winner, is shown
here along with a derivation
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/politicians-and-polytopes/message/176
G. A. Craig Carey
For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc),
please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
: Craig Carey [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: 3-valued Booleans inside rules, passing Condorcet (Re: [EM]
More often (was: IRV and Condorcet operating identically)
In-Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
References: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
At 03\03\02 09:58 +1300 Sunday, Craig Carey wrote:
At 03\03\01
of requirements that equal suffrage may impose.
What are the 10% and the 25% checkboxes on the ballot
papers for, Schulze ?. Those checkboxes permit a perfectly
monotonic method to have candidate C lose
Craig Carey
For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc),
please
At 03\03\02 02:38 -0500 Sunday, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Sun, 02 Mar 2003 09:58:47 +1300 Craig Carey wrote in part:
At 03\03\01 09:49 -0500 Saturday, Stephane Rouillon wrote:
...
about an election having only the papers (AB), (B), and (C). For
that election, the Condorcet method has an undefined
. Persons in
Africa can't remain confused forever, though it seems possible
for Nth Americans).
Craig Carey
For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc),
please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
-rotatable) polytope that defines the acceptable
normal vectors, be empty.
With P2, the touching polytope of Equal Suffrage is cut up into
a subspace and the quite possibly the definition of Equal Suffrage
is changed.
__
G. A. Craig Carey
For more information about this list (subscribe
At 03\03\02 00:19 +0100 Sunday, Markus Schulze wrote:
Dear Steph,
you wrote (1 March 2003):
I suppose you meant:
Suppose that candidate A is the winner. Suppose that
a set of voters, where each voter strictly prefers
candidate A to candidate B, is added to the original
profile. Then
then] there is a 1/3 [IFPP] quota
(applied after the other preprocessing) that sometimes
finds two losers.
Replacing IRV is certainly not a prime purpose of the
members at the Politicians and Polytopes mailing list. It
is too slight to interact with, I suppose.
Craig Carey
For more information
.
___
Corrections:
At 03\02\28 21:05 +1300 Friday, Craig Carey wrote to EM List;
...
Jan Kok said:
I'm curious if anyone can mathematically justify such statements as
Voting method A exhibits property P 'more often' than method B?
...
The method would
At 2002\12\28 20:18 +1300 Saturday, Craig Carey wrote:
At 2002\12\27 22:38 -0500 Friday, Elisabeth Varin/Stephane Rouillon wrote:
...
This seems to be only about the default meaning of a term that is using
less words than are needed to get its meaning pinned down. So the thread
...
I have
At 02\12\27 07:08 + Friday, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
...
have more to complain about. I understand that a mailing list
isn't a journal, but that doesn't mean that its charter topic shouldn't
be respected.
We seem to have passed through events showing that existing online
principles of the owner
\12\25 11:35 +1300 Wednesday, Craig Carey wrote to Single-Transferable-Vote:
...
| [...] Kenneth May, A Set of Independent Necessary and
| Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision, Econometrica
| 10 (1952): 680-84
I am a little confused on how Mr Simmons reasoned and I asked questions
is over meanings, (3),(4) and (5).
For example, how many papers under your ideas, has this election got ?:
(ABCD) 5 +sqrt(7)/1000
(BDAC) 4
(CDAB) 3
(DBCA) -1
I should not have to respond to questions as simple as this one that Mr R
sent.
Craig Carey
For more information about
enforcement agencies. Maybe it would be to just used
to check to see if staff are pro-Executive or not, especially nearer to
the top of the agencies.
G. A. Craig Carey
Opposed to Poindexterville sullying the global record of achievements
For more information about this list (subscribe
being never used.
Maybe it might be possible to unify the two ideas.
Approval is a method of a Mr Brams.
Craig Carey
For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc),
please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
fool me: I took Donald's characterization at face value and defended
your message in the context of Approval. I was in a hurry when replying.
1. Yes or No on declaring a members' request that Craig Carey no longer
be allowed to post to EM
I vote no.
As incoherent as he is, there have been
, then Approval would be over some limit that politicians would
set, saying how much allocating of power, is unjustly large.
Certainly when the topic is total ignorance for the public, then it can be
very worse with the CVD, partly since they have many comments for various
cities.
G. A. Craig Carey
Hi Forest.
I find your message incomprehensible and most of the problem is with the
English words. This is not a message that is sent merely to create an
opportunity for you to subsequently write nothing. The geometry of
voting is somewhat really simple. There is plain space and a dimension
Her are some examples constructed to be similar to the example that was
recently provided.
The Alternative Vote is only discarding about 17% of the vote which is a lot less than what it can do for
4 candidates.
These 1 winner 5 candidate examples are designed to:
* Have B win
* Have an
At 02\12\20 14:16 + Friday, James Gilmour wrote:
Craig Carey wrote (in part):
It might seem that in a 6 candidate election, the paper (ABC) is more
about A,B,C, than about D,E,F. But it can be expanded out like this:
1(ABC) = ((ABCDEF) + (ABCDFE) + (ABCEDF) + (ABCEFD) + (ABCFDE) + (ABCFED
At 02\12\20 23:04 + Friday, James Gilmour wrote:
At 02\12\20 14:16 + Friday, James Gilmour wrote:
Craig Carey wrote (in part):
It might seem that in a 6 candidate election, the paper (ABC) is more
about A,B,C, than about D,E,F. But it can be expanded out like this:
1(ABC
salon, to me. It would be better to
read up on Princess Diana.
Mr Schulze does not produce quantifier equations any more than Mr Ossipoff
does (rather, has).
G. A. Craig Carey
For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc),
please see http://www.eskimo.com
The geometry is not obviously Euclidean since there might not ever be a
formula that calculates the Euclidean distance (the square root of the
sum of the squares of differences in the weights, over all kinds of
papers). Also rules that use normalised weights seem to be less likely.
Suppose
make the same type of error or is the word voter a code
term implying that the weights are non-negative, or was there an
inaccuracy in the copying.
Craig Carey
Real facts for the Aquarian age:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/politicians-and-polytopes
For more information about
Here is a correction:
At 02\12\18 18:41 +1300 Wednesday, Craig Carey wrote:
...
Markus wrote (4 Feb 2002):
In so far as IRV meets majority for solid coalitions and independence
from clones, IRV can hardly be called erratic compared to primary
with runoff.
...
A better rule
At 02\12\18 12:27 +0200 Wednesday, Markus Schulze wrote:
Dear Craig Carey,
the concept of clones has been proposed by Tideman:
T. Nicolaus Tideman, Independence of Clones as
a Criterion for Voting Rules, SOCIAL CHOICE AND
WELFARE, vol. 4, pp. 185-206, 1987.
Markus Schulze
Well, you
At 02\12\18 16:12 +0200 Wednesday, Markus Schulze wrote:
Dear Craig Carey,
you wrote (19 Dec 2002):
Markus wrote (18 Dec 2002):
The concept of clones has been proposed by Tideman:
T. Nicolaus Tideman, Independence of Clones as
a Criterion for Voting Rules, SOCIAL CHOICE
Great style of example and it pointedly reminds that the reformers
that said the Alternative Vote fixed some vote splitting problem
with First Past the Post were lying. E.g. the CVD top leaders
certainly are recalled by us (Chessin, Dan and Rob, and others).
To some extend the complaint about
of mayors or polticians [the last filled in by guessing].
Is research progressing fast enough at this mailing list ?.
G. A. Craig Carey
Voting for the masses: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/single-transferable-vote
For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc
I shall reply briefly since I am considering leaving again this mailing
list of people that have no interest in truth in preferential voting.
At 2002\08\17 10:37 -0700 Saturday, Richard Moore wrote:
Craig Carey wrote:
...
Your definition did not keep the other papers unchanging.
Here
Election Methods Lists online archives are these two websites:
http://www.mail-archive.com/election-methods-list@eskimo.com/index.html
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/messages
_
At 2002\08\16 15:56 -0700 Friday, Forest Simmons wrote:
...
The simplest of these,
time and answer (with
exactness) my request for the definition of a Condorcet Method.
It looks like Mr Simmons may both want to include and exclude some
preferential voting methods.
What we are not seeing is definition just for the fun of it.
At 02\08\17 19:35 +1200 Saturday, Craig Carey wrote
At 2002\08\15 23:44 -0700 Thursday, Richard Moore wrote:
Craig Carey wrote:
The definition of monotonicity was wrong. In general (i.e. for some
number of winners and candidates), all 3 rules ought be rejected for
failing a perfect method.
Hmm, I wonder what was wrong about
At 02\08\16 11:46 +1200 Friday, Craig Carey wrote:
Solving a 2 candidate election without use of pairwise comparing.
...
| 1st 2nd
|A a0a0 - u*(1-v)
|ABabab - u*v
|B b0b0 + t + u*(1-w)
|BAbaba - t + u*w
|
|Define: b=b0+ba, a=a0+ab. A usual case
At 02\08\09 21:59 -0700 Friday, Alex Small wrote:
There's been a considerable amount of bickering lately, some of it
slightly rancorous. I just want to offer this comment for people to think
about: Our disagreements are technical, not political.
Politically, we all agree that citizens
At 02\08\09 16:20 -0700 Friday, Joe Weinstein wrote:
Recall that in MCA (Majority Choice Approval), the voter rates each
candidate as preferred (or 'highly desired': two checks), accepted (one
check), or unacceptable (no checks, blank). If at least one candidate is
rated by a majority (50%
http://www.mathworks.com/access/helpdesk/help/toolbox/stats/fracfact.shtml#2205152
At 02\07\31 22:51 -0700 Wednesday, Richard Moore wrote:
Craig Carey wrote:
From:· Richard Moore [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date:· Tue Jul 30, 2002· 2:20 pm
Subject: ·Re: What are we all about?, etc.
http
?.
-
Craig Carey
Wed 31 July 2002
The headers (resent after being posted while I was not subscribed):
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED],
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: Craig Carey [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2002 18:52:41 +1200
Subject: One Man One Vote in equation form; Approval is rejected
Reply
are getting too much power (but paying a price for that
not necessarily getting what they really want).
G. A. Craig Carey
For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc),
please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
principles well too.
(I just rejoined)
Craig Carey
http://www.ijs.co.nz/polytopes.htm
For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc),
please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
of
IRV would have perfectly failed since it is a wrong rule.
Mr Rouse might not have been reading my messages closely enough when I
was last subscribed.
-
At 02\04\10 17:50 +1200 Wednesday, Craig Carey wrote:
...
At 2000\12\25 06:37 +1300 Monday, Craig Carey
At 02\05\14 09:26 -0700 Tuesday, Michael Rouse wrote:
- Original Message -
From: Craig Carey [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, May 14, 2002 7:34 AM
Subject: Re: [EM] 05/13/02 - The Education of Poor Richard:
There are other important
Mr Ossipoff was mentioning a wv method.
REQUEST 1 to Mr Ossipoff:
Would Mr Ossipoff please e-mail into the Election Methods List, the
Boolean expression defining the 3 candidate wv method(s).
If Mr Ossipoff can't convert the method into a Boolean expression
then Mr
man one vote test (otherwise votes could be created as well as
being lost).
At 2000\12\25 06:37 +1300 Monday, Craig Carey wrote to
instantrunoff-freewheeling:
...
Here is (6.2): ((AB)-(B), Cw-Bw: Allowed but vote wastage):
(AB)--(B)
(6.2
He. I am unsubscribing from the this list. I could reply to any replies,
and perhaps even re-subscribe.
At 2002\03\25 07:53 +1200 Monday, Craig Carey wrote:
Greetings Election Methods List members
...
CORRECTION
My last message had partial re-lettering.
This is what the CVD person
written by Craig Carey
Dear Mr Rob Richie
Subject: 25% of Republican votes go missing in IRV
At 2002\03\09 23:19 +1300 Saturday, Craig Carey wrote:
...
The Alternative Vote
· · · · · · · 1st · · 2nd
· · · · · · ·change
· · · ·AB · · · ·
· · · ·B
the 2 candidate problem solved using axioms is quite as
simple as it might seem.
What was the purpose behind writing about = whilst not commenting on the
rule I named P2 ?.
Craig Carey
http://www.ijs.co.nz/quota-13.htm
Subject was: Re: [EM] CR style ballots for Ranked Preferences
At 01.09.26 11:06 -0700 Wednesday, Forest Simmons wrote:
On Tue, 25 Sep 2001, Richard Moore wrote in part:
.. what is Approval but Condorcet forced into
two levels?
Mike Ossipoff was the first to
if the posters had suspected
there was a possible link between the mathematics of logic and algebra, and
the (AB),(B),(C) triangle.
Craig Carey
Election Methods (theoretical):
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/politicians-and-polytopes
Ingles [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Craig Carey wrote:
...
Explorer.
We often seem to assume that a voter's chief problem with a system is
the ballot itself. That is, the voter neatly assigns a utility to
each candidate, but has trouble translating this into a ranked ballot
...
Voter's chief
At 01-09-22 08:21 AM +1000 Saturday, Craig Layton wrote:
Forest,
...
I expect you're right, but isn't the Condorcet Criterion phrased something
like if there is a sincere Condorcet winner, and all voters vote sincerely,
then the sincere Condorcet winner must win?
If it was such a
to be the latest thinking of Rob Richie who
_still_ was pushing the IRV ios good enough to actually use opinion.
At 2001.05.28 20:06 +1200 Monday, Craig Carey wrote to instant-runoff-vote:
Knowledge held by the CVD:
We are particularly knowledgeable about: ... 3) the option of
instant
At 01.09.17 01:03 -0700 Monday, Rob LeGrand wrote:
Well, it's a good thing Craig doesn't define his IFPP method for more than
three candidates!
First sentence botched. A definition can be implicit. It seems to be rather
definitely defined. implicitly, now that I have a definition of P4 at
the winner to be a candidate deemed
to have lost in stage 1 but that was not eliminated in stage 1. Another detail
is that with that checked or fixed, the method would doubtless getting the
winner wrong sometimes.
G. A. Craig Carey
Auckland
Ron Holzman for the
undesirable definition of the participation axiom/criteria?.
This list seems to be one of the foremost places to collect errors,
e.g. this new interpretation of 5 votes removed from Rob's example
error.
G. A. Craig Carey
Auckland
http://groups.yahoo.co/group/politicians
the rules be my P2, P3 and P4.
Craig Carey
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/single-transferable-vote
ATTACHMENT A:
/
At 98.December.08 16:10 +0100 Tuesday, Markus Schulze wrote:
Dear Albert,
[Albert Langer] wrote (7 Dec 1998
At 01.09.05 22:37 +1200 Wednesday, Craig Carey wrote:
...
Mr Ketchum: to state a position you can post up the equations
that define when this Condorcet method you like, will find the
wrong number of winners. Is Condorcet like
:21:57 -0700 Craig Carey wrote:
At 01.09.04 16:40 -0400 Tuesday, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Tue, 4 Sep 2001 08:35:54 -0700 Craig Carey wrote, in part:
...
This caught my eye so, thanks to eGroups/Yahoo, I could and did go back
to this item in Nov. 00 archives:
I was thinking of my
eliminate the CW if there is
one.
Unfortunately Copeland elimination by itself is not good enough to
guarantee the Ranked Pairs winner in a three way contest.
At 01.09.04 13:32 +1200 Tuesday, Craig Carey wrote:
Mr Forest Simmons wrote this. Since [he] was not replying to my request
At 01.09.04 16:40 -0400 Tuesday, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Tue, 4 Sep 2001 08:35:54 -0700 Craig Carey wrote, in part:
...
This caught my eye so, thanks to eGroups/Yahoo, I could and did go back
to this item in Nov. 00 archives:
I was thinking of my repair to that Fluffy example.
I do
in
deciding whether STV is a method that should be actually used (and ditto
MMP). It is not a very sharp view.
For the perhaps-brief time I am here, comments could be true.
Craig Carey
At 2001-04-12 19:09 +0100 Thursday, Martin Harper wrote:
I was going to write a longer reply, but this seems to be the crux of the
matter:
Craig wrote:
The test [for the power of a vote] is clearly stated but it does not
apply to
methods outside of the topic of preferential voting
preferential voting (i.e. checkbox methods,
e.g. the ASVB sub-vote Variant Block Vote voting method. I call it Approval.
I don't recommend it. Reformers everywhere are trying to remove it from
public elections, in part due to its faults.
-
At 2001-04-09 05:43 +1200 Monday, Craig Carey wro
At 2001-04-11 15:15 +0100 Wednesday, Martin Harper wrote:
==
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] Approval Elections Effective Weights
Replies mainly in the text.
...
Incidentally, you complain about me using the term "IRV" - you
say: the so called 'IRV' method
At 2001.04.04 17:47 +0100 Wednesday, Martin Harper wrote:
Approval for Tom, and others who reckon one-man-one-vote is solely
referring to
how an invisible genie moves your vote around, and is absolutely sacred - I
call
it "Instant Approval Poll and Plurality Voting".
1) collect approval
At 31-03-2001 19:45 -0500 Saturday, Gregg Hill wrote:
In order that we get our terms standardized, consult the following webpage:
http://www.idea.int/publications/ace/electoral_glossary.htm
Gregg
This list is one of the least academic around. If any find that
I have written
that.
One this is sent I will unsubscribe from the Election Methods list.
We can see how long Mr Craig Layton keeps writing for.
On Mon, 13 Nov 2000, Craig Carey wrote:
I warned Rob I would reply, just to get him to write a better quality
message that wasn't personal.
I will report ba
Mike Ossipoff
Thanks Mr Ossipoff for bringing the topic up. I could offer my list
but people over there would uphold truncation resistance I hope.
E-mail: Craig Carey [EMAIL PROTECTED] (backup [EMAIL PROTECTED])
Auckland, NZ. | Snooz Metasearch: http://www.ijs.co.nz/info/snooz.htm
rties simultaneously [Douglas R. Woodall,
"An impossibility theorem for electoral systems," Discrete
Mathematics, vol. 66, p. 209-211, 1987]:
On Sun, 5 Nov 2000, Craig Carey wrote:
At 22:41 04.11.00 -0800 Saturday, Blake Cretney wrote:
I just don't
see
remarks like
To "Norman Petry" [EMAIL PROTECTED]. I don't feel like sending
this to the Election Methods List (the topic is a seeming dud: which
of Tideman and Schulze is best, and there are over 40 subscribers
in that list and I don't want to waste their time on such an
unsound or uncertain topic).
I'd
At 08:19 20.10.00 +1300 Friday, Craig Carey wrote:
Correction: I suggested that Borda was easy to code up using J, but seems to
not easy.
Here is a calculation of the matrix of Borda weights in the standard Borda
method:
]b=.(|:(|.p)*(|.:/~p))+(|.|:/~p)*(p-1)%2[p=.i.10
9 8 7 6 5 4
ip
Can Demorep send in proof that the US public is dumb?. If that were
done, then what?. Nothing could be made of it, and surely some
regions are brighter than others. What about Washington's more
expensive suburbs?.
G. A. Craig Carey
http://www.ijs.co.nz/ifpp.htm
(0=a0)and(0=b0)and(0=c0)and(0=d0)and
(0=ab0)and(0=ac0)and(0=ad0)and
... [unfinished. Maybe I can get the votes negated upto 38%.]
IFPP defined: http://www.ijs.co.nz/ifpp.htm
G. A. Craig Carey
Auckland
New Zealand.
will reverse the intent
of 16.6% of the vote. How much worse is it with 4 candidates?.
Key phrases: Single Transferrable Vote
_
Correction: A subscriber here found a "that" wrong-word error in my
definition of truncation resistance.
E-mail: Craig Ca
At 12:49 09.10.00 -0700 Monday, JanetRAnderson wrote:
Dear Creigs, Mike, Bart and David,
Thank you for such quick and mostly understandable responses. Calling CVD
anti human rights, I still don't get!)
...
The second hat I wear is Chair of the Washington LWV Election Methods study
One up for Rob: it looks like the CVD has forged at its internal
anvils of triumph and process, a brochure recording a victory for
the Alternative Vote ("IRV") method when it came under a legal
consideration.
Neither brochures has any detailed legal references to the
decision. Even in the
This is draft quality material.
Please understand that I hardly know anything of both the CVD and STV.
I don't know what the CVD is upto.
At 08:47 08.10.00 -0700 Sunday, JanetRAnderson wrote:
May I interrupt your discussion for a moment to ask a couple of questions?
(I currently chair
ondition of
confidentiality.
What about my others questions?. What about the questions Mr Schulze
asked?. These questions can become progressively simpler and simpler
and they could come from any of the subscribers you like to reply to.
E-mail: Craig Carey [EMAIL PROTECTED] (backu
I see that Mike retained his FBC definition. He thinks it passes the
Approval Vote method. He and I are in a dispute over whether reading
and understanding one of his definitions is a valid use, if the result
contradictions his assertions on what the definition means.
Can anybody post in
This equation I sent in is wrong. It fails P1 which I proved.
The term "(b+ca+d)" in a B-wins formula would cause that.
Inside a D-must lose region, (c+acb+ab). Outside of that region, B had
more support but it lost since (c+acb+abd+ad).
At 13:39 03.10.00 +1300 Tuesday, Craig C
Using quotas to increase the loss of voters power in transfers away
from eliminated candidates ought allow a reduction in the loss of power
when transferring votes away from winners.
Some rationales/motives for eliminating with quotas:
* Putting quotas for losers into STV can allows the
s that aren't getting absorbed at all well (e.g.
the YES/NO method).
G. A. Craig Carey
Auckland
The maths I have done tends to suggest that the use of quotas to
reject losers is exactly what would turn up in an ideal method that
lacks clear arbitrariness.
The slopes of the quotas is done by P1, at least in IFPP. P1 is defined
on http://www.ijs.co.nz/ifpp.htm P1 only specifies slopes, and
**
At 08:03 03.10.00 +1000 Tuesday, David Catchpole wrote:
Problem is though that the US Presidential election system distorts the
vote by its "winner takes all" selection of delegates from each
State. Meaning, say, a huge number of voters in a huge State like
California have their vote
What are the seeming comments against the Electoral College for?.
It provides proportionality by providing a weighted summing of the
votes. A page here shows the weights. The pages allows a conclusion
that Demorep's wee comments adverse to the Electoral College would
be opposed California and
Sorry this message is a mechanistic reply to Schulze
Now is a good time to ask that major question:
Who that can still write, regards truncation resistance as being
of sufficient importance that it should be strictly held.
Mr Ossipoff recently sort of said that monotonicity was of major
er Wars: the Tripomutes versus Voters"
((Copyright 2000. Adaptation of the ideas contained herein, or any
((attempt to fix them, will be harshly prosecuted to the fullest extent
((that the law permits. No exception for intellectually handicapped folk.
((15-September-2000
I'm off and
At 01:16 00.09.11 + Monday, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Markus wrote:
In the website http://home.pacbell.net/paielli/voting you introduce
7 criteria. 2 of the 7 criteria are violated by Condorcet methods.
Yes, no method meets every criterion. Some of the best methods
fail criteria met by
e same time reducing its intensity?.
Mike's belief the the Condorcet winner is good, is undesirable and
unproven, and in somewhere in the future, the word false could be
used to describe it. Of course I am arguing against Tideman and
Schulze or SSD as well. They haven't been getting promoted well
here, but it may not matter.
I hope the website of Russ Pialli is improved. The defitinions are
bad. I can't call them false because they are not well defined. That
might not be fixable (e.g. if they lose power is the number of candidates
rises).
I leave this to others.
Craig Carey
I apologize for the length of this, and I write in defence of
principle in voting theory. Once a method is derived from principle,
then the principles can be given instead of the method to the voters,
although the counters would always need the method (unless some
computer program
I am writing to (a) get the topic in the subject field, for
browsers o www.egroups.com.
Also, (b), they are not keeping up to date this list's archive,
which is at (and around):
http://www.egroups.com/messages/election-methods-list/5293
I was just writing to Egroups to perk them up to
lf becomes
: a dwindling cretin before a simple hope that a true statement
...
Mr G. A. Craig Carey Auckland, New Zealand
E-mail address: Craig Carey [EMAIL PROTECTED],
Metasearch: http://www.ijs.co.nz/info/snooz.htm
Multithreaded URL Submit: http://www.ijs.co.nz/submit/
t accuracy to explained thinking. The last is
best done without, but maybe this list's subscribers prefer to
have matters explained....
G. A. Craig Careyhttp://www.ijs.co.nz/ifppvote.htm
At 11:17 22.09.99 +0100, Wiseman, Julian wrote:
See the "Note of Reservation" by Lord Alexander of Weedon QC in the Report
Of The Independent Commission on the Voting System,
(http://www.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm40/4090/chap-9.htm#c9-a).
His comments are about 'small-STV', called
[One of the thoughts at this mailing list was attracting my
attention: the unpromising FBC rule of Mr Mike Ossipoff]
Partly since I was caught out in an error, and partly because
of the plainly false comment from Mike unfortunate reference to
my sincerity in correctly arguing that FBC was
.
At 20:39 27.02.00, Craig Carey wrote:
Note on finding academic journals on the Internet:
http://www.coalliance.org/ejournal/
http://www.coalliance.org/ejournal/other.html
http://gort.ucsd.edu/newjour/search.html
http
At 18:31 12.03.00, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Prof. Saari wrote (9 Mar 2000)--
In this same spirit, please do not run into the silly mistake
(as someone on that web site did) of thinking that I am concerned about
adding or subtracting voters. My approach is equivalent to handling an
...
At 20:42 08.03.00, Norman Petry wrote:
List members interested in reading some nonsense about the merits of Borda's
method might be interested in:
http://www.colorado.edu/education/DMP/voting_b.html
In this paper, Saari argues against Condorcet's method by providing the
following "bad
I believe that FBC is a dud of an idea so long as it applies to a
single preference named the "the favorite". However, Mr Ossipoff
wrote about "precise language" so a few extra doubts added to the
ones I made earlier would not be out of place.
At 16:01 07.03.00, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
At 21:50 06.03.00, Rob Lanphier wrote:
To whom it may concern,
...
The method that Dr. Saari purports as the fairest method, the Borda count,
presupposes a very narrow definition of fairness. While focusing on
abstract concepts of symmetry and cancellation, he misses the boat on more
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