibniz and Whitehead. It is no accident that Leibniz was lampooned by Voltaire in Candide as Dr. Pangloss who believed that we lived in the best of all possible worlds. Not that different from Harvey's objection to Foster titleing a book "The Vulnerable Planet." Harvey puffed, "The planet can not be destroyed." Of course, with nothing left but rats, pigeons and "ecosystems" like Chicago and NYC (Harvey is a big fan of William Cronon), then I'll leave what's left over to the capitalist system and its hapless victims. Louis Proyect (The Marxism mailing list: http://www.marxmail.org)
Re: Re: Re: Marx's life and theory (fwd)
Engels uses "materialist dialectics" in _ Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy_. CB Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] 05/24/00 10:31AM I wrote: actually, there are good reasons to avoid the terms historical materialism and dialectical materialism. They aren't Marx's terms. Mine replies: Really? Marx says in Preface to the French edition of Capital (Tucker ed, p.301) the following: "My DIALECTIC METHOD is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite.to hegel, the life process of the human brain, ie the proces of thiking, which, under the name of the idea", he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external,phenomenal form of the idea. With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought" "dialectical method" is different from both "dialectical materialism" and "historical materialism." "Marx's dialectical method" is also less ambiguous. I looked at the index of Tucker, Marx uses the concept "dialectic" in pp.68-69, 106-25, 301-2... read what I said above. . ops,I forgot to mention Engels' _Letters on historical Materialism_ written to to Joseph Bloch.. You may wish to consider Tucker p.760.. that's Engels, not Marx. Marx referred to his "materialist conception of history." More importantly, the terms have been much abused, at one point being reduced to "histomat" and "diamat" by Stalin's ideologists . true however If Stalin abused these terms, it has nothing to do with the conceptual validity of the terms as developed by Marx. we are dealing with MArx here not Stalin... I wasn't dealing with the "conceptual validity" of dialectical method. (I think that a dialectical and materialist approach to understanding the world is absolutely necessary.) I was instead dealing with the need for terms that hadn't been formalized and denatured by generations of epigones and anti-Marx types who apply "thesis/antithesis/synthesis" formulas in a mechanical way. BTW, some of the best stuff on dialectical method appears in Ollman's book ALIENATION and Lewins Lewontin's THE DIALECTICAL BIOLOGIST. I think it's important to distinguish between dialectical ontology, dialectical epistemology, and dialectical mode of presentation (though of course these are interrelated). Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://liberalarts.lmu.edu/~JDevine
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Marx's life and theory (fwd)
Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] 05/24/00 11:04AM
Carroll writes"
I blow hot and cold on the usefulness of the term "dialectical
materialism," but even when I warm to it I don't like to see it posited
as *the* philosophical basis for "historical materialism."
Right. "a" philosophical basis for Marx's materialist conception of
history makes more sense than "the" philosophical basis. (The notion of
there being only one ("the") philosophical basis of historical materialism
seems to come from Stalinist diamat itself.) Better, there was a
dialectical relationship between the two as Marx developed them, just as
there was a dialectical relationship between theory and empirical research
and between theory and practice...
_
CB: By the way, don't think Marx used "historical materialism" either, so no reason to
be less comfortable with "dialectical materialism" than "historical materialism".
CB
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Marx's life and theory (fwd)
In my view, while Marx's work before the mid-1850s focuses on a socio-historical theory of knowledge, which necessarily removes Philosophy from its privileged place in a hierarchy of knowledges, Marx's remarks in later life (see his conversations with Alexei Voden and Liebknecht's reminiscences) make it clear he saw a continuing role for the study of philosophy and rejected the positivist and empiricist use of scientism as a worldview. Even Darwinism was critiqued for its bourgeois anthropomorphizing of animal life, and the elevation of atheist free-thinking into a secular form of proselytizing was dismissed as no better than Old Testament dogma. In his economics of 1857-1867 the critique of ideology is transformed into the critique of bourgeois civil society and its mode of production, and epistemic errors are located within the relations of production rather than simply in the superstructure. Reification and Personification are seen as systemic impediments to knowledge rooted in everyday practice, not just in the ideas of bourgeois commentators. Incidentally, Marx never "contributed a chapter to Anti-Duehring." He had written a journal article on Duerhing, which he allowed Engels to incorporate into his book, published serially at first without much attention. Despite Engels' comments much later that Marx approved the book, there is no indication that the dialectics Engels speculated about there had any relevance to the dialectics of praxis that Marx employed in his critique of political economy. hose interested in the issue of Naturdialectik or what has been known since Plekhanov as "Dialectical Materialism' may want to read my paper on 'Marx's Ecology: Synthesizing Dialectics of Praxis and Nature" at http://www.egroups.com/files/red-green/ To read it, you'll have to subscribe to the moderated, very low-volume Red/Green list, which can be done by clicking on the 'Subscribe' button. -Walt Sheasby In a message dated 5/23/00 7:35:46 PM Pacific Daylight Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: A credible case can be made that Marx consciously rehjected philosophy and philosophical bases, regarding them as mere ideology, and saw the materialist concetion of history as a partial substitute, preserving what might be valuable in philosophy while explaining why it was ideology. See Daniel Brudney's excellent recent book, Marx's Attempt to Escape Philosophy. One might debate, of courese, how successful was Marx's attempt to escape philosophy. Btw Engels, who is also responsible to a lot of what is called materialist dialectics as philosophy, with a certain degree of approval by and even participation from Marx, who contributed a chapter to Anti-Duehring, takes the Brudney line in a manner os speaking in his piece Ludwif Fuerback and the End of Classical German Philosophy. --jks
Re: Re: Re: Marx's life and theory (fwd)
I wrote: actually, there are good reasons to avoid the terms historical materialism and dialectical materialism. They aren't Marx's terms. Mine replies: Really? Marx says in Preface to the French edition of Capital (Tucker ed, p.301) the following: "My DIALECTIC METHOD is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite.to hegel, the life process of the human brain, ie the proces of thiking, which, under the name of the idea", he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external,phenomenal form of the idea. With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought" "dialectical method" is different from both "dialectical materialism" and "historical materialism." "Marx's dialectical method" is also less ambiguous. See Althusser for a distinction.. I looked at the index of Tucker, Marx uses the concept "dialectic" in pp.68-69, 106-25, 301-2... read what I said above. . you said "they aren't Marx terms". I showed that they were. are you treating a child Jim? it is flat obvious in the above passage that "dialectial method" refers to "dialectical materialism as understood by Marx. critical-realist methodology (whatever it is) is another obscurantist play of words while we have a better, more sophisticated terminology proposed by Marx. I am still not satified by the conceptual validity of the term... BTW, some of the best stuff on dialectical method appears in Ollman's book ALIENATION and Lewins Lewontin's THE DIALECTICAL BIOLOGIST. I think I have read them already.. the whole world knows Lewontin's book.. merci, Mine
Re: Re: Re: Marx's life and theory (fwd)
and "historical materialism" in letters to Joseph Bloch Mine Engels uses "materialist dialectics" in _ Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy_. CB Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] 05/24/00 10:31AM I wrote: actually, there are good reasons to avoid the terms historical materialism and dialectical materialism. They aren't Marx's terms. Mine replies: Really? Marx says in Preface to the French edition of Capital (Tucker ed, p.301) the following: "My DIALECTIC METHOD is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite.to hegel, the life process of the human brain, ie the proces of thiking, which, under the name of the idea", he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external,phenomenal form of the idea. With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought" "dialectical method" is different from both "dialectical materialism" and "historical materialism." "Marx's dialectical method" is also less ambiguous. I looked at the index of Tucker, Marx uses the concept "dialectic" in pp.68-69, 106-25, 301-2... read what I said above. . ops,I forgot to mention Engels' _Letters on historical Materialism_ written to to Joseph Bloch.. You may wish to consider Tucker p.760.. that's Engels, not Marx. Marx referred to his "materialist conception of history." More importantly, the terms have been much abused, at one point being reduced to "histomat" and "diamat" by Stalin's ideologists . true however If Stalin abused these terms, it has nothing to do with the conceptual validity of the terms as developed by Marx. we are dealing with MArx here not Stalin... I wasn't dealing with the "conceptual validity" of dialectical method. (I think that a dialectical and materialist approach to understanding the world is absolutely necessary.) I was instead dealing with the need for terms that hadn't been formalized and denatured by generations of epigones and anti-Marx types who apply "thesis/antithesis/synthesis" formulas in a mechanical way. BTW, some of the best stuff on dialectical method appears in Ollman's book ALIENATION and Lewins Lewontin's THE DIALECTICAL BIOLOGIST. I think it's important to distinguish between dialectical ontology, dialectical epistemology, and dialectical mode of presentation (though of course these are interrelated). Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://liberalarts.lmu.edu/~JDevine
Re: Re: Re: Re: Marx's life and theory (fwd)
[EMAIL PROTECTED] 05/23/00 10:34PM In a message dated 5/23/00 9:56:02 PM Eastern Daylight Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: I blow hot and cold on the usefulness of the term "dialectical materialism," but even when I warm to it I don't like to see it posited as *the* philosophical basis for "historical materialism." Even apart from the specific expressions, I'm with Carrol on this one. (Not quite a first, but close, eh, Carrol?) A credible case can be made that Marx consciously rehjected philosophy and philosophical bases, regarding them as mere ideology, and saw the materialist concetion of history as a partial substitute, preserving what might be valuable in philosophy while explaining why it was ideology. See Daniel Brudney's excellent recent book, Marx's Attempt to Escape Philosophy. One might debate, of courese, how successful was Marx's attempt to escape philosophy. CB: It's not all that mysterious. Just as Justin says below, Engels wrote clearly and explicitly about the end of philosophy, and that all would remain of the old philosophy as queen of sciences would be formal logic and dialectics ( and the sciences). No doubt Marx had the same attitude , and his works reflect it. Btw Engels, who is also responsible to a lot of what is called materialist dialectics as philosophy, with a certain degree of approval by and even participation from Marx, who contributed a chapter to Anti-Duehring, takes the Brudney line in a manner os speaking in his piece Ludwif Fuerback and the End of Classical German Philosophy. Of the latter: (a) independently of its origins, it has achieved a respectable pedigree and I think a useful and essentially accurate label for the mode of thought which I see first developed with any precision in *Poverty of Philosophy*; and (b) most of what I would think of as historical materialism can be defended independently of any particular view (pro or con or neutral) of the "dialectics of nature." Quite right. historical materialism, construed as a view about the centrality of class and the economy in social explanation, is consistent with any ontological view--including Machean or Berkeleyan idealism, as the Empiocritics pilloried by Lenin argued--are none. CB: I'd say that Engels and Marx conceive of revolution as qualitative changes in the mode of production, as a central example of the dialectics of their historical materialism. __ (Stephen Gould, hardly a "dogmatic Marxist," has however written favorably of the influence of conscious dialectics, even of the Soviet type, on biological thinking.) Right, but he is not talking about historical materialism, rather more a diamat sort of thing. See here also Lewontin, Rose, Kaim, The Dialectical Biologist, my least favorite Lewontin book. CB: Yes indeed. In one debate on this , someone said Gould told him that to Gould dialectics is a heuristic device. At any rate, Gould's punctuated equilibrium dialectizes Darwinism by introducing "leaps", as emphasized by Lenin and Engels as a characteristic of dialectical change, i.e. quantitative change turns into qualitative change.
RE: Marx's life and theory
Jim Devine wrote:
do you have any evidence that Marx followed Rousseau in this way?
Maybe this seems like a cop-out but I don't want to argue this point by
point, right now. Most of us have read enough of both men to have some
notion of what Rousseau's influences on Marx were, and you've just been
debating it here. Actually to say that Marx was an Enlightenment figure in
the same way as Rousseau was an Enlightenment figure begs more questions
than it answers given the peculiar ambivalences of Rousseau's own somewhat
Janus-like stance. I hope I may be allowed in this case to escape a
too-forensic examination. I don't want to discuss Rousseau now.
do you have evidence that this "became clear to him"? where does he say
these things?
This is the subject for a book, which in fact I'm writing. But yes, my basic
position is this: Marx saw clearly that the revolutionary wave of 1847 had
turned into a counter-revolution of such dimensions and intensity that it
made the likelihood of proletarian revolutions in industrial Europe
inconceivable not just in his lifetime but in the entire epoch. This was a
more than depressing discovery about a specific contemporary event, it was a
discovery which gradually came to imbue Marx's entire work with a specific
coloration (remember how closely he and Engels watched the runes, and for
many years acted as if they expected colossal outbreaks to begin on a weekly
or a daily basis). This is a complex question because just what 'the epoch'
was is still obviously a matter of argument, but loosely I mean the period
from the British industrial revolution to the emergence of definite new
forms of monopoly and finance capital, for example the foundation of BASF in
Germany in 1873, which seemed and was the harbinger of a qualitative shift
in production relations and the mode of appropriation of nature. I think
Marx hesitated about further volumes of Capital because he saw these changes
in progress and they did way interrogate his earlier findings. But at a
deeper level all this, I mean the whole gigantic upthrust and burgeoning of
capitalism, the massive strides of innercontinental development, the
manifest solidity of the things which were supposed to melt into air, really
raised a profound, what one might called psycho-phenomenological question
mark over the whole Marxian project. The wave of 1847 was simply buried by
a single flick of the dragon's tale and wiped out of history and even
working class folklore. The counter-revolutionary wave it triggered is
still TODAY the determining moment in the evolution of capitalist society
and therefore of civilisation itself.
Marx was a practical revolutionary who wanted power (not for himself but for
'his' social class!) and pursued it (he wasn't just meaning to be a solitary
untenured academic). He premised his philosophical outlook on a sustaining
belief, originally no more (and no less) than a hope, that the proletariat
was destined to be a new class of power ('the point however is to change
it'). He really believed it, to begin with. Later he changed his mind and
the evidence for this is so massively present throughout his work that once
you see it, it becomes hard to see anything else. With our baleful hindsight
of 150 more years of capitalist entrenchment, this specific feature of
Marx's life, outlook and motivation is very easy to ignore or sideline, but
looking at it from his point of view, putting ourselves in his shoes (the
pair not at the pawnbroker's), a quite different day-by-day story of his
life emerges. I don't think the standard biographies do much justice to this
either, mostly committed as they are to a peculiar stageism of their own,
i.e., the stages of revolutionary forced marches through history which
inevitably and with iron logic etc. take us to the threshold of Great
October etc, thus consummating History's own alleged Stages. The elevation
of Marx and Engels to the level of mythopoeic deities by the hagiographies
of the 2nd and 3rd Internationals entirely obscured the drama of the
conflict between their inner lives and hopes and fears, and the somewhat
sordid everyday realities. You say that Marx was prescient about Russia, but
I'm not so sure this wasn't born of desperation. Think about it. This flies
wholly in the face of the entire thrust of his early work and convictions --
to suppose that the advanced guard would materialise not in the proletarian
heartlands where the degree of political culture, depth of organisation, and
of social massification, was so great, and where the material tools of
power, of a different kind of social construction were to hand, in the shape
of the vast outgrowth of capital plant, machinery, infrastructure etc: i.e.,
precisely the alleged material basis of socialism - but instead the
revolution would begin in the most backward areas! Inconceivable lack of
historical method, hopeless idealism. And this argument only confirms the
defeatist view that it is precisely the
Re: RE: Marx's life and theory
Generally, we agree, now that I see that you're not emphasizing Marx's psychology as much as it appeared. At 10:10 AM 5/23/00 +0100, you wrote: Jim Devine wrote: do you have any evidence that Marx followed Rousseau in this way? Maybe this seems like a cop-out but I don't want to argue this point by point, right now. Most of us have read enough of both men to have some notion of what Rousseau's influences on Marx were, and you've just been debating it here. ... I don't want to discuss Rousseau now. I think the link between Marx and Rousseau would best be found through Hegel (though Marx was of course familiar with Rousseau). snip Marx was great because he developed a great theoretical framework, one that swallows the valid components of neoclassical economics the way Einsteinian physics swallowed Newton's physics. Oh, well, I'm bound to say that this is to misread both Einstein's intentions and his results. Sorry about the word "swallowed." Einsteinian physics does not _negate_ Newtonian physics but includes it as a special case, a special case which applies in almost all relevant cases of our lives. Similarly, the valid parts of neoclassical economics (e.g., supply demand) work fine if one is dealing only with the "surface of society, ... the action of different capitals on one another, i.e. ... competition, and ... the everyday consciousness of the agents of production themselves," the subject that volume III of CAPITAL develops. What the neoclassicals miss is that the realm of appearances that they study is structured and shaped by capital as a whole, the subject of the vol. I, and by structurally-based class antagonisms. (An example can be seen in ch. 25 of volume I, where the workings of supply and demand are determined by the capitalists' class monopoly, their control over accumulation.) That structuring doesn't mean that supply demand aren't wrong, but that more theory is needed. I'm following critical-realist methodology, in which paradigm X can only beat paradigm Y by incorporating its valid components (and explaining its short-comings). Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://liberalarts.lmu.edu/~jdevine
Re: Marx's life and theory (fwd)
I wrote: yes, it's true that the actual revolution in Russia turned into the kind of sh*t that he and Engels predicted would occur if a revolution occurred in a poor country (in the GERMAN IDEOLOGY). Mine wrote: by the way, do you have any evidence to your claims from German Ideology? "... this development of productive forces ... is an absolutely necessary practical premise because without it _want_ is merely made general, and with the _destitution_ the struggle for necessities and all the old filthy business would necessarily be reproduced... " (in Tucker, ed., THE MARX-ENGELS READER, 2nd ed., p. 161). I don't read German, but I am told by those who do that "the old filthy business" is a bowdlerized translation of "the old shit." Mine asserts: You have no slightest notion about what Engels is talking about here! German ideology is neither about a revolution in a "poor" country nor is it about the kind of "shit" you are talking about. It is a comprehensive statement of the materialist conception of history written in 1845-46. I can't see how it couldn't be both. In fact, any "comprehensive statement of the materialist conception of history" would have to have empirical references of all sorts if it were to be materialist. Marx and Engels did NOT make predictions about revolution in Russia here-- NOT IN THIS TEXT! Even assuming that they did, their explanation would definetely be much more qualified than your "shit" charecterization! They didn't make any predictions about _Russia_ per se, but (as I said) about countries _like_ Russia in 1917, with insufficient development of the forces of production. (It _is_ a prediction, BTW, as indicated by the assertion that the development of the forces of production is an "absolutely necessary practical premise.") And in a relatively abstract book like THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY, which was pretty early in their career, statements are _more_ sweeping (_less_ qualified) than in later works. (BTW, I've never read it, but Engels has a book about the peasant war in Germany which talks about the fate of a revolution under conditions of poverty.) BTW, unlike the hard-core social-democratic critics of the Russian Revolution of 1917, I am not completely endorsing ME's statement here. Their assertion indicates that a revolution in a poor country would have a lot of problems, including simply the socialization of poverty. _We_ need to bring in the qualifications (and we can't rely on a scholastic style, quoting scripture to prove points). For example, the poor country could get aid from the rich countries. That's why people like Lenin Trotsky hoped for revolution in Western Europe, so that they could get away from the fate of a revolution under conditions of poverty. Also, the Nicaraguan Sandinistas argued that the active participation and enthusiasm of the people could substitute for the narrowly-defined forces of production. One of the problems with ME's assertion is that the concept of degrees of development of the forces of production is ambiguous. People like G.A. Cohen want to quantify that development by referring to the productivity of labor, but that number can't be measured over time if the mixture of products being produced changes (just as comparing apple production per worker and orange production per worker doesn't make sense). But the mixture of products being produced (along with their quality) changes a lot over time. I think that the best way to measure the degree of the development of the forces of production is similar to that for defining poverty. It can't be measured absolutely, and must instead be measured relatively. A poor country is "poor" because it is out-competed or dominated in one way or another by "rich" countries. That suggests that a lot of the insights of dependency theory or world systems theory are relevant. Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://liberalarts.lmu.edu/~jdevine
Rousseau and Marx, was Re: Marx's life and theory
Jim Devine wrote: I think the link between Marx and Rousseau would best be found through Hegel (though Marx was of course familiar with Rousseau). Knowledge of Rousseau is the gap in my education which I lament most -- so I may be way off here. But it seems to me (going in part from consideration of the amount of attention Wollstonecraft gives to refuting Rousseau's idiocies on women) that the great service Rousseau performed for later radical reformers and revolutionaries was to perceive "society" as a work of art rather than a "natural" expression of human nature. The development of markets (and the subsequent growing triumph of abstract individualism in practice if not in theory) was breaking the hold of spontaneous hierarchical and analogical thought in Europe -- the sort of thought embodied in the very language in such expressions as "body politic" and "head of state" -- but formal thought still tended to this hierarchical mode. Rousseau's denial that the State was a *natural* product theorized this break, and hence prepared the way for the revolutionary thinking that reached (at least so far) its culmination in Marx. Just as Marx can be described as "Aristotle with an attitude," so he can be described as "Rousseau minus individualism." Rousseau's radical individualism helped prepare the context for historical materialism (or the rejection of metaphysical individualism). As I say -- I'm way beyond my scholastic limits here, so I won't cling to all or much of this. Carrol
Re: Rousseau and Marx, was Re: Marx's life and theory
Knowledge of Rousseau is the gap in my education which I lament most -- so I may be way off here. ... the great service Rousseau performed for later radical reformers and revolutionaries was to perceive "society" as a work of art rather than a "natural" expression of human nature. The development of markets (and the subsequent growing triumph of abstract individualism in practice if not in theory) was breaking the hold of spontaneous hierarchical and analogical thought in Europe ... but formal thought still tended to this hierarchical mode. Rousseau's denial that the State was a *natural* product theorized this break, and hence prepared the way for the revolutionary thinking that reached (at least so far) its culmination in Marx. Hobbes and Locke also saw the state as an unnatural act, though Locke posited private property as "natural," which undermines his whole effort (though it made him extremely popular, even to this day, among bourgeois thinkers). Just as Marx can be described as "Aristotle with an attitude," so he can be described as "Rousseau minus individualism." Rousseau's radical individualism helped prepare the context for historical materialism (or the rejection of metaphysical individualism). I wouldn't call R an individualist. Hobbes and Locke were, but not R. He has a lot of individualistic notions, for example, the idea of a social contract, but his view of individuals is as empty vessels that are filled by society. The only non-societal parts of the human personality for him are the survival instinct and empathy for others (which he also attributed to animals). These find different expression in different societies. (His vision is preminiscent of structuralism or modern sociology, or those Marxists who reduce "human nature" to merely an ensemble of social relations.) He sets up an ideal society -- in his SOCIAL CONTRACT -- which then fills our empty vessels up with ideal characteristics (via censorship, a civic religion, etc.) This encourages people to vote to reproduce the ideal society over time. (It's akin to Plato's REPUBLIC, but what Plato prescribes for the elite Guardians, R wants for all.) A lot of R's ideas were bandied about (and distorted) during the 1789 French revolution. Marx might be called a "Rousseau from below" (which rhymes!) Instead of having the "general will" leaping full-blown out of his skull (as with R), Marx hoped/predicted that workers would develop -- through struggle with the bourgeoisie -- their own "social contract," which would allow them to figure out for themselves what the "general will" was and to put it into practice. Note also that this is a dynamic, historical process, rather than R's mythical hope that an all-wise Legislator would come along and design the perfect society to be imposed on people. Unlike R, I think that Marx had a notion that goes beyond the "empty vessel" model, as seen in the 1844 MANUSCRIPTS. His hoped-for proletarian social contract involves disalienation, a potential within humanity. As I say -- I'm way beyond my scholastic limits here, so I won't cling to all or much of this. R is very readable. I recommend THE SOCIAL CONTRACT and also the DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGINS OF INEQUALITY. Those almost define my knowledge as a (mostly self-taught) Rousseau expert, though. I haven't read far beyond those. Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://liberalarts.lmu.edu/~jdevine
Re: Marx's life and theory (fwd)
At 12:38 PM 5/23/00 -0400, you wrote: Jim Devine: Also, the Nicaraguan Sandinistas argued that the active participation and enthusiasm of the people could substitute for the narrowly-defined forces of production. Not true. okay, but what was true? Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://liberalarts.lmu.edu/~jdevine
Re: Re: Marx's life and theory (fwd)
Jim Devine: Also, the Nicaraguan Sandinistas argued that the active participation and enthusiasm of the people could substitute for the narrowly-defined forces of production. Not true. okay, but what was true? Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://liberalarts.lmu.edu/~jdevine Lou and I may disagree here but... There was always tension between mass organizations FSLN even as former often served as support for latter's projects. In both political and workplace realms, masses achieved 'partial' participation in that they could affect decisions, but authority was retained by Sandinistas or by management. While capital appeared to have had its power undermined in various ways, certain FSLN resolutions decrees imposed limits upon masses. Frente's position on unions strikes, for example, was simultaneously antagonistic to capital labor. Industrial (CST) agricultural (ATC) unions had dual functions - increase productivity involve workers in transformation of Nicaragua's productive relations. But state-appointed (Sandinista) managers were among obstacles to meaningful worker input. Production participation, of course, are not separate and Revo eventually faced problems (amidst myriad others) associated with 'partial' participation - declining productivity, alienation, resistance.Michael Hoover
Re: Re: Marx's life and theory (fwd)
okay, but what was true? Sandinistas were pragmatists. They sought to develop what can be accurately called a "mixed economy" despite the Reaganite charge that they were Communists. The important difference between their attempt and failed attempts such as Arbenz's in Guatemala is that the Sandinistas armed the people, a decidedly Marxist and Leninist approach. They failed for reasons similar to those of the Paris Commune or the P9 strike in the 1980s. Poor relationship of forces. Louis Proyect (The Marxism mailing list: http://www.marxmail.org)
Re: RE: Marx's life and theory
Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] 05/23/00 11:53AM I'm following critical-realist methodology, in which paradigm X can only beat paradigm Y by incorporating its valid components (and explaining its short-comings). ___ CB: Marx and Engels call it extracting the rational kernel and discarding the husk. With Hegel they flipped him off of his head and onto his feet first before extracting the rational kernel. CB
Re: Re: RE: Marx's life and theory
At 01:59 PM 5/23/00 -0400, you wrote: Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] 05/23/00 11:53AM I'm following critical-realist methodology, in which paradigm X can only beat paradigm Y by incorporating its valid components (and explaining its short-comings). ___ CB: Marx and Engels call it extracting the rational kernel and discarding the husk. With Hegel they flipped him off of his head and onto his feet first before extracting the rational kernel. if I remember correctly, Bhaskar (a proponent of critical realism) didn't see any conflict between his views and those of Marx Engels. In fact, I think he referred approvingly to "dialectical materialism" at one point. Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://liberalarts.lmu.edu/~jdevine
Re: Marx's life and theory (fwd)
It doesn't differ as far as I can tell. At 02:21 PM 5/23/00 -0400, you wrote: This methodology does not seem terribly clear to me. how does it differ from historical materialism to be brief? Mine Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] 05/23/00 11:53AM I'm following critical-realist methodology, in which paradigm X can only beat paradigm Y by incorporating its valid components (and explaining its short-comings). Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://liberalarts.lmu.edu/~jdevine
Re: Marx's life and theory (fwd)
in any case, a self-identified Marxist would instead use historial materialism. If this methodology has the same connotations with h.m, then why to substitute h.m with a different name? Mine It doesn't differ as far as I can tell. At 02:21 PM 5/23/00 -0400, you wrote: This methodology does not seem terribly clear to me. how does it differ from historical materialism to be brief? Mine Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] 05/23/00 11:53AM I'm following critical-realist methodology, in which paradigm X can only beat paradigm Y by incorporating its valid components (and explaining its short-comings). Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://liberalarts.lmu.edu/~jdevine
RE: Re: RE: Marx's life and theory
-Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] On Behalf Of Jim Devine Sent: 23 May 2000 16:53 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject:[PEN-L:19455] Re: RE: Marx's life and theory I think the link between Marx and Rousseau would best be found through Hegel (though Marx was of course familiar with Rousseau). On the contrary, Marx came to Hegel via Rousseau. Does this sound odd? I don't mean chronologically, but logically, in the reconstruction of Hegel as a prototype-Marxist, ie, stood the right way up, Marx clearly based himself on Rousseau's ideas about the General Will. I don't feel that the debate here has quite got to grips with Rousseau. I therefore have a reservation about embarking on the matter here. BTW, I'm surprised you should think that we are otherwise in agreement. I have not changed my position, namely that Marx came to reject the leading role of the working class. Did you change yours? Mark
Re: Re: Marx's life and theory (fwd)
Mine wrote: in any case, a self-identified Marxist would instead use historial materialism. If this methodology has the same connotations with h.m, then why to substitute h.m with a different name? actually, there are good reasons to avoid the terms historical materialism and dialectical materialism. They aren't Marx's terms. Marx referred to his "materialist conception of history." More importantly, the terms have been much abused, at one point being reduced to "histomat" and "diamat" by Stalin's ideologists. Finally, critical realism links up and/or contrasts with other philosophical/methodological traditions, while not being constrained by quotes from old books. I made two errors in this thread. (1) it's not "historical materialism" that meshes so well with critical realism; rather, it's "dialectical materialism," which is interpreted as the philosophical basis for "historical materialism." (2) It wasn't Roy Bhaskar who expressed a friendly attitude toward "dialectical materialism," as far as I know. Rather, it was Dick Walker, someone who embraced B's methodology. Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://liberalarts.lmu.edu/~JDevine
Re: RE: Re: RE: Marx's life and theory
BTW, I'm surprised you should think that we are otherwise in agreement. I have not changed my position, namely that Marx came to reject the leading role of the working class. Did you change yours? no, I just came to understand that our differences weren't as large as I thought and that I wasn't interested in discussing the issues at this time. Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://liberalarts.lmu.edu/~JDevine
Re: Re: Marx's life and theory (fwd)
Mine wrote: in any case, a self-identified Marxist would instead use historial materialism. If this methodology has the same connotations with h.m, then why to substitute h.m with a different name? actually, there are good reasons to avoid the terms historical materialism and dialectical materialism. They aren't Marx's terms. Really? Marx says in Preface to the French edition of Capital (Tucker ed, p.301) the following: "My DIALECTIC METHOD is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite.to hegel, the life process of the human brain, ie the proces of thiking, which, under the name of the idea", he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external,phenomenal form of the idea. With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought" I looked at the index of Tucker, Marx uses the concept "dialectic" in pp.68-69, 106-25, 301-2... ops,I forgot to mention Engels' _Letters on historical Materialism_ written to to Joseph Bloch.. You may wish to consider Tucker p.760.. Marx referred to his "materialist conception of history." More importantly, the terms have been much abused, at one point being reduced to "histomat" and "diamat" by Stalin's ideologists . true however If Stalin abused these terms, it has nothing to do with the conceptual validity of the terms as developed by Marx. we are dealing with MArx here not Stalin... Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://liberalarts.lmu.edu/~JDevine Mine
Re: Re: Re: Marx's life and theory (fwd)
Jim Devine wrote: I made two errors in this thread. (1) it's not "historical materialism" that meshes so well with critical realism; rather, it's "dialectical materialism," which is interpreted as the philosophical basis for "historical materialism." (2) It wasn't Roy Bhaskar who expressed a friendly attitude toward "dialectical materialism," as far as I know. Rather, it was Dick Walker, someone who embraced B's methodology. I blow hot and cold on the usefulness of the term "dialectical materialism," but even when I warm to it I don't like to see it posited as *the* philosophical basis for "historical materialism." Of the latter: (a) independently of its origins, it has achieved a respectable pedigree and I think a useful and essentially accurate label for the mode of thought which I see first developed with any precision in *Poverty of Philosophy*; and (b) most of what I would think of as historical materialism can be defended independently of any particular view (pro or con or neutral) of the "dialectics of nature." (Stephen Gould, hardly a "dogmatic Marxist," has however written favorably of the influence of conscious dialectics, even of the Soviet type, on biological thinking.) On the "old Marx." It was near the end of his life that, interviewed by a New York reporter, he responded to the flippant question, "What is?" with first a long pause that made the reporter think he had fallen asleep and then one word, "Struggle." Carrol
Re: Re: Re: Re: Marx's life and theory (fwd)
In a message dated 5/23/00 9:56:02 PM Eastern Daylight Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: I blow hot and cold on the usefulness of the term "dialectical materialism," but even when I warm to it I don't like to see it posited as *the* philosophical basis for "historical materialism." Even apart from the specific expressions, I'm with Carrol on this one. (Not quite a first, but close, eh, Carrol?) A credible case can be made that Marx consciously rehjected philosophy and philosophical bases, regarding them as mere ideology, and saw the materialist concetion of history as a partial substitute, preserving what might be valuable in philosophy while explaining why it was ideology. See Daniel Brudney's excellent recent book, Marx's Attempt to Escape Philosophy. One might debate, of courese, how successful was Marx's attempt to escape philosophy. Btw Engels, who is also responsible to a lot of what is called materialist dialectics as philosophy, with a certain degree of approval by and even participation from Marx, who contributed a chapter to Anti-Duehring, takes the Brudney line in a manner os speaking in his piece Ludwif Fuerback and the End of Classical German Philosophy. Of the latter: (a) independently of its origins, it has achieved a respectable pedigree and I think a useful and essentially accurate label for the mode of thought which I see first developed with any precision in *Poverty of Philosophy*; and (b) most of what I would think of as historical materialism can be defended independently of any particular view (pro or con or neutral) of the "dialectics of nature." Quite right. historical materialism, construed as a view about the centrality of class and the economy in social explanation, is consistent with any ontological view--including Machean or Berkeleyan idealism, as the Empiocritics pilloried by Lenin argued--are none. (Stephen Gould, hardly a "dogmatic Marxist," has however written favorably of the influence of conscious dialectics, even of the Soviet type, on biological thinking.) Right, but he is not talking about historical materialism, rather more a diamat sort of thing. See here also Lewontin, Rose, Kaim, The Dialectical Biologist, my least favorite Lewontin book. --jks
