Hi Russell,
At 11:50 09/03/04 +1100, Russell Standish wrote:
Yes, in your thesis you often talk about survival under replacement of
a digital brain (cerveau digital). Digital simply means operates with
1s and 0s. Since any analogue value can be represented arbitrarily
accurately by a digital
Hi Stephen,
It seems to me that COMP is more general that computationalism since it
seems to include certain unfalsifiable postulations that are independent of
computationalism per say, AR, to be specific.
A can be unfalsifiable, and B can be unfalsifiable, but this does not entail
that A
On Fri, Mar 05, 2004 at 02:20:54PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
How does COMP entail that I am a machine? I don't follow that step at all.
But comp *is* the assumption that I am a machine, even a digital machine.
My last formulation of it, easy to remember is that comp = YD + CT + RA
YD =
Dear Russell and Bruno,
Interleaving.
- Original Message -
From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Monday, March 08, 2004 7:50 PM
Subject: Re: Tegmark is too physics-centric
On Fri, Mar 05, 2004 at 02:20:54PM +0100
At 09:08 03/03/04 +1100, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Mar 02, 2004 at 12:28:04PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
RS As I understand it, COMP refers to the conjunction of:
1) Arithmetic realism
2) Church-Turing thesis
3) Survivability of consciousness under duplication
BM...and
At 09:14 02/03/04 +1100, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Mar 01, 2004 at 03:00:30PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
comp assumes only that the sequence 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, ... lives in
Platonia. 3-person time apparantly does not appear. 1-person time
appears through the S4Grz logic.
Fair
Dear Bruno,
- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, March 02, 2004 6:28 AM
Subject: Re: Tegmark is too physics-centric
At 09:14 02/03/04 +1100, Russell Standish wrote:
snip
As I understand it, COMP refers to the conjunction
On Tue, Mar 02, 2004 at 12:28:04PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
As I understand it, COMP refers to the conjunction of:
1) Arithmetic realism
2) Church-Turing thesis
3) Survivability of consciousness under duplication
...and annihilation of the original (if not it could be trivial). I
At 10:33 28/02/04 +1100, Russell Standish wrote:
I deliberately leave vague what is in the theory of the mind, but
simply assume a small number of things about consciousness:
1) That there is a linear dimension called (psycholgical) time, in which the
conscious mind find itself embedded
2) The
I deliberately leave vague what is in the theory of the mind, but
simply assume a small number of things about consciousness:
1) That there is a linear dimension called (psycholgical) time, in which the
conscious mind find itself embedded
2) The observations are a form of a projection from the
Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED];
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 5:19 PM
Subject: Re: Tegmark is too physics-centric
I think that psychological time fits the bill. The observer needs a
a temporal dimension in which to appreciate differences
Hi Russell,
Let me try to be a little more specific. You say in your Occam paper
at http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks/docs/occam/node4.html
The first assumption to be made is that observers will find themselves
embedded in a temporal dimension. A Turing machine requires time to
separate the
I think that psychological time fits the bill. The observer needs a
a temporal dimension in which to appreciate differences between
states.
Physical time presupposes a physics, which I haven't done in
Occam.
It is obviously a little more structured than an ordering. A space
dimension is
- Original Message -
From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED];
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 5:19 PM
Subject: Re: Tegmark is too physics-centric
I think that psychological time fits the bill
At 18:00 23/02/04 +1100, Russell Standish wrote:
Comments interspersed.
On Sun, Jan 18, 2004 at 07:15:45AM -0500, Kory Heath wrote:
I understand this perspective, but for what it's worth, I'm profoundly out
of sympathy with it. In my view, computation universality is the real
key -
life and
Comments interspersed.
On Sun, Jan 18, 2004 at 07:15:45AM -0500, Kory Heath wrote:
I understand this perspective, but for what it's worth, I'm profoundly out
of sympathy with it. In my view, computation universality is the real key -
life and consciousness are going to pop up in any
- Original Message -
From: Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Sunday, January 18, 2004 1:15 PM
Subject: Re: Tegmark is too physics-centric
At 1/17/04, Hal Finney wrote:
But let me ask if you agree that considering Conway's 2D
Life world with simply-specified initial
Kory Heath, [EMAIL PROTECTED], writes:
It is very likely that even Conway's Life universe has this feature. Its
rules are absurdly simple, and we know that it can contain self-replicating
structures, which would be capable of mutation, and therefore evolution. We
can specify very simple
Eric Hawthorne writes:
2. SAS's which are part of a 3+1 space may not have higher measure than
SAS's in other spaces, but perhaps the SAS's
in the other spaces wouldn't have a decent way to make a living. In
other words, maybe they'd have a hard time
perceiving the things in their space,
Kory Heath wrote:
Tegmark goes into some detail on the
problems with other than 3+1 dimensional space.
Once again, I don't see how these problems apply to 4D CA. His
arguments are extremely physics-centric ones having to do with what
happens when you tweak quantum-mechanical or
I agree that this is what Tegmark is trying to say. If we look at it
in terms of measure, there are (broadly speaking) two ways for creatures
to exist: artificial or natural. By artificial I mean that there could
be some incredibly complex combination of laws and initial conditions
built
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