Re: The problem with Steganography

2000-01-26 Thread Nelson Minar
I wonder if stego users will have to choose between uncrackable encryption or undetectable data. I don't think so. Replacing the low-order bits of a picture with random noise (or an encrypted message) is silly - like you say, anyone can find it easily. But there is a certain amount of free

Re: The problem with Steganography

2000-01-26 Thread lcs Mixmaster Remailer
The basic notion of stego is that one replaces 'noise' in a document with the stego'ed information. Thus, a 'good' stego system must use a crypto strategy whose statistical properties mimic the noise properties of the carrying document. Our favorite off the shelf crypto algorithms do *not*

[Fwd: 1/28/00 C.S. Colloquium]

2000-01-26 Thread R. A. Hettinga
--- begin forwarded text Date: Tue, 25 Jan 2000 18:05:39 -0500 From: Richard Lethin [EMAIL PROTECTED] Organization: Reservoir Labs, Inc. To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [Fwd: 1/28/00 C.S. Colloquium] Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Reply-To: Richard Lethin [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- Reservoir Labs, Inc.

Re: legal status of RC4?

2000-01-26 Thread Greg Broiles
At 10:45 AM 1/25/00 , Eric Murray wrote: Real-To: Eric Murray [EMAIL PROTECTED] Does anyone know the legal status of RC4 in the US? I know that a cipher purporting to be RC4 was published on Cypherpunks by Anonymous, and that various crypto packages have RC4 or "EC4". My question is, has RSA

Re: The problem with Steganography

2000-01-26 Thread Russell Nelson
David Honig writes: At 03:20 PM 1/25/00 -0500, Russell Nelson wrote: I'm trying to do forward stego -- that is, publish some encrypted steganographic document, with the idea that, once everyone has a copy, *then* you reveal the key. Fascinating, captain. Canna imagine why.

Re: The problem with Steganography

2000-01-26 Thread P.J. Ponder
On Tue, 25 Jan 2000, Rick Smith wrote: . . . . For example, many stego implementations involve embedding data in the low order bits of a graphical image. Those low order bits undoubtedly have some measurably non-random statistical properties. Once we replace those bits with data, the bits

Re: The problem with Steganography

2000-01-26 Thread Dan Geer
If the picture was taken by an actual camera, the least significant bits will be random due to the nature of the way CCDs work in the real world. They might be biased, but it's not very hard to bias a "random" data stream. You could have the sender look at the bias in the

Re: legal status of RC4

2000-01-26 Thread Vin McLellan
Eric Murray [EMAIL PROTECTED] queried the Listocracy: Does anyone know the legal status of RC4 in the US? I know that a cipher purporting to be RC4 was published on Cypherpunks by Anonymous, and that various crypto packages have RC4 or "EC4". My question is, has RSA taken anyone to

Re: The problem with Steganography

2000-01-26 Thread Eric Tully
Forgive me if I'm missing the point here but I don't think the original question was how to make steganography better and hide the message more effectively (although that's certainly a valuable goal). Sometimes it's important to hide the fact that a secret message exists. A good guy in enemy

Re: NSA Declassified

2000-01-26 Thread Arnold G. Reinhold
John Young [EMAIL PROTECTED] responded: Your points are valid for the AIA document. However, in the Navy document, Number 9, image 3, there is the phrase, "Maintain and operate an ECHELON site." I had missed that reference. A agree that the capitalization here is consistent with a code name.

Re: DVD CCA Emergency Hearing to seal DeCSS

2000-01-26 Thread John Young
Up to 4 PM EST we've had no notice that the file has been "sealed." There have been over 26,000 downloads and they are now going out at 600 per hour.

Re: DVD CCA Emergency Hearing to seal DeCSS

2000-01-26 Thread John Young
This is becoming picayune but: I'm told that the court has now sealed Exhibits A and B of Hoy's declaration. These are the DeCSS notes and the CSS scramble code. However, the sealing applies only to the paper versions and will prevent hardcopying. Denying access to online versions will require

Re: The problem with Steganography

2000-01-26 Thread Ben Laurie
Rick Smith wrote: It sounds like there are a number of interesting design questions. For example, the sender and recipient must obviously share a secret key. Why is that obvious? What's wrong with encoding with the recipient's public key? Cheers, Ben. -- SECURE HOSTING AT THE BUNKER!

Re: The problem with Steganography

2000-01-26 Thread Ben Laurie
Rick Smith wrote: Rick Smith wrote: It sounds like there are a number of interesting design questions. For example, the sender and recipient must obviously share a secret key. At 10:18 PM 01/26/2000 +, Ben Laurie wrote: Why is that obvious? What's wrong with encoding with the

Re: The problem with Steganography

2000-01-26 Thread lcs Mixmaster Remailer
For example, it's possible that this email was written by a political prisoner in a 3rd world country and he's used steganography to conceal a message to his friends and family right here in these 3 paragraphs. My question is, without prior agreement or access to an outside channel, how are