On Oct 1, 2013, at 12:27 PM, Dirk-Willem van Gulik wrote:
It's clear what 10x stronger than needed means for a support beam: We're
pretty good at modeling the forces on a beam and we know how strong beams of
given sizes are.
Actually - do we ? I picked this example as it is one of those
On Oct 1, 2013, at 5:10 PM, Jeffrey Schiller wrote:
A friend of mine who used to build submarines once told me that the first
time the sub is submerged, the folks who built it are on board. :-)
Indeed. A friend served on nuclear subs; I heard about that practice from him.
(The same practice
On Oct 1, 2013, at 5:58 PM, Peter Fairbrother wrote:
[and why doesn't AES-256 have 256-bit blocks???]
Because there's no security advantage, but a practical disadvantage.
When blocks are small enough, the birthday paradox may imply repeated blocks
after too short a time to be comfortable.
On 2/10/13 00:43 AM, James A. Donald wrote:
On 2013-10-01 14:36, Bill Stewart wrote:
It's the data representations that map them into binary strings that
are a
wretched hive of scum and villainy, particularly because you can't
depend on a
bit string being able to map back into any well-defined
Greg writes:
This falls somewhere in the land of beyond-the-absurd.
So, my password, iPoopInYourHat, is being sent to me in the clear by your
servers.
Repeat after me: crypto without a threat model is like cookies without
milk.
If you are proposing that something needs stronger encryption
On 10/01/2013 11:36 PM, R. Hirschfeld wrote:
Your objections are understandable but aren't really an issue with
mailman because if you don't enter a password then mailman will choose
one for you (which I always let it do) and there's no need to remember
it because if you ever need it (a rare
On 10/02/2013 12:11 AM, Joshua Marpet wrote:
Low security environment, minimal ability to inflict damage, clear
instructions from the beginning.
Agreed.
There certainly are bigger problems on earth. And I really don't mind if
you move on and take care of any of those, first. :-)
If the
On 2013-10-02 13:18, Tony Arcieri wrote:
LANGSEC calls this: full recognition before processing
http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~sergey/langsec/occupy/
http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/%7Esergey/langsec/occupy/
I disagree slightly with langsec.
At compile time you want an extremely powerful language
On 10/02/2013 12:03 AM, Greg wrote:
Running a mailing list is not hard work. There are only so many things
one can fuck up. This is probably one of the biggest mistakes that can
be made in running a mailing list, and on a list that's about software
security. It's just ridiculous.
While I
BBN has created three ASN.1 code generators over time and even released a
couple. (ASN.1 to C, C++, and Java). I believe that DER to support typical
X.509 management is the easiest subset. I can check on status for release to
open source if there is interest. It has been available as part of
On 1/10/13 23:13 PM, Peter Fairbrother wrote:
...
Sounds like you want CurveCP?
http://curvecp.org/
Yes, EXACTLY that. Proposals like CurveCP.
I have said this first part before:
Dan Boneh was talking at this years RSA cryptographers track about
putting some sort of
Hi Peter,
On 30/09/13 23:31 PM, Peter Fairbrother wrote:
On 26/09/13 07:52, ianG wrote:
On 26/09/13 02:24 AM, Peter Fairbrother wrote:
On 25/09/13 17:17, ianG wrote:
On 24/09/13 19:23 PM, Kelly John Rose wrote:
I have always approached that no encryption is better than bad
encryption,
On 09/30/13 04:41, ianG wrote:
Experience suggests that asking a standards committee to do the encoding format
is a disaster.
I just looked at my code, which does something we call Wire, and it's 700 loc.
Testing code is about a kloc I suppose. Writing reference implementations is a
piece
On Oct 1, 2013, at 5:58 PM, Peter Fairbrother zenadsl6...@zen.co.uk wrote:
AES, the latest-and-greatest block cipher, comes in two main forms - AES-128
and AES-256.
AES-256 is supposed to have a brute force work factor of 2^256 - but we find
that in fact it actually has a very similar
Replying to James and John.
Yes, the early ARPANET protocols are much better than many that are in
binary formats. But the point where data encoding becomes an issue is where
you have nested structures. SMTP does not have nested structures or need
them. A lot of application protocols do.
I have
On 30 September 2013 23:35, John Kelsey crypto@gmail.com wrote:
If there is a weak curve class of greater than about 2^{80} that NSA knew
about 15 years ago and were sure nobody were ever going to find that weak
curve class and exploit it to break classified communications protected by
On Oct 1, 2013, at 12:51 PM, Adam Back a...@cypherspace.org wrote:
[Discussing how NSA might have generated weak curves via trying many choices
till they hit a weak-curve class that only they knew how to solve.]
...
But the more interesting question I was referring to is a trapdoor weakness
I'm interested in cases where Mailman passwords have been abused.
Show me one instance where a nuclear reactor was brought down by an
earthquake! Just one! Then I'll consider spending the $$ on it!
--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing with
the NSA.
On
While I agree in principle, I don't quite like the tone here.
I agree, I apologize for the excessively negative tone. I think RL (and
unrelated) agitation affected my writing and word choice. I've taken steps to
prevent that from happening again (via magic of self-censoring software).
But I
On 10/02/2013 04:32 PM, Greg wrote:
I agree, I apologize for the excessively negative tone. I think RL (and
unrelated) agitation affected my writing and word choice. I've taken
steps to prevent that from happening again (via magic of self-censoring
software).
Cool. :-)
I don't see why a
Has anyone tried to systematically look at what has led to previous crypto
failures? That would inform us about where we need to be adding armor plate.
My impression (this may be the availability heuristic at work) is that:
a. Most attacks come from protocol or mode failures, not so much
Hm.. that's a nice idea, but I don't think it can work reliably. What if
the send path changes in between? AFAIK there are legitimate reasons for
that, like load balancers or weird greylisting setups.
You're right, I think I misunderstood you when you talked about a one time
password. I
Hi,
On 01/10/2013 19:39, Peter Fairbrother wrote:
Also, the method by which the generators (and thus the actual groups in
use, not the curves) were chosen is unclear.
If we're talking about the NIST curves over prime fields, they all have cofactor
1, so the actual group used is E(F_p), the
maybe offtopic
On Tue, 1 Oct 2013, someone who (if I've unwrapped the nested quoting
correctly) might have been Jerry Leichter wrote:
There are three levels of construction. If you're putting together
a small garden shed, it looks right is generally enough - at least
if it's someone with
On Oct 2, 2013, at 9:54 AM, Paul Crowley p...@ciphergoth.org wrote:
On 30 September 2013 23:35, John Kelsey crypto@gmail.com wrote:
If there is a weak curve class of greater than about 2^{80} that NSA knew
about 15 years ago and were sure nobody were ever going to find that weak
curve
2. okt. 2013 kl. 16:59 skrev John Kelsey crypto@gmail.com:
On Oct 2, 2013, at 9:54 AM, Paul Crowley p...@ciphergoth.org wrote:
On 30 September 2013 23:35, John Kelsey crypto@gmail.com wrote:
If there is a weak curve class of greater than about 2^{80} that NSA knew
about 15 years
--- Start of forwarded message ---
Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2013 10:55:03 -0400
From: Nicolas Christin nicol...@cmu.edu
Subject: [fc-announce] Financial Cryptography 2014 Call for Papers
Call for Papers
FC 2014 March 3-7, 2014
Accra Beach Hotel Spa, Barbados
Financial Cryptography and Data
On 1 Oct 2013 23:48 Jerry Leichter wrote:
The larger the construction project, the tighter the limits on this stuff. I
used to work with a former structural engineer, and he repeated some of the
bad example stories they are taught. A famous case a number of years back
involved a hotel
2013/10/2 Russ Nelson nel...@crynwr.com
If you are proposing that something needs stronger encryption than
ROT-26, please explain the threat model that justifies your choice of
encryption and key distribution algorithms.
ROT-26 is fantastic for certain purposes. Like when encrypting for kids
On Oct 2, 2013, at 10:46 AM, Viktor Dukhovni cryptogra...@dukhovni.org wrote:
Text encodings are easy to read but very difficult to specify
boundaries in without ambiguity.
Yes, and not just boundaries.
Always keep in mind - when you argue for easy readability - that one of
COBOL's design
On 02/10/2013 13:58, John Kelsey wrote:
On Oct 1, 2013, at 5:58 PM, Peter Fairbrother zenadsl6...@zen.co.uk wrote:
AES, the latest-and-greatest block cipher, comes in two main forms - AES-128
and AES-256.
AES-256 is supposed to have a brute force work factor of 2^256 - but we
find that
On Wed, 2 Oct 2013, Jerry Leichter wrote:
Always keep in mind - when you argue for easy readability - that one
of COBOL's design goals was for programs to be readable and
understandable by non-programmers.
Managers, in particular.
-- Dave
___
The
32 matches
Mail list logo
