PKI Hierarchy Question

2015-07-21 Thread Tom Ritter
Hi all, I have a path validation/hierarchy question - specifically wondering about the path validation problems incurred on various clients. (I realize there's no definite answer besides test it on all the clients you care about.) Imagine a four-cert hierarchy R - A - B - L (Root, Leaf, and

Re: SSLKEYLOGFILE always enabled

2014-07-18 Thread Tom Ritter
(CC-ing DD as I found this bug he reported asking about the same thing: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=908046) On 17 July 2014 07:33, Patrick McManus pmcma...@mozilla.com wrote: If there would be a reduced risk by scoping the feature to debug builds I would agree with you that it

Re: SSLKEYLOGFILE always enabled

2014-07-15 Thread Tom Ritter
Is having it in by default useful enough to outweigh the risk? When the Dual_EC_DRBG news stories were blowing it, it was revealed that you could switch to it by just changing the Windows Registry. It's a Windows-supported backdoor - no malicious code needs to stay running on your system - just

Re: Proposal to Change the Default TLS Ciphersuites Offered by Browsers

2013-08-20 Thread Tom Ritter
On 20 August 2013 14:26, Gervase Markham g...@mozilla.org wrote: On 19/08/13 04:07, Brian Smith wrote: When risk is there to a user of having a network eavesdropper able to tell that they are using a particular browser? If I had an exploit for a particular browser, I'd just try it anyway and

Re: Proposal to Change the Default TLS Ciphersuites Offered by Browsers

2013-08-09 Thread Tom Ritter
Thoughts, as a random passerby: Of course I quite like the prioritization of (EC)DHE. I think standardizing on a ciphersuite preference order with the aims of reducing fingerprinting is a worthwhile (although wildly difficult) goal for SSL _libraries_, but less so for browsers - to the point of