Re: 1024-bit RSA keys in danger of compromise

2002-04-01 Thread Anonymous
Joseph Ashwood writes: Bernstein's proposal does have an impact, but I do not believ that 3x the key size is necessary I believe Bernstein's proposal results in the necessity of a keysize of approximately 1.5 times what was required before I believe that there are further similar advances

Re: 1024-bit RSA keys in danger of compromise

2002-03-29 Thread V Alex Brennen
On Mon, 25 Mar 2002, Bill Stewart wrote: While SSL implementations are mostly 1024 bits these days, aren't PGP Diffie-Hellman keys usually 1536 bits? I think there's a general consensus that the minimum recommended key size for X9.42 Diffie-Hellman PGP keys is 1024bits. I'm not sure if the

RE: 1024-bit RSA keys in danger of compromise

2002-03-28 Thread Tom Holroyd
You know, Lucky, most of the people here have been around the block a few times, and your previous post is just classic Usenet whinage. Complaining about puncuation indeed. Spare us, please. Look, we've all read the background. The improvement is a function f(n) which for large n may approach

RE: 1024-bit RSA keys in danger of compromise

2002-03-28 Thread Lucky Green
[OK, let me try this again, since we clearly got off on the wrong foot here. My apologies for overreacting to Damien's post; I have been receiving dozens of emails from the far corners of the Net over the last few days that alternatively claimed that I was a stooge of the NSA because everybody

RE: 1024-bit RSA keys in danger of compromise

2002-03-28 Thread Kevin Steves
On Thu, 28 Mar 2002, Lucky Green wrote: :Which brings me to an issue that I hope may be on-topic to this mailing :list: I would like to be able to enforce that the keys my users can use :to authenticate themselves to my sshd to be of a minimum size. Is there :a config option to sshd that will