Brian LaMacchia writes:
So the complexity isn't in how the keys get initialized on the SCP (hey, it
could be some crazy little hobbit named Mel who runs around to every machine
and puts them in with a magic wand). The complexity is in the keying
infrastructure and the set of signed
actually it is possible to build chips that generate keys as part of
manufactoring power-on/test (while still in the wafer, and the private key
never, ever exists outside of the chip) ... and be at effectively the same
trust level as any other part of the chip (i.e. hard instruction ROM).
using
I just want to point out that, as far as Palladium is concerned, we really
don't care how the keys got onto the machine. Certain *applications* written
on top of Palladium will probably care, but all the hardware the security
kernel really care about is making sure that secrets are only divulged
On Sat, 10 Aug 2002, Russell Nelson wrote:
I agree that it's irrelevant. So why is he trying to argue from
authority (always a fallacy anyway) without *even* having any way to
prove that he is that authority?
What has 'authority' got to do with it? Arguments from authority are
-worthless-.
Lucky Green wrote:
Ray wrote:
From: James A. Donald [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2002 20:51:24 -0700
On 29 Jul 2002 at 15:35, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
both Palladium and TCPA deny that they are designed to restrict
what applications you run. The TPM FAQ at
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
AARG! Anonymous [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Lucky Green wrote:
Ray wrote:
If I buy a lock I expect that by demonstrating ownership I
can get a replacement key or have a locksmith legally open it.
It appears the days when this was true are waning. At
Mike Rosing wrote:
On Fri, 2 Aug 2002, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
You don't have to send your data to Intel, just a master storage key.
This key encrypts the other keys which encrypt your data. Normally this
master key never leaves your TPM, but there is this optional feature
where it can
On Saturday 03 August 2002 05:12 pm, Morlock Elloi wrote:
UUCP will work as long as people can talk over telephone and there are
modems available. The harder and more inconvenient it becomes to connect
the higher average IQ of participants will be.
There is hope.
Just imagine the absence
On Sat, 3 Aug 2002, Morlock Elloi wrote:
Ah, the computers. Well, those that want computers will have them.
They may not be as cheap as today and there will not be as many of
them, but I think that all people *I* deal with will have them, so I
don't really care.
Sure, people will have
--
On 2 Aug 2002 at 14:36, Trei, Peter wrote:
OK, It's 2004, I'm an IT Admin,
and I've converted my corporation over to TCPA/Palladium machines. My
Head of Marketing has his TCPA/Palladium desktop's hard drive
jam-packed with corporate confidential documents he's been actively
working on
Quoting Jay Sulzberger [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
b. Why must TCPA/Palladium be a dongle on the whole computer? Why not a
separate dongle? Because, of course, the Englobulators proceed here on
principle. The principle being that only the Englobulators have a right to
own printing presses/music
Peter Trei writes:
It's rare enough that when a new anononym appears, we know
that the poster made a considered decision to be anonymous.
The current poster seems to have parachuted in from nowhere,
to argue a specific position on a single topic. It's therefore
reasonable to infer that
On Fri, 2 Aug 2002, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
I have sent over 400 anonymous messages in the past year
to cypherpunks, coderpunks, sci.crypt and the cryptography list (35
of them on TCPA related topics).
I see you are no too worries about traffic analysis?
--
Yours,
J.A. Terranson
[EMAIL
Peter Trei envisions data recovery in a TCPA world:
HoM: I want to recover my data.
Me: OK: We'll pull the HD, and get the data off it.
HoM: Good - mount it as a secondary HD in my new system.
Me: That isn't going to work now we have TCPA and Palladium.
HoM: Well, what do you have to
On Fri, 2 Aug 2002, Albion Zeglin wrote:
Quoting Jay Sulzberger [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
b. Why must TCPA/Palladium be a dongle on the whole computer? Why not a
separate dongle? Because, of course, the Englobulators proceed here on
principle. The principle being that only the Englobulators
--
On 2 Aug 2002 at 0:36, David Wagner wrote:
For instance, suppose that, thanks to TCPA/Palladium, Microsoft
could design Office 2005 so that it is impossible for StarOffice
and other clones to read files created in Office 2005. Would
some users object?
In an anarchic society, or
Jon Callas wrote:
On 8/1/02 1:14 PM, Trei, Peter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
So my question is: What is your reason for shielding your identity?
You do so at the cost of people assuming the worst about your
motives.
Is this a tacit way to suggest that the only people who need anonymity or
Jon Callas[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
On 8/1/02 1:14 PM, Trei, Peter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
So my question is: What is your reason for shielding your identity?
You do so at the cost of people assuming the worst about your
motives.
Is this a tacit way to suggest that the only
On 8/1/02 1:14 PM, Trei, Peter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
So my question is: What is your reason for shielding your identity?
You do so at the cost of people assuming the worst about your
motives.
Is this a tacit way to suggest that the only people who need anonymity or
pseudonymity are those
--
On 2 Aug 2002 at 10:43, Trei, Peter wrote:
Since the position argued involves nothing which would invoke
the malign interest of government powers or corporate legal
departments, it's not that. I can only think of two reasons why
our corrospondent may have decided to go undercover...
I
On Fri, 2 Aug 2002, James A. Donald wrote:
--
On 2 Aug 2002 at 10:43, Trei, Peter wrote:
Since the position argued involves nothing which would invoke
the malign interest of government powers or corporate legal
departments, it's not that. I can only think of two reasons why
our
Sampo Syreeni writes:
On 2002-08-01, AARG!Anonymous uttered to [EMAIL PROTECTED],...:
It does this by taking hashes of the software before transferring
control to it, and storing those hashes in its internal secure
registers.
So, is there some sort of guarantee that the transfer of
James Donald writes:
TCPA and Palladium give someone else super root privileges on my
machine, and TAKE THOSE PRIVILEGES AWAY FROM ME. All claims that
they will not do this are not claims that they will not do this,
but are merely claims that the possessor of super root privilege
on my
James A. Donald wrote:
According to Microsoft, the end user can turn the palladium
hardware off, and the computer will still boot. As long as that
is true, it is an end user option and no one can object.
Your point is taken. That said, even if you could turn off TCPA
Palladium and run some
--
On 31 Jul 2002 at 23:45, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
So TCPA and Palladium could restrict which software you could
run. They aren't designed to do so, but the design could be
changed and restrictions added.
Their design, and the institutions and software to be designed
around them, is
On Thu, Aug 01, 2002 at 02:33:43PM -0700, James A. Donald wrote:
According to Microsoft, the end user can turn the palladium
hardware off, and the computer will still boot. As long as that
is true, it is an end user option and no one can object.
But this is not what the content
From: James A. Donald [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2002 20:51:24 -0700
On 29 Jul 2002 at 15:35, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
both Palladium and TCPA deny that they are designed to restrict
what applications you run. The TPM FAQ at
Eric Murray writes:
TCPA (when it isn't turned off) WILL restrict the software that you
can run. Software that has an invalid or missing signature won't be
able to access sensitive data[1]. Meaning that unapproved software
won't work.
[1] TCPAmain_20v1_1a.pdf, section 2.2
We need to
--
On 29 Jul 2002 at 15:35, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
both Palladium and TCPA deny that they are designed to restrict
what applications you run. The TPM FAQ at
http://www.trustedcomputing.org/docs/TPM_QA_071802.pdf reads
They deny that intent, but physically they have that
James Donald wrote:
On 29 Jul 2002 at 15:35, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
both Palladium and TCPA deny that they are designed to restrict
what applications you run. The TPM FAQ at
http://www.trustedcomputing.org/docs/TPM_QA_071802.pdf reads
They deny that intent, but physically they have
I imagine there's a world of difference between will and would.
-Declan
On Mon, Jul 29, 2002 at 03:35:32PM -0700, AARG!Anonymous wrote:
Can you find anything in this spec that would do what David Wagner says
above, restrict what applications you could run? Despite studying this
spec for
On Tue, 30 Jul 2002, James A. Donald wrote:
--
On 29 Jul 2002 at 15:35, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
both Palladium and TCPA deny that they are designed to restrict
what applications you run. The TPM FAQ at
http://www.trustedcomputing.org/docs/TPM_QA_071802.pdf reads
They deny
On Wednesday, July 31, 2002, at 04:51 am, James A. Donald wrote:
On 29 Jul 2002 at 15:35, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
both Palladium and TCPA deny that they are designed to restrict
what applications you run. The TPM FAQ at
http://www.trustedcomputing.org/docs/TPM_QA_071802.pdf reads
AARG! Anonymous wrote:
James Donald wrote:
On 29 Jul 2002 at 15:35, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
both Palladium and TCPA deny that they are designed to restrict
what applications you run. The TPM FAQ at
http://www.trustedcomputing.org/docs/TPM_QA_071802.pdf reads
They deny that intent, but
--
29 Jul 2002 at 15:35, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
both Palladium and TCPA deny that they are designed to
restrict what applications you run.
James A. Donald:
They deny that intent, but physically they have that
capability.
On 31 Jul 2002 at 16:10, Nicko van Someren wrote:
And all
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