Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Sat, Dec 09, 2000 at 07:43:57PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: Personally, I worry about any kind of wholesale change in the language of the constitution. Yeah, if you change major chunks of the document then current ambiguities would go away. But how do we know whether we're introducing new ones? Or whether we're introducing other problems? Raul, how do you know your interpretations aren't introducing more problems? It's not like your interpretation (of supermajorities in particular, but also of cyclic tie-breaking) has ever actually been used before, either within Debian or without. It's not like it's the end result of months of discussion by experts, and years of electoral research. It's not even like it's the widely held consensus of a bunch of non-experts. Instead, it's one non-expert's interpretation of a not particularly plainly written document written mainly by another non-expert, that hasn't particularly stood the test of time all that well. Can you see why I don't think all this random "but that's not what the constitution *says*" junk isn't the right way to approach this, or even a particularly helpful interlude? Cheers, aj -- Anthony Towns [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/ I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred. ``Thanks to all avid pokers out there'' -- linux.conf.au, 17-20 January 2001 PGP signature
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Sat, Dec 09, 2000 at 07:43:57PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: Personally, I worry about any kind of wholesale change in the language of the constitution. Yeah, if you change major chunks of the document then current ambiguities would go away. But how do we know whether we're introducing new ones? Or whether we're introducing other problems? On Sun, Dec 10, 2000 at 08:16:13PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: Raul, how do you know your interpretations aren't introducing more problems? That's one of the reasons I've been talking about them -- to find out if anyone sees them from a point of view that introduces more problems. But, I'd like to make a distinction between philosophical problems and the more specific problem of ambiguities which could lead to different winners of the same vote. It's not like your interpretation (of supermajorities in particular, but also of cyclic tie-breaking) has ever actually been used before, either within Debian or without. On the "different winners of the same vote" issue: [1] I don't see that you've shown my ideas to be flawed in this fashion. [2] If my interpretation of the constitution is equivalent to your interpretation of the constitution where there's no cyclic tie, if the ambiguities in vote counting only appear where there is a cyclic tie, what room is there for additional ambiguities to appear where none existed before? On the philosopic side of things: It's not like anyone else has designed a real voting system to be used for an email participation context. If you want us to fall back on the sort of voting systems used in more traditional contexts: Supermajority would be described as a different kind of ratio: how much of the entire body must be in favor of the option before it can pass. For example: a 2/3 supermajority would mean that 2/3 of all debian developers must be in favor of the option before it can pass. [Can you point at any counter examples?] What I see is that debian's system is designed to work on the idea that the people interested in a subject are the people who are competent to decide on that subject, and that there's a right way to do things. That's funamentally different from the usual sort of voting system, which assumes universal participation of some sort, and doesn't presume that anything other than voter opinion indicates that one idea is better than any others. I'll agree that my interpretation of supermajority is different from the tradition, but I think that, philosophically, mine aligns closer to the way debian has made choices in the past. Something similar applies to my view of cyclic tie breaking -- I'm not assuming that only voter opinion matters, and I'm assuming that people have a particular *reason* for picking a first option first. Also, the weights assigned to votes at different preferences is fundamentally arbitrary: Smith/Condorcet would continue to break cyclic ties if the contribution introduced by each preference after the first was multiplied by an additional factor of 1/(number of voters) -- and, for the case of no cyclic tie, this variant of Smith/Condorcet would continue to pick the same winner as the traditional variant. It's not like it's the end result of months of discussion by experts, and years of electoral research. It's not even like it's the widely held consensus of a bunch of non-experts. Ok, point me at some references to expert discussion on voting systems with Debian's philosophic base. Instead, it's one non-expert's interpretation of a not particularly plainly written document written mainly by another non-expert, that hasn't particularly stood the test of time all that well. You're falling into an ad hominem argument. Can you see why I don't think all this random "but that's not what the constitution *says*" junk isn't the right way to approach this, or even a particularly helpful interlude? Can you point me at another organization which has tried to tackle things in the fashion that debian has been tackling things, whose model we should adopt? Thanks, -- Raul -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Sun, Dec 10, 2000 at 07:48:07AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: On Sun, Dec 10, 2000 at 08:16:13PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: It's not like your interpretation (of supermajorities in particular, but also of cyclic tie-breaking) has ever actually been used before, either within Debian or without. On the "different winners of the same vote" issue: [1] I don't see that you've shown my ideas to be flawed in this fashion. Of three possible interpretations of the constitution (one clearly valid, two of questionable validity, labeled "mine" (the 6 repeated final ballots) and "yours"), the former and mine end up with the same results given the same opinions of voters, yours ends up with different results in a number of cases, without introducing any (further) ambiguities. No, your system isn't random: it won't come up with different winners to the same vote; but that's a pretty pointless criteria. Choosing the first option alphabetically will manage that. [2] If my interpretation of the constitution is equivalent to your interpretation of the constitution where there's no cyclic tie, It isn't. It's at best equivalent when there are no cyclic ties and no differing supermajority requirements. There may also be other differences that we never got around to looking at. On the philosopic side of things: It's not like anyone else has designed a real voting system to be used for an email participation context. I'm not sure how much overemphasis you're putting on the word "email" in the above, but there certainly are plenty of other voting systems out there. If you want us to fall back on the sort of voting systems used in more traditional contexts: Supermajority would be described as a different kind of ratio: how much of the entire body must be in favor of the option before it can pass. ie, n:m vecomes n/(n+m). That's, err, not a terribly fundamental change. And it's yet again being inexplicit about what "in favour of the option" means, although since we're apparently talking about a general principle or something, that's somewhat understandable. A more useful description of supermajority might be by reversing the ratio, and saying that `a 2/3 supermajority means that a 1/3 minority can veto the resolution'. What I see is that debian's system is designed to work on the idea that the people interested in a subject are the people who are competent to decide on that subject, No one ever suggested making voting compulsory for developers. That's funamentally different from the usual sort of voting system, which assumes universal participation of some sort, and doesn't presume that anything other than voter opinion indicates that one idea is better than any others. And that doesn't follow at all. What, other than voter opinion, would you like to base a vote's results on? I'll agree that my interpretation of supermajority is different from the tradition, but I think that, philosophically, mine aligns closer to the way debian has made choices in the past. That's possible. ``If the majority are being stupid, then a minority shall form a Cabal, manipulate the system to their own ends, and get what they want anyway.'' Also, the weights assigned to votes at different preferences is fundamentally arbitrary: No, it's not. It influences how people have to vote in order to get what they want. To take a topical (and extreme) example, the US presidential elections give a weight of 1 to the first preference, and 0 to all other preferences, so someone with since preferences: 1: Nader, 2: Gore, 3: Bush is obliged to think carefully about their vote, and probably change it to 1: Gore, ... depending on whether he or she thinks Nader will get any use out of a vote for him (since Gore almost certainly will). The point of selecting a good voting system is to make sure voters get an optimal compromise without having to think carefully about whether they should lie about what option they'd really prefer to win. It's not like it's the end result of months of discussion by experts, and years of electoral research. It's not even like it's the widely held consensus of a bunch of non-experts. Ok, point me at some references to expert discussion on voting systems with Debian's philosophic base. ``Look, all these docs tell you how to create secure temp files in /tmp, while I want to create them in /var/tmp! What good are they? What a waste of time. I'll just use fopen(), it's easy and understandable.'' Whatever. There's plenty of actual criteria you can actually test a voting method against in previous messages. If you want to ignore those and instead base your measure of how good a voting system is solely on how closely it matches your reading of the constitution, you're both welcome and deluded. Cheers, aj -- Anthony Towns [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/ I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred. ``Thanks to all avid pokers out
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Sat, Dec 09, 2000 at 07:43:57PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: Personally, I worry about any kind of wholesale change in the language of the constitution. Yeah, if you change major chunks of the document then current ambiguities would go away. But how do we know whether we're introducing new ones? Or whether we're introducing other problems? Raul, how do you know your interpretations aren't introducing more problems? It's not like your interpretation (of supermajorities in particular, but also of cyclic tie-breaking) has ever actually been used before, either within Debian or without. It's not like it's the end result of months of discussion by experts, and years of electoral research. It's not even like it's the widely held consensus of a bunch of non-experts. Instead, it's one non-expert's interpretation of a not particularly plainly written document written mainly by another non-expert, that hasn't particularly stood the test of time all that well. Can you see why I don't think all this random but that's not what the constitution *says* junk isn't the right way to approach this, or even a particularly helpful interlude? Cheers, aj -- Anthony Towns [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/ I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred. ``Thanks to all avid pokers out there'' -- linux.conf.au, 17-20 January 2001 pgphZR2Xnhvd1.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Sat, Dec 09, 2000 at 07:43:57PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: Personally, I worry about any kind of wholesale change in the language of the constitution. Yeah, if you change major chunks of the document then current ambiguities would go away. But how do we know whether we're introducing new ones? Or whether we're introducing other problems? On Sun, Dec 10, 2000 at 08:16:13PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: Raul, how do you know your interpretations aren't introducing more problems? That's one of the reasons I've been talking about them -- to find out if anyone sees them from a point of view that introduces more problems. But, I'd like to make a distinction between philosophical problems and the more specific problem of ambiguities which could lead to different winners of the same vote. It's not like your interpretation (of supermajorities in particular, but also of cyclic tie-breaking) has ever actually been used before, either within Debian or without. On the different winners of the same vote issue: [1] I don't see that you've shown my ideas to be flawed in this fashion. [2] If my interpretation of the constitution is equivalent to your interpretation of the constitution where there's no cyclic tie, if the ambiguities in vote counting only appear where there is a cyclic tie, what room is there for additional ambiguities to appear where none existed before? On the philosopic side of things: It's not like anyone else has designed a real voting system to be used for an email participation context. If you want us to fall back on the sort of voting systems used in more traditional contexts: Supermajority would be described as a different kind of ratio: how much of the entire body must be in favor of the option before it can pass. For example: a 2/3 supermajority would mean that 2/3 of all debian developers must be in favor of the option before it can pass. [Can you point at any counter examples?] What I see is that debian's system is designed to work on the idea that the people interested in a subject are the people who are competent to decide on that subject, and that there's a right way to do things. That's funamentally different from the usual sort of voting system, which assumes universal participation of some sort, and doesn't presume that anything other than voter opinion indicates that one idea is better than any others. I'll agree that my interpretation of supermajority is different from the tradition, but I think that, philosophically, mine aligns closer to the way debian has made choices in the past. Something similar applies to my view of cyclic tie breaking -- I'm not assuming that only voter opinion matters, and I'm assuming that people have a particular *reason* for picking a first option first. Also, the weights assigned to votes at different preferences is fundamentally arbitrary: Smith/Condorcet would continue to break cyclic ties if the contribution introduced by each preference after the first was multiplied by an additional factor of 1/(number of voters) -- and, for the case of no cyclic tie, this variant of Smith/Condorcet would continue to pick the same winner as the traditional variant. It's not like it's the end result of months of discussion by experts, and years of electoral research. It's not even like it's the widely held consensus of a bunch of non-experts. Ok, point me at some references to expert discussion on voting systems with Debian's philosophic base. Instead, it's one non-expert's interpretation of a not particularly plainly written document written mainly by another non-expert, that hasn't particularly stood the test of time all that well. You're falling into an ad hominem argument. Can you see why I don't think all this random but that's not what the constitution *says* junk isn't the right way to approach this, or even a particularly helpful interlude? Can you point me at another organization which has tried to tackle things in the fashion that debian has been tackling things, whose model we should adopt? Thanks, -- Raul
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Sun, Dec 10, 2000 at 07:48:07AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: On Sun, Dec 10, 2000 at 08:16:13PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: It's not like your interpretation (of supermajorities in particular, but also of cyclic tie-breaking) has ever actually been used before, either within Debian or without. On the different winners of the same vote issue: [1] I don't see that you've shown my ideas to be flawed in this fashion. Of three possible interpretations of the constitution (one clearly valid, two of questionable validity, labeled mine (the 6 repeated final ballots) and yours), the former and mine end up with the same results given the same opinions of voters, yours ends up with different results in a number of cases, without introducing any (further) ambiguities. No, your system isn't random: it won't come up with different winners to the same vote; but that's a pretty pointless criteria. Choosing the first option alphabetically will manage that. [2] If my interpretation of the constitution is equivalent to your interpretation of the constitution where there's no cyclic tie, It isn't. It's at best equivalent when there are no cyclic ties and no differing supermajority requirements. There may also be other differences that we never got around to looking at. On the philosopic side of things: It's not like anyone else has designed a real voting system to be used for an email participation context. I'm not sure how much overemphasis you're putting on the word email in the above, but there certainly are plenty of other voting systems out there. If you want us to fall back on the sort of voting systems used in more traditional contexts: Supermajority would be described as a different kind of ratio: how much of the entire body must be in favor of the option before it can pass. ie, n:m vecomes n/(n+m). That's, err, not a terribly fundamental change. And it's yet again being inexplicit about what in favour of the option means, although since we're apparently talking about a general principle or something, that's somewhat understandable. A more useful description of supermajority might be by reversing the ratio, and saying that `a 2/3 supermajority means that a 1/3 minority can veto the resolution'. What I see is that debian's system is designed to work on the idea that the people interested in a subject are the people who are competent to decide on that subject, No one ever suggested making voting compulsory for developers. That's funamentally different from the usual sort of voting system, which assumes universal participation of some sort, and doesn't presume that anything other than voter opinion indicates that one idea is better than any others. And that doesn't follow at all. What, other than voter opinion, would you like to base a vote's results on? I'll agree that my interpretation of supermajority is different from the tradition, but I think that, philosophically, mine aligns closer to the way debian has made choices in the past. That's possible. ``If the majority are being stupid, then a minority shall form a Cabal, manipulate the system to their own ends, and get what they want anyway.'' Also, the weights assigned to votes at different preferences is fundamentally arbitrary: No, it's not. It influences how people have to vote in order to get what they want. To take a topical (and extreme) example, the US presidential elections give a weight of 1 to the first preference, and 0 to all other preferences, so someone with since preferences: 1: Nader, 2: Gore, 3: Bush is obliged to think carefully about their vote, and probably change it to 1: Gore, ... depending on whether he or she thinks Nader will get any use out of a vote for him (since Gore almost certainly will). The point of selecting a good voting system is to make sure voters get an optimal compromise without having to think carefully about whether they should lie about what option they'd really prefer to win. It's not like it's the end result of months of discussion by experts, and years of electoral research. It's not even like it's the widely held consensus of a bunch of non-experts. Ok, point me at some references to expert discussion on voting systems with Debian's philosophic base. ``Look, all these docs tell you how to create secure temp files in /tmp, while I want to create them in /var/tmp! What good are they? What a waste of time. I'll just use fopen(), it's easy and understandable.'' Whatever. There's plenty of actual criteria you can actually test a voting method against in previous messages. If you want to ignore those and instead base your measure of how good a voting system is solely on how closely it matches your reading of the constitution, you're both welcome and deluded. Cheers, aj -- Anthony Towns [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/ I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred. ``Thanks to all avid pokers out there''
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 04:52:38PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: You're mixing and matching what you apply the word "preference" to. The option ranked first is more important than the others because the voter has expressed that it's preferred to all the others. That is the following preferences are expressed: B A B S The option ranked second, however only gets: A S But "A S" counts just as much as "B S" or "B A". "A" however, doesn't count as much as "B", because, well, "B A". On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 01:04:42PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: I don't see that you can say "count as much" without assuming a counting methodology. If you're going to use this argument as an argument for that methodology you're introducing a circular argument. The way I see it, first preference is more important to the voter than the other preferences because, well, the voter rated it as the first preference. On Sat, Dec 09, 2000 at 01:14:34PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: Again, you're mixing terms. What are you trying to say? That by being ranked first, "B" should be treated as more important than "A"? Then, sure, I agree, and I just explained how Condorcet schemes deal with that. Of course I'm saying that. And, I know how the Condorcet schemes deal with that. If you're trying to say that the preference "B is better than A" is much more important than the preference "A is better than S", then I think you're making things up as you go, and that they're not very good things either. Once again: the 1st preference vote is more important than the other votes. There are schemes that'll work that way. You could invert a Borda counting method, for example, and get something that works that way. Condorcet, however doesn't. The constitution doesn't, either. Your "the constitution doesn't" requires that you use an interpretation where some number of potential votes are undecidable. Correct? The way I see it, the second (etc.) preferences are only to be used when there's an ambiguity in the cumulative impact of the first preferences. In which case you'd be wrong. Counter example? [Please limit this to something which fits within the constraints of the constitution. I'm fully aware that you can pick arbitrary voting systems with arbitrary properties.] Please rate your preferences for the final form of the draft resolution: [ _ ] P [ _ ] P+A [ _ ] P+B [ _ ] P+A+B [ _ ] P+A+C [ _ ] P+B+C [ _ ] Further Discussion Should P be the final form of the draft resolution, please rate your preferences for its acceptance: [ _ ] Yes [ _ ] No [ _ ] Further Discussion Should P+A be the fin... (etc) This looks like one amendment ballot and six other ballots, one which would be a final ballot, and five which would be neither amendment ballots nor final ballots. Not exactly. It's one amendment ballot and the final ballot repeated six times, one for each different form the final form of the draft resolution can take so that each voter can "vote differently in the final ballot for each of the possible forms of the final draft resolution". Eh? You're saying this is a single final ballot? That's not one ballot, it's six. It is the same ballot, repeated six times. Is that really difficult to understand? They're not the same ballot because they don't have the same options on them. Different ballots have different options on them. Different instances of the same ballot would have the same options on them. These ballots are similar, but they're not the same. Uh.. you do understand the distinction between "similar" and "the same", right? I'm also failing to see anything particularly unfair or worrying about it. I'm concerned about its unnecessary complexity. It's *exactly* equivalent to having N+1 separate ballots (spaced out in time), except that it's quicker (and doesn't give people time to change their minds between votes). Every outcome that's possible is the same, each of the ballots listed is in a form exactly specified in the constitution. There's no ambiguities that have to be carefully worked around. That's not what I see. First off, the internal conflicts in what you're saying: I see one amendment ballot, and six final ballots. N+1, where N=1 is 2. You've got seven ballots. To space them out in time, in exactly the same fashion, you'd have to have seven votes. Second off, the inconsistencies between your interpretation and the constitution. These aren't as blatent -- essentially, you've added constraints which are not present in the constitution: [a] You've decided that the form of the final ballot, specified in A.3(2), when there's a single draft resolution to be considered, is the only form possible for a final ballot. Except, since it's physically impossible to live within
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 04:52:38PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: You're mixing and matching what you apply the word preference to. The option ranked first is more important than the others because the voter has expressed that it's preferred to all the others. That is the following preferences are expressed: B A B S The option ranked second, however only gets: A S But A S counts just as much as B S or B A. A however, doesn't count as much as B, because, well, B A. On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 01:04:42PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: I don't see that you can say count as much without assuming a counting methodology. If you're going to use this argument as an argument for that methodology you're introducing a circular argument. The way I see it, first preference is more important to the voter than the other preferences because, well, the voter rated it as the first preference. On Sat, Dec 09, 2000 at 01:14:34PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: Again, you're mixing terms. What are you trying to say? That by being ranked first, B should be treated as more important than A? Then, sure, I agree, and I just explained how Condorcet schemes deal with that. Of course I'm saying that. And, I know how the Condorcet schemes deal with that. If you're trying to say that the preference B is better than A is much more important than the preference A is better than S, then I think you're making things up as you go, and that they're not very good things either. Once again: the 1st preference vote is more important than the other votes. There are schemes that'll work that way. You could invert a Borda counting method, for example, and get something that works that way. Condorcet, however doesn't. The constitution doesn't, either. Your the constitution doesn't requires that you use an interpretation where some number of potential votes are undecidable. Correct? The way I see it, the second (etc.) preferences are only to be used when there's an ambiguity in the cumulative impact of the first preferences. In which case you'd be wrong. Counter example? [Please limit this to something which fits within the constraints of the constitution. I'm fully aware that you can pick arbitrary voting systems with arbitrary properties.] Please rate your preferences for the final form of the draft resolution: [ _ ] P [ _ ] P+A [ _ ] P+B [ _ ] P+A+B [ _ ] P+A+C [ _ ] P+B+C [ _ ] Further Discussion Should P be the final form of the draft resolution, please rate your preferences for its acceptance: [ _ ] Yes [ _ ] No [ _ ] Further Discussion Should P+A be the fin... (etc) This looks like one amendment ballot and six other ballots, one which would be a final ballot, and five which would be neither amendment ballots nor final ballots. Not exactly. It's one amendment ballot and the final ballot repeated six times, one for each different form the final form of the draft resolution can take so that each voter can vote differently in the final ballot for each of the possible forms of the final draft resolution. Eh? You're saying this is a single final ballot? That's not one ballot, it's six. It is the same ballot, repeated six times. Is that really difficult to understand? They're not the same ballot because they don't have the same options on them. Different ballots have different options on them. Different instances of the same ballot would have the same options on them. These ballots are similar, but they're not the same. Uh.. you do understand the distinction between similar and the same, right? I'm also failing to see anything particularly unfair or worrying about it. I'm concerned about its unnecessary complexity. It's *exactly* equivalent to having N+1 separate ballots (spaced out in time), except that it's quicker (and doesn't give people time to change their minds between votes). Every outcome that's possible is the same, each of the ballots listed is in a form exactly specified in the constitution. There's no ambiguities that have to be carefully worked around. That's not what I see. First off, the internal conflicts in what you're saying: I see one amendment ballot, and six final ballots. N+1, where N=1 is 2. You've got seven ballots. To space them out in time, in exactly the same fashion, you'd have to have seven votes. Second off, the inconsistencies between your interpretation and the constitution. These aren't as blatent -- essentially, you've added constraints which are not present in the constitution: [a] You've decided that the form of the final ballot, specified in A.3(2), when there's a single draft resolution to be considered, is the only form possible for a final ballot. Except, since it's physically impossible to live within this constraint and still
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Sat, Dec 09, 2000 at 05:27:56AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: It is the same ballot, repeated six times. Is that really difficult to understand? They're not the same ballot because they don't have the same options on them. Actually, they do have the same options on them: Yes, No, and Further Discussion. The final ballot is precisely: ``Shall this resolution be passed: Y/N/F'' Since at the time it's voted on there are six different forms the resolution can take, and voters are required to be able to vote on this final ballot differently depending on which final form is chosen, the ballot has to be repeated six times. I suppose that means this conversation is near close. Well, I was hoping that we'd be able to achieve some consensus here, but the only objective technical standard for argument you seem willing to accept seems to be minimal wording changes to the constitution, so I guess there really is no point. Cheers, aj -- Anthony Towns [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/ I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred. ``Thanks to all avid pokers out there'' -- linux.conf.au, 17-20 January 2001 pgp9i1s2b8mki.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Sat, Dec 09, 2000 at 05:27:56AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: It is the same ballot, repeated six times. Is that really difficult to understand? They're not the same ballot because they don't have the same options on them. On Sun, Dec 10, 2000 at 12:45:23AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: Actually, they do have the same options on them: Yes, No, and Further Discussion. The final ballot is precisely: ``Shall this resolution be passed: Y/N/F'' Since at the time it's voted on there are six different forms the resolution can take, and voters are required to be able to vote on this final ballot differently depending on which final form is chosen, the ballot has to be repeated six times. I've been asserting that only one of these is the final ballot, and that the other five therefore, are not. I don't see that you've addressed that yet. I suppose that means this conversation is near close. Well, I was hoping that we'd be able to achieve some consensus here, but the only objective technical standard for argument you seem willing to accept seems to be minimal wording changes to the constitution, so I guess there really is no point. Oh? I try to look at whether an interpretation fits within what the constitution says. I try to look at whether there are other intepretations which would also fit within the constitution. I try to look at whether the interpretation would say that some part of the constitution could never have an effect (that's a pretty good sign that I'm thinking something different than what the original writer was thinking). I try to look at the intepretation itself, for inconsistencies. I try to look at what the actual differences are, between these interpretations, if they were implemented. If something seems to pass all these steps, then I consider it a valid interpretation. If there are different valid interpretations which yield different results, then I'd consider that an ambiguity. If the ambiguity seems outright wrong (for example: an ambiguity which could yield different results for the same set of votes on the same ballot), then I think of that as a part of the constitution where an amendment would be a good thing. I think at least one of the valid interpretations for a valid amendment should be proposed as a constitutional amendment. Perhaps all of them should be. Personally, I worry about any kind of wholesale change in the language of the constitution. Yeah, if you change major chunks of the document then current ambiguities would go away. But how do we know whether we're introducing new ones? Or whether we're introducing other problems? [Look how long it took for us to really notice the things you've been talking about in the voting.] So, yeah, I have a significant bias towards small changes that do nothing more than fix ambiguities. [Not that I've gotten off my duff and actually proposed something I'm happy with, at this point.] This is similar to my bias, as a package maintainer, towards fixing existing problems in the simplest, cleanest way possible, and fixing with documentation or wrappers when the underlying issue isn't a bug. [Which reminds me, I've got some packages to upgrade.] Thanks, -- Raul
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 04:52:38PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: Explain to me, again, why the first preference is no more important than the other preferences? You're mixing and matching what you apply the word "preference" to. The option ranked first is more important than the others because the voter has expressed that it's preferred to all the others. That is the following preferences are expressed: B A B S The option ranked second, however only gets: A S But "A S" counts just as much as "B S" or "B A". "A" however, doesn't count as much as "B", because, well, "B A". I don't see that you can say "count as much" without assuming a counting methodology. If you're going to use this argument as an argument for that methodology you're introducing a circular argument. The way I see it, first preference is more important to the voter than the other preferences because, well, the voter rated it as the first preference. Introducing a bunch of symbols then saying "well, no, it's not" doesn't add any information. I can accept that, in your opinion, the relationships introduced by the voter's second preference are just as important to the outcome of the vote as the relationships introduced by the voter's first preference. The way I see it, the second (etc.) preferences are only to be used when there's an ambiguity in the cumulative impact of the first preferences. I'll add: in most cases, these opinions (yours and mine) yield equivalent results. Please rate your preferences for the final form of the draft resolution: [ _ ] P [ _ ] P+A [ _ ] P+B [ _ ] P+A+B [ _ ] P+A+C [ _ ] P+B+C [ _ ] Further Discussion Should P be the final form of the draft resolution, please rate your preferences for its acceptance: [ _ ] Yes [ _ ] No [ _ ] Further Discussion Should P+A be the fin... (etc) This looks like one amendment ballot and six other ballots, one which would be a final ballot, and five which would be neither amendment ballots nor final ballots. Not exactly. It's one amendment ballot and the final ballot repeated six times, one for each different form the final form of the draft resolution can take so that each voter can "vote differently in the final ballot for each of the possible forms of the final draft resolution". Eh? You're saying this is a single final ballot? That's not one ballot, it's six. Also.. the constitution does specify that the user be able to vote differently in the final ballot for each of the forms of final draft resolution. You're only allowing the user to vote on one form of the final draft resolution in the final ballot. *Oh*, is that how you're reading this? You seem to be saying that should be read as: ``In the final ballot, each voter must be able to vote for each of the possible forms of the final draft resolution.'' whereas I'm saying it should be read as, ummm: ``If the amendment and final ballots are combined, then there are multiple forms of the final resolution that are possible. For each of these, each voter must be able to express a *different* preference for the options in the final vote (the Y/N/F one), even though it won't be clear which of these preferences will be used when the voter votes.'' Can you see how I'm breaking that clause up to read it that way? To some degree. Can you see that my interpretation is a whole lot simpler? [To me, my interpretation seems a whole lot less convoluted than this business of "It's one final ballot if you squint your eyes this way, even though it's six ballots if you look at it with your eyes wide open".] You seem to be joing the ``to vote'' with the ``for each'' to make it ``to vote for'', while I'm treating ``vote differently'' to stand alone, and the ``for each'' to mean they get to ``vote'' many times, each of which may well be ``different'', and what you're voting for or against is only mentioned in the previous clause. Um.. ok, you can describe the way I'm reading "to vote for each" as "'to' 'vote for' 'each'". [Or, as "'to vote' 'for each'".] However, although my interpretation allows "to vote for each" to be taken as "to vote differently for each", I still don't really understand... Well, let me just ask you this: Do you still think that my interpretation of this clause is incorrect. [Pretend I'm not a debian developer -- I'm asking if you still think that you have some valid criticism of that interpretation of A.3(3).] -- Raul -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 01:04:42PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 04:52:38PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: Explain to me, again, why the first preference is no more important than the other preferences? You're mixing and matching what you apply the word "preference" to. The option ranked first is more important than the others because the voter has expressed that it's preferred to all the others. That is the following preferences are expressed: B A B S The option ranked second, however only gets: A S But "A S" counts just as much as "B S" or "B A". "A" however, doesn't count as much as "B", because, well, "B A". I don't see that you can say "count as much" without assuming a counting methodology. If you're going to use this argument as an argument for that methodology you're introducing a circular argument. The way I see it, first preference is more important to the voter than the other preferences because, well, the voter rated it as the first preference. Again, you're mixing terms. What are you trying to say? That by being ranked first, "B" should be treated as more important than "A"? Then, sure, I agree, and I just explained how Condorcet schemes deal with that. If you're trying to say that the preference "B is better than A" is much more important than the preference "A is better than S", then I think you're making things up as you go, and that they're not very good things either. There are schemes that'll work that way. You could invert a Borda counting method, for example, and get something that works that way. Condorcet, however doesn't. The constitution doesn't, either. The way I see it, the second (etc.) preferences are only to be used when there's an ambiguity in the cumulative impact of the first preferences. In which case you'd be wrong. Please rate your preferences for the final form of the draft resolution: [ _ ] P [ _ ] P+A [ _ ] P+B [ _ ] P+A+B [ _ ] P+A+C [ _ ] P+B+C [ _ ] Further Discussion Should P be the final form of the draft resolution, please rate your preferences for its acceptance: [ _ ] Yes [ _ ] No [ _ ] Further Discussion Should P+A be the fin... (etc) This looks like one amendment ballot and six other ballots, one which would be a final ballot, and five which would be neither amendment ballots nor final ballots. Not exactly. It's one amendment ballot and the final ballot repeated six times, one for each different form the final form of the draft resolution can take so that each voter can "vote differently in the final ballot for each of the possible forms of the final draft resolution". Eh? You're saying this is a single final ballot? That's not one ballot, it's six. It is the same ballot, repeated six times. Is that really difficult to understand? I'm also failing to see anything particularly unfair or worrying about it. It's *exactly* equivalent to having N+1 separate ballots (spaced out in time), except that it's quicker (and doesn't give people time to change their minds between votes). Every outcome that's possible is the same, each of the ballots listed is in a form exactly specified in the constitution. There's no ambiguities that have to be carefully worked around. Also.. the constitution does specify that the user be able to vote differently in the final ballot for each of the forms of final draft resolution. You're only allowing the user to vote on one form of the final draft resolution in the final ballot. *Oh*, is that how you're reading this? You seem to be saying that should be read as: ``In the final ballot, each voter must be able to vote for each of the possible forms of the final draft resolution.'' whereas I'm saying it should be read as, ummm: ``If the amendment and final ballots are combined, then there are multiple forms of the final resolution that are possible. For each of these, each voter must be able to express a *different* preference for the options in the final vote (the Y/N/F one), even though it won't be clear which of these preferences will be used when the voter votes.'' Can you see how I'm breaking that clause up to read it that way? To some degree. Can you see that my interpretation is a whole lot simpler? Not really. To make your interpretation work you have to: * invent which options get included on the final ballot (since while to constitution explicitly describes what options are mean to be on every other ballot its possible to case, it somehow leaves this one out) * treat the words "Yes" "No" and "Further Discussion" as variables rather than explicitly stated options present on the ballot * treat the different language "ballot" and
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
I'm chopping lots of stuff out here. On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 01:53:50PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: constitution, while a vote in favor of B is a vote in favor of not modifying the constitution. This, however, doesn't make any sense. Again, there is no such thing as a vote that is simply for or against modifying the constitution, unless the vote simply has yes and no options. So, a vote which prefers A to B is a vote which prefers an option which modifies the constitution to an option which does not. A vote which prefers B to A is a vote which prefers not modifying the constitution to an option which prefers modifying the constitution. Do you disagree with this statement? Yes. Take a single vote that ranks: [ 2 ] A (change the constitution) [ 1 ] B (do such and such, don't change the constitution) [ 3 ] S (don't change anything, including the constitution) You'll note that B is preferred to A: thus it's a vote which prefers not modifying the constitution. Agreed. You'll note that A is preferred to S: thus it's a vote *for* modifying the constitution. You'll note that this preference is secondary. So yes, I think that's an unhelpful distinction to try to make. Explain to me, again, why the first preference is no more important than the other preferences? ...chop, hack, slash... Conveniently, your options aren't independent enough to actually be decided in separate ballots in any fair way (at least as far as I can tell [0]). Add in the missing option if that makes things work better. Please rate your preferences for the final form of the draft resolution: [ _ ] P [ _ ] P+A [ _ ] P+B [ _ ] P+A+B [ _ ] P+A+C [ _ ] P+B+C [ _ ] Further Discussion Should P be the final form of the draft resolution, please rate your preferences for its acceptance: [ _ ] Yes [ _ ] No [ _ ] Further Discussion Should P+A be the fin... (etc) This looks like one amendment ballot and six other ballots, one which would be a final ballot, and five which would be neither amendment ballots nor final ballots. I don't see anything in the constitution which allows for these non-ballots. Also.. the constitution does specify that the user be able to vote differently in the final ballot for each of the forms of final draft resolution. You're only allowing the user to vote on one form of the final draft resolution in the final ballot. Thanks, -- Raul
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 01:22:07AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: Yes. Take a single vote that ranks: [ 2 ] A (change the constitution) [ 1 ] B (do such and such, don't change the constitution) [ 3 ] S (don't change anything, including the constitution) You'll note that B is preferred to A: thus it's a vote which prefers not modifying the constitution. Agreed. You'll note that A is preferred to S: thus it's a vote *for* modifying the constitution. You'll note that this preference is secondary. No, actually I won't. So yes, I think that's an unhelpful distinction to try to make. Explain to me, again, why the first preference is no more important than the other preferences? You're mixing and matching what you apply the word preference to. The option ranked first is more important than the others because the voter has expressed that it's preferred to all the others. That is the following preferences are expressed: B A B S The option ranked second, however only gets: A S But A S counts just as much as B S or B A. A however, doesn't count as much as B, because, well, B A. Conveniently, your options aren't independent enough to actually be decided in separate ballots in any fair way (at least as far as I can tell [0]). Add in the missing option if that makes things work better. It makes them more complicated, so I'll avoid it unless you make me, just like I tried avoiding having independent options... Please rate your preferences for the final form of the draft resolution: [ _ ] P [ _ ] P+A [ _ ] P+B [ _ ] P+A+B [ _ ] P+A+C [ _ ] P+B+C [ _ ] Further Discussion Should P be the final form of the draft resolution, please rate your preferences for its acceptance: [ _ ] Yes [ _ ] No [ _ ] Further Discussion Should P+A be the fin... (etc) This looks like one amendment ballot and six other ballots, one which would be a final ballot, and five which would be neither amendment ballots nor final ballots. Not exactly. It's one amendment ballot and the final ballot repeated six times, one for each different form the final form of the draft resolution can take so that each voter can vote differently in the final ballot for each of the possible forms of the final draft resolution. Also.. the constitution does specify that the user be able to vote differently in the final ballot for each of the forms of final draft resolution. You're only allowing the user to vote on one form of the final draft resolution in the final ballot. *Oh*, is that how you're reading this? You seem to be saying that should be read as: ``In the final ballot, each voter must be able to vote for each of the possible forms of the final draft resolution.'' whereas I'm saying it should be read as, ummm: ``If the amendment and final ballots are combined, then there are multiple forms of the final resolution that are possible. For each of these, each voter must be able to express a *different* preference for the options in the final vote (the Y/N/F one), even though it won't be clear which of these preferences will be used when the voter votes.'' Can you see how I'm breaking that clause up to read it that way? You seem to be joing the ``to vote'' with the ``for each'' to make it ``to vote for'', while I'm treating ``vote differently'' to stand alone, and the ``for each'' to mean they get to ``vote'' many times, each of which may well be ``different'', and what you're voting for or against is only mentioned in the previous clause. Cheers, a ``it's a vase, you moron!'' j -- Anthony Towns [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/ I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred. ``Thanks to all avid pokers out there'' -- linux.conf.au, 17-20 January 2001 pgpsb9buiFYjr.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 04:52:38PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: Explain to me, again, why the first preference is no more important than the other preferences? You're mixing and matching what you apply the word preference to. The option ranked first is more important than the others because the voter has expressed that it's preferred to all the others. That is the following preferences are expressed: B A B S The option ranked second, however only gets: A S But A S counts just as much as B S or B A. A however, doesn't count as much as B, because, well, B A. I don't see that you can say count as much without assuming a counting methodology. If you're going to use this argument as an argument for that methodology you're introducing a circular argument. The way I see it, first preference is more important to the voter than the other preferences because, well, the voter rated it as the first preference. Introducing a bunch of symbols then saying well, no, it's not doesn't add any information. I can accept that, in your opinion, the relationships introduced by the voter's second preference are just as important to the outcome of the vote as the relationships introduced by the voter's first preference. The way I see it, the second (etc.) preferences are only to be used when there's an ambiguity in the cumulative impact of the first preferences. I'll add: in most cases, these opinions (yours and mine) yield equivalent results. Please rate your preferences for the final form of the draft resolution: [ _ ] P [ _ ] P+A [ _ ] P+B [ _ ] P+A+B [ _ ] P+A+C [ _ ] P+B+C [ _ ] Further Discussion Should P be the final form of the draft resolution, please rate your preferences for its acceptance: [ _ ] Yes [ _ ] No [ _ ] Further Discussion Should P+A be the fin... (etc) This looks like one amendment ballot and six other ballots, one which would be a final ballot, and five which would be neither amendment ballots nor final ballots. Not exactly. It's one amendment ballot and the final ballot repeated six times, one for each different form the final form of the draft resolution can take so that each voter can vote differently in the final ballot for each of the possible forms of the final draft resolution. Eh? You're saying this is a single final ballot? That's not one ballot, it's six. Also.. the constitution does specify that the user be able to vote differently in the final ballot for each of the forms of final draft resolution. You're only allowing the user to vote on one form of the final draft resolution in the final ballot. *Oh*, is that how you're reading this? You seem to be saying that should be read as: ``In the final ballot, each voter must be able to vote for each of the possible forms of the final draft resolution.'' whereas I'm saying it should be read as, ummm: ``If the amendment and final ballots are combined, then there are multiple forms of the final resolution that are possible. For each of these, each voter must be able to express a *different* preference for the options in the final vote (the Y/N/F one), even though it won't be clear which of these preferences will be used when the voter votes.'' Can you see how I'm breaking that clause up to read it that way? To some degree. Can you see that my interpretation is a whole lot simpler? [To me, my interpretation seems a whole lot less convoluted than this business of It's one final ballot if you squint your eyes this way, even though it's six ballots if you look at it with your eyes wide open.] You seem to be joing the ``to vote'' with the ``for each'' to make it ``to vote for'', while I'm treating ``vote differently'' to stand alone, and the ``for each'' to mean they get to ``vote'' many times, each of which may well be ``different'', and what you're voting for or against is only mentioned in the previous clause. Um.. ok, you can describe the way I'm reading to vote for each as 'to' 'vote for' 'each'. [Or, as 'to vote' 'for each'.] However, although my interpretation allows to vote for each to be taken as to vote differently for each, I still don't really understand... Well, let me just ask you this: Do you still think that my interpretation of this clause is incorrect. [Pretend I'm not a debian developer -- I'm asking if you still think that you have some valid criticism of that interpretation of A.3(3).] -- Raul
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 01:04:42PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 04:52:38PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: Explain to me, again, why the first preference is no more important than the other preferences? You're mixing and matching what you apply the word preference to. The option ranked first is more important than the others because the voter has expressed that it's preferred to all the others. That is the following preferences are expressed: B A B S The option ranked second, however only gets: A S But A S counts just as much as B S or B A. A however, doesn't count as much as B, because, well, B A. I don't see that you can say count as much without assuming a counting methodology. If you're going to use this argument as an argument for that methodology you're introducing a circular argument. The way I see it, first preference is more important to the voter than the other preferences because, well, the voter rated it as the first preference. Again, you're mixing terms. What are you trying to say? That by being ranked first, B should be treated as more important than A? Then, sure, I agree, and I just explained how Condorcet schemes deal with that. If you're trying to say that the preference B is better than A is much more important than the preference A is better than S, then I think you're making things up as you go, and that they're not very good things either. There are schemes that'll work that way. You could invert a Borda counting method, for example, and get something that works that way. Condorcet, however doesn't. The constitution doesn't, either. The way I see it, the second (etc.) preferences are only to be used when there's an ambiguity in the cumulative impact of the first preferences. In which case you'd be wrong. Please rate your preferences for the final form of the draft resolution: [ _ ] P [ _ ] P+A [ _ ] P+B [ _ ] P+A+B [ _ ] P+A+C [ _ ] P+B+C [ _ ] Further Discussion Should P be the final form of the draft resolution, please rate your preferences for its acceptance: [ _ ] Yes [ _ ] No [ _ ] Further Discussion Should P+A be the fin... (etc) This looks like one amendment ballot and six other ballots, one which would be a final ballot, and five which would be neither amendment ballots nor final ballots. Not exactly. It's one amendment ballot and the final ballot repeated six times, one for each different form the final form of the draft resolution can take so that each voter can vote differently in the final ballot for each of the possible forms of the final draft resolution. Eh? You're saying this is a single final ballot? That's not one ballot, it's six. It is the same ballot, repeated six times. Is that really difficult to understand? I'm also failing to see anything particularly unfair or worrying about it. It's *exactly* equivalent to having N+1 separate ballots (spaced out in time), except that it's quicker (and doesn't give people time to change their minds between votes). Every outcome that's possible is the same, each of the ballots listed is in a form exactly specified in the constitution. There's no ambiguities that have to be carefully worked around. Also.. the constitution does specify that the user be able to vote differently in the final ballot for each of the forms of final draft resolution. You're only allowing the user to vote on one form of the final draft resolution in the final ballot. *Oh*, is that how you're reading this? You seem to be saying that should be read as: ``In the final ballot, each voter must be able to vote for each of the possible forms of the final draft resolution.'' whereas I'm saying it should be read as, ummm: ``If the amendment and final ballots are combined, then there are multiple forms of the final resolution that are possible. For each of these, each voter must be able to express a *different* preference for the options in the final vote (the Y/N/F one), even though it won't be clear which of these preferences will be used when the voter votes.'' Can you see how I'm breaking that clause up to read it that way? To some degree. Can you see that my interpretation is a whole lot simpler? Not really. To make your interpretation work you have to: * invent which options get included on the final ballot (since while to constitution explicitly describes what options are mean to be on every other ballot its possible to case, it somehow leaves this one out) * treat the words Yes No and Further Discussion as variables rather than explicitly stated options present on the ballot * treat the different language ballot and single voting message as though
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 01:53:50PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: On Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 04:48:48PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: * What to require for an option to meet quorum (working assumption: count the number of votes that mention the option, and compare against quorum) This is just flat out wrong, the working assumption we had was count the number of votes that rate the option above the default, and compare against quorum. (For reference, yes, I did realise I was abusing myself there) Supermajority is a mechanism for saying, in my opinion: don't change this if you've got another reasonable option. Well, no, it's not. What would possibly convince you otherwise? General usage of the term? You seemed disinclined to care when I asked for other examples of this interpretation. That the alternative is more expressive? That the alternative is less biassed? A straw poll on this list? Anything at all? I really would like an answer to that. What would it take to convince you otherwise? What arguments would be worth presenting? Some things you could probably do to convince me otherwise would be: * list a number of other places where your interpretation has been used over mine * show how your system was less biassed than mine, or how the additional biasses are actually clearly beneficial * have a vote, and have a majority of developers prefer your interpretation over mine Cheers, aj -- Anthony Towns [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/ I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred. ``Thanks to all avid pokers out there'' -- linux.conf.au, 17-20 January 2001 pgpAHM23rFsnX.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 12:45:24AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: [Status-quo versus Further Discussion and No] I still maintain there's a difference (because the intent of the developers is more obvious), but you're right about the minimum discussion period. Okay, let's ignore what I've said previously about introducing more facets and go into this a little deeper. In our past votes, we've variously had: Constituion: Yes/No/Further Discussion Election 1: [nominees] + None of the above Logo License: Single/Dual/Further Discussion New Logo: [submissions, including current logo] + Further Discussion Swap Logo: For/Against/Further Discussion Election 2: [nominees] + Further Discussion and in our current pending vote we've currently got two ways of modifying the constitution, and further discussion (with no "No" option at all). Note, for example, that after the new logo vote, even though further discussion didn't win, we were quite happy to continue discussing the matter and change the logo a bit (although it probably would've been easier to just include the swapped swirl in the "New Logo" vote). So given that in the past we've not really had any benefit from the distinct options (and often haven't even bothered having distinct options), and that it doesn't make any actual difference in the result (if enough interested people want to keep discussing the matter and make a new proposal, they can; if no one's interested in discussing more, they don'thave) I really don't see any benefit in having separate options. For reference, the things I can think of that need fixing/disambiguating/discussing/whatever: * How to resolve the vote when you don't have a Condorcet winner (working assumption: find the Smith set and apply STV to it) * How to conduct a vote in a single ballot, as simply and fairly as possible (working assumption for votes where there are no independent options: allow voters to rank each option as well as either Status-Quo, or (Further Discussion and No)) * What to require for an option to meet quorum (working assumption: count the number of votes that mention the option, and compare against quorum) * What to require of an option for it to meet a supermajority requirement * How to formulate a ballot / set of ballots to decide amongst related but independent options * Whether to use a single Status-quo option or both Further discussion and No on each vote (or what). This isn't entirely ideal: it'll select the status-quo more often than is probably desirable, but otherwise it's fairly expressive, and doesn't weight any preferences any more than others wherever possible. I presume, here, you're talking about the case where we're picking between an option with a supermajority requirement and a case where we're not. And, I presume that a bias towards options with supermajority requirements is something that you don't really care about. _Huh_?! Where did that come from? The only biasses in the above are towards options that pairwise beat other options, and towards the status-quo options (in the event others don't meet their supermajority requirements). Supermajority options which don't meet supermajority requirement but do meet a lesser majority requirement will (by definition) pairwise beat other options [which don't have that requirement]. Let me start from the top, perhaps. There's no such "majority requirement", though, per se. This is why I avoided answering when you asked this before. Instead, preference for majority support is just handled by how you count votes. For example, if you have a vote: 30 ABC 35 BCA 40 CAB then none of these options meet its majority wrt *all* other options (75/105 people prefer C over A, 70/105 people prefer A over B, and 65/105 people prefer B over C). But we choose a winner anyway by using STV (A disappears, and B wins with 65/105 votes). What you could end up with (using my scheme) is a vote that goes something like: 60 ABS 40 BSA where A requires 3:1 supermajority. You get: A dominates B 60 to 40 B dominates S 100 to 0 S dominates A 40 to 20 (reduced 3:1) which would be a circular tie. For the moment, I'm just declaring that S (the Status-quo) wins (by claiming S wins whenever it's in the Smith set), but it would also be possible (and probably reasonable) to make B win (by having dropped A for not meeting its supermajority right at the start). Now, if we go back to: [...] And, I presume that a bias towards options with supermajority requirements is something that you don't really care about. then I'm afraid I still don't know what you're talking about. There's no way of voting that would have an
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
Anthony Towns [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: In our past votes, we've variously had: Constituion: Yes/No/Further Discussion Election 1: [nominees] + None of the above Logo License: Single/Dual/Further Discussion New Logo: [submissions, including current logo] + Further Discussion Swap Logo: For/Against/Further Discussion Election 2: [nominees] + Further Discussion Note that the two elections aren't strictly relevant - they're conducted under 'Concorde Vote Counting', but not under the Standard Resolution Procedure (5.2.7). What I'm trying to do is say that the best interpretation of "supermajority" is to only use it when comparing an option requiring a supermajority and an option that changes absolutely *nothing*. I think this is something about which reasonable people can disagree. Your way (effectively weighting the 'status quo' option or options up) seems to be closer to the way the constitution works at present: I read A.3.1-3 the same way as you do, so for 60 ABS 40 BAS, with A but not B requiring a change to the constitution, A wins the 'amendment ballot', and defeats S (or maybe N and F) in the 'final ballot'. Fair enough. The alternative way (effectively weighting the supermajority-requiring options down) is similar to a system in which all proposals which do not involve amending the constitution are voted on first, and attempts to modify the constitution only get their chance afterwards. This also seems reasonable to me. Consider that there might be an existing 'party' which wishes to make an amendment to the constitution, and that it has a majority of voters on-side, but does not have the requisite supermajority. It would not normally be able to do so. Now imagine that some problem arises, which would be solved by the consitutional amendment in question, and can also be solved in another way. Everyone agrees that the problem should be solved, and that either solution is better than the status quo. Now, if a member of the first 'party' proposes their constitutional change as a solution to the problem, and one of their opponents proposes an amendment to solve it the other way, if everyone votes honestly the constitution will be changed. It's not clear to me that this is a good result; it seems that the existence of a single problem which would be fixed by a constitutional amendment can be leveraged to change the constitution without requiring a supermajority. (Well, more likely if everyone knows what's going on then the voters who do not wish the constitution to be changed will dishonestly put status quo ahead of the constitutional change, and the result will be a problem which doesn't get fixed - also a Bad Thing.) -M- -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 04:48:48PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: * What to require for an option to meet quorum (working assumption: count the number of votes that mention the option, and compare against quorum) This is just flat out wrong, the working assumption we had was count the number of votes that rate the option above the default, and compare against quorum. Let me start from the top, perhaps. There's no such "majority requirement", though, per se. This is why I avoided answering when you asked this before. The constitution doesn't use the word "majority" except when it requires other than a simple majority. However, it's clear that the concept of majority (the greater number) is a way of contrasting the winning vote to the nonwinning votes. Sure, "the greatest good for the greatest number" is the whole point behind voting. That's one of the things that encourages an unbiassed voting system: if you're going to say that: 60 AB 40 BA should be a win for A because most people prefer it, you should also be saying: 60 BA 40 AB should be a win for B, for the exact same reason. I'll agree that it's possible to invent supermajority concepts which are different than those described in the constitution. Indeed, and, IMO and by my reading, this is exactly what you're doing. Can we possible skip the attempts to claw the moral high ground from each other with "you can't read!! this obviously doesn't mean that!!"? I'll agree that quorum biases against any change (when there aren't enough voters). I'll also note, here, that quorum is different from supermajority. Right. I'm using "bias" as a general term to analyse the effects of any extra requirements we might add beyond just saying `take the Smith set, apply STV'. Ok. I'll take "a general term" as meaning "doesn't have any particular negative connotation". Which means that the absence of bias isn't a positive feature without some further rationale. This isn't quite accurate. Biasses aren't *necessarily* bad, but they do need a good justification. constitution, while a vote in favor of B is a vote in favor of not modifying the constitution. This, however, doesn't make any sense. Again, there is no such thing as a vote that is simply "for" or "against" modifying the constitution, unless the vote simply has "yes" and "no" options. So, a vote which prefers A to B is a vote which prefers an option which modifies the constitution to an option which does not. A vote which prefers B to A is a vote which prefers not modifying the constitution to an option which prefers modifying the constitution. Do you disagree with this statement? Yes. Take a single vote that ranks: [ 2 ] A (change the constitution) [ 1 ] B (do such and such, don't change the constitution) [ 3 ] S (don't change anything, including the constitution) You'll note that B is preferred to A: thus it's a vote which prefers not modifying the constitution. You'll note that A is preferred to S: thus it's a vote *for* modifying the constitution. So yes, I think that's an unhelpful distinction to try to make. So no, I don't accept the implication that a vote where X isn't your first preference should be considered a vote "against" X. This sounds like you're try to get around the language of A.6(7). In the end, there can be only one. Yeah, well, good for A.6(7). If it agrees with you (and I personally think it doesn't) it's wrong too. Because it can represent the preferences of a voter who thinks "Well, changing the constitution (A, say) is a bit drastic, but we should move in this direction; so ideally I'd rather the compromise (B), but I don't mind if we go all out", because he could vote "BAS", and a voter who thinks (like you apparently might) "Changing the constitution is too drastic, we have a compromise, we have to use that instead" could express that by saying "BSA", and someone who'd rather go all out, but will accept the compromise if necessary can express *that* by voting "ABS". And, what about the voter who thinks: "Well, I don't think that a solution which modifies the constitution is the right solution, but this is a real problem, and it's better than nothing."? Then if they've got a better solution they (or someone else) probably already proposed it and they can vote for that. The only thing you can't express in my way that you can in yours is `My opinion is worth three times anyone else's, and modifying the constitution to say foo is much much worse than doing bar'. Note that biassing everything over A isn't the only way of handling a supermajority (and isn't even a common or usual way --- you're welcome to cite one other instance of _anyone_ doing it this way, though), you can simply require a supermajority of people preferring A to the status-quo (by literally having a "Status-quo" option, or by
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 09:42:57PM +, Matthew Woodcraft wrote: Note that the two elections aren't strictly relevant - they're conducted under 'Concorde Vote Counting', but not under the Standard Resolution Procedure (5.2.7). Ahh, so they are. Consider that there might be an existing 'party' which wishes to make an amendment to the constitution, and that it has a majority of voters on-side, but does not have the requisite supermajority. It would not normally be able to do so. Now imagine that some problem arises, which would be solved by the consitutional amendment in question, and can also be solved in another way. Everyone agrees that the problem should be solved, and that either solution is better than the status quo. Then, suddenly, they've gotten their supermajority. Presumably the only reason there weren't enough supporters for the plan in the first place was because they didn't see a need for it; thus now that they do see a need, they support it. Now, if a member of the first 'party' proposes their constitutional change as a solution to the problem, and one of their opponents proposes an amendment to solve it the other way, if everyone votes honestly the constitution will be changed. Under my system, or under the N+1 system, at any rate. It's not clear to me that this is a good result; it seems that the existence of a single problem which would be fixed by a constitutional amendment can be leveraged to change the constitution without requiring a supermajority. I doubt that. In that example, if that constitutional change *wasn't* necessary to resolve it (ie, there's a sensible, productive, non-constitutional way of resolving it), I'd expect the majority of voters to vote for that way as their first preference. OTOH, if the non-constitutional change was just a work around and a kludge (for example, blocking future uploads to non-free, and changing the requirements for a bug against a non-free package to be considered "release-critical", in the hopes that non-free will disappear without violating the letter of the social contract, say), I'd expect developers to vote for the cleaner solution. Furthermore, if the constitutional amendment isn't a minimal change that suffices to fix the identified problems and has a significant bloc of opposition, then I'd expect a new constitutional amendment to be proposed that _is_ a minimal change, that people can vote for instead. (Well, more likely if everyone knows what's going on then the voters who do not wish the constitution to be changed will dishonestly put status quo ahead of the constitutional change, and the result will be a problem which doesn't get fixed - also a Bad Thing.) Well, if they really would rather pervert the vote so that nothing's resolved than vote for the change to the constitution there's nothing insincere about them ranking further discussion/status quo above the constitutional amendment: that's what they're trying to achieve, after all. In which case they're not really perverting the vote, either. Cheers, aj -- Anthony Towns [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/ I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred. ``Thanks to all avid pokers out there'' -- linux.conf.au, 17-20 January 2001 PGP signature
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 01:22:07AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: Yes. Take a single vote that ranks: [ 2 ] A (change the constitution) [ 1 ] B (do such and such, don't change the constitution) [ 3 ] S (don't change anything, including the constitution) You'll note that B is preferred to A: thus it's a vote which prefers not modifying the constitution. Agreed. You'll note that A is preferred to S: thus it's a vote *for* modifying the constitution. You'll note that this preference is secondary. No, actually I won't. So yes, I think that's an unhelpful distinction to try to make. Explain to me, again, why the first preference is no more important than the other preferences? You're mixing and matching what you apply the word "preference" to. The option ranked first is more important than the others because the voter has expressed that it's preferred to all the others. That is the following preferences are expressed: B A B S The option ranked second, however only gets: A S But "A S" counts just as much as "B S" or "B A". "A" however, doesn't count as much as "B", because, well, "B A". Conveniently, your options aren't independent enough to actually be decided in separate ballots in any fair way (at least as far as I can tell [0]). Add in the missing option if that makes things work better. It makes them more complicated, so I'll avoid it unless you make me, just like I tried avoiding having independent options... Please rate your preferences for the final form of the draft resolution: [ _ ] P [ _ ] P+A [ _ ] P+B [ _ ] P+A+B [ _ ] P+A+C [ _ ] P+B+C [ _ ] Further Discussion Should P be the final form of the draft resolution, please rate your preferences for its acceptance: [ _ ] Yes [ _ ] No [ _ ] Further Discussion Should P+A be the fin... (etc) This looks like one amendment ballot and six other ballots, one which would be a final ballot, and five which would be neither amendment ballots nor final ballots. Not exactly. It's one amendment ballot and the final ballot repeated six times, one for each different form the final form of the draft resolution can take so that each voter can "vote differently in the final ballot for each of the possible forms of the final draft resolution". Also.. the constitution does specify that the user be able to vote differently in the final ballot for each of the forms of final draft resolution. You're only allowing the user to vote on one form of the final draft resolution in the final ballot. *Oh*, is that how you're reading this? You seem to be saying that should be read as: ``In the final ballot, each voter must be able to vote for each of the possible forms of the final draft resolution.'' whereas I'm saying it should be read as, ummm: ``If the amendment and final ballots are combined, then there are multiple forms of the final resolution that are possible. For each of these, each voter must be able to express a *different* preference for the options in the final vote (the Y/N/F one), even though it won't be clear which of these preferences will be used when the voter votes.'' Can you see how I'm breaking that clause up to read it that way? You seem to be joing the ``to vote'' with the ``for each'' to make it ``to vote for'', while I'm treating ``vote differently'' to stand alone, and the ``for each'' to mean they get to ``vote'' many times, each of which may well be ``different'', and what you're voting for or against is only mentioned in the previous clause. Cheers, a ``it's a vase, you moron!'' j -- Anthony Towns [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/ I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred. ``Thanks to all avid pokers out there'' -- linux.conf.au, 17-20 January 2001 PGP signature
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 12:45:24AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: [Status-quo versus Further Discussion and No] I still maintain there's a difference (because the intent of the developers is more obvious), but you're right about the minimum discussion period. Okay, let's ignore what I've said previously about introducing more facets and go into this a little deeper. In our past votes, we've variously had: Constituion: Yes/No/Further Discussion Election 1: [nominees] + None of the above Logo License: Single/Dual/Further Discussion New Logo: [submissions, including current logo] + Further Discussion Swap Logo: For/Against/Further Discussion Election 2: [nominees] + Further Discussion and in our current pending vote we've currently got two ways of modifying the constitution, and further discussion (with no No option at all). Note, for example, that after the new logo vote, even though further discussion didn't win, we were quite happy to continue discussing the matter and change the logo a bit (although it probably would've been easier to just include the swapped swirl in the New Logo vote). So given that in the past we've not really had any benefit from the distinct options (and often haven't even bothered having distinct options), and that it doesn't make any actual difference in the result (if enough interested people want to keep discussing the matter and make a new proposal, they can; if no one's interested in discussing more, they don'thave) I really don't see any benefit in having separate options. For reference, the things I can think of that need fixing/disambiguating/discussing/whatever: * How to resolve the vote when you don't have a Condorcet winner (working assumption: find the Smith set and apply STV to it) * How to conduct a vote in a single ballot, as simply and fairly as possible (working assumption for votes where there are no independent options: allow voters to rank each option as well as either Status-Quo, or (Further Discussion and No)) * What to require for an option to meet quorum (working assumption: count the number of votes that mention the option, and compare against quorum) * What to require of an option for it to meet a supermajority requirement * How to formulate a ballot / set of ballots to decide amongst related but independent options * Whether to use a single Status-quo option or both Further discussion and No on each vote (or what). This isn't entirely ideal: it'll select the status-quo more often than is probably desirable, but otherwise it's fairly expressive, and doesn't weight any preferences any more than others wherever possible. I presume, here, you're talking about the case where we're picking between an option with a supermajority requirement and a case where we're not. And, I presume that a bias towards options with supermajority requirements is something that you don't really care about. _Huh_?! Where did that come from? The only biasses in the above are towards options that pairwise beat other options, and towards the status-quo options (in the event others don't meet their supermajority requirements). Supermajority options which don't meet supermajority requirement but do meet a lesser majority requirement will (by definition) pairwise beat other options [which don't have that requirement]. Let me start from the top, perhaps. There's no such majority requirement, though, per se. This is why I avoided answering when you asked this before. Instead, preference for majority support is just handled by how you count votes. For example, if you have a vote: 30 ABC 35 BCA 40 CAB then none of these options meet its majority wrt *all* other options (75/105 people prefer C over A, 70/105 people prefer A over B, and 65/105 people prefer B over C). But we choose a winner anyway by using STV (A disappears, and B wins with 65/105 votes). What you could end up with (using my scheme) is a vote that goes something like: 60 ABS 40 BSA where A requires 3:1 supermajority. You get: A dominates B 60 to 40 B dominates S 100 to 0 S dominates A 40 to 20 (reduced 3:1) which would be a circular tie. For the moment, I'm just declaring that S (the Status-quo) wins (by claiming S wins whenever it's in the Smith set), but it would also be possible (and probably reasonable) to make B win (by having dropped A for not meeting its supermajority right at the start). Now, if we go back to: [...] And, I presume that a bias towards options with supermajority requirements is something that you don't really care about. then I'm afraid I still don't know what you're talking about. There's no way of voting that would have an option
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
Anthony Towns aj@azure.humbug.org.au writes: In our past votes, we've variously had: Constituion: Yes/No/Further Discussion Election 1: [nominees] + None of the above Logo License: Single/Dual/Further Discussion New Logo: [submissions, including current logo] + Further Discussion Swap Logo: For/Against/Further Discussion Election 2: [nominees] + Further Discussion Note that the two elections aren't strictly relevant - they're conducted under 'Concorde Vote Counting', but not under the Standard Resolution Procedure (5.2.7). What I'm trying to do is say that the best interpretation of supermajority is to only use it when comparing an option requiring a supermajority and an option that changes absolutely *nothing*. I think this is something about which reasonable people can disagree. Your way (effectively weighting the 'status quo' option or options up) seems to be closer to the way the constitution works at present: I read A.3.1-3 the same way as you do, so for 60 ABS 40 BAS, with A but not B requiring a change to the constitution, A wins the 'amendment ballot', and defeats S (or maybe N and F) in the 'final ballot'. Fair enough. The alternative way (effectively weighting the supermajority-requiring options down) is similar to a system in which all proposals which do not involve amending the constitution are voted on first, and attempts to modify the constitution only get their chance afterwards. This also seems reasonable to me. Consider that there might be an existing 'party' which wishes to make an amendment to the constitution, and that it has a majority of voters on-side, but does not have the requisite supermajority. It would not normally be able to do so. Now imagine that some problem arises, which would be solved by the consitutional amendment in question, and can also be solved in another way. Everyone agrees that the problem should be solved, and that either solution is better than the status quo. Now, if a member of the first 'party' proposes their constitutional change as a solution to the problem, and one of their opponents proposes an amendment to solve it the other way, if everyone votes honestly the constitution will be changed. It's not clear to me that this is a good result; it seems that the existence of a single problem which would be fixed by a constitutional amendment can be leveraged to change the constitution without requiring a supermajority. (Well, more likely if everyone knows what's going on then the voters who do not wish the constitution to be changed will dishonestly put status quo ahead of the constitutional change, and the result will be a problem which doesn't get fixed - also a Bad Thing.) -M-
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 06:31:41PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: In our past votes, we've variously had: Constituion: Yes/No/Further Discussion Election 1: [nominees] + None of the above Logo License: Single/Dual/Further Discussion New Logo: [submissions, including current logo] + Further Discussion Swap Logo: For/Against/Further Discussion Election 2: [nominees] + Further Discussion and in our current pending vote we've currently got two ways of modifying the constitution, and further discussion (with no No option at all). Ok. Note, for example, that after the new logo vote, even though further discussion didn't win, we were quite happy to continue discussing the matter and change the logo a bit (although it probably would've been easier to just include the swapped swirl in the New Logo vote). Ok -- but note that we did not revisit the Single/Dual issue. So given that in the past we've not really had any benefit from the distinct options (and often haven't even bothered having distinct options), and that it doesn't make any actual difference in the result (if enough interested people want to keep discussing the matter and make a new proposal, they can; if no one's interested in discussing more, they don'thave) I really don't see any benefit in having separate options. I think that further discussion, in that case, would have implied some kind of rehash of the Single/Dual vote -- presumably with some additional option(s). I think that Neither would have meant that we needed to pick some completely different logo -- that we shouldn't bother looking at those two again. Do you agree that these would have been distinct results. [Please note that I agree that these results were not the outcome of that vote. I am talking about hypothetical situations here.] For reference, the things I can think of that need fixing/disambiguating/discussing/whatever: * How to resolve the vote when you don't have a Condorcet winner (working assumption: find the Smith set and apply STV to it) Ok. I'm worried about this one, too. * How to conduct a vote in a single ballot, as simply and fairly as possible (working assumption for votes where there are no independent options: allow voters to rank each option as well as either Status-Quo, or (Further Discussion and No)) Ok. I think we need to agree on what option should mean. * What to require for an option to meet quorum (working assumption: count the number of votes that mention the option, and compare against quorum) Ok. I'll note that this conflicts with my interpretation of the constitution [which talks about votes which prefer the winning option to the default option]. I think the ambiguity here comes from the ignore references to that option language which is used to determine the winner. I understand that you want to continue ignoring references to the default option even after the winner has been selected. * What to require of an option for it to meet a supermajority requirement We sure seem to be having a problem reaching any kind of agreement on this one. * How to formulate a ballot / set of ballots to decide amongst related but independent options More specifically, how to formulate a voting message for this case which combines amendment votes with the final vote. * Whether to use a single Status-quo option or both Further discussion and No on each vote (or what). This seems more of a discuss than a disambiguate issue. Let me start from the top, perhaps. There's no such majority requirement, though, per se. This is why I avoided answering when you asked this before. The constitution doesn't use the word majority except when it requires other than a simple majority. However, it's clear that the concept of majority (the greater number) is a way of contrasting the winning vote to the nonwinning votes. Instead, preference for majority support is just handled by how you count votes. For example, if you have a vote: 30 ABC 35 BCA 40 CAB then none of these options meet its majority wrt *all* other options (75/105 people prefer C over A, 70/105 people prefer A over B, and 65/105 people prefer B over C). But we choose a winner anyway by using STV (A disappears, and B wins with 65/105 votes). Right. I'll note here that STV is described in terms of ignoring references to options on the ballot. Once these options have been ignored, the winner is still described in the same sort of terms which describe a majority. I'll agree that it's possible to invent supermajority concepts which are different than those described in the constitution. What you could end up with (using my scheme) is a vote that goes something like: 60 ABS 40 BSA where A requires 3:1 supermajority. You get: A dominates B 60 to
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 04:48:48PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: * What to require for an option to meet quorum (working assumption: count the number of votes that mention the option, and compare against quorum) This is just flat out wrong, the working assumption we had was count the number of votes that rate the option above the default, and compare against quorum. Let me start from the top, perhaps. There's no such majority requirement, though, per se. This is why I avoided answering when you asked this before. The constitution doesn't use the word majority except when it requires other than a simple majority. However, it's clear that the concept of majority (the greater number) is a way of contrasting the winning vote to the nonwinning votes. Sure, the greatest good for the greatest number is the whole point behind voting. That's one of the things that encourages an unbiassed voting system: if you're going to say that: 60 AB 40 BA should be a win for A because most people prefer it, you should also be saying: 60 BA 40 AB should be a win for B, for the exact same reason. I'll agree that it's possible to invent supermajority concepts which are different than those described in the constitution. Indeed, and, IMO and by my reading, this is exactly what you're doing. Can we possible skip the attempts to claw the moral high ground from each other with you can't read!! this obviously doesn't mean that!!? I'll agree that quorum biases against any change (when there aren't enough voters). I'll also note, here, that quorum is different from supermajority. Right. I'm using bias as a general term to analyse the effects of any extra requirements we might add beyond just saying `take the Smith set, apply STV'. Ok. I'll take a general term as meaning doesn't have any particular negative connotation. Which means that the absence of bias isn't a positive feature without some further rationale. This isn't quite accurate. Biasses aren't *necessarily* bad, but they do need a good justification. constitution, while a vote in favor of B is a vote in favor of not modifying the constitution. This, however, doesn't make any sense. Again, there is no such thing as a vote that is simply for or against modifying the constitution, unless the vote simply has yes and no options. So, a vote which prefers A to B is a vote which prefers an option which modifies the constitution to an option which does not. A vote which prefers B to A is a vote which prefers not modifying the constitution to an option which prefers modifying the constitution. Do you disagree with this statement? Yes. Take a single vote that ranks: [ 2 ] A (change the constitution) [ 1 ] B (do such and such, don't change the constitution) [ 3 ] S (don't change anything, including the constitution) You'll note that B is preferred to A: thus it's a vote which prefers not modifying the constitution. You'll note that A is preferred to S: thus it's a vote *for* modifying the constitution. So yes, I think that's an unhelpful distinction to try to make. So no, I don't accept the implication that a vote where X isn't your first preference should be considered a vote against X. This sounds like you're try to get around the language of A.6(7). In the end, there can be only one. Yeah, well, good for A.6(7). If it agrees with you (and I personally think it doesn't) it's wrong too. Because it can represent the preferences of a voter who thinks Well, changing the constitution (A, say) is a bit drastic, but we should move in this direction; so ideally I'd rather the compromise (B), but I don't mind if we go all out, because he could vote BAS, and a voter who thinks (like you apparently might) Changing the constitution is too drastic, we have a compromise, we have to use that instead could express that by saying BSA, and someone who'd rather go all out, but will accept the compromise if necessary can express *that* by voting ABS. And, what about the voter who thinks: Well, I don't think that a solution which modifies the constitution is the right solution, but this is a real problem, and it's better than nothing.? Then if they've got a better solution they (or someone else) probably already proposed it and they can vote for that. The only thing you can't express in my way that you can in yours is `My opinion is worth three times anyone else's, and modifying the constitution to say foo is much much worse than doing bar'. Note that biassing everything over A isn't the only way of handling a supermajority (and isn't even a common or usual way --- you're welcome to cite one other instance of _anyone_ doing it this way, though), you can simply require a supermajority of people preferring A to the status-quo (by literally having a Status-quo option, or by using No or Further Discussion or
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 02:25:26PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 05:58:47PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: It'd have a substantial effect if a supermajority was required: if 60 of 100 people preferred your second preference, and voted Yes/Further Discussion/No, while 40 people voted Further Discussion/Yes/No, the vote would fail, and you'd be back at the start again. Personally, I doubt this would do you any good: everyone's already likely to have decided on their preference, so you may as well take the compromise rather than trying again and again and again. Depends on how I felt on the issue -- I rate things based on my preferences, not based on some abstract expectation about other people's preferences. Certainly, you can vote however you like. But be aware that other people might _not_ want to hinder their second preference just because they've got no chance of getting their first preference. Similarly, in the counting scheme I proposed, you'd vote: Er.. I've been trying to find your proposal. Let me restate it, then. A single vote is called, with each alternative option in its full form as an option, along with a "Status-quo" option. Developers submit ballots with each option numbered according to their relative preferences. First note: you don't attempt to distinguish between "this is worth redoing" and "this is not worth redoing", in your "status quo". As I've said, I don't see any benefit in doing it. Whichever's selected, as far as the constitution's concerned, you'll get the same result (ie nothing will change). As far as people are concerned, I don't believe it's appropriate to try to silence discussion by a vote. I'll also note we haven't consistently distinguished between "no" and "further discussion" in past votes. Votes are counted by first counting how many individual votes rank one option above another option, and a matrix is formed, where M[a,b] is the number of votes that rank option "a" over option "b", and M[b,a] is the number of votes that rank option "b" over option "a". Second note: this mechanism won't work for STV (which you suggest using, below). Eh? The matrix won't help you working out STV, but so what? You can just ignore it later, if you want to. An option has quorum if the number of individual ballots mentioning that option is greater than or equal to the quorum required. An option, a, meets a supermajority of N:1 if M[a,S] M[S,a] * N, where S is the Status-Quo option. Third note: this is something we're still debating. Yes, and I'm using this scheme as an example of a single-ballot preferential system that has the properties of supermajority I describe. That's its whole point. The vote is counted by first finding the Smith set, then eliminating all options from the Smith set that don't make quorum or their respective supermajority requirement. If no options remain, the default option, Status-quo wins. If many options remain, they're chosen amongst by using STV, or something similar. It's interesting that you're throwing quorum into the middle of the vote instead of at the begining or the end. I'm curious: do you have any describable reason for this choice? If you throw it in at the very end, you don't have an opportunity to select an alternative winner. If you put it at the start, I *believe* it tends to encourage insincere votes unnecessarily. This isn't entirely ideal: it'll select the status-quo more often than is probably desirable, but otherwise it's fairly expressive, and doesn't weight any preferences any more than others wherever possible. I presume, here, you're talking about the case where we're picking between an option with a supermajority requirement and a case where we're not. And, I presume that a bias towards options with supermajority requirements is something that you don't really care about. _Huh_?! Where did that come from? The only biasses in the above are towards options that pairwise beat other options, and towards the status-quo options (in the event others don't meet their supermajority requirements). That is there isn't a bias towards options with supermajority requirements. I don't care about problems that don't exist, if that's what you mean, I guess... Let me try a different explanation for what a "bias" is. Suppose you had a vote amongst only two options, Foo and Bar, that went something like: 60 votes F over B 40 votes B over F then you would expect F to beat B, right? And if the vote went the other way, 60 votes B over F 40 votes F over B you'd expect B to win. That would be a completely unbiassed vote. If, instead, you had a "Yes" and a "No" vote, and "Yes" required 3:1 supermajority to win, then clearly: 60 votes N over Y 40 votes Y over N would be a clear win for N, but then 60 votes Y over N 40 votes N over Y would also be a win for N. So any way of counting
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Wed, Dec 06, 2000 at 09:42:09PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: Certainly, you can vote however you like. But be aware that other people might _not_ want to hinder their second preference just because they've got no chance of getting their first preference. If they don't want to put their first preference first, then it's no longer their first preference. First note: you don't attempt to distinguish between "this is worth redoing" and "this is not worth redoing", in your "status quo". As I've said, I don't see any benefit in doing it. Whichever's selected, as far as the constitution's concerned, you'll get the same result (ie nothing will change). As far as people are concerned, I don't believe it's appropriate to try to silence discussion by a vote. I'll also note we haven't consistently distinguished between "no" and "further discussion" in past votes. Eh? [I'm deleting a paragraph I wrote here, about courtesy and understanding.] If no wins, and a new vote is called, the minimum discussion period must elapse before any further votes can be held. If further discussion wins, a new vote can be held whenever. An option has quorum if the number of individual ballots mentioning that option is greater than or equal to the quorum required. An option, a, meets a supermajority of N:1 if M[a,S] M[S,a] * N, where S is the Status-Quo option. Third note: this is something we're still debating. Yes, and I'm using this scheme as an example of a single-ballot preferential system that has the properties of supermajority I describe. That's its whole point. Well, except that you're squeezing in other concepts (for example, you're tossing the further discussion option). The vote is counted by first finding the Smith set, then eliminating all options from the Smith set that don't make quorum or their respective supermajority requirement. If no options remain, the default option, Status-quo wins. If many options remain, they're chosen amongst by using STV, or something similar. It's interesting that you're throwing quorum into the middle of the vote instead of at the begining or the end. I'm curious: do you have any describable reason for this choice? If you throw it in at the very end, you don't have an opportunity to select an alternative winner. If you put it at the start, I *believe* it tends to encourage insincere votes unnecessarily. You really think that "winner doesn't have quorum, but some option it beat does" is a worthwhile scenario? [You might be right -- I'm trying to understand if there's a reason behind this viewpoint.] This isn't entirely ideal: it'll select the status-quo more often than is probably desirable, but otherwise it's fairly expressive, and doesn't weight any preferences any more than others wherever possible. I presume, here, you're talking about the case where we're picking between an option with a supermajority requirement and a case where we're not. And, I presume that a bias towards options with supermajority requirements is something that you don't really care about. _Huh_?! Where did that come from? The only biasses in the above are towards options that pairwise beat other options, and towards the status-quo options (in the event others don't meet their supermajority requirements). Supermajority options which don't meet supermajority requirement but do meet a lesser majority requirement will (by definition) pairwise beat other options [which don't have that requirement]. Let me try a different explanation for what a "bias" is. Suppose you had a vote amongst only two options, Foo and Bar, that went something like: 60 votes F over B 40 votes B over F then you would expect F to beat B, right? And if the vote went the other way, 60 votes B over F 40 votes F over B you'd expect B to win. That would be a completely unbiassed vote. No problem. If, instead, you had a "Yes" and a "No" vote, and "Yes" required 3:1 supermajority to win, then clearly: 60 votes N over Y 40 votes Y over N would be a clear win for N, but then 60 votes Y over N 40 votes N over Y would also be a win for N. So any way of counting votes like this is biassed towards a "No" answer. Which is justifiable, because things like changing the constitution or the social contract shouldn't be done on a whim. Doing what we've always done is at least somewhat effective, you need to have a strong, convincing argument to take the risk and change. It's entirely fair and reasonable to be biassed towards what we're already doing, and to encode that into the way we vote. Ok, here you're defining the effect of supermajority as "bias". What you're also saying, though, is that given three options, A, B and Status-Quo, say, where A requires a 3:1 supermajority, but B doesn't, that if the vote went like: 60 votes B over A over S 40 votes A over B over S
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Wed, Dec 06, 2000 at 12:36:48PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: First note: you don't attempt to distinguish between "this is worth redoing" and "this is not worth redoing", in your "status quo". As I've said, I don't see any benefit in doing it. Whichever's selected, as far as the constitution's concerned, you'll get the same result (ie nothing will change). As far as people are concerned, I don't believe it's appropriate to try to silence discussion by a vote. I'll also note we haven't consistently distinguished between "no" and "further discussion" in past votes. If no wins, and a new vote is called, the minimum discussion period must elapse before any further votes can be held. If further discussion wins, a new vote can be held whenever. From A.3(1): ``If Further Discussion wins then the entire resolution procedure is set back to the start of the discussion period.'' From A.3(2): ``If Further Discussion wins then the entire procedure is set back to the start of the discussion period.'' If you're going to bring new assertions in, could you at least verify them first? The above isn't something I'd thought of, and thus could've been interesting if it had at least been correct. An option has quorum if the number of individual ballots mentioning that option is greater than or equal to the quorum required. An option, a, meets a supermajority of N:1 if M[a,S] M[S,a] * N, where S is the Status-Quo option. Third note: this is something we're still debating. Yes, and I'm using this scheme as an example of a single-ballot preferential system that has the properties of supermajority I describe. That's its whole point. Well, except that you're squeezing in other concepts (for example, you're tossing the further discussion option). Oh, you meant `the Status-Quo option', by `this'. Look, forget it then. Assume `Further Discussion' and `No' are separate options on the ballot, and that they're both scaled according to the relevant supermajority requirements. For the purposes of this discussion it doesn't really matter. The vote is counted by first finding the Smith set, then eliminating all options from the Smith set that don't make quorum or their respective supermajority requirement. If no options remain, the default option, Status-quo wins. If many options remain, they're chosen amongst by using STV, or something similar. It's interesting that you're throwing quorum into the middle of the vote instead of at the begining or the end. I'm curious: do you have any describable reason for this choice? If you throw it in at the very end, you don't have an opportunity to select an alternative winner. If you put it at the start, I *believe* it tends to encourage insincere votes unnecessarily. You really think that "winner doesn't have quorum, but some option it beat does" is a worthwhile scenario? [You might be right -- I'm trying to understand if there's a reason behind this viewpoint.] No, I'm not interested in it at all. Look, I realise this has other features, but right now, I don't care about them. I'm trying to get you to understand what supermajority stuff is about. This isn't entirely ideal: it'll select the status-quo more often than is probably desirable, but otherwise it's fairly expressive, and doesn't weight any preferences any more than others wherever possible. I presume, here, you're talking about the case where we're picking between an option with a supermajority requirement and a case where we're not. And, I presume that a bias towards options with supermajority requirements is something that you don't really care about. _Huh_?! Where did that come from? The only biasses in the above are towards options that pairwise beat other options, and towards the status-quo options (in the event others don't meet their supermajority requirements). Supermajority options which don't meet supermajority requirement but do meet a lesser majority requirement will (by definition) pairwise beat other options [which don't have that requirement]. You're using a particular definition for `supermajority requirement' there, that I don't accept or agree with. Can we avoid assuming you're right for the moment, and see if there's a reasonable justification for thinking that way? Let me try a different explanation for what a "bias" is. Suppose you had a vote amongst only two options, Foo and Bar, that went something like: 60 votes F over B 40 votes B over F then you would expect F to beat B, right? And if the vote went the other way, 60 votes B over F 40 votes F over B you'd expect B to win. That would be a completely unbiassed vote. No problem. Now, I probably should have added: a completely unbiassed vote isn't something we want. We want to bias towards (at least) the status-quo because we know it works. This is at least what quorum is about, and IMO, what
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 01:37:31PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: From A.3(1): ``If Further Discussion wins then the entire resolution procedure is set back to the start of the discussion period.'' From A.3(2): ``If Further Discussion wins then the entire procedure is set back to the start of the discussion period.'' Oops, my goof. I still maintain there's a difference (because the intent of the developers is more obvious), but you're right about the minimum discussion period. The vote is counted by first finding the Smith set, then eliminating all options from the Smith set that don't make quorum or their respective supermajority requirement. If no options remain, the default option, Status-quo wins. If many options remain, they're chosen amongst by using STV, or something similar. It's interesting that you're throwing quorum into the middle of the vote instead of at the begining or the end. I'm curious: do you have any describable reason for this choice? If you throw it in at the very end, you don't have an opportunity to select an alternative winner. If you put it at the start, I *believe* it tends to encourage insincere votes unnecessarily. You really think that "winner doesn't have quorum, but some option it beat does" is a worthwhile scenario? [You might be right -- I'm trying to understand if there's a reason behind this viewpoint.] No, I'm not interested in it at all. Look, I realise this has other features, but right now, I don't care about them. I'm trying to get you to understand what supermajority stuff is about. Ok. I think this ties together, but let's see how it pans out. This isn't entirely ideal: it'll select the status-quo more often than is probably desirable, but otherwise it's fairly expressive, and doesn't weight any preferences any more than others wherever possible. I presume, here, you're talking about the case where we're picking between an option with a supermajority requirement and a case where we're not. And, I presume that a bias towards options with supermajority requirements is something that you don't really care about. _Huh_?! Where did that come from? The only biasses in the above are towards options that pairwise beat other options, and towards the status-quo options (in the event others don't meet their supermajority requirements). Supermajority options which don't meet supermajority requirement but do meet a lesser majority requirement will (by definition) pairwise beat other options [which don't have that requirement]. You're using a particular definition for `supermajority requirement' there, that I don't accept or agree with. Can we avoid assuming you're right for the moment, and see if there's a reasonable justification for thinking that way? Er.. I thought I was using your definition of supermajority options, in that paragraph. Let me try a different explanation for what a "bias" is. Suppose you had a vote amongst only two options, Foo and Bar, that went something like: 60 votes F over B 40 votes B over F then you would expect F to beat B, right? And if the vote went the other way, 60 votes B over F 40 votes F over B you'd expect B to win. That would be a completely unbiassed vote. No problem. Now, I probably should have added: a completely unbiassed vote isn't something we want. We want to bias towards (at least) the status-quo because we know it works. This is at least what quorum is about, and IMO, what supermajority is about. I'll agree that quorum biases against any change (when there aren't enough voters). I'll also note, here, that quorum is different from supermajority. I'll only agree that supermajority biases against certain forms of change (changing the constitution, for example). Ok, here you're defining the effect of supermajority as "bias". I'm saying that supermajority requirements is a particular kind of bias, yes. Ok. What you're also saying, though, is that given three options, A, B and Status-Quo, say, where A requires a 3:1 supermajority, but B doesn't, that if the vote went like: 60 votes B over A over S 40 votes A over B over S then B should clearly win (which I agree with), but also, if A and B were swapped, so that you had: 60 votes A over B over S 40 votes B over A over S that B should still win. That is, you're biassed towards accepting any option that doesn't require a supermajority over any that does. Sure, this validates your underlying assumption: that a supermajority requirement is a bias. I can accept this definition, but using the terms in the way you've indicated: I don't see that "taking the bias out of the voting" system means anything other than "taking the effect of supermajority out of the voting system". It'd also take quorum out of the voting system too. Well, it could mean
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 02:25:26PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 05:58:47PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: It'd have a substantial effect if a supermajority was required: if 60 of 100 people preferred your second preference, and voted Yes/Further Discussion/No, while 40 people voted Further Discussion/Yes/No, the vote would fail, and you'd be back at the start again. Personally, I doubt this would do you any good: everyone's already likely to have decided on their preference, so you may as well take the compromise rather than trying again and again and again. Depends on how I felt on the issue -- I rate things based on my preferences, not based on some abstract expectation about other people's preferences. Certainly, you can vote however you like. But be aware that other people might _not_ want to hinder their second preference just because they've got no chance of getting their first preference. Similarly, in the counting scheme I proposed, you'd vote: Er.. I've been trying to find your proposal. Let me restate it, then. A single vote is called, with each alternative option in its full form as an option, along with a Status-quo option. Developers submit ballots with each option numbered according to their relative preferences. First note: you don't attempt to distinguish between this is worth redoing and this is not worth redoing, in your status quo. As I've said, I don't see any benefit in doing it. Whichever's selected, as far as the constitution's concerned, you'll get the same result (ie nothing will change). As far as people are concerned, I don't believe it's appropriate to try to silence discussion by a vote. I'll also note we haven't consistently distinguished between no and further discussion in past votes. Votes are counted by first counting how many individual votes rank one option above another option, and a matrix is formed, where M[a,b] is the number of votes that rank option a over option b, and M[b,a] is the number of votes that rank option b over option a. Second note: this mechanism won't work for STV (which you suggest using, below). Eh? The matrix won't help you working out STV, but so what? You can just ignore it later, if you want to. An option has quorum if the number of individual ballots mentioning that option is greater than or equal to the quorum required. An option, a, meets a supermajority of N:1 if M[a,S] M[S,a] * N, where S is the Status-Quo option. Third note: this is something we're still debating. Yes, and I'm using this scheme as an example of a single-ballot preferential system that has the properties of supermajority I describe. That's its whole point. The vote is counted by first finding the Smith set, then eliminating all options from the Smith set that don't make quorum or their respective supermajority requirement. If no options remain, the default option, Status-quo wins. If many options remain, they're chosen amongst by using STV, or something similar. It's interesting that you're throwing quorum into the middle of the vote instead of at the begining or the end. I'm curious: do you have any describable reason for this choice? If you throw it in at the very end, you don't have an opportunity to select an alternative winner. If you put it at the start, I *believe* it tends to encourage insincere votes unnecessarily. This isn't entirely ideal: it'll select the status-quo more often than is probably desirable, but otherwise it's fairly expressive, and doesn't weight any preferences any more than others wherever possible. I presume, here, you're talking about the case where we're picking between an option with a supermajority requirement and a case where we're not. And, I presume that a bias towards options with supermajority requirements is something that you don't really care about. _Huh_?! Where did that come from? The only biasses in the above are towards options that pairwise beat other options, and towards the status-quo options (in the event others don't meet their supermajority requirements). That is there isn't a bias towards options with supermajority requirements. I don't care about problems that don't exist, if that's what you mean, I guess... Let me try a different explanation for what a bias is. Suppose you had a vote amongst only two options, Foo and Bar, that went something like: 60 votes F over B 40 votes B over F then you would expect F to beat B, right? And if the vote went the other way, 60 votes B over F 40 votes F over B you'd expect B to win. That would be a completely unbiassed vote. If, instead, you had a Yes and a No vote, and Yes required 3:1 supermajority to win, then clearly: 60 votes N over Y 40 votes Y over N would be a clear win for N, but then 60 votes Y over N 40 votes N over Y would also be a win for N. So any way of counting votes like this is biassed
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Wed, Dec 06, 2000 at 09:42:09PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: Certainly, you can vote however you like. But be aware that other people might _not_ want to hinder their second preference just because they've got no chance of getting their first preference. If they don't want to put their first preference first, then it's no longer their first preference. First note: you don't attempt to distinguish between this is worth redoing and this is not worth redoing, in your status quo. As I've said, I don't see any benefit in doing it. Whichever's selected, as far as the constitution's concerned, you'll get the same result (ie nothing will change). As far as people are concerned, I don't believe it's appropriate to try to silence discussion by a vote. I'll also note we haven't consistently distinguished between no and further discussion in past votes. Eh? [I'm deleting a paragraph I wrote here, about courtesy and understanding.] If no wins, and a new vote is called, the minimum discussion period must elapse before any further votes can be held. If further discussion wins, a new vote can be held whenever. An option has quorum if the number of individual ballots mentioning that option is greater than or equal to the quorum required. An option, a, meets a supermajority of N:1 if M[a,S] M[S,a] * N, where S is the Status-Quo option. Third note: this is something we're still debating. Yes, and I'm using this scheme as an example of a single-ballot preferential system that has the properties of supermajority I describe. That's its whole point. Well, except that you're squeezing in other concepts (for example, you're tossing the further discussion option). The vote is counted by first finding the Smith set, then eliminating all options from the Smith set that don't make quorum or their respective supermajority requirement. If no options remain, the default option, Status-quo wins. If many options remain, they're chosen amongst by using STV, or something similar. It's interesting that you're throwing quorum into the middle of the vote instead of at the begining or the end. I'm curious: do you have any describable reason for this choice? If you throw it in at the very end, you don't have an opportunity to select an alternative winner. If you put it at the start, I *believe* it tends to encourage insincere votes unnecessarily. You really think that winner doesn't have quorum, but some option it beat does is a worthwhile scenario? [You might be right -- I'm trying to understand if there's a reason behind this viewpoint.] This isn't entirely ideal: it'll select the status-quo more often than is probably desirable, but otherwise it's fairly expressive, and doesn't weight any preferences any more than others wherever possible. I presume, here, you're talking about the case where we're picking between an option with a supermajority requirement and a case where we're not. And, I presume that a bias towards options with supermajority requirements is something that you don't really care about. _Huh_?! Where did that come from? The only biasses in the above are towards options that pairwise beat other options, and towards the status-quo options (in the event others don't meet their supermajority requirements). Supermajority options which don't meet supermajority requirement but do meet a lesser majority requirement will (by definition) pairwise beat other options [which don't have that requirement]. Let me try a different explanation for what a bias is. Suppose you had a vote amongst only two options, Foo and Bar, that went something like: 60 votes F over B 40 votes B over F then you would expect F to beat B, right? And if the vote went the other way, 60 votes B over F 40 votes F over B you'd expect B to win. That would be a completely unbiassed vote. No problem. If, instead, you had a Yes and a No vote, and Yes required 3:1 supermajority to win, then clearly: 60 votes N over Y 40 votes Y over N would be a clear win for N, but then 60 votes Y over N 40 votes N over Y would also be a win for N. So any way of counting votes like this is biassed towards a No answer. Which is justifiable, because things like changing the constitution or the social contract shouldn't be done on a whim. Doing what we've always done is at least somewhat effective, you need to have a strong, convincing argument to take the risk and change. It's entirely fair and reasonable to be biassed towards what we're already doing, and to encode that into the way we vote. Ok, here you're defining the effect of supermajority as bias. What you're also saying, though, is that given three options, A, B and Status-Quo, say, where A requires a 3:1 supermajority, but B doesn't, that if the vote went like: 60 votes B over A over S 40 votes A over B over S then B should clearly win
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Wed, Dec 06, 2000 at 12:36:48PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: First note: you don't attempt to distinguish between this is worth redoing and this is not worth redoing, in your status quo. As I've said, I don't see any benefit in doing it. Whichever's selected, as far as the constitution's concerned, you'll get the same result (ie nothing will change). As far as people are concerned, I don't believe it's appropriate to try to silence discussion by a vote. I'll also note we haven't consistently distinguished between no and further discussion in past votes. If no wins, and a new vote is called, the minimum discussion period must elapse before any further votes can be held. If further discussion wins, a new vote can be held whenever. From A.3(1): ``If Further Discussion wins then the entire resolution procedure is set back to the start of the discussion period.'' From A.3(2): ``If Further Discussion wins then the entire procedure is set back to the start of the discussion period.'' If you're going to bring new assertions in, could you at least verify them first? The above isn't something I'd thought of, and thus could've been interesting if it had at least been correct. An option has quorum if the number of individual ballots mentioning that option is greater than or equal to the quorum required. An option, a, meets a supermajority of N:1 if M[a,S] M[S,a] * N, where S is the Status-Quo option. Third note: this is something we're still debating. Yes, and I'm using this scheme as an example of a single-ballot preferential system that has the properties of supermajority I describe. That's its whole point. Well, except that you're squeezing in other concepts (for example, you're tossing the further discussion option). Oh, you meant `the Status-Quo option', by `this'. Look, forget it then. Assume `Further Discussion' and `No' are separate options on the ballot, and that they're both scaled according to the relevant supermajority requirements. For the purposes of this discussion it doesn't really matter. The vote is counted by first finding the Smith set, then eliminating all options from the Smith set that don't make quorum or their respective supermajority requirement. If no options remain, the default option, Status-quo wins. If many options remain, they're chosen amongst by using STV, or something similar. It's interesting that you're throwing quorum into the middle of the vote instead of at the begining or the end. I'm curious: do you have any describable reason for this choice? If you throw it in at the very end, you don't have an opportunity to select an alternative winner. If you put it at the start, I *believe* it tends to encourage insincere votes unnecessarily. You really think that winner doesn't have quorum, but some option it beat does is a worthwhile scenario? [You might be right -- I'm trying to understand if there's a reason behind this viewpoint.] No, I'm not interested in it at all. Look, I realise this has other features, but right now, I don't care about them. I'm trying to get you to understand what supermajority stuff is about. This isn't entirely ideal: it'll select the status-quo more often than is probably desirable, but otherwise it's fairly expressive, and doesn't weight any preferences any more than others wherever possible. I presume, here, you're talking about the case where we're picking between an option with a supermajority requirement and a case where we're not. And, I presume that a bias towards options with supermajority requirements is something that you don't really care about. _Huh_?! Where did that come from? The only biasses in the above are towards options that pairwise beat other options, and towards the status-quo options (in the event others don't meet their supermajority requirements). Supermajority options which don't meet supermajority requirement but do meet a lesser majority requirement will (by definition) pairwise beat other options [which don't have that requirement]. You're using a particular definition for `supermajority requirement' there, that I don't accept or agree with. Can we avoid assuming you're right for the moment, and see if there's a reasonable justification for thinking that way? Let me try a different explanation for what a bias is. Suppose you had a vote amongst only two options, Foo and Bar, that went something like: 60 votes F over B 40 votes B over F then you would expect F to beat B, right? And if the vote went the other way, 60 votes B over F 40 votes F over B you'd expect B to win. That would be a completely unbiassed vote. No problem. Now, I probably should have added: a completely unbiassed vote isn't something we want. We want to bias towards (at least) the status-quo because we know it works. This is at least what quorum is about, and IMO, what supermajority is about.
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 01:37:31PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: From A.3(1): ``If Further Discussion wins then the entire resolution procedure is set back to the start of the discussion period.'' From A.3(2): ``If Further Discussion wins then the entire procedure is set back to the start of the discussion period.'' Oops, my goof. I still maintain there's a difference (because the intent of the developers is more obvious), but you're right about the minimum discussion period. The vote is counted by first finding the Smith set, then eliminating all options from the Smith set that don't make quorum or their respective supermajority requirement. If no options remain, the default option, Status-quo wins. If many options remain, they're chosen amongst by using STV, or something similar. It's interesting that you're throwing quorum into the middle of the vote instead of at the begining or the end. I'm curious: do you have any describable reason for this choice? If you throw it in at the very end, you don't have an opportunity to select an alternative winner. If you put it at the start, I *believe* it tends to encourage insincere votes unnecessarily. You really think that winner doesn't have quorum, but some option it beat does is a worthwhile scenario? [You might be right -- I'm trying to understand if there's a reason behind this viewpoint.] No, I'm not interested in it at all. Look, I realise this has other features, but right now, I don't care about them. I'm trying to get you to understand what supermajority stuff is about. Ok. I think this ties together, but let's see how it pans out. This isn't entirely ideal: it'll select the status-quo more often than is probably desirable, but otherwise it's fairly expressive, and doesn't weight any preferences any more than others wherever possible. I presume, here, you're talking about the case where we're picking between an option with a supermajority requirement and a case where we're not. And, I presume that a bias towards options with supermajority requirements is something that you don't really care about. _Huh_?! Where did that come from? The only biasses in the above are towards options that pairwise beat other options, and towards the status-quo options (in the event others don't meet their supermajority requirements). Supermajority options which don't meet supermajority requirement but do meet a lesser majority requirement will (by definition) pairwise beat other options [which don't have that requirement]. You're using a particular definition for `supermajority requirement' there, that I don't accept or agree with. Can we avoid assuming you're right for the moment, and see if there's a reasonable justification for thinking that way? Er.. I thought I was using your definition of supermajority options, in that paragraph. Let me try a different explanation for what a bias is. Suppose you had a vote amongst only two options, Foo and Bar, that went something like: 60 votes F over B 40 votes B over F then you would expect F to beat B, right? And if the vote went the other way, 60 votes B over F 40 votes F over B you'd expect B to win. That would be a completely unbiassed vote. No problem. Now, I probably should have added: a completely unbiassed vote isn't something we want. We want to bias towards (at least) the status-quo because we know it works. This is at least what quorum is about, and IMO, what supermajority is about. I'll agree that quorum biases against any change (when there aren't enough voters). I'll also note, here, that quorum is different from supermajority. I'll only agree that supermajority biases against certain forms of change (changing the constitution, for example). Ok, here you're defining the effect of supermajority as bias. I'm saying that supermajority requirements is a particular kind of bias, yes. Ok. What you're also saying, though, is that given three options, A, B and Status-Quo, say, where A requires a 3:1 supermajority, but B doesn't, that if the vote went like: 60 votes B over A over S 40 votes A over B over S then B should clearly win (which I agree with), but also, if A and B were swapped, so that you had: 60 votes A over B over S 40 votes B over A over S that B should still win. That is, you're biassed towards accepting any option that doesn't require a supermajority over any that does. Sure, this validates your underlying assumption: that a supermajority requirement is a bias. I can accept this definition, but using the terms in the way you've indicated: I don't see that taking the bias out of the voting system means anything other than taking the effect of supermajority out of the voting system. It'd also take quorum out of the voting system too. Well, it could mean that, but
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 12:32:12AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: The Condorcet criterion says that if there's a single option that pairwise beats every other option, it should win (assuming there's no supermajority requirement, and quorum is met). That's a relatively weak criterion, all things considered. On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 11:35:45PM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote: "All things considered" just being: -- it doesn't deal with supermajorities -- it doesn't deal with quorum issues -- it doesn't state what should happen if there isn't a single option that pairwise beats every other option. I was refering to this last one. It's what the current A.6(2) and A.6(3) are for. (The Condorcet criterion doesn't say anything about the ambiguous cases we've been talking about) I thought we'd agreed that they are to ensure that the Smith criterion is met (which is more specific than the Condorcet criterion). If A.6(3) is supposed to reduce the options to the Smith set, it is very poorly written. I guess this depends on whether you think that Dominates means "pairwise beats" or "transitively beats". I think it means "transitively beats". I do see that other people (you, anthony) disagree with me, and I think that's sufficient reason to consider a constitutional amendment to resolve this issue. [I'd like to achieve agreement on a few other issues, however, before I propose anything formal.] Thanks, -- Raul -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 11:20:15PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: My point of view is that these two are essentially equivalent: in the N+1 style of voting, a person who thinks that the option isn't the best would vote for further discussion. Well, they might do that, yes. Or else they might think to themselves, well, I'm never going to get my preferred choice, and this isn't bad, so yeah, let's do that. I think that's a valid point of view to hold. Indeed, things could happen this way. [Personally, I'm not sure I'd say Oh well -- if My First Preference was important to me, I'd very likely vote 1: further discussion, 2: yes, 3: no -- this wouldn't have a substantially different effect, unless some of the people who had voted the other way had second thoughts, or unless more people participated in the second vote.] It'd have a substantial effect if a supermajority was required: if 60 of 100 people preferred your second preference, and voted Yes/Further Discussion/No, while 40 people voted Further Discussion/Yes/No, the vote would fail, and you'd be back at the start again. Personally, I doubt this would do you any good: everyone's already likely to have decided on their preference, so you may as well take the compromise rather than trying again and again and again. Similarly, in the counting scheme I proposed, you'd vote: Er.. I've been trying to find your proposal. Let me restate it, then. A single vote is called, with each alternative option in its full form as an option, along with a Status-quo option. Developers submit ballots with each option numbered according to their relative preferences. Votes are counted by first counting how many individual votes rank one option above another option, and a matrix is formed, where M[a,b] is the number of votes that rank option a over option b, and M[b,a] is the number of votes that rank option b over option a. An option has quorum if the number of individual ballots mentioning that option is greater than or equal to the quorum required. An option, a, meets a supermajority of N:1 if M[a,S] M[S,a] * N, where S is the Status-Quo option. The vote is counted by first finding the Smith set, then eliminating all options from the Smith set that don't make quorum or their respective supermajority requirement. If no options remain, the default option, Status-quo wins. If many options remain, they're chosen amongst by using STV, or something similar. This isn't entirely ideal: it'll select the status-quo more often than is probably desirable, but otherwise it's fairly expressive, and doesn't weight any preferences any more than others wherever possible. Consider it more as an example of a way to conduct a single vote that has less flaws than yours, rather than one that's useful as is. No, your view of supermajority isn't good because it affects other options than the status-quo options, and raises the odds that they'll win. An alternative way of looking at it is that there's no way to express a preference towards a non-supermajority vote without that preference counting for three preferences the other way. What if I *don't* feel that strongly about it? Well.. if supermajority decreases the chance that an option will win, then, yes, that does tend to bias things in the direction of alternatives. It's also possible to simply bias the vote towards the status-quo, rather than simply biassing it away from some other option. To avoid this bias, you seem to want to bias things away from the alternatives, and in favor of the choice between the supermajority option, and what you call the status quo option. No, I don't want to avoid bias entirely; if I did I'd be saying let's do away with supermajorities and quorums and just use a straight out Condorcet method of some description. But I think the main benefit of a quorum and supermajority is to bias towards the status-quo, not to bias against that particular possibility. Well, again, my reading explicitly requires a vote with Yes/No/Further Discussion as the only options, and only applies supermajority and quorum to those options. Oh? The only way I see to get that interpretation requires I either: [A] Completely ignore A.3(3), or [B] imagine that A.6(7) somehow says that X stands for only no or further discussion What have I missed? Okay, let me flesh out how I'd conduct a vote that has multiple related alternatives that should be decided on at once. First, since the constitution doesn't say anything about merging distinct votes, I'd require the later alternatives to be phrased as amendments to the first alternative presented, even if this essentially implies ignoring the original proposal and rewriting it from scratch. Once all the alternatives are assembled, and the proposers/sponsors have called for a vote, I'd first form a ballot under A.3(1) that looked like [ _ ] Original proposal [ _ ] First amendment [ _ ] Second amendment
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
My point of view is that these two are essentially equivalent: in the N+1 style of voting, a person who thinks that the option isn't the best would vote for further discussion. Well, they might do that, yes. Or else they might think to themselves, well, I'm never going to get my preferred choice, and this isn't bad, so yeah, let's do that. I think that's a valid point of view to hold. On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 11:20:15PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: Indeed, things could happen this way. [Personally, I'm not sure I'd say Oh well -- if My First Preference was important to me, I'd very likely vote 1: further discussion, 2: yes, 3: no -- this wouldn't have a substantially different effect, unless some of the people who had voted the other way had second thoughts, or unless more people participated in the second vote.] On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 05:58:47PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: It'd have a substantial effect if a supermajority was required: if 60 of 100 people preferred your second preference, and voted Yes/Further Discussion/No, while 40 people voted Further Discussion/Yes/No, the vote would fail, and you'd be back at the start again. Personally, I doubt this would do you any good: everyone's already likely to have decided on their preference, so you may as well take the compromise rather than trying again and again and again. Depends on how I felt on the issue -- I rate things based on my preferences, not based on some abstract expectation about other people's preferences. Similarly, in the counting scheme I proposed, you'd vote: Er.. I've been trying to find your proposal. Let me restate it, then. A single vote is called, with each alternative option in its full form as an option, along with a Status-quo option. Developers submit ballots with each option numbered according to their relative preferences. First note: you don't attempt to distinguish between this is worth redoing and this is not worth redoing, in your status quo. Votes are counted by first counting how many individual votes rank one option above another option, and a matrix is formed, where M[a,b] is the number of votes that rank option a over option b, and M[b,a] is the number of votes that rank option b over option a. Second note: this mechanism won't work for STV (which you suggest using, below). An option has quorum if the number of individual ballots mentioning that option is greater than or equal to the quorum required. An option, a, meets a supermajority of N:1 if M[a,S] M[S,a] * N, where S is the Status-Quo option. Third note: this is something we're still debating. The vote is counted by first finding the Smith set, then eliminating all options from the Smith set that don't make quorum or their respective supermajority requirement. If no options remain, the default option, Status-quo wins. If many options remain, they're chosen amongst by using STV, or something similar. It's interesting that you're throwing quorum into the middle of the vote instead of at the begining or the end. I'm curious: do you have any describable reason for this choice? This isn't entirely ideal: it'll select the status-quo more often than is probably desirable, but otherwise it's fairly expressive, and doesn't weight any preferences any more than others wherever possible. I presume, here, you're talking about the case where we're picking between an option with a supermajority requirement and a case where we're not. And, I presume that a bias towards options with supermajority requirements is something that you don't really care about. Consider it more as an example of a way to conduct a single vote that has less flaws than yours, rather than one that's useful as is. The chief flaw you seem to be addressing is this very point we're debating: what should supermajority mean, when comparing options with different supermajority requirements. No, your view of supermajority isn't good because it affects other options than the status-quo options, and raises the odds that they'll win. An alternative way of looking at it is that there's no way to express a preference towards a non-supermajority vote without that preference counting for three preferences the other way. What if I *don't* feel that strongly about it? Well.. if supermajority decreases the chance that an option will win, then, yes, that does tend to bias things in the direction of alternatives. It's also possible to simply bias the vote towards the status-quo, rather than simply biassing it away from some other option. Unless we are contrasting with an unambiguous reference, bias is a matter of what you're contrasting with. To avoid this bias, you seem to want to bias things away from the alternatives, and in favor of the choice between the supermajority option, and what you call the status quo option. No, I don't want to avoid bias entirely; if I did I'd be saying let's do away
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 12:32:12AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: The Condorcet criterion says that if there's a single option that pairwise beats every other option, it should win (assuming there's no supermajority requirement, and quorum is met). That's a relatively weak criterion, all things considered. On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 11:35:45PM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote: All things considered just being: -- it doesn't deal with supermajorities -- it doesn't deal with quorum issues -- it doesn't state what should happen if there isn't a single option that pairwise beats every other option. I was refering to this last one. It's what the current A.6(2) and A.6(3) are for. (The Condorcet criterion doesn't say anything about the ambiguous cases we've been talking about) I thought we'd agreed that they are to ensure that the Smith criterion is met (which is more specific than the Condorcet criterion). If A.6(3) is supposed to reduce the options to the Smith set, it is very poorly written. I guess this depends on whether you think that Dominates means pairwise beats or transitively beats. I think it means transitively beats. I do see that other people (you, anthony) disagree with me, and I think that's sufficient reason to consider a constitutional amendment to resolve this issue. [I'd like to achieve agreement on a few other issues, however, before I propose anything formal.] Thanks, -- Raul
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 10:02:40PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: Actually, if you're talking about a properly formed A.3(3) vote, where you're voting on option A and independent option B, there should be on the ballot: Yes on A and B Yes on A, no on B Yes on B no on A no on A, no on B further discussion. On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 11:46:55AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: Okay, now consider the vote being proposed by Manoj and Branden, then one that has alternatives "Allow modification of foundational documents with 3:1 supermajority" and "Allow modification to all documents". These are not independent options. Nor are "Debian will have nothing to do with non-free ever again" and "Debian will continue to maintain non-free, but will do it on unofficial.debian.org instead of ftp-master". So I don't see what relevance the above has at all. I think I've consistently ignored the possibility of actual independent alternatives in a single resolution throughout this whole thread. I get the feeling you're not even trying to see how what I'm talking about relates to what's said in the constitution. Certainly, you're not quoting from the constitution in your "refutations" of my points. Well, you seem willing to infer whole vistas of implied conditions from single words, and seem to take the position that anything not explicitly forbidden in the constitution is implicitly allowed, so I don't really see much point discussing what the constitution says, since I can't see any objective basis for analysis remaining, and you have the high-ground as far as subjective analysis goes (since you have some possibility of actually acting as secretary). I'm much more interested in how we should conduct votes in future, anyway. Cheers, aj -- Anthony Towns [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/ I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred. ``Thanks to all avid pokers out there'' -- linux.conf.au, 17-20 January 2001 PGP signature
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 12:32:12AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: The Condorcet criterion says that if there's a single option that pairwise beats every other option, it should win (assuming there's no supermajority requirement, and quorum is met). That's a relatively weak criterion, all things considered. It's what the current A.6(2) and A.6(3) are for. (The Condorcet criterion doesn't say anything about the ambiguous cases we've been talking about) I thought we'd agreed that they are to ensure that the Smith criterion is met (which is more specific than the Condorcet criterion). There are two reasonable ways of treating supermajorities, that I can think of: a) A supermajority of developers believe this option is acceptable. b) A supermajority of developers support this option above all others. I believe (a) is the better case, and I think it's essentially what the N+1 scheme described in the constitution achieves. From some of your mails, I'm lead to believe you might prefer (b). Er.. you've lost me here. (*scratches head*) I, uh, don't see how... [0] Ignore all the procedures established in the appendices, and just note that a consitutional amendment requires a `3:1 supermajority' to succeed. I can only see two things this can be attempting to require: * For every person who wouldn't accept it as a resolution, there must be three who will for it to pass. Agreed. * For every person who would prefer some other solution, there must be three who think this is the best solution possible. Agreed. The way the N+1 style of voting behave, you're effectively requiring the former. My point of view is that these two are essentially equivalent: in the N+1 style of voting, a person who thinks that the option isn't the best would vote for "further discussion". The way your proposed clarification behaves, you're requiring (I think) that if you have an option, S, requiring a supermajority, that it be preferred by a supermajority over every option, A, B, C that don't require a supermajority (of which "No" and "Further Discussion" are examples, but others are possible too). I don't think this is particularly useful. I'm guessing that you're saying my view of supermajority isn't particularly useful is based on your idea where "further discussion" is equivalent to a "no" vote, even though they're disctinct options on the ballot, and even though the matter is dropped if "no" wins, but further votes will be conducted if "further discussion" wins. I suppose a literal interpretation of 3:1 "supermajority" would be that over 75% of all of debian's developers must be in favor of an item before it can be passed. I think that my intepretation of "supermajority" is more relaxed than this, but that it's equivalent for the case where everyone is voting. Ok, I think you're basing [your view of my view of supermajority] off of my earlier response to a specific example where I thought, at the time, you were talking about a vote which mixed a supermajority option with a non-supermajority option. That's the main (sole?) example where it behaves differently to the other methods. I'll agree that the constitution doesn't explictly address this sort of mixed majority example. (b) isn't quite what your system does, though (aiui). If you consider the Manoj and Branden's proposed vote, we might end up with people holding preferences like: 120 people prefer M, B, S, F (Manoj, Branden, Status-Quo, F.Disc) 100 people prefer B, M, S, F This means that the ratio between M and B would be only 6:5, rather than 3:1, so presumably neither should win (that's what (b) would imply to me)? If we're talking about *my* interpretation of what the constitution is saying, and what it's trying to say, and *my* understanding of that particular vote. And, if we agree that a 3:1 supermajority applies to changing the social contract: (By Manoj's and Branden's proposals, I mean the amendments to the constitution to provide a procedure for changing the constitution, not any of the non-free votes themselves, since both would change the constitution if accepted, both require a supermajority to pass) [agreed] The way I see it, when determining which votes Dominate which others, votes which prefer an option with a supermajority are reduced to an appropriate fraction (in this case 1/3). But, 40 Dominates 33 1/3, so M wins. Yes, that's how I understand your interpretation too; it just doesn't seem sensible to me to have the voting system be biassed towards options that don't require a supermajority (or require a lesser one). Well.. the constitution seems to explicitly state this. That is, given two options, A and B, both of which pass quorum, both of which are acceptable to their respective supermajorities, then the one that's picked should be the one that's preferred by more people, simple as
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 11:20:15PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: My point of view is that these two are essentially equivalent: in the N+1 style of voting, a person who thinks that the option isn't the best would vote for "further discussion". Well, they might do that, yes. Or else they might think to themselves, "well, I'm never going to get my preferred choice, and this isn't bad, so yeah, let's do that". I think that's a valid point of view to hold. Indeed, things could happen this way. [Personally, I'm not sure I'd say "Oh well" -- if "My First Preference" was important to me, I'd very likely vote 1: further discussion, 2: yes, 3: no -- this wouldn't have a substantially different effect, unless some of the people who had voted the other way had second thoughts, or unless more people participated in the second vote.] It'd have a substantial effect if a supermajority was required: if 60 of 100 people preferred your second preference, and voted Yes/Further Discussion/No, while 40 people voted Further Discussion/Yes/No, the vote would fail, and you'd be back at the start again. Personally, I doubt this would do you any good: everyone's already likely to have decided on their preference, so you may as well take the compromise rather than trying again and again and again. Similarly, in the counting scheme I proposed, you'd vote: Er.. I've been trying to find your proposal. Let me restate it, then. A single vote is called, with each alternative option in its full form as an option, along with a "Status-quo" option. Developers submit ballots with each option numbered according to their relative preferences. Votes are counted by first counting how many individual votes rank one option above another option, and a matrix is formed, where M[a,b] is the number of votes that rank option "a" over option "b", and M[b,a] is the number of votes that rank option "b" over option "a". An option has quorum if the number of individual ballots mentioning that option is greater than or equal to the quorum required. An option, a, meets a supermajority of N:1 if M[a,S] M[S,a] * N, where S is the Status-Quo option. The vote is counted by first finding the Smith set, then eliminating all options from the Smith set that don't make quorum or their respective supermajority requirement. If no options remain, the default option, Status-quo wins. If many options remain, they're chosen amongst by using STV, or something similar. This isn't entirely ideal: it'll select the status-quo more often than is probably desirable, but otherwise it's fairly expressive, and doesn't weight any preferences any more than others wherever possible. Consider it more as an example of a way to conduct a single vote that has less flaws than yours, rather than one that's useful as is. No, your view of supermajority isn't good because it affects other options than the status-quo options, and raises the odds that they'll win. An alternative way of looking at it is that there's no way to express a preference towards a non-supermajority vote without that preference counting for three preferences the other way. What if I *don't* feel that strongly about it? Well.. if supermajority decreases the chance that an option will win, then, yes, that does tend to bias things in the direction of alternatives. It's also possible to simply bias the vote towards the status-quo, rather than simply biassing it away from some other option. To avoid this "bias", you seem to want to bias things away from the alternatives, and in favor of the choice between the supermajority option, and what you call the "status quo" option. No, I don't want to avoid bias entirely; if I did I'd be saying "let's do away with supermajorities and quorums and just use a straight out Condorcet method of some description". But I think the main benefit of a quorum and supermajority is to bias towards the status-quo, not to bias against that particular possibility. Well, again, my reading explicitly requires a vote with Yes/No/Further Discussion as the only options, and only applies supermajority and quorum to those options. Oh? The only way I see to get that interpretation requires I either: [A] Completely ignore A.3(3), or [B] imagine that A.6(7) somehow says that X stands for only "no" or "further discussion" What have I missed? Okay, let me flesh out how I'd conduct a vote that has multiple related alternatives that should be decided on at once. First, since the constitution doesn't say anything about merging distinct votes, I'd require the later alternatives to be phrased as amendments to the first alternative presented, even if this essentially implies ignoring the original proposal and rewriting it from scratch. Once all the alternatives are assembled, and the proposers/sponsors have called for a vote, I'd first form a ballot under A.3(1) that looked like [ _ ] Original proposal [ _ ] First amendment
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
Damn, I've got to stop postponing and forgetting these things. On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:08:50AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: I suspect we've also agreed that the Condorcet winner (if there is one) should always win. And we seem to have agreed that the winner should be from the Smith set, although that's apparently considered debatable amongst the pairwise voting cognescenti. I'm uncomfortable saying if I've agreed to this. The Smith/Condorcet criteria that Buddha posted is not something I've agreed to. The Condorcet criterion says that if there's a single option that pairwise beats every other option, it should win (assuming there's no supermajority requirement, and quorum is met). It's what the current A.6(2) and A.6(3) are for. (The Condorcet criterion doesn't say anything about the ambiguous cases we've been talking about) There are two reasonable ways of treating supermajorities, that I can think of: a) A supermajority of developers believe this option is acceptable. b) A supermajority of developers support this option above all others. I believe (a) is the better case, and I think it's essentially what the N+1 scheme described in the constitution achieves. From some of your mails, I'm lead to believe you might prefer (b). Er.. you've lost me here. (*scratches head*) I, uh, don't see how... [0] Ignore all the procedures established in the appendices, and just note that a consitutional amendment requires a `3:1 supermajority' to succeed. I can only see two things this can be attempting to require: * For every person who wouldn't accept it as a resolution, there must be three who will for it to pass. * For every person who would prefer some other solution, there must be three who think this is the best solution possible. The way the N+1 style of voting behave, you're effectively requiring the former. The way your proposed clarification behaves, you're requiring (I think) that if you have an option, S, requiring a supermajority, that it be preferred by a supermajority over every option, A, B, C that don't require a supermajority (of which No and Further Discussion are examples, but others are possible too). I don't think this is particularly useful. Ok, I think you're basing this off of my earlier response to a specific example where I thought, at the time, you were talking about a vote which mixed a supermajority option with a non-supermajority option. That's the main (sole?) example where it behaves differently to the other methods. (b) isn't quite what your system does, though (aiui). If you consider the Manoj and Branden's proposed vote, we might end up with people holding preferences like: 120 people prefer M, B, S, F (Manoj, Branden, Status-Quo, F.Disc) 100 people prefer B, M, S, F This means that the ratio between M and B would be only 6:5, rather than 3:1, so presumably neither should win (that's what (b) would imply to me)? If we're talking about *my* interpretation of what the constitution is saying, and what it's trying to say, and *my* understanding of that particular vote. And, if we agree that a 3:1 supermajority applies to changing the social contract: (By Manoj's and Branden's proposals, I mean the amendments to the constitution to provide a procedure for changing the constitution, not any of the non-free votes themselves, since both would change the constitution if accepted, both require a supermajority to pass) The way I see it, when determining which votes Dominate which others, votes which prefer an option with a supermajority are reduced to an appropriate fraction (in this case 1/3). But, 40 Dominates 33 1/3, so M wins. Yes, that's how I understand your interpretation too; it just doesn't seem sensible to me to have the voting system be biassed towards options that don't require a supermajority (or require a lesser one). That is, given two options, A and B, both of which pass quorum, both of which are acceptable to their respective supermajorities, then the one that's picked should be the one that's preferred by more people, simple as that. There's an obvious justification for choosing A: more people prefer it. I can't see one for being biassed towards B (anywhere up to a 2.99:1 majority for A:B would still make B the winner), merely because it's easier, constitutionally, to implement. [Also, 73 1/3 -- the total number of votes for M, exceeds quorum of 37, so there's not a problem with not enough people voting.] Eh? Supermajorities and quorum requirments are usually distinct, aren't they? You'll note the constitution currently says ``For votes requiring a supermajority, the actual number of Yes votes is used when checking whether the quorum has been reached.'' So there's 220 votes for M, as far as quorum is concerned, unless I've missed something. Did any of that make any more sense? Cheers, aj [0] If it's just the terms, I'm using N+1 / the
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 10:02:40PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: Actually, if you're talking about a properly formed A.3(3) vote, where you're voting on option A and independent option B, there should be on the ballot: Yes on A and B Yes on A, no on B Yes on B no on A no on A, no on B further discussion. On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 11:46:55AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: Okay, now consider the vote being proposed by Manoj and Branden, then one that has alternatives Allow modification of foundational documents with 3:1 supermajority and Allow modification to all documents. These are not independent options. Nor are Debian will have nothing to do with non-free ever again and Debian will continue to maintain non-free, but will do it on unofficial.debian.org instead of ftp-master. So I don't see what relevance the above has at all. I think I've consistently ignored the possibility of actual independent alternatives in a single resolution throughout this whole thread. I get the feeling you're not even trying to see how what I'm talking about relates to what's said in the constitution. Certainly, you're not quoting from the constitution in your refutations of my points. Well, you seem willing to infer whole vistas of implied conditions from single words, and seem to take the position that anything not explicitly forbidden in the constitution is implicitly allowed, so I don't really see much point discussing what the constitution says, since I can't see any objective basis for analysis remaining, and you have the high-ground as far as subjective analysis goes (since you have some possibility of actually acting as secretary). I'm much more interested in how we should conduct votes in future, anyway. Cheers, aj -- Anthony Towns [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/ I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred. ``Thanks to all avid pokers out there'' -- linux.conf.au, 17-20 January 2001 pgpqTfG9Q2ugR.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 12:32:12AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: The Condorcet criterion says that if there's a single option that pairwise beats every other option, it should win (assuming there's no supermajority requirement, and quorum is met). That's a relatively weak criterion, all things considered. It's what the current A.6(2) and A.6(3) are for. (The Condorcet criterion doesn't say anything about the ambiguous cases we've been talking about) I thought we'd agreed that they are to ensure that the Smith criterion is met (which is more specific than the Condorcet criterion). There are two reasonable ways of treating supermajorities, that I can think of: a) A supermajority of developers believe this option is acceptable. b) A supermajority of developers support this option above all others. I believe (a) is the better case, and I think it's essentially what the N+1 scheme described in the constitution achieves. From some of your mails, I'm lead to believe you might prefer (b). Er.. you've lost me here. (*scratches head*) I, uh, don't see how... [0] Ignore all the procedures established in the appendices, and just note that a consitutional amendment requires a `3:1 supermajority' to succeed. I can only see two things this can be attempting to require: * For every person who wouldn't accept it as a resolution, there must be three who will for it to pass. Agreed. * For every person who would prefer some other solution, there must be three who think this is the best solution possible. Agreed. The way the N+1 style of voting behave, you're effectively requiring the former. My point of view is that these two are essentially equivalent: in the N+1 style of voting, a person who thinks that the option isn't the best would vote for further discussion. The way your proposed clarification behaves, you're requiring (I think) that if you have an option, S, requiring a supermajority, that it be preferred by a supermajority over every option, A, B, C that don't require a supermajority (of which No and Further Discussion are examples, but others are possible too). I don't think this is particularly useful. I'm guessing that you're saying my view of supermajority isn't particularly useful is based on your idea where further discussion is equivalent to a no vote, even though they're disctinct options on the ballot, and even though the matter is dropped if no wins, but further votes will be conducted if further discussion wins. I suppose a literal interpretation of 3:1 supermajority would be that over 75% of all of debian's developers must be in favor of an item before it can be passed. I think that my intepretation of supermajority is more relaxed than this, but that it's equivalent for the case where everyone is voting. Ok, I think you're basing [your view of my view of supermajority] off of my earlier response to a specific example where I thought, at the time, you were talking about a vote which mixed a supermajority option with a non-supermajority option. That's the main (sole?) example where it behaves differently to the other methods. I'll agree that the constitution doesn't explictly address this sort of mixed majority example. (b) isn't quite what your system does, though (aiui). If you consider the Manoj and Branden's proposed vote, we might end up with people holding preferences like: 120 people prefer M, B, S, F (Manoj, Branden, Status-Quo, F.Disc) 100 people prefer B, M, S, F This means that the ratio between M and B would be only 6:5, rather than 3:1, so presumably neither should win (that's what (b) would imply to me)? If we're talking about *my* interpretation of what the constitution is saying, and what it's trying to say, and *my* understanding of that particular vote. And, if we agree that a 3:1 supermajority applies to changing the social contract: (By Manoj's and Branden's proposals, I mean the amendments to the constitution to provide a procedure for changing the constitution, not any of the non-free votes themselves, since both would change the constitution if accepted, both require a supermajority to pass) [agreed] The way I see it, when determining which votes Dominate which others, votes which prefer an option with a supermajority are reduced to an appropriate fraction (in this case 1/3). But, 40 Dominates 33 1/3, so M wins. Yes, that's how I understand your interpretation too; it just doesn't seem sensible to me to have the voting system be biassed towards options that don't require a supermajority (or require a lesser one). Well.. the constitution seems to explicitly state this. That is, given two options, A and B, both of which pass quorum, both of which are acceptable to their respective supermajorities, then the one that's picked should be the one that's preferred by more people, simple as that. Do you agree
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 05:03:25PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 12:32:12AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: The Condorcet criterion says that if there's a single option that pairwise beats every other option, it should win (assuming there's no supermajority requirement, and quorum is met). That's a relatively weak criterion, all things considered. Yeah, well. Most of the time, it's still a good one, though. (It's applied to all the votes we've actually had.) It's what the current A.6(2) and A.6(3) are for. (The Condorcet criterion doesn't say anything about the ambiguous cases we've been talking about) I thought we'd agreed that they are to ensure that the Smith criterion is met (which is more specific than the Condorcet criterion). What I meant was that there was no reasonable way of misinterpreting A.6(2) and A.6(3) so that the Condorcet condition wasn't met. Ignore all the procedures established in the appendices, and just note that a consitutional amendment requires a `3:1 supermajority' to succeed. I can only see two things this can be attempting to require: * For every person who wouldn't accept it as a resolution, there must be three who will for it to pass. Agreed. * For every person who would prefer some other solution, there must be three who think this is the best solution possible. Agreed. The way the N+1 style of voting behave, you're effectively requiring the former. My point of view is that these two are essentially equivalent: in the N+1 style of voting, a person who thinks that the option isn't the best would vote for further discussion. Well, they might do that, yes. Or else they might think to themselves, well, I'm never going to get my preferred choice, and this isn't bad, so yeah, let's do that. I think that's a valid point of view to hold. In the current voting system, you'd express that by voting [ 1 ] My First Preference [ 2 ] My Second Preference [ 3 ] Further Disucssion then, when My Second Preference wins, you'd say Oh well and vote [ 1 ] Yes [ 3 ] No [ 2 ] Further Discussion Similarly, in the counting scheme I proposed, you'd vote: [ 1 ] My First Preference [ 2 ] My Second Preference [ 3 ] Status-quo (No change, but further discussion possible) and whichever of First/Second won the majority count would implicitly be treated as a Yes vote for quorum and supermajority purposes. If you wanted to only help First Preference achieve its supermajority, you'd instead vote: [ 1 ] My First Preference [ 3 ] My Second Preference [ 2 ] Status-quo which would have the same effect as voting NFY (No, Further Discussion, Yes) on the final vote. I'm guessing that you're saying my view of supermajority isn't particularly useful is based on your idea where further discussion is equivalent to a no vote, even though they're disctinct options on the ballot, and even though the matter is dropped if no wins, but further votes will be conducted if further discussion wins. No, your view of supermajority isn't good because it affects other options than the status-quo options, and raises the odds that they'll win. An alternative way of looking at it is that there's no way to express a preference towards a non-supermajority vote without that preference counting for three preferences the other way. What if I *don't* feel that strongly about it? As far as no versus further discussion goes, consider what would happen if the non-free vote had gone something like: my amendment passes, so then it's voted on and fails, with No winning. I, personally, would suspect that John and friends would immediately make a new proposal so they can get their issue actually voted on, although there would be good odds that it'd fail a Yes/No vote, just as it did against my amendment. I suppose a literal interpretation of 3:1 supermajority would be that over 75% of all of debian's developers must be in favor of an item before it can be passed. I think that my intepretation of supermajority is more relaxed than this, but that it's equivalent for the case where everyone is voting. A supermajority enforces a proportion of yays versus nays, a quorum enforces a reasonable proportion of the voting membership is represented. Requiring 75% of developers to vote in an election would basically make it impossible to ever change anything. So, I don't think you're being particularly liberal there at all :) The way I see it, when determining which votes Dominate which others, votes which prefer an option with a supermajority are reduced to an appropriate fraction (in this case 1/3). But, 40 Dominates 33 1/3, so M wins. Yes, that's how I understand your interpretation too; it just doesn't seem sensible to me to have the voting system be biassed towards options that don't require a supermajority (or require a lesser one). Well.. the
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 12:32:12AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: The Condorcet criterion says that if there's a single option that pairwise beats every other option, it should win (assuming there's no supermajority requirement, and quorum is met). On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 05:03:25PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: That's a relatively weak criterion, all things considered. On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 12:06:17PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: Yeah, well. Most of the time, it's still a good one, though. (It's applied to all the votes we've actually had.) Sounds like we're in agreement here (and, it's true, most of what we've been talking about is fairly academic). It's what the current A.6(2) and A.6(3) are for. (The Condorcet criterion doesn't say anything about the ambiguous cases we've been talking about) I thought we'd agreed that they are to ensure that the Smith criterion is met (which is more specific than the Condorcet criterion). What I meant was that there was no reasonable way of misinterpreting A.6(2) and A.6(3) so that the Condorcet condition wasn't met. Ok, no problem. Ignore all the procedures established in the appendices, and just note that a consitutional amendment requires a `3:1 supermajority' to succeed. I can only see two things this can be attempting to require: * For every person who wouldn't accept it as a resolution, there must be three who will for it to pass. Agreed. * For every person who would prefer some other solution, there must be three who think this is the best solution possible. Agreed. The way the N+1 style of voting behave, you're effectively requiring the former. My point of view is that these two are essentially equivalent: in the N+1 style of voting, a person who thinks that the option isn't the best would vote for further discussion. Well, they might do that, yes. Or else they might think to themselves, well, I'm never going to get my preferred choice, and this isn't bad, so yeah, let's do that. I think that's a valid point of view to hold. In the current voting system, you'd express that by voting [ 1 ] My First Preference [ 2 ] My Second Preference [ 3 ] Further Disucssion then, when My Second Preference wins, you'd say Oh well and vote [ 1 ] Yes [ 3 ] No [ 2 ] Further Discussion Indeed, things could happen this way. [Personally, I'm not sure I'd say Oh well -- if My First Preference was important to me, I'd very likely vote 1: further discussion, 2: yes, 3: no -- this wouldn't have a substantially different effect, unless some of the people who had voted the other way had second thoughts, or unless more people participated in the second vote.] Similarly, in the counting scheme I proposed, you'd vote: Er.. I've been trying to find your proposal. Looking for the word counting in the message body, the closest to a proposal I've found in your recent posts is: Message-ID: [EMAIL PROTECTED] If you can point me at the right message, I'll try to get back to your proposal. [Thanks.] I'm guessing that you're saying my view of supermajority isn't particularly useful is based on your idea where further discussion is equivalent to a no vote, even though they're disctinct options on the ballot, and even though the matter is dropped if no wins, but further votes will be conducted if further discussion wins. No, your view of supermajority isn't good because it affects other options than the status-quo options, and raises the odds that they'll win. An alternative way of looking at it is that there's no way to express a preference towards a non-supermajority vote without that preference counting for three preferences the other way. What if I *don't* feel that strongly about it? Well.. if supermajority decreases the chance that an option will win, then, yes, that does tend to bias things in the direction of alternatives. To avoid this bias, you seem to want to bias things away from the alternatives, and in favor of the choice between the supermajority option, and what you call the status quo option. Anyways, the vote has to have some kind of outcome. As far as no versus further discussion goes, consider what would happen if the non-free vote had gone something like: my amendment passes, so then it's voted on and fails, with No winning. I, personally, would suspect that John and friends would immediately make a new proposal so they can get their issue actually voted on, although there would be good odds that it'd fail a Yes/No vote, just as it did against my amendment. He'd be silly to propose something substantially similar unless it was a very close vote. I suppose a literal interpretation of 3:1 supermajority would be that over 75% of all of debian's developers must be in favor of an item before it can be passed. I think that my intepretation of supermajority is more relaxed than this, but that it's equivalent for the
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
I'm back from vacation now...I've read the other posts, but I'm probably not going to respond to them (too many to process all at once...) So I'll just pick up here. On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 12:32:12AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: The Condorcet criterion says that if there's a single option that pairwise beats every other option, it should win (assuming there's no supermajority requirement, and quorum is met). That's a relatively weak criterion, all things considered. All things considered just being: -- it doesn't deal with supermajorities -- it doesn't deal with quorum issues -- it doesn't state what should happen if there isn't a single option that pairwise beats every other option. or are there other things to consider that make it weak? The Condorcet Criterion isn't a voting method. It's a property that voting methods may (or may not) have. It is part of the theory of single-winner elections, which mainly concerns itself with votes where one winner out of many procedurally equal candidates must be chosen. Supermajority isn't considered. Neither does quorum issues. The same goes with the Smith Criterion. It's what the current A.6(2) and A.6(3) are for. (The Condorcet criterion doesn't say anything about the ambiguous cases we've been talking about) I thought we'd agreed that they are to ensure that the Smith criterion is met (which is more specific than the Condorcet criterion). If A.6(3) is supposed to reduce the options to the Smith set, it is very poorly written. A.6(4) is, in the context of A.6(2), an -exact- statement of the Condorcet Criterion. Because of A.6(4) and A.6(2), the voting scheme we are using (in the absence of quorum or supermajority requirements) by definition meets the Condorcet Criterion. Ignore all the procedures established in the appendices, and just note that a consitutional amendment requires a `3:1 supermajority' to succeed. I can only see two things this can be attempting to require: * For every person who wouldn't accept it as a resolution, there must be three who will for it to pass. Agreed. * For every person who would prefer some other solution, there must be three who think this is the best solution possible. Agreed. The way the N+1 style of voting behave, you're effectively requiring the former. My point of view is that these two are essentially equivalent: in the N+1 style of voting, a person who thinks that the option isn't the best would vote for further discussion. Clarification request: N+1 style of voting means to first hold a series of votes to decide a final form of the amendment, followed by a single Y/N/F ballot? So what you are saying is that you feel that if in the first of two ballots, I voted ABFC, and B was determined to be the winner of the ballot, then I should vote either of FNY or FYN on the final ballot? If the first ballot was: A. Grant Buddha Buck a $10,000 Debian Fellowship B. Grant Buddha Buck a $ 1,000 Debian Fellowship C. Grant Bill Gates a $10,000 Debian Fellowship D. Grant Bill Gates a $ 1,000 Debian Fellowship F. Further Discussion and I unethically ignored the conflict of interest issue, I would most certainly vote ABFDC. If B were the unambiguous winner of the first ballot (under A.6(4)), you feel that in the final vote, I should vote FYN, because I think that the $10,000 is better than the $1,000? I think that most people would vote YNF or YFN in the final ballot if they felt that accepting the resolution was preferable to the other two options. I think that if there had already been N votes, most people would be inclined to vote F last (if at all) rather than risk having to continue the discussion. -- Buddha Buck [EMAIL PROTECTED] Just as the strength of the Internet is chaos, so the strength of our liberty depends upon the chaos and cacophony of the unfettered speech the First Amendment protects. -- A.L.A. v. U.S. Dept. of Justice
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Sat, Dec 02, 2000 at 01:07:26AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: "Status-quo" means don't resolve *anything*. There are at most two ways of doing that: by doing nothing, and not even discussing the matter again, and by doing nothing constructive, but continuing to flame each other. I personally don't think that's a distinction that'll be successfully determined by a vote, though. On Sat, Dec 02, 2000 at 03:17:05AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: I disagree. Status-quo in the context of supermajority means don't do anything that requires supermajority. That can still leave a lot of options. On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 05:02:29PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: Well, you're welcome to disagree, but be aware that your definition doesn't match the way the current system (the N+1 votes) works, and doesn't match the way most systems work (which only provide "No, don't resolve this" as a `status-quo' option). You're implicitly claiming here that: [1] The default option (further discussion) isn't a status quo option. [2] A.3(3) votes will not contain *any* status quo options. I should also elaborate, before we drift too far: My understanding of supermajority is that you always scale the number of votes for a supermajority option. If you compare one option with supermajority to another option with supermajority, you scale the votes for both of them (and thus there's no particular effect). [I suppose, in principle, you could have options with different supermajority factors, but I've been ignoring that up to now.] Status quo options are, thus, options without supermajority. Biassing the results towards options that don't require a supermajority doesn't seem a particularly useful thing to do to me [0]. Supermajority means that more than a majority of voters must be in favor of the option before it can pass. A 3:1 supermajority means you have to exceed 3 voters in favor for every one voter against, before the option will pass. If that's not biasing towards options which don't require a supermajority (which only need to exceed 1 voter in favor for every one voter against), I'd like to know what is? [And, if you want to claim that this isn't what the constitution claims, please supplement that claim with a relevant quote from the constitution and an explanation of your reasoning.] [0] I say "biassing" since if you take a vote where you have two options: * Modify social contract (M) (requires 3:1 supermajority) * Do nothing (N) For there to be only two options you'd have to have a vote without a quorum. and M has unanimous support over N, and then add a third option: * Evade constitution (E) If M really has unanimous support, you wouldn't add a new option -- no one would want a new option. Adding a new option only happens: [*] before the vote is taken, and [*] when someone prefers some other option, and [*] suggests it, and [*] other people agree that this is a good idea (sponsor it). (which would resolve that, say, "No new .debs will be added to non-free, and wherever possible .debs already there will be removed"), which is preferred over N by everyone, but preferred over M by just over a quarter of the voters, it'd win. That's my understanding of how the constitutional voting system is supposed to work, presuming that you'd manage to come up with a vote with those kind of numbers and options, yes. I'll note that there are other ways the ballot could have been constructed, as far as introducing a gradual phase out. For example, the people proposing E could have proposed "amend the constitution AND phase out gradually". If they proposed "phase out gradually and do not amend the constitution", then presumably they really are having second thoughts about amending the constitution, and don't want it amended. The voting system (and debian itself) isn't going to work if people pretend to want things they don't want. This isn't what would happen in the current system (E would be dismissed when deciding on the form of the resolution), and isn't, IMO, a reasonable outcome at all. That's my understanding of what Darren was proposing to implement, on vote 8, yes. And, I'll assert that both are reasonable interpretations of the constitution. I think that my current understanding is closer to the intent of the constitution, but I don't think there's anything earth-shatteringly wrong with either approach. I do agree that it would be a good idea to modify the constitution so that it unambiguously specifies which approach is correct. -- Raul -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 06:11:07AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 05:02:29PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Well, you're welcome to disagree, but be aware that your definition
doesn't match the way the current system (the N+1 votes) works, and
doesn't match the way most systems work (which only provide "No, don't
resolve this" as a `status-quo' option).
You're implicitly claiming here that:
[1] The default option (further discussion) isn't a status quo
option.
Eh? No, I'm claiming no such thing. If "further discussion" wins, then
no, we don't resolve anything. We may later have another vote, and we
may resolve something then, but we don't resolve anything as a result
of the vote.
I will assert that the options "no" and "further discussion" aren't
usefully different.
[2] A.3(3) votes will not contain *any* status quo options.
I'll also note that your interpretation of A.3(3) isn't one I'm willing
to make, and as such, I'm not really inclined to speculate what options
the secretary might include in such a vote.
Either "further discussion" or "no" is a status-quo option though: nothing
changes as a result of the vote.
Status quo options are, thus, options without supermajority.
You're basing this on the mechanics of how a supermajority might be
checked, not what it's there for in the first place.
From WordNet (r) 1.6 [wn]:
status quo
n : the existing state of affairs
Passing some other possibility, even one without supermajority
requirements isn't keeping the existing state of affairs.
It would certainly be an odd situation where the status-quo required
supermajority support to remain that way, but not every possibility that
doesn't require supermajority support is equivalent to the status-quo.
Biassing the results towards options that don't require a supermajority
doesn't seem a particularly useful thing to do to me [0].
Supermajority means that more than a majority of voters must be in favor
of the option before it can pass.
The term "in favour" isn't really very helpful. Do you mean "exclusively
in favour of, in preference to all other possibilities", or do you mean
"in favour of, in preference to how Debian is at the moment"?
If that's not biasing towards options which don't require a supermajority
(which only need to exceed 1 voter in favor for every one voter against),
I'd like to know what is?
I'd like you to show one other voting system in use where supermajority
is interpreted in this way.
[And, if you want to claim that this isn't what the constitution claims,
please supplement that claim with a relevant quote from the constitution
and an explanation of your reasoning.]
I've done this a number of times on this list already. If you'd like to
provide actual reasons for your interpretation, perhaps it'd be worth
having a discussion about it.
[0] I say "biassing" since if you take a vote where you have two options:
* Modify social contract (M) (requires 3:1 supermajority)
* Do nothing (N)
For there to be only two options you'd have to have a vote without a
quorum.
"Further Discussion" is a good enough stand in for "Do Nothing". You
could, alternatively add "Further Discussion" as a third option, which
everyone puts last.
and M has unanimous support over N, and then add a third option:
* Evade constitution (E)
If M really has unanimous support, you wouldn't add a new option --
no one would want a new option. Adding a new option only happens:
No, M has unanimous suppoer over N, that is everyone prefers it to
the current situation. That is, everyone wants to get rid of non-free.
A minority of those people would rather do it by exploiting loopholes in
the social contract ("We'll continue to provide non-free for download,
but we won't necessarily allow people to upload to it!! Muahahaha").
Why, exactly, is it so undesirable to modify the social contract that
we should just ignore the expressed preferences of half/three-quarters
of the developer body, and take the "easier" solution, instead?
Certainly, we should make sure that everyone prefers the modified social
contract to what it says at the moment, but there's no good reason to
accept *any* other option in favour of one requiring a supermajority.
That's my understanding of how the constitutional voting system is
supposed to work,
Considering, under the most liberal interpretation, the constitution
describes two methods, one of which works that way, and one of which
works the other way, it seems a little bold to say that the constitution
is *supposed* to act that way.
Certainly, I think the constitution pretty clearly indicates that's
*not* how votes are meant to be handled or interpreted.
I'll note that there are other ways the ballot could have been
constructed, as far as introducing a gradual phase out. For example,
the people proposing E could have proposed "amend the constitution AND
phase out gradually". If they proposed
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 10:13:58PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
I will assert that the options "no" and "further discussion" aren't
usefully different.
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 08:49:38AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
They're procedurally different, however.
On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 12:31:23AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Not particularly so. If "No" wins the final vote, does that actually
stop people from continuing discussion, and proposing a new vote? If
"Further Discussion" wins, does that actually require people to continue
discussing things, or does it ensure the newly reset vote doesn't expire?
"No" is a vote against all the whole idea under discussion, and
indicates how the person would vote on future such ballots.
"Further discussion" is a vote against the ballot itself -- it's
a vote for an option not present on the ballot.
I claim that "my first preference is yes on option A", is a yes vote
for option A. And, if A requires a supermajority, then A.6(7) applies.
Do you claim this is not an actual reason? Why?
You're also claiming that "my second preference is a yes on option A"
is a no vote for option A.
I'm claiming that "I prefer option A to the status quo" is a yes vote
for A, and "I prefer the status quo to option A" is a no vote for A, at
least as far as quorum and the supermajority are concerned.
Actually, if you're talking about a properly formed A.3(3) vote, where
you're voting on option A and independent option B, there should be
on the ballot:
Yes on A and B
Yes on A, no on B
Yes on B no on A
no on A, no on B
further discussion.
and M has unanimous support over N, and then add a third option:
* Evade constitution (E)
If M really has unanimous support, you wouldn't add a new option --
no one would want a new option. Adding a new option only happens:
No, M has unanimous suppoer over N, that is everyone prefers it to
the current situation. That is, everyone wants to get rid of non-free.
A minority of those people would rather do it by exploiting loopholes in
the social contract ("We'll continue to provide non-free for download,
but we won't necessarily allow people to upload to it!! Muahahaha").
Why, exactly, is it so undesirable to modify the social contract that
we should just ignore the expressed preferences of half/three-quarters
of the developer body, and take the "easier" solution, instead?
I don't actually know, this is your fantasy.
Well, it's also the result of your interpretation of the constitution, and
your proposed changes to the constitution.
The *sole* reason that "E" wins in the above is because the alternative
preferred by the majority modifies the social contract. It's not because
that alternative doesn't have supermajority support over the status-quo.
It's not because most people dislike. It's not even because most people
prefer some other option.
It's not even a well formed ballot, near as I can tell. It's just an
exercise in numbers.
I assert that the purpose of supermajority requirements (like the
purpose of a quorum requirement) is simply to ensure that the
character of the organisation doesn't change without due consideration
by the members of the organisation.
For some definition of "due consideration". I assert that it's a
requirement for greater than majority agreement.
Your scheme seems to give it a meaning more like "try to choose
any other possible alternative that doesn't involve modifying the
constitution or overturning a decision of the tech ctte or whatever
else might require a supermajority".
Those sorts of things only require a majority agreement, yes.
That's my understanding of how the constitutional voting system is
supposed to work,
Considering, under the most liberal interpretation, the constitution
describes two methods, one of which works that way, and one of which
works the other way, it seems a little bold to say that the constitution
is *supposed* to act that way.
Certainly, I think the constitution pretty clearly indicates that's
*not* how votes are meant to be handled or interpreted.
Eh? If there's a sequence of votes, and people don't like the way
that sequence went, they can vote against the final option. They
can even keep the sequence going at the same time by voting for
"further discussion".
Even on an A.3(3) vote in your interpretation?
Could you please give an example of some possible ways of conducting
a vote that includes at least "remove non-free" and "move non-free to
unofficial.debian.org", assuming that "remove non-free" modifies the
social contract, and that that requires a supermajority?
See above "properly formed A.3(3)". Use "remove non-free" as option
A, and "move non-free to unofficial.debian.org" as option B.
If they then get their supermajority support, why then ignore the stated
preferences of the voters, and choose the unnecessary compromise position
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
Actually, if you're talking about a properly formed A.3(3) vote, where you're voting on option A and independent option B, there should be on the ballot: Yes on A and B Yes on A, no on B Yes on B no on A no on A, no on B further discussion. On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 11:46:55AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: Okay, now consider the vote being proposed by Manoj and Branden, then one that has alternatives "Allow modification of foundational documents with 3:1 supermajority" and "Allow modification to all documents". These are not independent options. Note that the discussion so far seems to indicate the issue will be resolved by a single vote with the options: [ ] Allow modification of foundati... [ ] Allow modification to all docu... [ ] Further discussion Is this a third way of allowing issues to be decided supposedly allowed by the constitution, with yet another different bias towards choosing a winner in corner cases? These are not independent options. Note also that the constitution allows for the caller of the vote to state what form the ballot should take. Supposing "A" and "B" are contradictory in your example above (ie, "remove non-free" and "support non-free", or "modify 4.1.5 to say foo" and "modify 4.1.5 to say bar", what happens if "Yes on A, Yes on B" wins the vote? That wasn't the case for your earlier example, in the message I was responding to. Note if you have more than two real alternatives, you get an exponential increase in the number of options listed on the ballot; if these options are mutually exclusive almost all of these options will be incoherent. Obviously. Consider the leadership elecions we've had, by section 4.1.1 and 4.2.1 we use the the procedures outlined in appendix A to resolve them. Have the leader elections been invalid (since the ballots only had the various candidates and "further discussion" as options, and we were never given an option to vote "yes" or "no"), and if so, will future ones be conducted so we get to vote for: [ ] Yes to "Wichert as Leader", yes to "Ben Collins as leader", Yes to "Joel Klecker as Leader", yes to "Matthew Vernon as Leader" [ ] ... ? I was under the impression your interpretation of A.3(3) was mainly to make the previous votes we've had constitutional. I'm not seeing what relevance `YYY/YYN/YNY/YNN/...' votes have to this discussion at all. They're not something we've ever done, and they seem way to awkward to be anything we'd ever want to do. I get the feeling you're not even trying to see how what I'm talking about relates to what's said in the constitution. Certainly, you're not quoting from the constitution in your "refutations" of my points. -- Raul -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 06:11:07AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 05:02:29PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: Well, you're welcome to disagree, but be aware that your definition doesn't match the way the current system (the N+1 votes) works, and doesn't match the way most systems work (which only provide No, don't resolve this as a `status-quo' option). You're implicitly claiming here that: [1] The default option (further discussion) isn't a status quo option. Eh? No, I'm claiming no such thing. If further discussion wins, then no, we don't resolve anything. We may later have another vote, and we may resolve something then, but we don't resolve anything as a result of the vote. I will assert that the options no and further discussion aren't usefully different. [2] A.3(3) votes will not contain *any* status quo options. I'll also note that your interpretation of A.3(3) isn't one I'm willing to make, and as such, I'm not really inclined to speculate what options the secretary might include in such a vote. Either further discussion or no is a status-quo option though: nothing changes as a result of the vote. Status quo options are, thus, options without supermajority. You're basing this on the mechanics of how a supermajority might be checked, not what it's there for in the first place. From WordNet (r) 1.6 [wn]: status quo n : the existing state of affairs Passing some other possibility, even one without supermajority requirements isn't keeping the existing state of affairs. It would certainly be an odd situation where the status-quo required supermajority support to remain that way, but not every possibility that doesn't require supermajority support is equivalent to the status-quo. Biassing the results towards options that don't require a supermajority doesn't seem a particularly useful thing to do to me [0]. Supermajority means that more than a majority of voters must be in favor of the option before it can pass. The term in favour isn't really very helpful. Do you mean exclusively in favour of, in preference to all other possibilities, or do you mean in favour of, in preference to how Debian is at the moment? If that's not biasing towards options which don't require a supermajority (which only need to exceed 1 voter in favor for every one voter against), I'd like to know what is? I'd like you to show one other voting system in use where supermajority is interpreted in this way. [And, if you want to claim that this isn't what the constitution claims, please supplement that claim with a relevant quote from the constitution and an explanation of your reasoning.] I've done this a number of times on this list already. If you'd like to provide actual reasons for your interpretation, perhaps it'd be worth having a discussion about it. [0] I say biassing since if you take a vote where you have two options: * Modify social contract (M) (requires 3:1 supermajority) * Do nothing (N) For there to be only two options you'd have to have a vote without a quorum. Further Discussion is a good enough stand in for Do Nothing. You could, alternatively add Further Discussion as a third option, which everyone puts last. and M has unanimous support over N, and then add a third option: * Evade constitution (E) If M really has unanimous support, you wouldn't add a new option -- no one would want a new option. Adding a new option only happens: No, M has unanimous suppoer over N, that is everyone prefers it to the current situation. That is, everyone wants to get rid of non-free. A minority of those people would rather do it by exploiting loopholes in the social contract (We'll continue to provide non-free for download, but we won't necessarily allow people to upload to it!! Muahahaha). Why, exactly, is it so undesirable to modify the social contract that we should just ignore the expressed preferences of half/three-quarters of the developer body, and take the easier solution, instead? Certainly, we should make sure that everyone prefers the modified social contract to what it says at the moment, but there's no good reason to accept *any* other option in favour of one requiring a supermajority. That's my understanding of how the constitutional voting system is supposed to work, Considering, under the most liberal interpretation, the constitution describes two methods, one of which works that way, and one of which works the other way, it seems a little bold to say that the constitution is *supposed* to act that way. Certainly, I think the constitution pretty clearly indicates that's *not* how votes are meant to be handled or interpreted. I'll note that there are other ways the ballot could have been constructed, as far as introducing a gradual phase out. For example, the people proposing E could have proposed amend the constitution AND phase out gradually. If they proposed phase out gradually and do not amend
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 08:49:38AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 10:13:58PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: I will assert that the options no and further discussion aren't usefully different. They're procedurally different, however. Not particularly so. If No wins the final vote, does that actually stop people from continuing discussion, and proposing a new vote? If Further Discussion wins, does that actually require people to continue discussing things, or does it ensure the newly reset vote doesn't expire? If that's not biasing towards options which don't require a supermajority (which only need to exceed 1 voter in favor for every one voter against), I'd like to know what is? I'd like you to show one other voting system in use where supermajority is interpreted in this way. Why? This is debian-vote, not congress-vote. To give some evidence that your interpretation is reasonable. It doesn't have to be something an American government uses. I claim that my first preference is yes on option A, is a yes vote for option A. And, if A requires a supermajority, then A.6(7) applies. Do you claim this is not an actual reason? Why? You're also claiming that my second preference is a yes on option A is a no vote for option A. I'm claiming that I prefer option A to the status quo is a yes vote for A, and I prefer the status quo to option A is a no vote for A, at least as far as quorum and the supermajority are concerned. and M has unanimous support over N, and then add a third option: * Evade constitution (E) If M really has unanimous support, you wouldn't add a new option -- no one would want a new option. Adding a new option only happens: No, M has unanimous suppoer over N, that is everyone prefers it to the current situation. That is, everyone wants to get rid of non-free. A minority of those people would rather do it by exploiting loopholes in the social contract (We'll continue to provide non-free for download, but we won't necessarily allow people to upload to it!! Muahahaha). Why, exactly, is it so undesirable to modify the social contract that we should just ignore the expressed preferences of half/three-quarters of the developer body, and take the easier solution, instead? I don't actually know, this is your fantasy. Well, it's also the result of your interpretation of the constitution, and your proposed changes to the constitution. The *sole* reason that E wins in the above is because the alternative preferred by the majority modifies the social contract. It's not because that alternative doesn't have supermajority support over the status-quo. It's not because most people dislike. It's not even because most people prefer some other option. I assert that the purpose of supermajority requirements (like the purpose of a quorum requirement) is simply to ensure that the character of the organisation doesn't change without due consideration by the members of the organisation. Your scheme seems to give it a meaning more like try to choose any other possible alternative that doesn't involve modifying the constitution or overturning a decision of the tech ctte or whatever else might require a supermajority. Certainly, we should make sure that everyone prefers the modified social contract to what it says at the moment, but there's no good reason to accept *any* other option in favour of one requiring a supermajority. You don't put just *any* option on the ballot. Only alternatives. any other *alternative* then. That's my understanding of how the constitutional voting system is supposed to work, Considering, under the most liberal interpretation, the constitution describes two methods, one of which works that way, and one of which works the other way, it seems a little bold to say that the constitution is *supposed* to act that way. Certainly, I think the constitution pretty clearly indicates that's *not* how votes are meant to be handled or interpreted. Eh? If there's a sequence of votes, and people don't like the way that sequence went, they can vote against the final option. They can even keep the sequence going at the same time by voting for further discussion. Even on an A.3(3) vote in your interpretation? Could you please give an example of some possible ways of conducting a vote that includes at least remove non-free and move non-free to unofficial.debian.org, assuming that remove non-free modifies the social contract, and that that requires a supermajority? If they then get their supermajority support, why then ignore the stated preferences of the voters, and choose the unnecessary compromise position anyway? Because people voted for a different option from the one which required supermajority. Do you want to discount someone's vote on the basis that you find their position disagreeable? Again, you don't vote for or against an option when you're expressing
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 10:13:58PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: I will assert that the options no and further discussion aren't usefully different. On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 08:49:38AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: They're procedurally different, however. On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 12:31:23AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: Not particularly so. If No wins the final vote, does that actually stop people from continuing discussion, and proposing a new vote? If Further Discussion wins, does that actually require people to continue discussing things, or does it ensure the newly reset vote doesn't expire? No is a vote against all the whole idea under discussion, and indicates how the person would vote on future such ballots. Further discussion is a vote against the ballot itself -- it's a vote for an option not present on the ballot. I claim that my first preference is yes on option A, is a yes vote for option A. And, if A requires a supermajority, then A.6(7) applies. Do you claim this is not an actual reason? Why? You're also claiming that my second preference is a yes on option A is a no vote for option A. I'm claiming that I prefer option A to the status quo is a yes vote for A, and I prefer the status quo to option A is a no vote for A, at least as far as quorum and the supermajority are concerned. Actually, if you're talking about a properly formed A.3(3) vote, where you're voting on option A and independent option B, there should be on the ballot: Yes on A and B Yes on A, no on B Yes on B no on A no on A, no on B further discussion. and M has unanimous support over N, and then add a third option: * Evade constitution (E) If M really has unanimous support, you wouldn't add a new option -- no one would want a new option. Adding a new option only happens: No, M has unanimous suppoer over N, that is everyone prefers it to the current situation. That is, everyone wants to get rid of non-free. A minority of those people would rather do it by exploiting loopholes in the social contract (We'll continue to provide non-free for download, but we won't necessarily allow people to upload to it!! Muahahaha). Why, exactly, is it so undesirable to modify the social contract that we should just ignore the expressed preferences of half/three-quarters of the developer body, and take the easier solution, instead? I don't actually know, this is your fantasy. Well, it's also the result of your interpretation of the constitution, and your proposed changes to the constitution. The *sole* reason that E wins in the above is because the alternative preferred by the majority modifies the social contract. It's not because that alternative doesn't have supermajority support over the status-quo. It's not because most people dislike. It's not even because most people prefer some other option. It's not even a well formed ballot, near as I can tell. It's just an exercise in numbers. I assert that the purpose of supermajority requirements (like the purpose of a quorum requirement) is simply to ensure that the character of the organisation doesn't change without due consideration by the members of the organisation. For some definition of due consideration. I assert that it's a requirement for greater than majority agreement. Your scheme seems to give it a meaning more like try to choose any other possible alternative that doesn't involve modifying the constitution or overturning a decision of the tech ctte or whatever else might require a supermajority. Those sorts of things only require a majority agreement, yes. That's my understanding of how the constitutional voting system is supposed to work, Considering, under the most liberal interpretation, the constitution describes two methods, one of which works that way, and one of which works the other way, it seems a little bold to say that the constitution is *supposed* to act that way. Certainly, I think the constitution pretty clearly indicates that's *not* how votes are meant to be handled or interpreted. Eh? If there's a sequence of votes, and people don't like the way that sequence went, they can vote against the final option. They can even keep the sequence going at the same time by voting for further discussion. Even on an A.3(3) vote in your interpretation? Could you please give an example of some possible ways of conducting a vote that includes at least remove non-free and move non-free to unofficial.debian.org, assuming that remove non-free modifies the social contract, and that that requires a supermajority? See above properly formed A.3(3). Use remove non-free as option A, and move non-free to unofficial.debian.org as option B. If they then get their supermajority support, why then ignore the stated preferences of the voters, and choose the unnecessary compromise position anyway? Because people voted for a different
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 07:35:17PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: I claim that my first preference is yes on option A, is a yes vote for option A. And, if A requires a supermajority, then A.6(7) applies. Do you claim this is not an actual reason? Why? You're also claiming that my second preference is a yes on option A is a no vote for option A. I'm claiming that I prefer option A to the status quo is a yes vote for A, and I prefer the status quo to option A is a no vote for A, at least as far as quorum and the supermajority are concerned. Actually, if you're talking about a properly formed A.3(3) vote, where you're voting on option A and independent option B, there should be on the ballot: Yes on A and B Yes on A, no on B Yes on B no on A no on A, no on B further discussion. Okay, now consider the vote being proposed by Manoj and Branden, then one that has alternatives Allow modification of foundational documents with 3:1 supermajority and Allow modification to all documents. Note that the discussion so far seems to indicate the issue will be resolved by a single vote with the options: [ ] Allow modification of foundati... [ ] Allow modification to all docu... [ ] Further discussion Is this a third way of allowing issues to be decided supposedly allowed by the constitution, with yet another different bias towards choosing a winner in corner cases? Supposing A and B are contradictory in your example above (ie, remove non-free and support non-free, or modify 4.1.5 to say foo and modify 4.1.5 to say bar, what happens if Yes on A, Yes on B wins the vote? Note if you have more than two real alternatives, you get an exponential increase in the number of options listed on the ballot; if these options are mutually exclusive almost all of these options will be incoherent. Consider the leadership elecions we've had, by section 4.1.1 and 4.2.1 we use the the procedures outlined in appendix A to resolve them. Have the leader elections been invalid (since the ballots only had the various candidates and further discussion as options, and we were never given an option to vote yes or no), and if so, will future ones be conducted so we get to vote for: [ ] Yes to Wichert as Leader, yes to Ben Collins as leader, Yes to Joel Klecker as Leader, yes to Matthew Vernon as Leader [ ] ... ? I was under the impression your interpretation of A.3(3) was mainly to make the previous votes we've had constitutional. I'm not seeing what relevance `YYY/YYN/YNY/YNN/...' votes have to this discussion at all. They're not something we've ever done, and they seem way to awkward to be anything we'd ever want to do. Cheers, aj -- Anthony Towns [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/ I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred. ``Thanks to all avid pokers out there'' -- linux.conf.au, 17-20 January 2001 pgpcy7VeS3tf0.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
Actually, if you're talking about a properly formed A.3(3) vote, where you're voting on option A and independent option B, there should be on the ballot: Yes on A and B Yes on A, no on B Yes on B no on A no on A, no on B further discussion. On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 11:46:55AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: Okay, now consider the vote being proposed by Manoj and Branden, then one that has alternatives Allow modification of foundational documents with 3:1 supermajority and Allow modification to all documents. These are not independent options. Note that the discussion so far seems to indicate the issue will be resolved by a single vote with the options: [ ] Allow modification of foundati... [ ] Allow modification to all docu... [ ] Further discussion Is this a third way of allowing issues to be decided supposedly allowed by the constitution, with yet another different bias towards choosing a winner in corner cases? These are not independent options. Note also that the constitution allows for the caller of the vote to state what form the ballot should take. Supposing A and B are contradictory in your example above (ie, remove non-free and support non-free, or modify 4.1.5 to say foo and modify 4.1.5 to say bar, what happens if Yes on A, Yes on B wins the vote? That wasn't the case for your earlier example, in the message I was responding to. Note if you have more than two real alternatives, you get an exponential increase in the number of options listed on the ballot; if these options are mutually exclusive almost all of these options will be incoherent. Obviously. Consider the leadership elecions we've had, by section 4.1.1 and 4.2.1 we use the the procedures outlined in appendix A to resolve them. Have the leader elections been invalid (since the ballots only had the various candidates and further discussion as options, and we were never given an option to vote yes or no), and if so, will future ones be conducted so we get to vote for: [ ] Yes to Wichert as Leader, yes to Ben Collins as leader, Yes to Joel Klecker as Leader, yes to Matthew Vernon as Leader [ ] ... ? I was under the impression your interpretation of A.3(3) was mainly to make the previous votes we've had constitutional. I'm not seeing what relevance `YYY/YYN/YNY/YNN/...' votes have to this discussion at all. They're not something we've ever done, and they seem way to awkward to be anything we'd ever want to do. I get the feeling you're not even trying to see how what I'm talking about relates to what's said in the constitution. Certainly, you're not quoting from the constitution in your refutations of my points. -- Raul
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Sat, Dec 02, 2000 at 12:45:53AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: This summary is completely wrong for any Condorcet scheme. Ok... By definition, any member of the smith set is a plausible winner of a vote. So there's no way to show an implausible winner, if we've restricted the discussion to the smith set. My original observation about Smith/Condorcet winds up meaning that Smith/Condorcet penalizes supermajority a bit more than the current constitution. But you're right, I can't call that implausible. -- Raul -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Sat, Dec 02, 2000 at 03:17:05AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: On Sat, Dec 02, 2000 at 01:07:26AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: "Status-quo" means don't resolve *anything*. There are at most two ways of doing that: by doing nothing, and not even discussing the matter again, and by doing nothing constructive, but continuing to flame each other. I personally don't think that's a distinction that'll be successfully determined by a vote, though. I disagree. Status-quo in the context of supermajority means don't do anything that requires supermajority. That can still leave a lot of options. Well, you're welcome to disagree, but be aware that your definition doesn't match the way the current system (the N+1 votes) works, and doesn't match the way most systems work (which only provide "No, don't resolve this" as a `status-quo' option). Biassing the results towards options that don't require a supermajority doesn't seem a particularly useful thing to do to me [0]. Cheers, aj [0] I say "biassing" since if you take a vote where you have two options: * Modify social contract (M) (requires 3:1 supermajority) * Do nothing (N) and M has unanimous support over N, and then add a third option: * Evade constitution (E) (which would resolve that, say, "No new .debs will be added to non-free, and wherever possible .debs already there will be removed"), which is preferred over N by everyone, but preferred over M by just over a quarter of the voters, it'd win. This isn't what would happen in the current system (E would be dismissed when deciding on the form of the resolution), and isn't, IMO, a reasonable outcome at all. -- Anthony Towns [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/ I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred. ``Thanks to all avid pokers out there'' -- linux.conf.au, 17-20 January 2001 PGP signature
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get: 10: 0 B:C 3 1/3: 0 A:B 3 1/3: 0 A:C B wins. On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 10:24:41PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: This isn't correct: A wins by being preferred to all other options (A B, 3.3 to 0 and A C, 3.3 to 0). The strengths of the victories don't come into play unless you have a cycle. On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 08:00:04AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: I was talking about the smith/condorcet mechanism. On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 11:06:41PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: Err, no you weren't... (You only ever ignore preferences when there's a cycle involed, which there isn't in the above) Mechanism.. how do I explain that I'm talking about the mechanism itself..? Try this on for size: If the first preference would lose against the second preference when opinion is unanimous, it's not reasonable to use that mechanism in more complicated circumstances. -- Raul -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get: 10: 0 B:C 3 1/3: 0 A:B 3 1/3: 0 A:C B wins. On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 10:24:41PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: This isn't correct: A wins by being preferred to all other options (A B, 3.3 to 0 and A C, 3.3 to 0). The strengths of the victories don't come into play unless you have a cycle. I was talking about the smith/condorcet mechanism. You may have been talking about it, but you didn't apply it properly. The SC method I described said "drop the weakest defeat from the Smith set until there is an undefeated option". The Smith Set is defined as the smallest set of options that are not defeated by any option outside the Smith Set. In your example, even after Supermajority scaling, you have A defeating B and C, so the Smith Set contains the sole option A. Option A is undefeated in the Smith set (trivially) so the SC method would declare A the victor, not B. In fact, A would be the victor in any of the methods I mentioned, simply because it is an undefeated option. Even after supermajority scaling. -- Buddha Buck [EMAIL PROTECTED] "Just as the strength of the Internet is chaos, so the strength of our liberty depends upon the chaos and cacophony of the unfettered speech the First Amendment protects." -- A.L.A. v. U.S. Dept. of Justice -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
I was talking about the smith/condorcet mechanism. On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 08:51:28AM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote: You may have been talking about it, but you didn't apply it properly. The SC method I described said "drop the weakest defeat from the Smith set until there is an undefeated option". I know. See my reply to Anthony on this same topic. -- Raul -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
This is a drastically chopped down version of my response to the Buddha/Eudora message trilogy. I want to focus on one issue. On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 06:17:13PM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote: Option: Smith/Condorcet Of the n options in the Smith set, order the n*(n-1) pairwise results by number of votes for the winning choice, strongest to weakest. (e.g., if A beat B by 100:50, and B beat C by 76:74, order them as AB first, BC second, because 100 is bigger than 76). Drop the weakest defeat iteratively until one option is unbeaten. That unbeaten option is the winner. Advantages: Variants have been studied for 200+ years. Disadvantages [I picked this mechanism because it's the first one for which you claimed no disavantages. I believe that your disadvantages for these various methods are incorrect in a large number of cases, but I don't feel like tackling that issue point by point.] I'm trying to figure out how to implement the concept of supermajority in this voting system. I don't think it can be done in a reasonable fashion, because in this system (and many of the others), you're voting against yourself. Here's an example set of votes (for a ballot which offers ABCDE as options): ACBDE AD AEBD BACED BEC C CABED CADB CDA E Here's the condorcet strengths: 7:2 C:D 7:2 A:E 6:1 A:D 6:2 A:B 6:3 C:E 5:2 B:E 5:3 C:B 5:3 B:D 5:4 E:D 5:4 C:A C wins (it's unbeaten). Now, if we introduce a 3:1 supermajority which only affects C, C loses: 7: 2 A:E 6: 1 A:D 6: 2 A:B 5: 2 B:E 5: 3 B:D 5: 4 E:D 4: 1 2/3 A:C 3: 1 2/3 B:C 2 1/3: 2 C:D 2: 3 C:E And, that makes sense, because I constructed that set of votes with a linear random number generator. But, let's try a simpler multi-option ballot, with everyone in favor. Ballot: ABC, 3:1 supermajority required for A, 10 votes, all cast as: ABC. If there was no supermajority, the ballots would look like: 10:0 A:B 10:0 B:C 10:0 A:C And you can figure out by inspection that A wins. However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get: 10: 0 B:C 3 1/3: 0 A:B 3 1/3: 0 A:C B wins. There is a similar flaw even without supermajority (by indicating a second or even third preference, I can tip the balance in favor of another option, causing it to win), but that's a bit more subtle to talk about. What's interesting is that most of the voting mechanisms you posted about share this characteristic about supermajority votes. [Of course, the characteristic goes away if you offer a simple 2 choice ballot, because in that circumstance they're all equivalent.] -- Raul P.S. pseudocode *is* poorly written english.
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: But, let's try a simpler multi-option ballot, with everyone in favor. Ballot: ABC, 3:1 supermajority required for A, 10 votes, all cast as: ABC. If there was no supermajority, the ballots would look like: 10:0 A:B 10:0 B:C 10:0 A:C And you can figure out by inspection that A wins. However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get: 10: 0 B:C 3 1/3: 0 A:B 3 1/3: 0 A:C B wins. There is a similar flaw even without supermajority (by indicating a second or even third preference, I can tip the balance in favor of another option, causing it to win), but that's a bit more subtle to talk about. What's interesting is that most of the voting mechanisms you posted about share this characteristic about supermajority votes. [Of course, the characteristic goes away if you offer a simple 2 choice ballot, because in that circumstance they're all equivalent.] Which sheds a great deal of light on the motivations behind his amendment to John Goerzen's proposal. -- G. Branden Robinson | joeyh oh my, it's a UP P III. Debian GNU/Linux| doogie dos it. [EMAIL PROTECTED] | * joeyh runs dselect http://www.debian.org/~branden/ | Overfiend that ought to be sufficient :) pgpw7SZ9Wz4Y4.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 07:04:02AM -0500, Branden Robinson wrote: Which sheds a great deal of light on the motivations behind his amendment to John Goerzen's proposal. Which was to be handled by having two votes, which would've required, initially, a simple majority in favour of John's proposal, then a 3:1 vote (assuming a supermajority was required for it to pass) in favour for it to succeed. Are you making these random snide comments about scare-quoted amendments because you actually believe them, or just to get a reaction, btw? Cheers, aj -- Anthony Towns [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/ I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred. ``Thanks to all avid pokers out there'' -- linux.conf.au, 17-20 January 2001 pgpYEYPtU78S4.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get: 10: 0 B:C 3 1/3: 0 A:B 3 1/3: 0 A:C B wins. This isn't correct: A wins by being preferred to all other options (A B, 3.3 to 0 and A C, 3.3 to 0). The strengths of the victories don't come into play unless you have a cycle. Cheers, aj -- Anthony Towns [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/ I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred. ``Thanks to all avid pokers out there'' -- linux.conf.au, 17-20 January 2001 pgpxGn2QZxZeg.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get: 10: 0 B:C 3 1/3: 0 A:B 3 1/3: 0 A:C B wins. On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 10:24:41PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: This isn't correct: A wins by being preferred to all other options (A B, 3.3 to 0 and A C, 3.3 to 0). The strengths of the victories don't come into play unless you have a cycle. I was talking about the smith/condorcet mechanism. -- Raul
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 08:00:04AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get: 10: 0 B:C 3 1/3: 0 A:B 3 1/3: 0 A:C B wins. On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 10:24:41PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: This isn't correct: A wins by being preferred to all other options (A B, 3.3 to 0 and A C, 3.3 to 0). The strengths of the victories don't come into play unless you have a cycle. I was talking about the smith/condorcet mechanism. Err, no you weren't... (You only ever ignore preferences when there's a cycle involed, which there isn't in the above) Cheers, aj -- Anthony Towns [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/ I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred. ``Thanks to all avid pokers out there'' -- linux.conf.au, 17-20 January 2001
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get: 10: 0 B:C 3 1/3: 0 A:B 3 1/3: 0 A:C B wins. On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 10:24:41PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: This isn't correct: A wins by being preferred to all other options (A B, 3.3 to 0 and A C, 3.3 to 0). The strengths of the victories don't come into play unless you have a cycle. On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 08:00:04AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: I was talking about the smith/condorcet mechanism. On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 11:06:41PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: Err, no you weren't... (You only ever ignore preferences when there's a cycle involed, which there isn't in the above) Mechanism.. how do I explain that I'm talking about the mechanism itself..? Try this on for size: If the first preference would lose against the second preference when opinion is unanimous, it's not reasonable to use that mechanism in more complicated circumstances. -- Raul
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 08:44:26AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get: 10: 0 B:C 3 1/3: 0 A:B 3 1/3: 0 A:C B wins. Mechanism.. how do I explain that I'm talking about the mechanism itself..? I'm not sure what you're talking about because in the above, A wins. (It's the Condorcet winner, so all Condorcet methods select it) Whatever method you're applying, you've either got a bad description of it, or you're doing something wrong. (Any method that declares B the winner is obviously broken beyond repair; but Condorcet methods don't do that) Cheers, aj -- Anthony Towns [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/ I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred. ``Thanks to all avid pokers out there'' -- linux.conf.au, 17-20 January 2001
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get: 10: 0 B:C 3 1/3: 0 A:B 3 1/3: 0 A:C B wins. On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 08:44:26AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: Mechanism.. how do I explain that I'm talking about the mechanism itself..? On Sat, Dec 02, 2000 at 12:13:57AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: I'm not sure what you're talking about because in the above, A wins. (It's the Condorcet winner, so all Condorcet methods select it) What I'm saying is that you can't meaningfully mix this Condorcet mechanism with the concept of supermajority. I'm also implying that there's probably a reason that the voting mechanism in the constitution isn't labeled Condorcet. Whatever method you're applying, you've either got a bad description of it, or you're doing something wrong. Ok, try it this way: applying the concept of supermajority to a Condorcet tallying mechanism is wrong. (Any method that declares B the winner is obviously broken beyond repair; but Condorcet methods don't do that) Agreed: Condorcet + supermajority is broken. The simplifying assumptions used by Condorcet are broken by the concept of supermajority. Thanks, -- Raul
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
I'm about to leave town for the weekend, so I don't have time to answer too many of these in detail. For now, I'll respond to one comment by Raul: I'm uncomfortable saying if I've agreed to this. The Smith/Condorcet criteria that Buddha posted is not something I've agreed to. So, discussion could happen here, to make sure we were using the same terminology. Yes, let's be clear on terminology. The Smith/Condorcet METHOD I posted is not a criterion, but a method of choosing a victor (in non-supermajority situations). It happens to be a method that meets both the Condorcet Criterion and the Smith Criterion: Condorcet Criterion: If there is an undefeated option (in pairwise contests), that option should be the winner. Smith Criterion: The winner should come from the Smith set. The Smith Criterion implies the Condorcet Criterion, because if there is an undefeated option, the Smith set consists solely of that option. Do you have a problem with these criteria in NON-Supermajority elections? The Smith/Condorcet method (as well as Sequential Dropping, Schwartz Sequential Dropping, Tideman) all meet both of the above criteria. Plurality and IRV limited to the Smith set also meet both criteria. In a Supermajority situation, the big question becomes: What does a supermajority mean in a multi-option election? In a single-option election, it's easy: More yeas than nays by a supermajority. I can even see that extended to an Approval voting system: an option -can- win by a N:M supermajority if the ratio of Approved votes to Not approved votes is at least N:M. This leads to another possible criterion: Supermajority Criterion: If any option requires a N:M supermajority, then if more than M/N of the ballots disapprove of the option, then it should not win. Does that sound reasonable? Please keep in mind that I haven't defined what approved and disapproved means on a preferential ballot. One suggestion I've heard recently says that to vote sincerely in an Approval election one should vote approved on any option one prefers to the incumbent (which would be the status quo) and not approved on any option one prefers the incumbent to. This is obviously debatable, and I don't know if I accept it myself. It can, however, be turned on its head and used to get an Approval election out of a preferential election. It is unclear of the status quo option should be No or Further Discussion. This is also debatable. How about this Supermajority Election proceedure: 1) Find a winner using some method that meets both the Smith and Condorcet Criteria (exact method still under debate). 2) If the winner has a supermajority requirement, compare the winner with the status quo option. If it defeats the status quo by the supermajority requirement, then it wins, otherwise default wins. Now I really must be going... Later, Buddha -- Buddha Buck [EMAIL PROTECTED] Just as the strength of the Internet is chaos, so the strength of our liberty depends upon the chaos and cacophony of the unfettered speech the First Amendment protects. -- A.L.A. v. U.S. Dept. of Justice
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 09:31:13AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get: 10: 0 B:C 3 1/3: 0 A:B 3 1/3: 0 A:C B wins. This summary is completely wrong for any Condorcet scheme. A dominates B (by a reduced margin of 3.3 to 0 rather than 10 to 0) A dominates C (also by a reduced margin) B dominates C (by its original margin) A thus wins by dominating all others. Whatever you're using to declare B the winner above, it's not a Condorcet method. The rest of your message, and the conclusion that Condorced+Supermajority isn't possible is thus invalid. Cheers, aj -- Anthony Towns [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/ I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred. ``Thanks to all avid pokers out there'' -- linux.conf.au, 17-20 January 2001
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 08:38:13AM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote: Condorcet Criterion: If there is an undefeated option (in pairwise contests), that option should be the winner. Smith Criterion: The winner should come from the Smith set. The Smith Criterion implies the Condorcet Criterion, because if there is an undefeated option, the Smith set consists solely of that option. Do you have a problem with these criteria in NON-Supermajority elections? I agree with the Smith Criterion. I'm not sure I understand enough about what's meant by pairwise contests to agree with the Condorcet criterion. In a Supermajority situation, the big question becomes: What does a supermajority mean in a multi-option election? In a single-option election, it's easy: More yeas than nays by a supermajority. I can even see that extended to an Approval voting system: an option -can- win by a N:M supermajority if the ratio of Approved votes to Not approved votes is at least N:M. This leads to another possible criterion: Supermajority Criterion: If any option requires a N:M supermajority, then if more than M/N of the ballots disapprove of the option, then it should not win. Does that sound reasonable? Please keep in mind that I haven't defined what approved and disapproved means on a preferential ballot. Exactly. Those definition would have to be nailed down before it would be reasonable to agree or disagree on this. How about this Supermajority Election proceedure: 1) Find a winner using some method that meets both the Smith and Condorcet Criteria (exact method still under debate). Heh.. this procedure is already debatable. 2) If the winner has a supermajority requirement, compare the winner with the status quo option. If it defeats the status quo by the supermajority requirement, then it wins, otherwise default wins. I dislike this, immensely. What if you have more than one flavor of status quo you're voting for? Later, -- Raul
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
I was talking about the smith/condorcet mechanism. On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 08:51:28AM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote: You may have been talking about it, but you didn't apply it properly. The SC method I described said drop the weakest defeat from the Smith set until there is an undefeated option. I know. See my reply to Anthony on this same topic. -- Raul
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 09:46:00AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: I agree with the Smith Criterion. I'm not sure I understand enough about what's meant by pairwise contests to agree with the Condorcet criterion. The Smith criterion implies the Condorcet criterion, btw. Pairwise contests just means take all the votes you've got, and ignore all options but the two you're considering. If one's ranked higher than the other, consider it a vote for the one, if its the other way around a vote for the other, if neither are ranked, ignore it. You then get a table that tells you: N people preferred A to B, while M preferred B to A (and O didn't seem to care at all) for each option A to B. The Condorcet criteria says that if there's a single option, which wins every pairwise contest (so 100 people prefer it over X, while only 50 prefered X to it, and 78 prefered it over Y, but only 70 prefered Y to it, and so on for *every* option), then it should win. 2) If the winner has a supermajority requirement, compare the winner with the status quo option. If it defeats the status quo by the supermajority requirement, then it wins, otherwise default wins. I dislike this, immensely. What if you have more than one flavor of status quo you're voting for? Status-quo means don't resolve *anything*. There are at most two ways of doing that: by doing nothing, and not even discussing the matter again, and by doing nothing constructive, but continuing to flame each other. I personally don't think that's a distinction that'll be successfully determined by a vote, though. IMHO, anyway. Cheers, aj -- Anthony Towns [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/ I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred. ``Thanks to all avid pokers out there'' -- linux.conf.au, 17-20 January 2001 pgpGtBZ8Dljzo.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 09:31:13AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get: 10: 0 B:C 3 1/3: 0 A:B 3 1/3: 0 A:C B wins. On Sat, Dec 02, 2000 at 12:45:53AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: This summary is completely wrong for any Condorcet scheme. A dominates B (by a reduced margin of 3.3 to 0 rather than 10 to 0) A dominates C (also by a reduced margin) B dominates C (by its original margin) A thus wins by dominating all others. Whatever you're using to declare B the winner above, it's not a Condorcet method. My hypothesis is: if everyone votes for all options, any smith set which combines an option with a supermajority and an option which does not, will result in a lose for the supermajority if you're using the condorcet method. The rest of your message, and the conclusion that Condorced+Supermajority isn't possible is thus invalid. It's a simple observation about the numbers involved. However, I've been wrong before -- can you construct a counterexample to my hypothesis? Alternatively, can you show me how my hypothesis is irrelevant? Thanks, -- Raul
RE: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
Buddha Buck wrote:
The Smith Set is defined as the smallest set of options that are not
defeated by any option outside the Smith Set.
This definition of the Smith set is incorrect. Suppose we have:
AB, BC, A=C, AD, BD, CD. ('' means 'dominates', or beats pairwise)
Then by your definition, the Smith set would consist of only {A}, whereas in
fact the Smith set contains three members: {A,B,C}. In other words, any
candidate which is tied with a member of the Smith set is also a member of
that set. The corrected definition would be something like:
The Smith Set is defined as the smallest set of options that defeat
('dominate') all options outside the set.
I mention this, because a number of messages posted recently to debian-vote
contain this subtle error, and if an incorrect definition was used in a
constitutional amendment, it could affect the interpretation of results in
certain elections. Your incorrect definition has a name, too -- it's called
the 'Schwartz Set'. In large-scale public elections, where pairties are
very rare, the Smith and Schwartz sets are the same. However, for committee
voting, or decisions made by other small groups (like Debian), pairties can
easily occur during vote counting. In the above example, if the winners are
restricted to being members of the Schwartz set, then there is a single
winner; if the Smith set is used, then a tiebreaker procedure (STV?) would
need to be invoked to determine the winner, which might not be A.
Note that I am *NOT* saying the Schwartz set is preferable to Smith, or that
either one should necessarily be used as part of any voting procedure Debian
might adopt (I'd recommend against it, in fact -- it is better to just use a
method which satisfies the Smith criterion, than use Smith as a method).
I'm merely pointing out how easy it is to make mistakes like this, so it is
important to word any proposed constitutional amendments *very* carefully.
--
Norm Petry
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 09:53:29AM -0600, Norman Petry wrote:
AB, BC, A=C, AD, BD, CD. ('' means 'dominates', or beats pairwise)
Thanks, here's an example:
1000 ABCD
100 CABD
10:1 supermajority.
Using the Smith/Condorcet method:
1000:100 B:C
110:0 A:B
100:100 C:A
A wins, my hypothesis was wrong.
I'll need to think about this a bit more.
--
Raul
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 01:32:00PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: Here's some possible fairness criteria: * If there are multiple ways of conducting a vote, the outcome should not depend on which way is chosen (only on the preferences of the developers). Agreed. Comment: the current constitution is ambiguous on this issue, for the case of supermajority. My original reading of the constitution was that A.6(7) applied to any ballot which combined an option with supermajority and an option without supermajority. The example embedded in A.6(7), however, indicates an A.6(2) vote and not an A.6(3) or A.6(1) vote. * Ideally, there shouldn't be any more effective way of getting what you want than simply ranking your preferences in order. (Although this is, aiui, provably impossible to achieve) Of course, this is a contradiction -- much discussion could happen here. I suspect we've also agreed that the Condorcet winner (if there is one) should always win. And we seem to have agreed that the winner should be from the Smith set, although that's apparently considered debatable amongst the pairwise voting cognescenti. I'm uncomfortable saying if I've agreed to this. The Smith/Condorcet criteria that Buddha posted is not something I've agreed to. So, discussion could happen here, to make sure we were using the same terminology. There are two reasonable ways of treating supermajorities, that I can think of: a) A supermajority of developers believe this option is acceptable. b) A supermajority of developers support this option above all others. I believe (a) is the better case, and I think it's essentially what the N+1 scheme described in the constitution achieves. From some of your mails, I'm lead to believe you might prefer (b). Er.. you've lost me here. (*scratches head*) Ok, I think you're basing this off of my earlier response to a specific example where I thought, at the time, you were talking about a vote which mixed a supermajority option with a non-supermajority option. (b) isn't quite what your system does, though (aiui). If you consider the Manoj and Branden's proposed vote, we might end up with people holding preferences like: 120 people prefer M, B, S, F (Manoj, Branden, Status-Quo, F.Disc) 100 people prefer B, M, S, F This means that the ratio between M and B would be only 6:5, rather than 3:1, so presumably neither should win (that's what (b) would imply to me)? If we're talking about *my* interpretation of what the constitution is saying, and what it's trying to say, and *my* understanding of that particular vote. And, if we agree that a 3:1 supermajority applies to changing the social contract: The way I see it, when determining which votes Dominate which others, votes which prefer an option with a supermajority are reduced to an appropriate fraction (in this case 1/3). But, 40 Dominates 33 1/3, so M wins. [Also, 73 1/3 -- the total number of votes for M, exceeds quorum of 37, so there's not a problem with not enough people voting.] [since the rest of your message just seems to build on this point, I've just left it off.] Thanks, -- Raul
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
[second pass, talking about the situation as a whole, rather than focussing on voting mechanics.] On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 02:00:57PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: It's unambiguous, but it has undesirable properties (ie, as well as voting in a particular way, supporters of one side or the other have a stake in how the issue is voted on also, since one way makes one group more likely to win, and another way makes another group more likely to win). To be specific: supposing no one actually minds getting rid of non-free, everyone wants to see it moved off the mirrors, in general, but there is a reasonable minority of people who would rather see it kept on some out of the way machine, just for old times sake. In the N+1 vote system, the votes go like: 60 Remove, Move, Further Discussion 40 Move, Remove, Further Discussion Remove wins, and the final vote is: 100 Yes, Further Discussion, No and Remove wins. Given your assumptions, correct. If, however, some of the 40 people connive together privately, and convince the secretary to decide the issue in a single vote, using your interpretation of the supermajority clause, they vote instead goes something like: 60 Remove, Move, Further Discussion, Do Nothing 40 Move, Remove, Further Discussion, Do Nothing and the results are scaled to: Remove dominates Further Discussion Do Nothing, 33.3 to 0 Move dominates Further Discussion Do Nothing, 100 to 0 Move dominates Remove, 40 to 20 and, the 40 people who prefered Move rejoice having won the vote. Oh, shudder, a less drastic result occurs because of these "conniving" people. Of course the same thing might happen if these 40 people "connive" together to set up an out of the way server to preserve non-free. Surely you agree that a minority of people being able to subvert the resolution procedure to get what they want instead of what the majority want is a bad thing? Only if "majority" and "supermajority" are equivalent -- which they're not. In this case, your starting assumption is that no one really cares which option is choosen, as long as one is. It's not "subverting the system" to get results which correspond with this starting assumption. -- Raul -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
At 02:23 PM 11-30-2000 -0500, Raul Miller wrote: [third pass] On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 02:00:57PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: Surely you agree that a minority of people being able to subvert the resolution procedure to get what they want instead of what the majority want is a bad thing? I think I agree with your underlying point -- that this kind of discrepancy in the voting system indicates a flaw. This sounds like what the www.electionmethods.com site calls the "Strong Defensive Strategy Criterion": "If a majority of the voters prefer candidate A to candidate B, then they should have a way of voting that will ensure that B cannot win, without any member of that majority reversing a sincere preference for one candidate over another or insincerely voting two candidates equal." I disagree with your emotional loading (e.g. the use of words like "subvert"), but you still have a valid point. Is the wording of the SDSC better? Thanks, -- Raul -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
At 02:23 PM 11-30-2000 -0500, Raul Miller wrote: [third pass] On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 02:00:57PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: Surely you agree that a minority of people being able to subvert the resolution procedure to get what they want instead of what the majority want is a bad thing? I think I agree with your underlying point -- that this kind of discrepancy in the voting system indicates a flaw. On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 02:29:47PM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote: This sounds like what the www.electionmethods.com site calls the "Strong Defensive Strategy Criterion": "If a majority of the voters prefer candidate A to candidate B, then they should have a way of voting that will ensure that B cannot win, without any member of that majority reversing a sincere preference for one candidate over another or insincerely voting two candidates equal." I disagree with your emotional loading (e.g. the use of words like "subvert"), but you still have a valid point. Is the wording of the SDSC better? No. It's perfectly reasonable to vote for neither (I suppose you could call this "Candidate C"), and it's perfectly reasonable to vote for a revote on a different ballot after futher discussion (I suppose you could call this "Candidate D"). However, Anthony's starting assumption was that neither of these circumstances were desirable to any of the voters, and that no one is voting insincerely. Anyways, insincere voting would be likely to cause one of these undesirable options to win. No, the problem Anthony is that the constitution doesn't express how to have consistent results (between A.3(1)+A.3(2) votes and A.3(3) votes) if an A.3(1) vote chooses between an option with an associated supermajority and an option which does not. Logically, there's three possible resolutions: [1] Discard the concept of supermajority [2] Discard the concept of A.3(3) votes [3] Apply the supermajority voting rules on A.3(1) votes. I favor [3]. Anthony favors [2], but hasn't entirely dismissed [1]. -- Raul -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 11:52:53PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: * A single vote, where the pairwise preferences for A against Further Discussion (only) are scaled according to A's supermajority requirements. F:A in A.6(7) stands for For:Against. Not Further Discussion : Option A. I'm not claiming that the constitution as it stands can or should be interpreted in this way. I'm suggesting it as a possible way things can be done in future after the constitution in amended. I have been, and continue to be, very conservative in how I'm willing to interpret the constitution. I'd've thought you'd have noticed this by now... * A single vote, where the pairwise preferences for A against all other options are scaled according to A's supermajority requirement. [0] This is what A.3(3) specifies [given what's already said in A.3(1), A.3(2) and A.6(7)]. No, this is how you interpret A.3(3). That's a very different thing. Is clear and obvious and not in any sort of dispute that F and A, and A, B and X are metasyntactic variables. It's not at all obvious that Yes and No are, no matter how strongly you might assert it. Cheers, aj -- Anthony Towns [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/ I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred. ``Thanks to all avid pokers out there'' -- linux.conf.au, 17-20 January 2001 pgpKZcS1WQ2XL.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
[second pass, talking about the situation as a whole, rather than focussing on voting mechanics.] On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 02:00:57PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: It's unambiguous, but it has undesirable properties (ie, as well as voting in a particular way, supporters of one side or the other have a stake in how the issue is voted on also, since one way makes one group more likely to win, and another way makes another group more likely to win). To be specific: supposing no one actually minds getting rid of non-free, everyone wants to see it moved off the mirrors, in general, but there is a reasonable minority of people who would rather see it kept on some out of the way machine, just for old times sake. In the N+1 vote system, the votes go like: 60 Remove, Move, Further Discussion 40 Move, Remove, Further Discussion Remove wins, and the final vote is: 100 Yes, Further Discussion, No and Remove wins. Given your assumptions, correct. If, however, some of the 40 people connive together privately, and convince the secretary to decide the issue in a single vote, using your interpretation of the supermajority clause, they vote instead goes something like: 60 Remove, Move, Further Discussion, Do Nothing 40 Move, Remove, Further Discussion, Do Nothing and the results are scaled to: Remove dominates Further Discussion Do Nothing, 33.3 to 0 Move dominates Further Discussion Do Nothing, 100 to 0 Move dominates Remove, 40 to 20 and, the 40 people who prefered Move rejoice having won the vote. Oh, shudder, a less drastic result occurs because of these conniving people. Of course the same thing might happen if these 40 people connive together to set up an out of the way server to preserve non-free. Surely you agree that a minority of people being able to subvert the resolution procedure to get what they want instead of what the majority want is a bad thing? Only if majority and supermajority are equivalent -- which they're not. In this case, your starting assumption is that no one really cares which option is choosen, as long as one is. It's not subverting the system to get results which correspond with this starting assumption. -- Raul
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
[third pass] On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 02:00:57PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: Surely you agree that a minority of people being able to subvert the resolution procedure to get what they want instead of what the majority want is a bad thing? I think I agree with your underlying point -- that this kind of discrepancy in the voting system indicates a flaw. I disagree with your emotional loading (e.g. the use of words like subvert), but you still have a valid point. Thanks, -- Raul
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
At 02:23 PM 11-30-2000 -0500, Raul Miller wrote: [third pass] On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 02:00:57PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: Surely you agree that a minority of people being able to subvert the resolution procedure to get what they want instead of what the majority want is a bad thing? I think I agree with your underlying point -- that this kind of discrepancy in the voting system indicates a flaw. This sounds like what the www.electionmethods.com site calls the Strong Defensive Strategy Criterion: If a majority of the voters prefer candidate A to candidate B, then they should have a way of voting that will ensure that B cannot win, without any member of that majority reversing a sincere preference for one candidate over another or insincerely voting two candidates equal. I disagree with your emotional loading (e.g. the use of words like subvert), but you still have a valid point. Is the wording of the SDSC better? Thanks, -- Raul -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
At 02:23 PM 11-30-2000 -0500, Raul Miller wrote: [third pass] On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 02:00:57PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: Surely you agree that a minority of people being able to subvert the resolution procedure to get what they want instead of what the majority want is a bad thing? I think I agree with your underlying point -- that this kind of discrepancy in the voting system indicates a flaw. On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 02:29:47PM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote: This sounds like what the www.electionmethods.com site calls the Strong Defensive Strategy Criterion: If a majority of the voters prefer candidate A to candidate B, then they should have a way of voting that will ensure that B cannot win, without any member of that majority reversing a sincere preference for one candidate over another or insincerely voting two candidates equal. I disagree with your emotional loading (e.g. the use of words like subvert), but you still have a valid point. Is the wording of the SDSC better? No. It's perfectly reasonable to vote for neither (I suppose you could call this Candidate C), and it's perfectly reasonable to vote for a revote on a different ballot after futher discussion (I suppose you could call this Candidate D). However, Anthony's starting assumption was that neither of these circumstances were desirable to any of the voters, and that no one is voting insincerely. Anyways, insincere voting would be likely to cause one of these undesirable options to win. No, the problem Anthony is that the constitution doesn't express how to have consistent results (between A.3(1)+A.3(2) votes and A.3(3) votes) if an A.3(1) vote chooses between an option with an associated supermajority and an option which does not. Logically, there's three possible resolutions: [1] Discard the concept of supermajority [2] Discard the concept of A.3(3) votes [3] Apply the supermajority voting rules on A.3(1) votes. I favor [3]. Anthony favors [2], but hasn't entirely dismissed [1]. -- Raul
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 02:23:08PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 02:00:57PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: Surely you agree that a minority of people being able to subvert the resolution procedure to get what they want instead of what the majority want is a bad thing? I think I agree with your underlying point -- that this kind of discrepancy in the voting system indicates a flaw. Oh good, I can delete all my postponed rants then. :) Here's some possible fairness criteria: * If there are multiple ways of conducting a vote, the outcome should not depend on which way is chosen (only on the preferences of the developers). * Ideally, there shouldn't be any more effective way of getting what you want than simply ranking your preferences in order. (Although this is, aiui, provably impossible to achieve) I suspect we've also agreed that the Condorcet winner (if there is one) should always win. And we seem to have agreed that the winner should be from the Smith set, although that's apparently considered debatable amongst the pairwise voting cognescenti. There are two reasonable ways of treating supermajorities, that I can think of: a) A supermajority of developers believe this option is acceptable. b) A supermajority of developers support this option above all others. I believe (a) is the better case, and I think it's essentially what the N+1 scheme described in the constitution achieves. From some of your mails, I'm lead to believe you might prefer (b). (b) isn't quite what your system does, though (aiui). If you consider the Manoj and Branden's proposed vote, we might end up with people holding preferences like: 120 people prefer M, B, S, F (Manoj, Branden, Status-Quo, F.Disc) 100 people prefer B, M, S, F This means that the ratio between M and B would be only 6:5, rather than 3:1, so presumably neither should win (that's what (b) would imply to me)? My reading of your proposal would scale both sides of the M dominates B, 120 to 100 down by 3, which would end up with M dominates B, 40 to 33.3 which would leave M winning, which, aiui, it shouldn't. If you really wanted (b), you could achieve this by scaling the sides individually, ie: M doesn't dominate B (40 to 100) B doesn't dominate M (33.3 to 120) and then using this to eliminate both options. I'm not sure how you'd phrase that for the constitution, and I don't think it's a desirable interpretation of a supermajority anyway. Cheers, aj -- Anthony Towns [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/ I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred. ``Thanks to all avid pokers out there'' -- linux.conf.au, 17-20 January 2001 pgpLVyMSkklej.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 02:38:23AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 12:36:21PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: That depends what you consider "plausible". I'm willing to believe the constitution has bugs, and that in some circumstances it may very well come up with nonsensical results for a vote. So I'm not willing to rule such an answer implausible. It sounds as if you're interested in interpreting the constitution such that the results are nonsensical. Huh? Look, all I'm trying to say is that the straightforward and obvious reading of the constitution leads to a result that doesn't make any sense. I should expand on my concern about your interpretation of the constitution. If you're claiming that A.6(2) is ambiguous, and doesn't mean what, IMO, it clearly and obviously means, and if your claim has any merit, then I don't see how it's possible to have the constitution ever be unambiguous. If we use traditional mathsy terms and say things must be `strictly greater' to ensure no one mistakenly assumes `greater than or equal to', somehow this translates to increased ambiguity rather than less. I don't see how anyone could hope to write a clear and unambiguous constitution under those circumstances. Single Transferable Vote biases the selection in favor of first preferences at the expense of other preferences. Can you think of a better kind of criteria for making the selection? Other methods can be found at the URLs I cited at the start of the thread. "Reversing the fewest and weakest pairwise defeats" (ie, using the smallest possible casting vote) is probably another reasonable alternative. But, as I said, I don't profess to know enough about cycle breakers to really say. But: I'm not asking "are there other methods", I'm asking "what's a better criteria?" and "why?" And I'm telling you, I don't know. There are plenty of fairness criteria out there, there are plenty of justifications for resolving circular ties in various ways. There are plenty of fairness criteria on the fortunecity page, many of which aren't met by STV alone. I've no idea how many of them are met when you apply STV to the Smith set: certainly more of them than when you apply it to the entire vote, but I don't know how many. There's a discussion of this in the February archives of this list. I'll note that the URL you cited doesn't have anything equivalent to Single Transferrable Vote. http://www.fortunecity.com/meltingpot/harrow/124/methods.html#IRV It's the second method listed. It really sounds more as if you want to find faults in the constitution than you've thought this through and have a better alternative to propose. If you'd care to go back to the first few messages in this thread, you'll find the constructive suggestions. Oddly, you won't find all that many in my responses to you, since I've had to spend most of those rebutting your continual assertions that I don't understand what I'm talking about. Cheers, aj -- Anthony Towns [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/ I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred. ``Thanks to all avid pokers out there'' -- linux.conf.au, 17-20 January 2001 PGP signature
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 06:39:16PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: Huh? Look, all I'm trying to say is that the straightforward and obvious reading of the constitution leads to a result that doesn't make any sense. I should expand on my concern about your interpretation of the constitution. If you're claiming that A.6(2) is ambiguous, and doesn't mean what, IMO, it clearly and obviously means, and if your claim has any merit, then I don't see how it's possible to have the constitution ever be unambiguous. If we use traditional mathsy terms and say things must be `strictly greater' to ensure no one mistakenly assumes `greater than or equal to', somehow this translates to increased ambiguity rather than less. I don't see how anyone could hope to write a clear and unambiguous constitution under those circumstances. What's ambiguous is the concept of preference, in a circular tie. If we accept it as axiomatic that a result which doesn't make sense is preferable over one which does, then we get your kind of interpretation -- where the concept of "preference" is purely a matter of pairwise comparison. If we accept it as axiomatic that a result which does make sense is preferable over one which doesn't, then we get my kind of interpretation -- where the concept of "preference" must consider not only pairwise comparison but transitive effects. If you want it expressed in "mathy" terms, the question is: does "strictly prefer" refer to a lattice, or some other [less strict] sort of relation? The constitution doesn't explicitly say. But: I'm not asking "are there other methods", I'm asking "what's a better criteria?" and "why?" And I'm telling you, I don't know. There are plenty of fairness criteria out there, there are plenty of justifications for resolving circular ties in various ways. Ok, and I'm telling you that I, personally, at least, don't find that a convincing reason to accept that the single transferrable vote mechanism of the constitution should be eliminated. I'm willing to entertain the concept, if someone wants to put forth some kind of argument about why some other method would be better, but until then, what's the point? There are plenty of fairness criteria on the fortunecity page, many of which aren't met by STV alone. I've no idea how many of them are met when you apply STV to the Smith set: certainly more of them than when you apply it to the entire vote, but I don't know how many. And then there's statistical effects -- how many of them are met "most of the time". [But, by the way, I don't consider "number of fairness criteria mentioned on the fortunecity page" as some kind of absolute metric of vote goodness.] There's a discussion of this in the February archives of this list. I'm kind of busy right now. Is there anything in particular that I should look for, if I read those archives? [Like, maybe, some kind of concept of "vote goodness" that the constutions could be measured against?] I'll note that the URL you cited doesn't have anything equivalent to Single Transferrable Vote. http://www.fortunecity.com/meltingpot/harrow/124/methods.html#IRV It's the second method listed. Hmm.. at first glance, this isn't the same. It doesn't make any kind of explicit reference to first preference. However, you're probably right. It really sounds more as if you want to find faults in the constitution than you've thought this through and have a better alternative to propose. If you'd care to go back to the first few messages in this thread, you'll find the constructive suggestions. Oddly, you won't find all that many in my responses to you, since I've had to spend most of those rebutting your continual assertions that I don't understand what I'm talking about. Eh? I'm not trying to say that you've never said anything positive -- you have (though, I read the begining of this thread and I didn't see anything constructive in the specific direction of suggesting constitutional ammendments). Thanks, -- Raul -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 02:53:15AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: A.6(3) A supermajority requirement of n:m for an option A means that when votes are considered which indicate option A as a better choice than some other option B, the number of votes in favor of A are multiplied by m/n. On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 07:26:01PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: This gives different results to the current system when two options on a single ballot would require different supermajorities to pass. Please reread: Message-ID: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Fri, 24 Nov 2000 10:07:24 +1000 and: Message-ID: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Fri, 24 Nov 2000 14:44:40 +1000 for the explanation. Eh? All I see is that my proposal is less ambiguous than the current constitution for this kind of case. [Those specific messages are where we were talking at cross purposes -- I thought we were talking about alternative final votes, and you had intended that we talk about an amendment an a final vote. This kind of misunderstanding on my part isn't something that you fix by setting the structure of the constitution.] A much fairer supermajority requirement would simply be: A.6(3) A supermajority of N:M for an option A is met when the number of votes ranking A higher than the default option, divided by N is greater than than the number of votes ranking the default option higher than A. So, a 3:1 supermajority is required to pass a constitutional amendment, 101 ballots YES:NO 100 ballots NO:YES [No one wants to talk about it any more, and the results are almost even.] Under your rule, the constitution would be amended, even though almost as many people voted NO as YES. What do you imagine the purpose of the supermajority is? To encorage further discussion? Now, if you're trying to say that my version has some ambiguity about it, well.. that might be true. But I'm not quite seeing it, yet. However it's not clear what should happen when the clear winner of a set of options doesn't meet its supermajority requirement, yet a loser (with a different supermajority requirement) does. It's similarly unclear what should happen if the winner doesn't meet its supermajority requirments, but some other member of the Smith set does. My version makes that clear. And, I'll assert: it's reasonable to interpret the current constitution in that fashion. Your above reference documents don't really deal with that assertion, all they talk about is what happens if something like a constitutional amendment ballot is treated by a sequence of at least on amendment ballots followed by a final ballot. My version of A.6 still allows for this (obviously, since that's an A.3 issue, not an A.6 issue). I would suggest something to the effect of: * Reduce to the Smith Set * Eliminate options that don't meet the supermajority requirement * If none left - default option wins * If one left - it wins * If many left, use some tie-breaker, eg STV, Tideman, Schulze This directly contradicts the last sentence of A.6(7). Do you have some reason for this contradiction? Thanks, -- Raul -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 07:28:44AM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote: Whether one criteria is better than another is of course a matter of opinion. Agreed. Still, consensus is possible. Above, you prefer Single Transferable Vote (which also appears to be called "Instant Runoff Voting" or "IRV" on most of the voting method websites) because it "biases selection in favor of first preferences at the expense of other preferences". Obviously, you think this is a good thing. Sure -- but logically, if I'm a voter, and I indicate a second and third preference on a ballot, that shouldn't weaken the strength of my first preference. Others may prefer other methods because they reverse the preferences of the fewest number of voters. This is a different criteria. Is it better? I think so, and so do others. You may not. Most of the "traditional" Condorcet resolution methods favor this criteria. Sure -- mediocracy tends to be easy to agree on. I think the best we can do is list a bunch of alternatives, with explanations and descriptions of their advantages and disadvantages, and discuss from there. I'm willing (see above :). I'll note that the URL you cited doesn't have anything equivalent to Single Transferrable Vote. [So it's not comprehensive.] I don't think "my favorite web site doesn't mention this system" somehow makes the systems it proposes to be somehow superior. The URL I'm looking at does not discuss IRV under Condorcet resolution methods, but it does discuss IRV as a technique for general elections (i.e., an alternative to Condorcet). I'm looking at http:// www.electionmethods.org/, which does have some faults (it has an -extreme- bias towards Condorcet and against plurality and IRV, for instance). Turns out I'd missed the cite. The nice thing about Single Transferrable Vote is that it automatically makes first preference votes more important than second preference votes (and so on). There are few systems at the URL you cited which even attempt this. Most of the Condorcet resolution methods I've seen don't attempt that because they don't see it as a valid criteria. They see overruling the fewest number of votes to be a valid criteria. Right, but that's method, and not a reason why. Actually, I did find one description of a voting concern that does severely impact IRV. IRV requires the multiple examination of every ballot, which can be prohibitive if the number of ballots is huge, or fragile, etc. Since most voting reform sites are concerned with reform of real-world elections, where there may be millions of voters, this is a bigger concern for them than it is for us. And this is a valid criteria for them to consider. The Condorcet resolution methods normally discussed can all be computed solely from the aggregate voting data, not needing to further examine individual ballots. In other words: it requires computerization of the voting process. And: rankings actually indicate preference, as they represent more than the ability to cast multiple votes. This sort of situation happens no matter how you resolve a cyclic tie, though. You pretty much have to be "unfair" in some sense to choose a winner. As I said, I'm inclined to suspect that there other means are likely to be more optimal, although I'm not clear exactly how. It really sounds more as if you want to find faults in the constitution than you've thought this through and have a better alternative to propose. No voting system is going to be 100% "fair" to all voters. The question remains, however: How do we determine "fairness" to evaluate different methods? That's one question. Another question is: what problem are we trying to solve? -- Raul -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
At 10:07 AM 11-29-2000 -0500, Raul Miller wrote: That's one question. Another question is: what problem are we trying to solve? Last things first... This is a -very- important question that I don't know the full answer to. The main problem: The current "Standard Resolution Procedure" as written in Appendix A of the Debian Constitution is confusing and ambiguous. There are (at least) two ways of addressing this issue. The first way is to amend Appendix A so that the current procedure is made unambiguous and clear. The advantage of this is that it causes the minimal amount of change to the actual process. The disadvantage is that if the main problem is real, there are multiple interpretations as to what the proper unambiguous method is. The second way is to look for what the faults are in the current process are, and amend Appendix A with a better procedure that is also unambiguous and clear. I think I prefer this way. What I would consider ideally unambiguous for a replacement for A.6 would be pseudocode for determining the election, rather than the poorly-written english we have now. Something that most of the Debian Developers could probably be able to sit down, code in their favorite language, and get all get the same answers. On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 07:28:44AM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote: Whether one criteria is better than another is of course a matter of opinion. Agreed. Still, consensus is possible. Above, you prefer Single Transferable Vote (which also appears to be called "Instant Runoff Voting" or "IRV" on most of the voting method websites) because it "biases selection in favor of first preferences at the expense of other preferences". Obviously, you think this is a good thing. Sure -- but logically, if I'm a voter, and I indicate a second and third preference on a ballot, that shouldn't weaken the strength of my first preference. I was going to say that I would consider that a valid criteria to consider for a voting system, but then I realized that I don't understand what you mean. Could you elaborate? I don't know if IRV has the problem that your 2nd or 3rd choice votes could cause your 1st vote choice to lose, but IRV does have the problem that in certain cases, your 2nd choice vote could cause your 3rd choice to win. The http://www.electionmethods.org/ site describes this. Others may prefer other methods because they reverse the preferences of the fewest number of voters. This is a different criteria. Is it better? I think so, and so do others. You may not. Most of the "traditional" Condorcet resolution methods favor this criteria. Sure -- mediocracy tends to be easy to agree on. Again, I don't understand what you mean... Here's what I meant... In a Condorcet vote, if there is one choice which pairwise defeats all other choices, then that choice wins. That's a pretty good indication that that choice is well supported. However, if there is no choice that pairwise defeats all other choices, then you must have a cycle(s) of some sort: More people prefer A to B, more B to C, more C to A, in the simplest of cycles. To claim an absolute victor, the cycle(s) needs to be broken, effectively reversing one or more of the pair-wise contests. Such a reversal is effectively overriding voters expressed preferences, I think the best we can do is list a bunch of alternatives, with explanations and descriptions of their advantages and disadvantages, and discuss from there. I'm willing (see above :). I'll note that the URL you cited doesn't have anything equivalent to Single Transferrable Vote. [So it's not comprehensive.] I don't think "my favorite web site doesn't mention this system" somehow makes the systems it proposes to be somehow superior. The URL I'm looking at does not discuss IRV under Condorcet resolution methods, but it does discuss IRV as a technique for general elections (i.e., an alternative to Condorcet). I'm looking at http:// www.electionmethods.org/, which does have some faults (it has an -extreme- bias towards Condorcet and against plurality and IRV, for instance). Turns out I'd missed the cite. The nice thing about Single Transferrable Vote is that it automatically makes first preference votes more important than second preference votes (and so on). There are few systems at the URL you cited which even attempt this. Most of the Condorcet resolution methods I've seen don't attempt that because they don't see it as a valid criteria. They see overruling the fewest number of votes to be a valid criteria. Right, but that's method, and not a reason why. Actually, I did find one description of a voting concern that does severely impact IRV. IRV requires the multiple examination of every ballot, which can be prohibitive if the number of ballots is huge, or fragile, etc. Since most voting reform sites are concerned with reform of real-world
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 09:05:09AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: Please reread: [...] for the explanation. Eh? All I see is that my proposal is less ambiguous than the current constitution for this kind of case. [Those specific messages are where we were talking at cross purposes -- *sigh* I'll repeat myself then. Taking the obvious, verbatim, `I have no initiative of my own, nor any idea what's gone before' interpretation of the constitution, then the non-free problem would be dealt with as follows: * An initial vote, with no supermajority or quorum requirements, on whether the resolution takes the form "A: The developers resolve to remove non-free from the social contract, etc" or "B: The developers resolve to move non-free to a separate server" or whether further discussion should take place. * Depending on the result of the initial vote, either: + further discussion would take place + if A won the initial vote, a final vote would take place with options Yes/No/Further Discussion, with (let us assume) 3:1 supermajority requirements, and a quorum of 3Q. + if B won the initial vote, a final vote would take place with options Y/N/F with a mere majority requirement, and a quorum of 3Q. The first vote might end up going like this: 60 voters vote ABF (people who want to get rid of non-free) 40 voters vote BAF (people who want to de-emphasise it somehow) 10 voters vote F(people who like non-free how it is) Without quorum or supermajority requirements coming in to play, this results in A dominating B, 60 to 40, and both A and B dominating F 100 to 10, so A wins. The second vote, presumably results in: 100 votes Y 10 votes N and A wins with a clear supermajority. With your rule, you instead just have an initial vote, with the initial pairwise preferences: A dominates B, 60 to 40 A dominates F, 100 to 10 B dominates F, 100 to 10 which are then scaled with supermajority requirements to be: B dominates A, 40 to 20 A dominates F, 33.3 to 10 B dominates F, 100 to 10 and B wins by dominating all other options. If the majority of people prefer option A to option B, and a supermajority of people are willing to accept option A, I don't see any reason to do B instead, merely becase A doesn't have a supermajority over B as well. Scaling only in comparison to "Further Discussion" does not have this problem. The other, independent, question is what to do when the Condorcet winner doesn't meet it's supermajority requirement. That is, a simple majority of people prefer some particular option to all others, but there isn't a supermajority that's willing to accept it. There are two ways of handling it I can think of: either try the next preferred option, or go back to further discussion. My initial impression was that further discussion was the safer choice, but I'm not convinced of that, at the moment. Something akin to: * Scale pair-wise comparisons against further discussion according to each option's supermajority requirement * Find the Smith set * If the Smith set is empty, or contains the default option, the default option wins * Otherwise the winner is determined by applying STV to the Smith set would allow you to fall back to some less preferred choice that does meet its supermajority requirements, if that's appropriate. I'm not sure what the exact effect of the third point (either using it as such, or replacing it with some other rule to remove options that don't meet their supermajority requirement) would be in general. A much fairer supermajority requirement would simply be: A.6(3) A supermajority of N:M for an option A is met when the number of votes ranking A higher than the default option, divided by N is greater than than the number of votes ranking the default option higher than A. So, a 3:1 supermajority is required to pass a constitutional amendment, 101 ballots YES:NO 100 ballots NO:YES [No one wants to talk about it any more, and the results are almost even.] Those aren't realistic votes: there's no default option listed, which there must be. One possible interpretation would be: 101 ballots YNF 100 ballots NYF in which case Y wins, with a supermajority of 201 to 0. Another would be: 101 ballots YNF 100 ballots NFY in which case Y loses because 101:100 is not a 3:1 supermajority, and either the vote defaults to further discussion, or falls back to N (preferred 201 to 0 over F). Now, if you're trying to say that my version has some ambiguity about it, well.. that might be true. But I'm not quite seeing it, yet. No, your version has results inconsistent with the system roughly as it
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 02:34:58AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: With your rule, you instead just have an initial vote, with the initial pairwise preferences: A dominates B, 60 to 40 A dominates F, 100 to 10 B dominates F, 100 to 10 What part of my proposed A.6 leads you to believe this? [It's other parts of the constitution which specify how the ballots are constructed.] which are then scaled with supermajority requirements to be: B dominates A, 40 to 20 A dominates F, 33.3 to 10 B dominates F, 100 to 10 and B wins by dominating all other options. Supermajority doesn't apply on votes which are not final votes, since they won't be ammending the constitution. -- Raul -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
What part of my proposed A.6 leads you to believe this? [It's other parts of the constitution which specify how the ballots are constructed.] On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 11:16:14AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: If you still require N initial votes and 1 final vote, it has no benefit over the current wording, at all, since supermajorities only apply to final votes, which are forced to have simply Yes/No/Further Discussion as their options. This is an allowed option, but it's not required. So the specific case you mentioned can be handled in exactly the way you specified. However, it could also be handled in a different fashion. This would depend on the way the ballots are prepared. If you'd rather that I'd phrased it as "you instead just have a final vote, with the pairwise preferences", you're welcome to take it as that. "It?" [Sorry, there's too many concepts flying around for me to parse this reasonably.] Again, the three things that need to be changed in the constitution, IMO, are: a) resolving circular ties needs to be decided on and spelled out I think I dealt with that. b) votes with multiple options need to be able to be handled by a single vote That's already possible. c) supermajority requirements need to be updated to cope with (b) There was a question about exactly what supermajority meant in this context, and while I recognize the interpretations which give rise to that ambiguity, I think I see what is supposed to happen there. I like to believe that my alternate phrasing is unambiguous about this. On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 11:41:26AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: One problem if you don't have further discussion win more often than it perhaps should is as follows: Suppose you have three options on your ballot, A, B and F. A requires a 3:1 supermajority. Sincere preferences are: 60 people order the options A, B, F 40 people order the options B, A, F in which case A would win by dominating B 60:40 and F 100:0 (33.3:0). Since a vote for B is a vote against A, I completely disagree with this assesment. Quoting the constitution: 7. If a supermajority is required the number of Yes votes in the final ballot is reduced by an appropriate factor. Strictly speaking, for a supermajority of F:A, the number of ballots which prefer Yes to X (when considering whether Yes Dominates X or X Dominates Yes) or the number of ballots whose first (remaining) preference is Yes (when doing STV comparisons for winner and elimination purposes) is multiplied by a factor A/F before the comparison is done. This means that a 2:1 vote, for example, means twice as many people voted for as against; abstentions are not counted. After substituting meta-syntactic variables, this would read: 7. If a supermajority is required the number of A votes in the final ballot is reduced by an appropriate factor. Strictly speaking, for a supermajority of 3:1, the number of ballots which prefer A to B (when considering whether A Dominates B or B Dominates A) or the number of ballots whose first (remaining) preference is A (when doing STV comparisons for winner and elimination purposes) is multiplied by a factor 1/3 before the comparison is done. This means that a 3:1 vote, for example, means three times as many people voted for as against; abstentions are not counted. [You might try to claim that some of these are not meta-syntactic variables -- but that would be equivalent to the claim that there is no 3:1 supermajority requirement for A, in this vote.] -- Raul -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 10:30:05PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 11:16:14AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: If you still require N initial votes and 1 final vote, it has no benefit over the current wording, at all, since supermajorities only apply to final votes, which are forced to have simply Yes/No/Further Discussion as their options. This is an allowed option, but it's not required. Gag. Can you *please* try to follow? A clear and obvious interpretation of the constitution is that it is possible to decide on an issue by having N + 1 votes, initially N votes to decide on what form the resolution should take, followed by 1 vote to ensure quorum and supermajority requirements are met, and to see if the resolution is passed. Given a particular sentiment in the Debian community with regard to these possibilities, this procedure results in a particular outcome. If, instead, for expediency perhaps, you choose the method you describe (a single vote with all the options, supermajorities and quorums all taken into account as you describe) you can end up with a *different* result. That is, supporters of, say, option A have a reason to argue for the N+1 votes to take place, whereas supports of option B have a reason to argue for the resolution to be decided by a single vote, since whichever way the vote is processed can dictate who wins. However, it could also be handled in a different fashion. This would depend on the way the ballots are prepared. Yeah, sure: being able to handle to vote differently (and thus get it over and done with quicker) is a good thing, but not if it changes the result of the vote. The decision should be made based *solely* on the wishes of the community, not based on whether the secretary feels like being expedient or not. If you'd rather that I'd phrased it as "you instead just have a final vote, with the pairwise preferences", you're welcome to take it as that. "It?" [Sorry, there's too many concepts flying around for me to parse this reasonably.] How, exactly, do you propose the non-free vote, say, be resolved with a single vote, then? Again, the three things that need to be changed in the constitution, IMO, are: a) resolving circular ties needs to be decided on and spelled out I think I dealt with that. Yes. b) votes with multiple options need to be able to be handled by a single vote That's already possible. Only by secretarial interpretation. c) supermajority requirements need to be updated to cope with (b) There was a question about exactly what supermajority meant in this context, and while I recognize the interpretations which give rise to that ambiguity, I think I see what is supposed to happen there. I like to believe that my alternate phrasing is unambiguous about this. It's unambiguous, but it has undesirable properties (ie, as well as voting in a particular way, supporters of one side or the other have a stake in how the issue is voted on also, since one way makes one group more likely to win, and another way makes another group more likely to win). To be specific: supposing no one actually minds getting rid of non-free, everyone wants to see it moved off the mirrors, in general, but there is a reasonable minority of people who would rather see it kept on some out of the way machine, just for old times sake. In the N+1 vote system, the votes go like: 60 Remove, Move, Further Discussion 40 Move, Remove, Further Discussion Remove wins, and the final vote is: 100 Yes, Further Discussion, No and Remove wins. If, however, some of the 40 people connive together privately, and convince the secretary to decide the issue in a single vote, using your interpretation of the supermajority clause, they vote instead goes something like: 60 Remove, Move, Further Discussion, Do Nothing 40 Move, Remove, Further Discussion, Do Nothing and the results are scaled to: Remove dominates Further Discussion Do Nothing, 33.3 to 0 Move dominates Further Discussion Do Nothing, 100 to 0 Move dominates Remove, 40 to 20 and, the 40 people who prefered Move rejoice having won the vote. Surely you agree that a minority of people being able to subvert the resolution procedure to get what they want instead of what the majority want is a bad thing? On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 11:41:26AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: One problem if you don't have further discussion win more often than it perhaps should is as follows: Suppose you have three options on your ballot, A, B and F. A requires a 3:1 supermajority. Sincere preferences are: 60 people order the options A, B, F 40 people order the options B, A, F in which case A would win by dominating B 60:40 and F 100:0 (33.3:0). Since a vote for B is a vote against A, I completely disagree with this assesment. A vote for B is *NOT* a vote against A. A vote for B over A says "I would
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 11:41:26AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: One problem if you don't have further discussion win more often than it perhaps should is as follows: Suppose you have three options on your ballot, A, B and F. A requires a 3:1 supermajority. Sincere preferences are: 60 people order the options A, B, F 40 people order the options B, A, F in which case A would win by dominating B 60:40 and F 100:0 (33.3:0). Since a vote for B is a vote against A, I completely disagree with this assesment. On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 02:00:57PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: A vote for B is *NOT* a vote against A. If B wins, A loses. What's your definition of a vote against A? A vote for B over A says "I would prefer it if Debian resolved B", not "I think it would be unacceptable if Debian resolved A". If B wins, A loses. After substituting meta-syntactic variables, this would read: "Yes" is not a metasyntactic variable, however. (If it were, section A.3(2) would have to be read as requiring the final vote to have three options, and that supermajority requirements only apply to the first option). Try reading A.3(3). Also, what I said before: [You might try to claim that some of these are not meta-syntactic variables -- but that would be equivalent to the claim that there is no 3:1 supermajority requirement for A, in this vote.] There are three ways of handling supermajorities under discussion, afaict: * Two (N+1) votes, the latter being Y/N/F with Y requiring the supermajority, and no supermajority requirement in the former vote. Agreed. * A single vote, where the pairwise preferences for A against "Further Discussion" (only) are scaled according to A's supermajority requirements. F:A in A.6(7) stands for For:Against. Not Further Discussion : Option A. Alternatively: F:A stands for two small integers, and does not in any way specify the notation used to label the ballot choices. * A single vote, where the pairwise preferences for A against all other options are scaled according to A's supermajority requirement. [0] This is what A.3(3) specifies [given what's already said in A.3(1), A.3(2) and A.6(7)]. The first two of these methods can be made to have the same results in all cases, given a particular sentiment among the electors. The latter method will give different results in a number of cases. I'm dubious. But let's first try to agree on terminology before we discuss this any further. Thanks, -- Raul -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 11:52:53PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: * A single vote, where the pairwise preferences for A against "Further Discussion" (only) are scaled according to A's supermajority requirements. F:A in A.6(7) stands for For:Against. Not Further Discussion : Option A. I'm not claiming that the constitution as it stands can or should be interpreted in this way. I'm suggesting it as a possible way things can be done in future after the constitution in amended. I have been, and continue to be, very conservative in how I'm willing to interpret the constitution. I'd've thought you'd have noticed this by now... * A single vote, where the pairwise preferences for A against all other options are scaled according to A's supermajority requirement. [0] This is what A.3(3) specifies [given what's already said in A.3(1), A.3(2) and A.6(7)]. No, this is how you interpret A.3(3). That's a very different thing. Is clear and obvious and not in any sort of dispute that "F" and "A", and "A", "B" and "X" are metasyntactic variables. It's not at all obvious that "Yes" and "No" are, no matter how strongly you might assert it. Cheers, aj -- Anthony Towns [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/ I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred. ``Thanks to all avid pokers out there'' -- linux.conf.au, 17-20 January 2001 PGP signature
Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 12:36:21PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: That depends what you consider plausible. I'm willing to believe the constitution has bugs, and that in some circumstances it may very well come up with nonsensical results for a vote. So I'm not willing to rule such an answer implausible. It sounds as if you're interested in interpreting the constitution such that the results are nonsensical. Single Transferable Vote biases the selection in favor of first preferences at the expense of other preferences. Can you think of a better kind of criteria for making the selection? Other methods can be found at the URLs I cited at the start of the thread. Reversing the fewest and weakest pairwise defeats (ie, using the smallest possible casting vote) is probably another reasonable alternative. But, as I said, I don't profess to know enough about cycle breakers to really say. But: I'm not asking are there other methods, I'm asking what's a better criteria? and why? I'll note that the URL you cited doesn't have anything equivalent to Single Transferrable Vote. [So it's not comprehensive.] I don't think my favorite web site doesn't mention this system somehow makes the systems it proposes to be somehow superior. The nice thing about Single Transferrable Vote is that it automatically makes first preference votes more important than second preference votes (and so on). There are few systems at the URL you cited which even attempt this. This sort of situation happens no matter how you resolve a cyclic tie, though. You pretty much have to be unfair in some sense to choose a winner. As I said, I'm inclined to suspect that there other means are likely to be more optimal, although I'm not clear exactly how. It really sounds more as if you want to find faults in the constitution than you've thought this through and have a better alternative to propose. That's not in and of itself a bad thing, but it does lead to a lot of talk. Thanks, -- Raul
