Re: Scalia, Textualism, and Printz

2003-10-15 Thread Scott Gerber
Bobby: You're assuming that Justice Scalia is being consistent. Prof. Tribe wrote a wonderful comment in the Harvard Law Review about the Saenz case that convinced me (if I needed more convincing) that almost none of the justices (conservative or liberal) are methodologically consistent. I

Re: Scalia, Textualism, and Printz

2003-10-15 Thread Richard Dougherty
Scott: Do you think Scalia was being inconsistent in this case? In addition to Larry Tribe's comment, I would recommend Sandy Levinson's piece, The Operational Irrelevance of Originalism. The question of the authority of precedent is obviously a significant challenge for originalists, but Scalia

Re: Scalia, Textualism, and Printz

2003-10-15 Thread Larry Solum
If I may be permitted to raise a minor quibble with Scott's point: (1) A demonstration of methodological inconsistency is always difficult. Because judges do not articulate their full theory of the law, the methodology of a particular judge must always be inferred. When trying to prove a charge

Re: Scalia, Textualism, and Printz

2003-10-15 Thread Eric Segall
A larger problem for Justice Scalia in Printz is that after he says text doesn't help (which by the way it does, see Steven's dissent), is that Scalia then purports to look at history, structure, and precedent, though history and structure clearly cut against the result. New York does

Re: Scalia, Textualism, and Printz

2003-10-15 Thread earl maltz
I must be getting slow in my old age, but I don't see how precedent poses a greater problem for originalists than for those who take other views. A judicial decision is a superceding text adopted through a legitimate process (even if the mode of reasoning is not what I would choose). It is thus