On Sunday 14 September 2003 16:31, Cliff Stabbert wrote:
Hi, you wrote:
a I don't quite follow this train of thought. Physicalism to me is
a justified by the success of the natural sciences with their
a materialist ontology of atoms, electrons, molecules and so on.
It is entirely possible
Arnoud,
On Sep 15, 2003, at 2:36 AM, arnoud wrote:
On Sunday 14 September 2003 18:38, Tim wrote:
On Sep 14, 2003, at 5:30 PM, arnoud wrote:
Hello Tim,
The other ontological monist stances are philosophical idealism and
neutral
monism. But almost nobody holds those theories anymore (not?).
arnoud:
a On Sunday 14 September 2003 16:31, Cliff Stabbert wrote:
aca I don't quite follow this train of thought. Physicalism to me is
aca justified by the success of the natural sciences with their
aca materialist ontology of atoms, electrons, molecules and so on.
ac
ac It is entirely possible
Hello all,
Been on the list listening for a week. Thought I would chime in. First,
this has been a nice chance to see a lot of sharp minds in action.
Having followed Ben's work for a while, I am not entirely surprised.
There are lot of points that I would like to engage, but let me break
it
Hello Tim,
On Sunday 14 September 2003 02:21, Timothy Estes wrote:
(1) Private Language / Communicability of Qualia
The movement from a discussion of the ontological status of qualia -
i.e. illusion, representation, or substance - to the communicability of
these items is an engaging turn
Hi, you wrote:
a I don't quite follow this train of thought. Physicalism to me is
a justified by the success of the natural sciences with their
a materialist ontology of atoms, electrons, molecules and so on.
It is entirely possible to use the scientific method and its fruits
without buying into
On Sep 14, 2003, at 5:30 PM, arnoud wrote:
Hello Tim,
The other ontological monist stances are philosophical idealism and
neutral
monism. But almost nobody holds those theories anymore (not?).
Materialism is
by far the most dominant monist position. Like Fodor said: we are all
materialists now
arnoud, first off let me apologize for my tone (not necessarily my
content) towards the end. I shouldn't post when I'm out of coffee ;)
arnoud:
a Yes, of course. Pain without pain behaviour, and also pain
a behaviour without pain can happen. The point is that if that were
a the case most of the
arnoud wrote:
a Well, to name internal events, there have to be rules/criteria for correct use
a of a term/name, like always for any use of language. How do you know how to
a use the word 'pain' for example, how did you learn its rule(s)? Well probably
a from your parents who told you you were
You're arguing that experiences are projected into the social domain by the use of language. But in my view, they are merely projected into the *social* domain by the use of language. There are several different perspectives on language. The perspective that language is based on rules is one
On Tuesday 09 September 2003 19:41, Ben Goertzel wrote:
On Monday 08 September 2003 14:37, Ben Goertzel wrote:
The problem is to
fit qualia
into a pure physicalistic ontology. Physical theories because of
their success have become the measure of all things.
I understand
I see physics as a collection of patterns in the experienced
world. It's a
very, very powerful and intense collection of patterns. But
nevertheless,
it's not totally comprehensive, in the sense that there are
some patterns
in the experienced world that are not part of physics, but
On Wednesday 10 September 2003 06:12, Ben Goertzel wrote:
Then you see qualia as something over and above (or next to) the material
world and you hold a kind of mind-bodydualism.
Not over and above -- of course not. Next to would be more accurate.
Well, that still sounds very much like
On Monday 08 September 2003 14:37, Ben Goertzel wrote:
The problem is to
fit qualia
into a pure physicalistic ontology. Physical theories because of their
success have become the measure of all things.
I understand your perspective, but mine is different. I'm not
so sure that
Ben Goertzel wrote:
I see physics as a collection of patterns in the experienced world. It's a
very, very powerful and intense collection of patterns. But nevertheless,
it's not totally comprehensive, in the sense that there are some patterns in
the experienced world that are not part of
I am not sure if I define qualia exactly the same way as Dennett or not;
that would take some thought to figure out...
However, I think it's clear that qualia -- examples thereof, though perhaps
not the abstract concept -- are found useful by people in conducting
conversations about their own
On Monday 08 September 2003 04:27, Ben Goertzel wrote:
I am not sure if I define qualia exactly the same way as Dennett or not;
that would take some thought to figure out...
Qualia are what-things-look-like-to-you (or to e.g. me). This generally
accepted in the philosophy of mind. But of
The problem is to
fit qualia
into a pure physicalistic ontology. Physical theories because of their
success have become the measure of all things.
I understand your perspective, but mine is different. I'm not so sure that
physical theories are the measure of all things. Physicalistic
On Saturday 06 September 2003 20:45, Jef Allbright wrote:
Of course the strong sense of immediacy and directness trumps logical and
philosophical arguments. In a very circular (and conventionally correct
way) we certainly are our feelings. And in the bigger picture, that self
is an illusion
Jef wrote:
On Saturday 06 September 2003 20:45, Jef Allbright wrote:
Of course the strong sense of immediacy and directness trumps
logical and philosophical arguments. In a very circular (and
conventionally correct way) we certainly are our feelings. And in
the bigger picture, that self is
Arnoud, it appears there is agreement that qualia exist -- as a very real
illusion. The problem of qualia, however, seems to be the
question of how
to represent/implement qualia in a thinking machine (assuming this must be
designed-in for true and full consciousness.)
...
From a wider
On Sunday 07 September 2003 10:46, Jef Allbright wrote:
Jef wrote:
Arnoud, it appears there is agreement that qualia exist -- as a very real
illusion. The problem of qualia, however, seems to be the question of
how to represent/implement qualia in a thinking machine (assuming this must
be
Qualia by their definition (ineffable, non-causal etc.) have no
function, can
have no function in the system, that I do agree with Dennett ('quining
qualia'). I also agree with Dennett that if the behaviour of a system is
completely explained nothing remains, all extra ontology is just
PROTECTED]
Behalf Of Timothy Estes
Sent: Sunday, September 07, 2003 10:24 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [agi] Web Consciousness and self consciousness
I'm new... is there a way to see the beginning of this discussion. I am
intrigued to comment, but don't want to repeat something that has
On 9/6/03 2:34 AM, arnoud [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If you look at consciousness scientifically you would like an operational
(measurement of behaviour) definition. In that case two can be
given(sketched): 1 consciousness is attention and control. 2 consciousness is
reporting of internal
I would define consciousness more simply as being able to measure
the impact
of your existence on those things you observe.
...
I would say that
consciousness is at its
essence a purely inferred self-model, which naturally requires a fairly
large machine to support the model.
Cheers,
James Rogers wrote:
I would say that consciousness is at its essence a purely inferred
self-model, which naturally requires a fairly large machine to
support the model.
Ben Goertzel wrote:
Of course, this captures part of the consciousness phenomenon, but
it's very much a
Title: RE: [agi] Web Consciousness and self consciousness
Hi
Shai,
I read
your brief article on consciousness.
Much
of what you say is agreeable to me -- I do think that human consciousness has a
lot to do with the kind of "attentional dynamics" of active "objects" t
Title: RE: [agi] Web Consciousness and self consciousness
The URL I was referring to
is...
http://goertzel.org/dynapsyc/2000/ConsciousnessInWebmind.htm
--
ben
I
have a slightly different phraseology for discussing these topics,but I
think my ideas on attentional dynamics
Title: Web Consciousness and self consciousness
Here is a pointer for a very short paper I wrote, trying to explain what is the web self consciousness, and self concsionsness in general.
Would be glad to get your feedback,
Thanks,
Shai.
Just a word of advice, you'd get more and better feedback if your .htm
didn't crash IE.
If you've got some wierd html in there, tone it down a bit.
---
To unsubscribe, change your address, or temporarily deactivate your subscription,
please go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/[EMAIL
Title: RE: [agi] Web Consciousness and self consciousness
You're right. Sorry.
Attached is a word version.
Thanks,
Shai.
-Original Message-
From: Brad Wyble [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2003 2:30 PM
To: '[EMAIL PROTECTED]'
Subject: Re: [agi] Web
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