Ben,
I'm glad that you have decided to respond to, - or at least recognize - my
criticisms/points re creativity, because they are extremely important and
central to AGI - as I said, it isn't just you but everyone who is avoiding
them - when it is in all your interests to confront them
A brief and non-technical description of the two types of semantics
mentioned in the previous discussions:
(1) Model-Theoretic Semantics (MTS)
(1.1) There is a world existing independently outside the intelligent
system (human or machine).
(1.2) In principle, there is an objective description
Thanks Pei,
I would add (for others, obviously you know this stuff) that there are many
different
theoretical justifications of probability theory, hence that the use of
probability
theory does not imply model-theoretic semantics nor any other particular
approach to semantics.
My own philosophy
Ben,
Of course, probability theory, in its mathematical form, is not
bounded to any semantics at all, though it implicitly exclude some
possibilities. A semantic theory is associated to it when probability
theory is applied to a practical situation.
There are several major schools in the
Mike,
A very messily formatted rough draft of From Complexity to Creativity is
here
http://www.goertzel.org/books/complex/contents.html
Alas I long ago lost the wordperfect 5.1 file that was used to generate the
final proofs way back when...
The chapter that gives an overall theory of the
I think it's normal for tempers to flare during a depression. This
kind of technology really pays for itself. The only thing that matters
is the code
Eric B
On 10/12/08, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
No idea, Mentifex ... I haven't filtered out any of your messages (or
anyone's) ...
Pei,
In this context, how do you justify the use of 'k'? It seems like, by
introducing 'k', you add a reliance on the truth of the future after
k observations into the semantics. Since the induction/abduction
formula is dependent on 'k', the truth values that result no longer
only summarize
On the other hand, in PLN's indefinite probabilities there is a parameter k
which
plays a similar mathematical role, yet **is** explicitly interpreted as
being about
a number of hypothetical future observations ...
Clearly the interplay btw algebra and interpretation is one of the things
that
True. Similar parameters can be found in the work of Carnap and
Walley, with different interpretations.
Pei
On Sun, Oct 12, 2008 at 2:11 PM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On the other hand, in PLN's indefinite probabilities there is a parameter k
which
plays a similar mathematical
Pei,
You are right, it doesn't make any such assumptions while Bayesian
practice does. But, the parameter 'k' still fixes the length of time
into the future that we are interested in predicting, right? So it
seems to me that the truth value must be predictive, if its
calculation depends on what
On Sun, Oct 12, 2008 at 3:06 PM, Abram Demski [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Pei,
You are right, it doesn't make any such assumptions while Bayesian
practice does. But, the parameter 'k' still fixes the length of time
into the future that we are interested in predicting, right? So it
seems to me
Hugh Loebner talks AI
http://developers.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=08/10/11/2137200
I may have written my signature twice on the OpenCog list, earlier
today. I'm going to try to not do that. Otherwise I have nothing to
report
---
agi
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