In German:
http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpolitik/im-internet-veroeffentlichte-dokumente-um-den-nsa-skandal-a-923335.html
Translation (Google), so not supporting links:
Bovenkant formulier
NSA Files: overview of published documents and films
Thousands of documents should have
In German:
http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpolitik/im-internet-veroeffentlichte-dokumente-um-den-nsa-skandal-a-923335.html
Translation (Google), LINKS ADDED :
NSA Files: overview of published documents and films
Thousands of documents should have whistleblower Edward Snowden , prove
On 19/09/13 00:23 AM, Lucky Green wrote:
According to published reports that I saw, NSA/DoD pays $250M (per
year?) to backdoor cryptographic implementations. I have knowledge of
only one such effort. That effort involved DoD/NSA paying $10M to a
leading cryptographic library provider to both
Sorry that this question is only tangentially related to cryptography.
Then again, a lot of the stuff here is only tangentially related.
Could anybody here link me to some good resources on chaos theory? I'm
not looking for anything specifically about certain chaotic systems
(like the Lorentz
ianG i...@iang.org writes:
One mystery is left for me. Why so much? It clearly doesn't cost that much
money to implement the DRBG, or if it did, I would have done it for $5m,
honest injun! Nor would it cost that to test it nor to deploy it on mass.
Documentation, etc.
You're assuming that
The Snowden revelations describe several methods by which NSA committed
kleptography, caused compliance by hardware makers and influenced standards.
Why has AES escaped general suspicion? Are we to believe that NIST tested,
selected, endorsed and promulgated an algorithm that was immune to
Ed Stone t...@synernet.com at Sunday, September 22, 2013, 3:05:06 PM:
Why has AES escaped general suspicion?
because it was not created by NIST, nor NSA nor any other US gov org. it was
created by the academia, namely two guys, daemen and rijmen (neither of them
are americans).
the
New to the list, so I'm sorry if I missed it, but what was the evidence
presented that RSA took a $10M payoff to make Dual EC DRBG the default in
Crypto-C?
Thanks,
-Jared
On Sep 22, 2013, at 9:01 AM, Peter Gutmann pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz wrote:
ianG i...@iang.org writes:
One mystery
On 22/09/13 16:05 PM, Ed Stone wrote:
Why has AES escaped general suspicion? Are we to believe that NIST tested,
selected, endorsed and promulgated an algorithm that was immune to NSA's
toolset, without NSA participation and approval? NSA involvement in DES is
known, but we await
Nothing more useful for spies than widely trusted cryptosystems.
Nor do they ever reveal cracking the highly reputable. Neither
confirm nor deny. They do leak vulns, participate in standards
settings earnestly and lackadasiacly, fund good and bad research,
buy good and bad systems, hire good and
On Sun, Sep 22, 2013 at 7:05 AM, Ed Stone t...@synernet.com wrote:
There was some criticism from various parties, including from public-key
cryptography pioneers Martin Hellman and Whitfield Diffie,[2] citing a
shortened key length and the mysterious S-boxes as evidence of improper
2013/9/22 Tony Arcieri basc...@gmail.com
Furthermore, 3DES continues to remain a viable cipher.
I, personally, find that a most commendable and remarkable fact. To use DES
with longer keying (and more rounds) is, to this very day, a solid choice.
It makes one wonder why the longer keys weren't
On 2013-09-22 23:01, Peter Gutmann wrote:
You're assuming that someone got passed a suitcase full of cash and that was
it. Far more likely that RSA got a $10M contract for some government work and
at some point that included a request to make the ECDRBG the default for
insert
Just an example of how to spend $250M.
Jared Hunter feralch...@gmail.com wrote:
New to the list, so I'm sorry if I missed it, but what was the evidence
presented that RSA took a $10M payoff to make Dual EC DRBG the default
in Crypto-C?
Thanks,
-Jared
On Sep 22, 2013, at 9:01 AM, Peter
James A. Donald jam...@echeque.com wrote:
On 2013-09-22 23:01, Peter Gutmann wrote:
You're assuming that someone got passed a suitcase full of cash and
that was
it. Far more likely that RSA got a $10M contract for some government
work and
at some point that included a request to make the
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
On 9/22/2013 2:23 PM, Jerry Leichter wrote:
On Sep 21, 2013, at 10:05 PM, d.nix wrote:
Hah hah hah. Uh, reading between the lines, color me *skeptical*
that this is really what it claims to be, given the current
understanding of things...
if you're looking for general research in complexity / chaos, shortcut
to perusing:
Santa Fe Instutute series[0] then AKNOS[1]
from there you'll be able to traverse the myraid particulars of interest...
best regards,
0. Santa Fe Institute Series
On Sun, Sep 22, 2013 at 7:56 PM, d.nix d@comcast.net wrote:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
On 9/22/2013 2:23 PM, Jerry Leichter wrote:
On Sep 21, 2013, at 10:05 PM, d.nix wrote:
Hah hah hah. Uh, reading between the lines, color me *skeptical*
that this is really what it
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
- Original Message
Subject: Re: What is Intel® Core™ vPro™ Technology Animation
Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2013 05:56:48 +0200
From:
To: cypherpu...@cpunks.org
Security Evaluation of Intel's Active Management Technology
VASSILIOS VERVERIS
Http://spot-on.sf.net
This should have what you search for. Rgds.
___
cryptography mailing list
cryptography@randombit.net
http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
20 matches
Mail list logo
