I'm trying to understand the details of this procedure.
On Apr 16, 2007, at 12:03 PM, Chris Benham wrote:
My current favourite plain ranked-ballot method is Approval-
Sorted Margins(Ranking) Elimination:
1. Voters rank candidates, truncation and equal-ranking allowed.
2. Interpreting
James Gilmour jgilmour at globalnet.co.uk
raphfrk at netscape.net Sent: 16 April 2007 20:08
It might be easier to explain. The real problem with PR-STV is the
fractional transfers. They are not very easy to explain.
Fractional transfers are absolutely essential for STV-PR (unless you
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax Sent: 17 April 2007 15:50
Just two points to which I wish to respond.
The ballots could also be counted sequentially, as needed. I dislike
this, because I think every vote should be counted, even if
supposedly moot. If I went to the trouble to cast it, it shouldn't
be
This might be a stupid question but I was wondering if
SociallyBest exists at all, and if some day it will be found.
I can think of only the Clarke-tax as the next best thing.
It is voting with money, and the good feature of it is
that sometimes you really have to pay that money, so
it motivates
Brian Olson wrote:
I'm trying to understand the details of this procedure.
On Apr 16, 2007, at 12:03 PM, Chris Benham wrote:
My current favourite plain ranked-ballot method is Approval-
Sorted Margins(Ranking) Elimination:
1. Voters rank candidates, truncation and equal-ranking
My english translation of their web page on this now has hyperlinks that
actually work :)
http://rangevoting.org/BalinskiL.html
One of these hyperlinks (the last) leads to an English language version of a
PAPER
by them about their voting method and its properties.
I'd like to make a webpage
[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: 17 April 2007 09:37
James Gilmour jgilmour at globalnet.co.uk
raphfrk at netscape.net Sent: 16 April 2007 20:08
It might be easier to explain. The real problem with PR-STV is
the
fractional transfers. They are not very easy to explain.
Fractional transfers
As it happens, I've never paid attention to the details of how PR-STV
works. So, in a sense, my mind is free of distraction on the point,
and what I come up with *may* represent an intuitive approach of some
value. If my intuition is sound, it may also match what has come to
be seen as a more
From: Howard Swerdfeger Sent: 17 April 2007 17:37
Tactical voting is easy in STV.
Step 1 : Determine what your preferred ranking is.
Step 2 : Determine who is sure to lose the election
Step 3 : Rank all candidates you are sure will loose above
the rest of your real list
The only flaw
When some weeks ago I started to read electo pages,
I was both fascinated an overwhelmed by the information.
One day at home thinking I realized I didn't know whether
in clone-proof and other phrases clone means a
candidate which relates (wins/ties/loses) to every
other candidate as its
At 11:20 AM 4/17/2007, James Gilmour wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax Sent: 17 April 2007 15:50
The ballots could also be counted sequentially, as needed. I dislike
this, because I think every vote should be counted, even if
supposedly moot. If I went to the trouble to cast it, it shouldn't
be
To run the contest between the quasi-clone sets, I
propose the Schwarz method.
I mean Schulze. Sorry for that.
Peter Barath
___
Kiadós akció! 40% engedménnyel kínáljuk az Európa Könyvkiadó több mint hétszáz
kötetét
From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax Sent: 17 April 2007 17:15
I didn't claim that this information was what STV-PR is all about.
It is primarily a method for creating a proportional representation
assembly. The information I'm talking about is not directly relevant
to that goal. But, I assert, it
On Apr 17, 2007, at 9:54 AM, James Gilmour wrote:
From: Howard Swerdfeger Sent: 17 April 2007 17:37
Tactical voting is easy in STV.
Step 1 : Determine what your preferred ranking is.
Step 2 : Determine who is sure to lose the election
Step 3 : Rank all candidates you are sure will loose
Well, as far as I'm thinking, standard STV is already too complicated to
explain. Introducing Meek/Warren would only make it more likely to fail
(this has to be voted on by the student government and the student body) due
to the added complexity of explaining them. I don't even want to think of
Any suggestions? I'm currently pushing the proportional aspect of the
system, as that seems to be the primary thing that sets it apart from the
status quo. It's also the reason I see it as a big issue - elections have
been rather uncompetitive thanks for to the tendency for the
Instant Runoff Normalized Ratings Proportional
Use ratings ballots on any scale, or Borda-convert from rankings.
1. Maintain a 'weight' for each choice, staring at 1.0.
2. Sum up the normalized de-weighted preferences from the voters
For each vote:
* multiply each
In my research of voting systems, PR, etc, I've been trying to come up with
the most simple candidate-based PR system that I can possibly devise that
uses votes for candidates and no other factors to determine the winners (i.e.
open list and asset voting don't count for this purpose). I know
http://www.rangevoting.org/MedianVrange.html
Warren D Smith
http://rangevoting.org
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Dear Peter Barath,
your proposal is very similar to Mike Ossipoff's subcycle rule.
Please read:
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/1996-June/000494.html
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/1996-June/000532.html
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