msnbc.com: Case of fully veiled woman roils France
Case of fully veiled woman roils France Dissenting voices are wondering whether France went too far in denying citizenship to a Muslim woman who sheaths herself in a head-to-toe veil, saying she had not assimilated into society. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25707374/from/ET/ Joel L. Sogol Attorney at Law 811 21st Avenue Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35401 ph (205) 345-0966 fx (205) 345-0967 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Ben Franklin observed that truth wins a fair fight -- which is why we have evidence rules in U.S. courts. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: msnbc.com: Case of fully veiled woman roils France
What interests me in the story is the statement--about which nobody seems to have commented--that the woman professed no knowledge of the personal freedoms French law grants to women and all individuals. Having no knowledge of French immigration law, and precious little of US immigration law, I would have expected this to be the handle for denying citizenship, namely that she had not sufficiently familiarized herself with the fundamental laws of the country. Whether or not she chooses to avail herself of these liberties is a different matter; but one should know what the options are. Vance On Thu, Jul 17, 2008 at 5:20 AM, Joel Sogol [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Case of fully veiled woman roils France Dissenting voices are wondering whether France went too far in denying citizenship to a Muslim woman who sheaths herself in a head-to-toe veil, saying she had not assimilated into society. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25707374/from/ET/ Joel L. Sogol Attorney at Law 811 21st Avenue Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35401 ph (205) 345-0966 fx (205) 345-0967 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Ben Franklin observed that truth wins a fair fight -- which is why we have evidence rules in U.S. courts. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. -- Vance R. Koven Boston, MA USA [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: msnbc.com: Case of fully veiled woman roils France
The case started quietly, when a Muslim woman who sheaths herself in a head-to-toe veil was denied French citizenship because she had not assimilated enough into this society. You know what this reminds me of? Frankfurter's explanation to FDR ER of his vote in GOBITIS--in a melting pot, people should give up their quaint idiosyncratic customs (like not saluting the flag) and blend in. See Max Freedmen, ed. ROOSEVELT-FRANKFURTER LETTERS. Judy Baer ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: msnbc.com: Case of fully veiled woman roils France
True enough, but France is not the US. Their traditions and culture are really quite different. Naturalization in France has always required that one becomes French whereas in the US we have only required knowledge (a test) and an oath. You can still be something else. That is why Frankfurter's opinions in Gobitis and Barnette are so awful. Paul Finkelman President William McKinley Distinguished Professor of Law and Public Policy Albany Law School 80 New Scotland Avenue Albany, New York 12208-3494 518-445-3386 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Judith Baer [EMAIL PROTECTED] 7/17/2008 11:29 AM The case started quietly, when a Muslim woman who sheaths herself in a head-to-toe veil was denied French citizenship because she had not assimilated enough into this society. You know what this reminds me of? Frankfurter's explanation to FDR ER of his vote in GOBITIS--in a melting pot, people should give up their quaint idiosyncratic customs (like not saluting the flag) and blend in. See Max Freedmen, ed. ROOSEVELT-FRANKFURTER LETTERS. Judy Baer ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: msnbc.com: Case of fully veiled woman roils France
True enough, but France is not the US. Their traditions and culture are really quite different. Naturalization in France has always required that one becomes French whereas in the US we have only required knowledge (a test) and an oath. You can still be something else. That is why Frankfurter's opinions in Gobitis and Barnette are so awful. Paul Finkelman Not the only reason, Paul. What I object to is his hypocrisy (and his sanctimonious tone in Barnette.) FF was trying to have it both ways, hinting that his heart was with the liberals and appeasing advocates of judicial restraint. And all along he thought that what the school boards did was not only constitutional; it was right. Judy ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Judicial enforcement of Islamic dowry-on-divorce agreements
I should note, by the way, that a similar First Amendment argument has been raised against the enforceability of mahrs in some other cases. I've only seen it squarely confronted in one other case, Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93 (N.J. Super. Ch. 2002), which held that a mahr may be enforced so long as it can be enforced based upon 'neutral principles of law' and not on religious policy or theories, for instance if it simply and expressly calls for a money payment. Eugene -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Thursday, July 17, 2008 2:13 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Judicial enforcement of Islamic dowry-on-divorce agreements Mohammed Zawahiri and Raghad Z. Alwattar were married, in an arranged marriage. The day of the wedding, Zawahiri signed a mahr under which he promised to pay his wife $25,000 in the event of divorce. A few days ago, the Ohio Court of Appeals (http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/10/2008/2008-ohio- 3473.pdf) held that the agreement was unenforceable under generally applicable Ohio prenuptial agreement law (chiefly because it was presented a very short time before the wedding ceremony and postponement of the ceremony would cause significant hardship, embarrassment, or emotional stress, and because Zawahiri did not have the opportunity to consult with an attorney prior to signing the marriage contract); this may well be right. What particularly interests me, though, is the trial court's alternative basis for its decision, on which the appellate court didn't opine: The First Amendment barred enforcement of a mahr -- just as it would bar the enforcement of an agreement to give a Jewish religious divorce (citing an unpublished Ohio decision, Steinberg v. Steinberg, 1982 WL 2446 (Ohio. App.)). Though the mahr requirement seems less like a religious act than the participation in a religious divorce ceremony, because the obligation to pay $25,000 is rooted in a religious practice, it is similarly a religious act and a court therefore can't order the husband to make the payment. I've put the trial court decision online at http://volokh.com/files/zawahiri.pdf . Could that be right? Is it even constitutionally permissible to categorically refuse to enforce all contracts -- including those that call for what would otherwise be seen as secular behavior -- because they are rooted in a religious practice? Or would such a denial of civil court access to people who seek enforcement of contracts, simply because the contracts are rooted in a religious practice (and don't require any determination of religious truth or religious law, coercion of inherently religious conduct, or supervision of religious institutions or rituals), itself violate the Free Exercise Clause? Eugene ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Judicial enforcement of Islamic dowry-on-divorce agreements
The New Jersey court surely has the better of this argument. The Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. Wolf rests on the view that of course the courts can enforce contracts that implement underlying religious practices, so long as the contracts are written in secular language. . Quoting Volokh, Eugene [EMAIL PROTECTED]: I should note, by the way, that a similar First Amendment argument has been raised against the enforceability of mahrs in some other cases. I've only seen it squarely confronted in one other case, Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93 (N.J. Super. Ch. 2002), which held that a mahr may be enforced so long as it can be enforced based upon 'neutral principles of law' and not on religious policy or theories, for instance if it simply and expressly calls for a money payment. Eugene -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Thursday, July 17, 2008 2:13 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Judicial enforcement of Islamic dowry-on-divorce agreements Mohammed Zawahiri and Raghad Z. Alwattar were married, in an arranged marriage. The day of the wedding, Zawahiri signed a mahr under which he promised to pay his wife $25,000 in the event of divorce. A few days ago, the Ohio Court of Appeals (http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/10/2008/2008-ohio[1]- 3473.pdf) held that the agreement was unenforceable under generally applicable Ohio prenuptial agreement law (chiefly because it was presented a very short time before the wedding ceremony and postponement of the ceremony would cause significant hardship, embarrassment, or emotional stress, and because Zawahiri did not have the opportunity to consult with an attorney prior to signing the marriage contract); this may well be right. What particularly interests me, though, is the trial court's alternative basis for its decision, on which the appellate court didn't opine: The First Amendment barred enforcement of a mahr -- just as it would bar the enforcement of an agreement to give a Jewish religious divorce (citing an unpublished Ohio decision, Steinberg v. Steinberg, 1982 WL 2446 (Ohio. App.)). Though the mahr requirement seems less like a religious act than the participation in a religious divorce ceremony, because the obligation to pay $25,000 is rooted in a religious practice, it is similarly a religious act and a court therefore can't order the husband to make the payment. I've put the trial court decision online at http://volokh.com/files/zawahiri.pdf[2] . Could that be right? Is it even constitutionally permissible to categorically refuse to enforce all contracts -- including those that call for what would otherwise be seen as secular behavior -- because they are rooted in a religious practice? Or would such a denial of civil court access to people who seek enforcement of contracts, simply because the contracts are rooted in a religious practice (and don't require any determination of religious truth or religious law, coercion of inherently religious conduct, or supervision of religious institutions or rituals), itself violate the Free Exercise Clause? Eugene ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw[3] Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw[4] Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. Douglas Laycock Yale Kamisar Collegiate Professor of Law University of Michigan Law School 625 S. State St. Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1215 734-647-9713 Links: -- [1] http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/10/2008/2008-ohio [2] http://volokh.com/files/zawahiri.pdf [3] http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw [4] http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages
Re: Judicial enforcement of Islamic dowry-on-divorce agreements
I am travelling and don,t have the citation but the new york court of appeals held the ketubah is enforceable. The ketubah is the jewish eqiuvalent of the islamic mahr(indeed the word mahr has a hebrew equivalent mohar_a word used in the bible in exodus 21 Marc stern - Original Message - From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Thu Jul 17 17:20:05 2008 Subject: RE: Judicial enforcement of Islamic dowry-on-divorce agreements I should note, by the way, that a similar First Amendment argument has been raised against the enforceability of mahrs in some other cases. I've only seen it squarely confronted in one other case, Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93 (N.J. Super. Ch. 2002), which held that a mahr may be enforced so long as it can be enforced based upon 'neutral principles of law' and not on religious policy or theories, for instance if it simply and expressly calls for a money payment. Eugene -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Thursday, July 17, 2008 2:13 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Judicial enforcement of Islamic dowry-on-divorce agreements Mohammed Zawahiri and Raghad Z. Alwattar were married, in an arranged marriage. The day of the wedding, Zawahiri signed a mahr under which he promised to pay his wife $25,000 in the event of divorce. A few days ago, the Ohio Court of Appeals (http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/10/2008/2008-ohio- 3473.pdf) held that the agreement was unenforceable under generally applicable Ohio prenuptial agreement law (chiefly because it was presented a very short time before the wedding ceremony and postponement of the ceremony would cause significant hardship, embarrassment, or emotional stress, and because Zawahiri did not have the opportunity to consult with an attorney prior to signing the marriage contract); this may well be right. What particularly interests me, though, is the trial court's alternative basis for its decision, on which the appellate court didn't opine: The First Amendment barred enforcement of a mahr -- just as it would bar the enforcement of an agreement to give a Jewish religious divorce (citing an unpublished Ohio decision, Steinberg v. Steinberg, 1982 WL 2446 (Ohio. App.)). Though the mahr requirement seems less like a religious act than the participation in a religious divorce ceremony, because the obligation to pay $25,000 is rooted in a religious practice, it is similarly a religious act and a court therefore can't order the husband to make the payment. I've put the trial court decision online at http://volokh.com/files/zawahiri.pdf . Could that be right? Is it even constitutionally permissible to categorically refuse to enforce all contracts -- including those that call for what would otherwise be seen as secular behavior -- because they are rooted in a religious practice? Or would such a denial of civil court access to people who seek enforcement of contracts, simply because the contracts are rooted in a religious practice (and don't require any determination of religious truth or religious law, coercion of inherently religious conduct, or supervision of religious institutions or rituals), itself violate the Free Exercise Clause? Eugene ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Judicial enforcement of Islamic dowry-on-divorce agreements
I jusr remembered that the case I refered to is avitzur v avitzur Marc - Original Message - From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Thu Jul 17 17:37:15 2008 Subject: Re: Judicial enforcement of Islamic dowry-on-divorce agreements I am travelling and don,t have the citation but the new york court of appeals held the ketubah is enforceable. The ketubah is the jewish eqiuvalent of the islamic mahr(indeed the word mahr has a hebrew equivalent mohar_a word used in the bible in exodus 21 Marc stern - Original Message - From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Thu Jul 17 17:20:05 2008 Subject: RE: Judicial enforcement of Islamic dowry-on-divorce agreements I should note, by the way, that a similar First Amendment argument has been raised against the enforceability of mahrs in some other cases. I've only seen it squarely confronted in one other case, Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93 (N.J. Super. Ch. 2002), which held that a mahr may be enforced so long as it can be enforced based upon 'neutral principles of law' and not on religious policy or theories, for instance if it simply and expressly calls for a money payment. Eugene -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Thursday, July 17, 2008 2:13 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Judicial enforcement of Islamic dowry-on-divorce agreements Mohammed Zawahiri and Raghad Z. Alwattar were married, in an arranged marriage. The day of the wedding, Zawahiri signed a mahr under which he promised to pay his wife $25,000 in the event of divorce. A few days ago, the Ohio Court of Appeals (http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/10/2008/2008-ohio- 3473.pdf) held that the agreement was unenforceable under generally applicable Ohio prenuptial agreement law (chiefly because it was presented a very short time before the wedding ceremony and postponement of the ceremony would cause significant hardship, embarrassment, or emotional stress, and because Zawahiri did not have the opportunity to consult with an attorney prior to signing the marriage contract); this may well be right. What particularly interests me, though, is the trial court's alternative basis for its decision, on which the appellate court didn't opine: The First Amendment barred enforcement of a mahr -- just as it would bar the enforcement of an agreement to give a Jewish religious divorce (citing an unpublished Ohio decision, Steinberg v. Steinberg, 1982 WL 2446 (Ohio. App.)). Though the mahr requirement seems less like a religious act than the participation in a religious divorce ceremony, because the obligation to pay $25,000 is rooted in a religious practice, it is similarly a religious act and a court therefore can't order the husband to make the payment. I've put the trial court decision online at http://volokh.com/files/zawahiri.pdf . Could that be right? Is it even constitutionally permissible to categorically refuse to enforce all contracts -- including those that call for what would otherwise be seen as secular behavior -- because they are rooted in a religious practice? Or would such a denial of civil court access to people who seek enforcement of contracts, simply because the contracts are rooted in a religious practice (and don't require any determination of religious truth or religious law, coercion of inherently religious conduct, or supervision of religious institutions or rituals), itself violate the Free Exercise Clause? Eugene ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be
