Re: [cryptography] Gogo inflight Internet uses fake SSL certs to MITM their users

2015-01-06 Thread Peter Maxwell
On 6 January 2015 at 15:40, Jeffrey Altman jalt...@secure-endpoints.com wrote: On 1/5/2015 8:47 PM, John Levine wrote: http://venturebeat.com/2015/01/05/gogo-in-flight-internet-says-it-issues-fake-ssl-certificates-to-throttle-video-streaming/ They claim they're doing it to throttle

Re: [cryptography] Announcing ClearCrypt: a new transport encryption library

2014-05-04 Thread Peter Maxwell
On 4 May 2014 23:54, Tony Arcieri basc...@gmail.com wrote: The project is presently complete vaporware, but the goal is to produce a Rust implementation of a next generation transport encryption library. The protocol itself is still up for debate, but will likely be based off CurveCP or

Re: [cryptography] New Hand Cipher - The Drunken Bishop

2013-12-26 Thread Peter Maxwell
On 26 December 2013 19:56, Aaron Toponce aaron.topo...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Dec 26, 2013 at 02:53:06PM -0500, Jeffrey Walton wrote: On Thu, Dec 26, 2013 at 2:44 PM, Aaron Toponce aaron.topo...@gmail.com wrote: BBS is not practical in practice due to the size of the moduli required.

[cryptography] Fwd: Which programs need good random values when a system first boots?

2013-10-20 Thread Peter Maxwell
​(sorry, I'll try sending to the list this time... gmail seems to default reply to the individual)​ ​ On 20 October 2013 16:25, Paul Hoffman paul.hoff...@vpnc.org wrote: Greetings again. The recent discussion seems to have veered towards having enough good random bits to create long-lived

Re: [cryptography] Preventing Time Correlation Attacks on Leaks: Help! :-)

2013-08-20 Thread Peter Maxwell
Hi Fabio, While I don't mean to be dismissive, I suspect your threat model is flawed for the following reasons: i. Most mid to large companies would not permit the use of Tor within their infrastructure and even if the hypothetical company did, it doesn't take a whole lot of effort to track down

Re: [cryptography] open letter to Phil Zimmermann and Jon Callas of Silent Circle, re: Silent Mail shutdown

2013-08-17 Thread Peter Maxwell
On 17 August 2013 19:23, Jon Callas j...@callas.org wrote: On Aug 17, 2013, at 10:41 AM, ianG i...@iang.org wrote: Apologies, ack -- I noticed that in your post. (And I think for crypto/security products, the BSD-licence variant is more important for getting it out there than any OSI

Re: [cryptography] [ramble] [tldr] Layered security where encryption is used?

2013-07-21 Thread Peter Maxwell
On 21 July 2013 22:40, Ben Lincoln f70c9...@beneaththewaves.net wrote: Maybe I am misunderstanding (and I apologize if so), but I don't think authenticated encryption will address the main problem I'm trying to solve. Preventing tampering is important (and I think some of what I suggested has

Re: [cryptography] 100 Gbps line rate encryption

2013-07-17 Thread Peter Maxwell
On 17 July 2013 08:50, William Allen Simpson william.allen.simp...@gmail.com wrote: In summary, don't use RC4. Don't use it carelessly with IVs. And don't use RC4. RC4 is available in many libraries and platforms. For the immediate future, it is most easily and likely implemented. We

Re: [cryptography] Potential funding for crypto-related projects

2013-06-30 Thread Peter Maxwell
On 1 July 2013 01:55, Jacob Appelbaum ja...@appelbaum.net wrote: I would like to see a tor configuration flag that sacrifices speed for anonymity. You're the first person, perhaps ever, to make that feature request without it being in a mocking tone. At least, I think you're not mocking!

Re: [cryptography] 100 Gbps line rate encryption

2013-06-22 Thread Peter Maxwell
I think Bernstein's Salsa20 is faster and significantly more secure than RC4, whether you'll be able to design hardware to run at line-speed is somewhat more questionable though (would be interested to know if it's possible right enough). On 22 June 2013 18:35, William Allen Simpson

Re: [cryptography] 100 Gbps line rate encryption

2013-06-22 Thread Peter Maxwell
On 22 June 2013 23:31, James A. Donald jam...@echeque.com wrote: On 2013-06-23 6:47 AM, Peter Maxwell wrote: I think Bernstein's Salsa20 is faster and significantly more secure than RC4, whether you'll be able to design hardware to run at line-speed is somewhat more questionable though

Re: [cryptography] can the German government read PGP and ssh traffic?

2012-05-29 Thread Peter Maxwell
On 30 May 2012 05:01, ianG i...@iang.org wrote: On 29/05/12 11:03 AM, Peter Maxwell wrote: On 29 May 2012 01:35, Peter Gutmann pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz mailto:pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz wrote: Peter Maxwell pe...@allicient.co.uk mailto:pe...@allicient.co.uk writes: Why

Re: [cryptography] can the German government read PGP and ssh traffic?

2012-05-28 Thread Peter Maxwell
On 29 May 2012 01:35, Peter Gutmann pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz wrote: Peter Maxwell pe...@allicient.co.uk writes: Why on earth would you need to spread your private-key across any number of less secure machines? The technical details are long and tedious (a pile of machines that need

Re: [cryptography] can the German government read PGP and ssh traffic?

2012-05-26 Thread Peter Maxwell
On 26 May 2012 06:57, Peter Gutmann pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz wrote: Werner Koch w...@gnupg.org writes: Which is not a surprise given that many SSH users believe that ssh automagically make their root account save and continue to use their lame passwords instead of using PK based

Re: [cryptography] Symantec/Verisign DV certs issued with excessive validity period of 6 years

2012-04-23 Thread Peter Maxwell
On 23 April 2012 22:41, Marsh Ray ma...@extendedsubset.com wrote: Thought the list might be interested in this little development in the PKI saga. Do you all agree with my assertion that No one with a clue about PKI security would believe that a revoked cert provides equivalent security

Re: [cryptography] NIST and other organisations that set up standards in information security cryptography.

2012-04-22 Thread Peter Maxwell
On Sun, Apr 22, 2012 at 4:54 AM, Marsh Ray ma...@extendedsubset.com wrote: On 04/22/2012 02:55 PM, Jeffrey Walton wrote: This might sound crazy, but I would rather have a NIST approved hash that runs orders of magnitude slower to resist offline, brute forcing attacks. Well,

Re: [cryptography] MS PPTP MPPE only as secure as *single* DES

2012-04-05 Thread Peter Maxwell
On 5 April 2012 18:06, Marsh Ray ma...@extendedsubset.com wrote: On 04/05/2012 04:12 AM, Ralf-Philipp Weinmann wrote: Do you have statistics on that? I remember newer Microsoft and Apple operating systems supporting L2Sec quite well. And then there are the Cisco abominanations of IPSec that

Re: [cryptography] [info] The NSA Is Building the Country's Biggest Spy Center (Watch What You Say)

2012-03-22 Thread Peter Maxwell
On 22 March 2012 14:15, Dean, James jd...@lsuhsc.edu wrote: From http://blogs.computerworld.com/19917/shocker_nsa_chief_denies_total_info rmation_awareness_spying_on_americans?source=CTWNLE_nlt_security_2012-03 -22: Despite the fact that domestic spying on Americans is already an