At 10:55 AM 6/6/2008, Fred Gohlke wrote:
ou might be interested to know I just learned of a paper written by
Professor Jane Mansbridge of the John F. Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard University. It concerns candidate selection
and is the first work I've seen that provides an academic basis for
the electoral method I've outlined on this site. If you'd like to
read the paper, it can be downloaded without charge from:
http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP08-010
Interesting. I want to thank Mr. Gohlke for drawing our attention to
this paper.
Indeed, Mansbridge explores the theory of representation,
distinguishing between the selection model and the sanctions model,
and covering much of the territory that I covered when inventing
FA/DP (but with her own specialization, I'm not claiming that I
covered what she covered, only that she covered much of what I covered).
Delegable Proxy is a pure selection model of representation, but it
also, through revocability, incorporates the sanctions model on an
immediate basis, because the principal (which I usually call the
"client") may at any time withdraw the proxy. That is not exactly a
"sanction," because it does not necessarily cause the loss of an
office (this depends on many other factors), but it has the same
effect; the principal may hold the representative responsible for his
or her actions, and may respond by either continuing to maintain the
representation, or by withdrawing it and, perhaps, assigning it to
someone else.
Mansbridge is writing mostly about the existing system and how some
representatives are selected for general compatibility with those who
vote with them ("selections") whereas others are considered to be
motivated by a desire to keep office, so they will act to please
their constituents who may otherwise "punish" them by removing them
from office ("sanctions"). However, she notes that selection works
best when a constituency is relatively homogeneous.
In Delegable Proxy, the constituency is defined as homogeneous by
being the set of all those who have chosen the same proxy, i.e., who
consider this person the best to represent them.
Mansbridge doesn't seem to be aware that representation (in a
proportional representation assembly) through chosen proxy was first
proposed by Lewis Carroll (Charles Dodgson) in 1884. He noted that,
in an STV election, instead of vote transfers being controlled only
by the voter's preferential ballot, voters who preferred to trust a
single candidate could do so, and vote transfers could then be under
the control of that candidate, "as if those votes were his own
property." This, of course, is the same metaphor that was used when
Warren Smith named his method, in 2004 (?) "Asset Voting." Mike
Ossipoff and Forest Simmons had earlier called it "Candidate Proxy."
And, unaware of all this at the time, I called it "Delegable Proxy,"
though I was considering representation only for the purpose of
measuring consensus on a large scale.... but the core idea is the
same in all of these: representation by chosen representatives, not
"elected" representatives, in the sense of an oppositional election,
with losers. Pure selection, and only the minimal sanction of
continued voluntary maintenance of the proxy assignment, or withdrawal.
I don't see Ms. Mansbridge's work as well-related to the complex
system of elections proposed by Mr. Gohlke, partly because his groups
are not self-selected and not homogeneous, generally. Mansbridge is
specifically likening selection to "Agency," which is precisely
equivalent to the institution of the proxy. Proxies are "elected,"
technically, but the election isn't a contested one. It's unanimous.
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