Ben,
We seem to agree that probability theory can/should be applied in certain
situations, but not in certain others. Now the problem is the condition for
the application.
Clearly, when there isn't much data, probability theory shouldn't be used.
If the available data is rich, it is usually fine
Ben,
We seem to agree that probability theory can/should be applied in certain
situations, but not in certain others. Now the problem is the
condition for
the application.
Not exactly. I think that probability theory is nearly always useful, but
that in some situations it can be used
Ben Goertzel wrote:
BTW, to me, the psychological work on human bias, heuristics, and
fallacy (including the well known work by Tversky and Kahneman)
contains many wrong results --- the phenomena are correctly
documented, but their analysis and conclusions are often based on
implicit assumptions
Here is an old paper of Pei's on the Wason card experiment:
http://www.cogsci.indiana.edu/farg/peiwang/PUBLICATION/wang.evidence.pdf
I don't know if he wrote something similar relating to Tversky's experiments
or not. I think I remember reading it, but I don't remember where it was...
I think
Sure, but NARS or any other uncertain inference system, when applied to
predicting the future, also falls prey to Hume's induction paradox.
There's
no way to avoid it.
Recall how Hume avoided it: he introduced the assumption of human
nature.
In modern terms, he argued that we have some
Here is an old paper of Pei's on the Wason card experiment:
http://www.cogsci.indiana.edu/farg/peiwang/PUBLICATION/wang.evidence.pdf
Ben: Thanks for replying for me.
I don't know if he wrote something similar relating to Tversky's
experiments
or not. I think I remember reading it, but I
Probability theory is not compactable with the first semantics above ...
It should be compatible. Sorry.
Pei
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According to my experience-grounded semantics, in NARS truth value (the
frequency-confidence pair) measures the compatibility between a statement
and available (past) experience, without assuming anything about the real
world or the future experience of the system.
I know you also accept a
Here is an old paper of Pei's on the Wason card experiment:
http://www.cogsci.indiana.edu/farg/peiwang/PUBLICATION/wang.evidence.pdf
Attached is a Word document discussing the Wason card experiment from the
perspective of Probabilistic Term Logic.
Basically, I disagree with Pei that
Since confidence is defined as a function of the amount of evidence (in past
experience), it is based on no assumption about the object world. Of course,
I cannot prevent other people from interpreting it in other ways.
I've made it clear in several places (such as
Ok, Pei, but I wonder a bit whether the distinctions you're making here are
deeply semantic or just verbal ...
You say your system makes no assumptions about reality. That's fine -- but
still, your system has to make assumptions about the nature of its
experience over time. Specifically,
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