RE: [dvd-discuss] Re: Sen. Hollings plans to introduce DMCA sequel: The SSSCA

2001-09-10 Thread Richard Hartman
-Original Message- From: Scott A Crosby [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] ... Worse.. Think of it: This even applies to answering machines that store the message on a digital chip. (Like the one my mother uses). So, this like the DMCA, will be a law that will be very selectively

Re: Sen. Hollings plans to introduce DMCA sequel: The SSSCA

2001-09-10 Thread Victor Duchovni
I believe that only the DA (government) can initiate criminal proceedings. Unlike in civil proceedings the copyright holders don't have to spend a dime defending their DMCA or (proposed) SSSCA rights, the taxpayer foots the bill. -- Viktor. Richard Hartman If this

Re: Sen. Hollings plans to introduce DMCA sequel: The SSSCA

2001-09-10 Thread Ian BROWN
Rick is absolutely right, but could I give the lobbyist reply? 1) This Act actually creates two types of computers: those that comply with the Act and those that don't comply. Wrong; it eradicates the second type. Our innovative US hardware sector will be ready with compliant machines the day

Re: Sen. Hollings plans to introduce DMCA sequel: The SSSCA

2001-09-10 Thread Will Rodger
Ian Brown writes: It won't take long to use the WIPO, WTO, and good 'ole US strongarm tactics to impose this legislation on the rest of the world. Meanwhile, we impose crippling sanctions on any company with any US exposure that produces such devices. cf Cuba, war on drugs, etc. etc. Before we

Re: Sen. Hollings plans to introduce DMCA sequel: The SSSCA

2001-09-10 Thread Jeffrey Altman
I see little reason to believe we won't see a similar result this time, especially given the huge issue (finally!) digital copyright has become. After all, what hardware company wants to sell a hobbled computer whose main purpose is to protect someone else's line of business? The

Re: Field slide attacks and how to avoid them.

2001-09-10 Thread Kevin E. Fu
I've been noticing a lot of ways you can mess up a cryptographic protocol due to the sliding around of fields within a signed or MACed message. The classic example of this is the old attack on PGP fingerprints, which let you use some odd keysize, and thus get two different keys (with different

Re: Compression side channel

2001-09-10 Thread Ben Laurie
Greg Rose wrote: At 12:44 AM 9/9/2001 -0400, Sandy Harris wrote: Does using non-adaptive compression save the day? Huffman coding using a fixed code table is not a bad way to go. You can even peek at the characteristics of the input and choose a table based on that... having standardised