Re: NSA back doors in encryption products

2000-05-28 Thread Arnold G. Reinhold
At 8:39 AM -0400 5/27/2000, Steven M. Bellovin wrote: In message v04210109b5531fa89365@[24.218.56.92], "Arnold G. Reinhold" writes: o There is the proposed legislation I cited earlier to protect these methods from being revealed in court. These are not aimed at news reports (that would never

Re: NSA back doors in encryption products

2000-05-28 Thread David Honig
At 02:39 PM 5/26/00 -0500, Jim Choate wrote: No, you don't. Sign the source and binaries. And you trust the software that verifies the signatures why?

Re: Andrew Fernandes on NSA back doors

2000-05-28 Thread John Young
Arnold Rheinhold wrote: I'm afraid I don't find Mr. Fernandes' argument convincing. ... To me the mystery is why Microsoft is unwilling to fully explain its actions. Perhaps there are other details they do not wish to reveal. For example, since each CAPI module to be signed would require BXA

Re: NSA back doors in encryption products

2000-05-28 Thread David Honig
At 05:54 AM 5/27/00 +0100, Ben Laurie wrote: David Honig wrote: Yes but *once* you've verified the RTL (and from them the masks) you don't have to worry about some stray applet hosing your security. You do with software. Errr ... you do with an FPGA, surely? Yep. By definition,