RE: speech and religion hypothetical

[Volokh, Eugene]

   No and no.  A content-neutral restriction forbidding the 
disruption of speakers who have been invited by a group that has booked a room, 
and thus gotten exclusive access to the room for that time, is certainly 
constitutional.  And religious speakers are no more and no less protected here.

   Eugene

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Alan E Brownstein
Sent: Thursday, April 21, 2016 9:41 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics 
Subject: speech and religion hypothetical


I recognize this hypothetical, based very indirectly on a real incident, is 
more speech than religion, but I hope Eugene will allow my post to go forward 
in any case.



Suppose a LGBT student group at a public university invites a guest speaker to 
present a scheduled lecture in a university classroom. The campus 
administration allows student groups to invite speakers and to sign up to use 
campus facilities with few restrictions.  It is a common practice. A group of 
religious students strongly opposed to the speaker's message disrupt the 
speaker's presentation after it has begun. They commandeer the front of the 
room and chant anti-LGBT messages for 3 - 4 minutes. Then they leave. 
(Alternatively, we can reverse the facts and have  the presentation of a 
religious speaker invited by a religious group of students disrupted by gay 
rights proponents to a similar extent.)



I have two questions for list members.



1. Is the conduct of the protestors protected by the Free Speech Clause of the 
First Amendment? Does the First Amendment prevent the university from 
prohibiting this kind of protest through content neutral time, place and manner 
regulations and from punishing the protestors' conduct if the regulations are 
disobeyed? (If you think that this is or is not protected speech, are there 
particular cases you rely on to support this conclusion?)



2. Does the answer to the first question change in any way because religious 
speakers, protestors, and messages are involved in these incidents.



Alan Brownstein








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speech and religion hypothetical

[Alan E Brownstein]

I recognize this hypothetical, based very indirectly on a real incident, is 
more speech than religion, but I hope Eugene will allow my post to go forward 
in any case.


Suppose a LGBT student group at a public university invites a guest speaker to 
present a scheduled lecture in a university classroom. The campus 
administration allows student groups to invite speakers and to sign up to use 
campus facilities with few restrictions.  It is a common practice. A group of 
religious students strongly opposed to the speaker's message disrupt the 
speaker's presentation after it has begun. They commandeer the front of the 
room and chant anti-LGBT messages for 3 - 4 minutes. Then they leave. 
(Alternatively, we can reverse the facts and have  the presentation of a 
religious speaker invited by a religious group of students disrupted by gay 
rights proponents to a similar extent.)


I have two questions for list members.


1. Is the conduct of the protestors protected by the Free Speech Clause of the 
First Amendment? Does the First Amendment prevent the university from 
prohibiting this kind of protest through content neutral time, place and manner 
regulations and from punishing the protestors' conduct if the regulations are 
disobeyed? (If you think that this is or is not protected speech, are there 
particular cases you rely on to support this conclusion?)


2. Does the answer to the first question change in any way because religious 
speakers, protestors, and messages are involved in these incidents.


Alan Brownstein




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Zubik: Revisiting the Laycock/BJC Amicus Brief in Light of the Supplemental Briefing

[James Oleske]

My impression after oral argument was that things went better for the
petitioners and worse for the government than many expected, in large part
because the substantial-burden issue got so little play.

My impression after reading the two rounds of supplemental briefs, which
ended with the filing of today's reply briefs, is that the petitioners may
have put the substantial-burden issue squarely back on the table.

In particular, the argument the petitioners have chosen to focus on in the
supplemental briefs -- that they are now okay with their insurance
companies providing contraceptive coverage to their employees, but that
coverage cannot be the "automatic" result of their opting out and must be
delivered through a "separate policy with a separate card" -- might well
remind the justices of following passage from the amicus brief filed by
Doug and the Baptist Joint Committee (a passage, by the way, that follows a
hypothetical that looks quite similar to the proposal in the Court's order):

"These objections reach too far. They are in fact objections to the
government pursuing its own interests by its own means. Petitioners object
to how the government regulates secular insurers No matter how they
describe it, their objection seeks to control their secular insurance
companies and the government’s regulation of those companies. The acts
required of them are purely incidental; they would have the same objections
if the government required nothing of them. Some substantial-burden cases
may be difficult, but many, including these cases, are amenable to
bright-line rules. Religious objectors are not entitled to exemptions for
secular entities they deal with at arm’s length, or to control the
government’s regulation of such entities."


- Jim
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