On Sat, Dec 09, 2000 at 07:43:57PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
Personally, I worry about any kind of wholesale change in the language
of the constitution. Yeah, if you change major chunks of the document
then current ambiguities would go away. But how do we know whether we're
introducing new
On Sat, Dec 09, 2000 at 07:43:57PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
Personally, I worry about any kind of wholesale change in the language
of the constitution. Yeah, if you change major chunks of the document
then current ambiguities would go away. But how do we know whether we're
introducing
On Sun, Dec 10, 2000 at 07:48:07AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Sun, Dec 10, 2000 at 08:16:13PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
It's not like your interpretation (of supermajorities in particular,
but also of cyclic tie-breaking) has ever actually been used before,
either within Debian or
On Sat, Dec 09, 2000 at 07:43:57PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
Personally, I worry about any kind of wholesale change in the language
of the constitution. Yeah, if you change major chunks of the document
then current ambiguities would go away. But how do we know whether we're
introducing new
On Sat, Dec 09, 2000 at 07:43:57PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
Personally, I worry about any kind of wholesale change in the language
of the constitution. Yeah, if you change major chunks of the document
then current ambiguities would go away. But how do we know whether we're
introducing
On Sun, Dec 10, 2000 at 07:48:07AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Sun, Dec 10, 2000 at 08:16:13PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
It's not like your interpretation (of supermajorities in particular,
but also of cyclic tie-breaking) has ever actually been used before,
either within Debian or
On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 04:52:38PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
You're mixing and matching what you apply the word "preference"
to. The option ranked first is more important than the others
because the voter has expressed that it's preferred to all the
others. That is the following
On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 04:52:38PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
You're mixing and matching what you apply the word preference
to. The option ranked first is more important than the others
because the voter has expressed that it's preferred to all the
others. That is the following
On Sat, Dec 09, 2000 at 05:27:56AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
It is the same ballot, repeated six times. Is that really difficult to
understand?
They're not the same ballot because they don't have the same options
on them.
Actually, they do have the same options on them: Yes, No, and Further
On Sat, Dec 09, 2000 at 05:27:56AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
It is the same ballot, repeated six times. Is that really difficult to
understand?
They're not the same ballot because they don't have the same options
on them.
On Sun, Dec 10, 2000 at 12:45:23AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 04:52:38PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Explain to me, again, why the first preference is no more important
than the other preferences?
You're mixing and matching what you apply the word "preference" to. The
option ranked first is more important than the others
On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 01:04:42PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 04:52:38PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Explain to me, again, why the first preference is no more important
than the other preferences?
You're mixing and matching what you apply the word "preference" to.
I'm chopping lots of stuff out here.
On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 01:53:50PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
constitution, while a vote in favor of B is a vote in favor of not
modifying the constitution.
This, however, doesn't make any sense. Again, there is no such thing
as a vote that is
On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 01:22:07AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
Yes. Take a single vote that ranks:
[ 2 ] A (change the constitution)
[ 1 ] B (do such and such, don't change the constitution)
[ 3 ] S (don't change anything, including the constitution)
You'll note that B is
On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 04:52:38PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Explain to me, again, why the first preference is no more important
than the other preferences?
You're mixing and matching what you apply the word preference to. The
option ranked first is more important than the others because
On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 01:04:42PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 04:52:38PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Explain to me, again, why the first preference is no more important
than the other preferences?
You're mixing and matching what you apply the word preference to. The
On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 01:53:50PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
On Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 04:48:48PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
* What to require for an option to meet quorum
(working assumption: count the number of votes that mention
the option, and compare against quorum)
This
On Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 12:45:24AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
[Status-quo versus Further Discussion and No]
I still maintain there's a difference (because the intent of the
developers is more obvious), but you're right about the minimum discussion
period.
Okay, let's ignore what I've said
Anthony Towns [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
In our past votes, we've variously had:
Constituion: Yes/No/Further Discussion
Election 1: [nominees] + None of the above
Logo License: Single/Dual/Further Discussion
New Logo: [submissions, including current logo] + Further
On Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 04:48:48PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
* What to require for an option to meet quorum
(working assumption: count the number of votes that mention
the option, and compare against quorum)
This is just flat out wrong, the working assumption we had was
On Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 09:42:57PM +, Matthew Woodcraft wrote:
Note that the two elections aren't strictly relevant - they're conducted
under 'Concorde Vote Counting', but not under the Standard Resolution
Procedure (5.2.7).
Ahh, so they are.
Consider that there might be an existing
On Fri, Dec 08, 2000 at 01:22:07AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
Yes. Take a single vote that ranks:
[ 2 ] A (change the constitution)
[ 1 ] B (do such and such, don't change the constitution)
[ 3 ] S (don't change anything, including the constitution)
You'll note that B is
On Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 12:45:24AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
[Status-quo versus Further Discussion and No]
I still maintain there's a difference (because the intent of the
developers is more obvious), but you're right about the minimum discussion
period.
Okay, let's ignore what I've said
Anthony Towns aj@azure.humbug.org.au writes:
In our past votes, we've variously had:
Constituion: Yes/No/Further Discussion
Election 1: [nominees] + None of the above
Logo License: Single/Dual/Further Discussion
New Logo: [submissions, including current logo] +
On Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 06:31:41PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
In our past votes, we've variously had:
Constituion: Yes/No/Further Discussion
Election 1: [nominees] + None of the above
Logo License: Single/Dual/Further Discussion
New Logo: [submissions, including
On Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 04:48:48PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
* What to require for an option to meet quorum
(working assumption: count the number of votes that mention
the option, and compare against quorum)
This is just flat out wrong, the working assumption we had was
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 02:25:26PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 05:58:47PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
It'd have a substantial effect if a supermajority was required: if 60
of 100 people preferred your second preference, and voted Yes/Further
Discussion/No, while 40
On Wed, Dec 06, 2000 at 09:42:09PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Certainly, you can vote however you like. But be aware that other people
might _not_ want to hinder their second preference just because they've
got no chance of getting their first preference.
If they don't want to put their
On Wed, Dec 06, 2000 at 12:36:48PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
First note: you don't attempt to distinguish between "this is worth
redoing" and "this is not worth redoing", in your "status quo".
As I've said, I don't see any benefit in doing it. Whichever's
selected, as far as the
On Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 01:37:31PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
From A.3(1): ``If Further Discussion wins then the entire resolution
procedure is set back to the start of the discussion period.'' From
A.3(2): ``If Further Discussion wins then the entire procedure is set
back to the start of
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 02:25:26PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 05:58:47PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
It'd have a substantial effect if a supermajority was required: if 60
of 100 people preferred your second preference, and voted Yes/Further
Discussion/No, while 40
On Wed, Dec 06, 2000 at 09:42:09PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Certainly, you can vote however you like. But be aware that other people
might _not_ want to hinder their second preference just because they've
got no chance of getting their first preference.
If they don't want to put their first
On Wed, Dec 06, 2000 at 12:36:48PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
First note: you don't attempt to distinguish between this is worth
redoing and this is not worth redoing, in your status quo.
As I've said, I don't see any benefit in doing it. Whichever's
selected, as far as the constitution's
On Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 01:37:31PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
From A.3(1): ``If Further Discussion wins then the entire resolution
procedure is set back to the start of the discussion period.'' From
A.3(2): ``If Further Discussion wins then the entire procedure is set
back to the start of the
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 12:32:12AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
The Condorcet criterion says that if there's a single option that
pairwise beats every other option, it should win (assuming there's no
supermajority requirement, and quorum is met).
That's a relatively weak criterion, all
On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 11:20:15PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
My point of view is that these two are essentially equivalent: in the
N+1 style of voting, a person who thinks that the option isn't the best
would vote for further discussion.
Well, they might do that, yes. Or else they might
My point of view is that these two are essentially equivalent: in the
N+1 style of voting, a person who thinks that the option isn't the best
would vote for further discussion.
Well, they might do that, yes. Or else they might think to themselves,
well, I'm never going to get my
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 12:32:12AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
The Condorcet criterion says that if there's a single option that
pairwise beats every other option, it should win (assuming there's no
supermajority requirement, and quorum is met).
That's a relatively weak criterion, all
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 10:02:40PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
Actually, if you're talking about a properly formed A.3(3) vote, where
you're voting on option A and independent option B, there should be
on the ballot:
Yes on A and B
Yes on A, no on B
Yes on B no on A
no on A, no
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 12:32:12AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
The Condorcet criterion says that if there's a single option that
pairwise beats every other option, it should win (assuming there's no
supermajority requirement, and quorum is met).
That's a relatively weak criterion, all things
On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 11:20:15PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
My point of view is that these two are essentially equivalent: in the
N+1 style of voting, a person who thinks that the option isn't the best
would vote for "further discussion".
Well, they might do that, yes. Or else they
Damn, I've got to stop postponing and forgetting these things.
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:08:50AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
I suspect we've also agreed that the Condorcet winner (if there is
one) should always win. And we seem to have agreed that the winner
should be from the Smith set,
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 10:02:40PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
Actually, if you're talking about a properly formed A.3(3) vote, where
you're voting on option A and independent option B, there should be
on the ballot:
Yes on A and B
Yes on A, no on B
Yes on B no on A
no on A, no
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 12:32:12AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
The Condorcet criterion says that if there's a single option that
pairwise beats every other option, it should win (assuming there's no
supermajority requirement, and quorum is met).
That's a relatively weak criterion, all things
On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 05:03:25PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 12:32:12AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
The Condorcet criterion says that if there's a single option that
pairwise beats every other option, it should win (assuming there's no
supermajority requirement, and
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 12:32:12AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
The Condorcet criterion says that if there's a single option that
pairwise beats every other option, it should win (assuming there's no
supermajority requirement, and quorum is met).
On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 05:03:25PM -0500,
I'm back from vacation now...I've read the other posts, but I'm
probably not going to respond to them (too many to process all at
once...) So I'll just pick up here.
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 12:32:12AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
The Condorcet criterion says that if there's a single option
On Sat, Dec 02, 2000 at 01:07:26AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
"Status-quo" means don't resolve *anything*. There are at most two
ways of doing that: by doing nothing, and not even discussing the
matter again, and by doing nothing constructive, but continuing to
flame each other. I
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 06:11:07AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 05:02:29PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Well, you're welcome to disagree, but be aware that your definition
doesn't match the way the current system (the N+1 votes) works, and
doesn't match the way most
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 10:13:58PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
I will assert that the options "no" and "further discussion" aren't
usefully different.
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 08:49:38AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
They're procedurally different, however.
On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 12:31:23AM
Actually, if you're talking about a properly formed A.3(3) vote, where
you're voting on option A and independent option B, there should be
on the ballot:
Yes on A and B
Yes on A, no on B
Yes on B no on A
no on A, no on B
further discussion.
On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 11:46:55AM
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 06:11:07AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 05:02:29PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Well, you're welcome to disagree, but be aware that your definition
doesn't match the way the current system (the N+1 votes) works, and
doesn't match the way most
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 08:49:38AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 10:13:58PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
I will assert that the options no and further discussion aren't
usefully different.
They're procedurally different, however.
Not particularly so. If No wins the final
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 10:13:58PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
I will assert that the options no and further discussion aren't
usefully different.
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 08:49:38AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
They're procedurally different, however.
On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 12:31:23AM
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 07:35:17PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
I claim that my first preference is yes on option A, is a yes vote
for option A. And, if A requires a supermajority, then A.6(7) applies.
Do you claim this is not an actual reason? Why?
You're also claiming that my second
Actually, if you're talking about a properly formed A.3(3) vote, where
you're voting on option A and independent option B, there should be
on the ballot:
Yes on A and B
Yes on A, no on B
Yes on B no on A
no on A, no on B
further discussion.
On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 11:46:55AM
On Sat, Dec 02, 2000 at 12:45:53AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
This summary is completely wrong for any Condorcet scheme.
Ok...
By definition, any member of the smith set is a plausible winner of
a vote. So there's no way to show an implausible winner, if we've
restricted the discussion to
On Sat, Dec 02, 2000 at 03:17:05AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Sat, Dec 02, 2000 at 01:07:26AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
"Status-quo" means don't resolve *anything*. There are at most two
ways of doing that: by doing nothing, and not even discussing the
matter again, and by doing
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get:
10: 0 B:C
3 1/3: 0 A:B
3 1/3: 0 A:C
B wins.
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 10:24:41PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
This isn't correct: A wins by
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get:
10: 0 B:C
3 1/3: 0 A:B
3 1/3: 0 A:C
B wins.
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 10:24:41PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
This isn't correct: A wins by being
I was talking about the smith/condorcet mechanism.
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 08:51:28AM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote:
You may have been talking about it, but you didn't apply it properly.
The SC method I described said "drop the weakest defeat from the Smith
set until there is an undefeated
This is a drastically chopped down version of my response to the
Buddha/Eudora message trilogy. I want to focus on one issue.
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 06:17:13PM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote:
Option: Smith/Condorcet
Of the n options in the Smith set, order the n*(n-1) pairwise results by
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
But, let's try a simpler multi-option ballot, with everyone in favor.
Ballot: ABC, 3:1 supermajority required for A, 10 votes, all cast as:
ABC.
If there was no supermajority, the ballots would look like:
10:0 A:B
10:0 B:C
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 07:04:02AM -0500, Branden Robinson wrote:
Which sheds a great deal of light on the motivations behind his amendment
to John Goerzen's proposal.
Which was to be handled by having two votes, which would've required,
initially, a simple majority in favour of John's
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get:
10: 0 B:C
3 1/3: 0 A:B
3 1/3: 0 A:C
B wins.
This isn't correct: A wins by being preferred to all other options (A
B, 3.3 to 0 and A C, 3.3 to 0). The
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get:
10: 0 B:C
3 1/3: 0 A:B
3 1/3: 0 A:C
B wins.
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 10:24:41PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
This isn't correct: A wins by being preferred
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 08:00:04AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get:
10: 0 B:C
3 1/3: 0 A:B
3 1/3: 0 A:C
B wins.
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 10:24:41PM +1000,
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get:
10: 0 B:C
3 1/3: 0 A:B
3 1/3: 0 A:C
B wins.
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 10:24:41PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
This isn't correct: A wins by being
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 08:44:26AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get:
10: 0 B:C
3 1/3: 0 A:B
3 1/3: 0 A:C
B wins.
Mechanism.. how do I explain that
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get:
10: 0 B:C
3 1/3: 0 A:B
3 1/3: 0 A:C
B wins.
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 08:44:26AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
Mechanism.. how do I explain
I'm about to leave town for the weekend, so I don't have time to answer
too many of these in detail. For now, I'll respond to one comment by
Raul:
I'm uncomfortable saying if I've agreed to this. The Smith/Condorcet
criteria that Buddha posted is not something I've agreed to. So,
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 09:31:13AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get:
10: 0 B:C
3 1/3: 0 A:B
3 1/3: 0 A:C
B wins.
This summary is
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 08:38:13AM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote:
Condorcet Criterion: If there is an undefeated option (in pairwise
contests), that option should be the winner.
Smith Criterion: The winner should come from the Smith set. The Smith
Criterion implies the Condorcet Criterion,
I was talking about the smith/condorcet mechanism.
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 08:51:28AM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote:
You may have been talking about it, but you didn't apply it properly.
The SC method I described said drop the weakest defeat from the Smith
set until there is an undefeated
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 09:46:00AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
I agree with the Smith Criterion. I'm not sure I understand
enough about what's meant by pairwise contests to agree with
the Condorcet criterion.
The Smith criterion implies the Condorcet criterion, btw.
Pairwise contests just
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 09:31:13AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get:
10: 0 B:C
3 1/3: 0 A:B
3 1/3: 0 A:C
B wins.
On Sat, Dec 02,
Buddha Buck wrote:
The Smith Set is defined as the smallest set of options that are not
defeated by any option outside the Smith Set.
This definition of the Smith set is incorrect. Suppose we have:
AB, BC, A=C, AD, BD, CD. ('' means 'dominates', or beats pairwise)
Then by your definition,
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 09:53:29AM -0600, Norman Petry wrote:
AB, BC, A=C, AD, BD, CD. ('' means 'dominates', or beats pairwise)
Thanks, here's an example:
1000 ABCD
100 CABD
10:1 supermajority.
Using the Smith/Condorcet method:
1000:100 B:C
110:0 A:B
100:100 C:A
A wins, my hypothesis was
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 01:32:00PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Here's some possible fairness criteria:
* If there are multiple ways of conducting a vote, the outcome
should not depend on which way is chosen (only on the
preferences of the developers).
Agreed.
Comment:
[second pass, talking about the situation as a whole, rather than
focussing on voting mechanics.]
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 02:00:57PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
It's unambiguous, but it has undesirable properties (ie, as well as voting
in a particular way, supporters of one side or the other
At 02:23 PM 11-30-2000 -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
[third pass]
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 02:00:57PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Surely you agree that a minority of people being able to subvert the
resolution procedure to get what they want instead of what the majority
want is a bad thing?
I
At 02:23 PM 11-30-2000 -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
[third pass]
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 02:00:57PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Surely you agree that a minority of people being able to subvert the
resolution procedure to get what they want instead of what the majority
want is a bad
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 11:52:53PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
* A single vote, where the pairwise preferences for A against
Further Discussion (only) are scaled according to A's
supermajority requirements.
F:A in A.6(7) stands for For:Against. Not Further Discussion : Option
[second pass, talking about the situation as a whole, rather than
focussing on voting mechanics.]
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 02:00:57PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
It's unambiguous, but it has undesirable properties (ie, as well as voting
in a particular way, supporters of one side or the other
[third pass]
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 02:00:57PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Surely you agree that a minority of people being able to subvert the
resolution procedure to get what they want instead of what the majority
want is a bad thing?
I think I agree with your underlying point -- that this
At 02:23 PM 11-30-2000 -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
[third pass]
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 02:00:57PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Surely you agree that a minority of people being able to subvert the
resolution procedure to get what they want instead of what the majority
want is a bad thing?
I
At 02:23 PM 11-30-2000 -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
[third pass]
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 02:00:57PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Surely you agree that a minority of people being able to subvert the
resolution procedure to get what they want instead of what the majority
want is a bad
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 02:23:08PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 02:00:57PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Surely you agree that a minority of people being able to subvert the
resolution procedure to get what they want instead of what the majority
want is a bad thing?
I
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 02:38:23AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 12:36:21PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
That depends what you consider "plausible". I'm willing to believe the
constitution has bugs, and that in some circumstances it may very well
come up with nonsensical
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 06:39:16PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Huh? Look, all I'm trying to say is that the straightforward and
obvious reading of the constitution leads to a result that doesn't
make any sense.
I should expand on my concern about your interpretation of the
constitution. If
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 02:53:15AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
A.6(3) A supermajority requirement of n:m for an option A means that
when votes are considered which indicate option A as a better
choice than some other option B, the number of votes in favor
of A are multiplied by
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 07:28:44AM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote:
Whether one criteria is better than another is of course a matter of
opinion.
Agreed. Still, consensus is possible.
Above, you prefer Single Transferable Vote (which also appears to be
called "Instant Runoff Voting" or "IRV"
At 10:07 AM 11-29-2000 -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
That's one question. Another question is: what problem are we trying
to solve?
Last things first... This is a -very- important question that I don't know
the full answer to.
The main problem: The current "Standard Resolution Procedure" as
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 09:05:09AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
Please reread: [...] for the explanation.
Eh? All I see is that my proposal is less ambiguous than the current
constitution for this kind of case.
[Those specific messages are where we were talking at cross purposes --
*sigh*
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 02:34:58AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
With your rule, you instead just have an initial vote, with the initial
pairwise preferences:
A dominates B, 60 to 40
A dominates F, 100 to 10
B dominates F, 100 to 10
What part of my proposed A.6 leads you
What part of my proposed A.6 leads you to believe this? [It's other
parts of the constitution which specify how the ballots are constructed.]
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 11:16:14AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
If you still require N initial votes and 1 final vote, it has no benefit
over the
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 10:30:05PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 11:16:14AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
If you still require N initial votes and 1 final vote, it has no benefit
over the current wording, at all, since supermajorities only apply to
final votes, which are
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 11:41:26AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
One problem if you don't have further discussion win more often than it
perhaps should is as follows:
Suppose you have three options on your ballot, A, B and F. A requires a
3:1 supermajority. Sincere preferences are:
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 11:52:53PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
* A single vote, where the pairwise preferences for A against
"Further Discussion" (only) are scaled according to A's
supermajority requirements.
F:A in A.6(7) stands for For:Against. Not Further Discussion :
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 12:36:21PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
That depends what you consider plausible. I'm willing to believe the
constitution has bugs, and that in some circumstances it may very well
come up with nonsensical results for a vote. So I'm not willing to rule
such an answer
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