Re: “Could a Quantum Computer Have Subjective Experience?”
On Tue, Jun 27, 2017 at 08:52:15AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On 26/06/2017 3:57 pm, Russell Standish wrote: > >On Mon, Jun 26, 2017 at 11:50:45AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > >>That is not what is normally meant by the '+' symbol. You have > >>simply defined a conjunction to be a disjunction! > >We are constructively defining +. I would not be so cruel as to use + > >if the end point were not the usual group operation. > > Yes, the endpoint is that the '+' is simple addition. It seems to me > that if you actually wrote > > psi_a v psi_b, > > where 'v' stands for disjunction, or 'or', you would not have got > very far with your derivation. By writing the sum > >psi_a + psi_b = psi_{ab} > > you have, in fact, simply assumed linearity. Not at all. The latter equation is identical to the first with the symbol v replaced by +. > A significant property > of linear systems is that if you have two solutions, the sum is also > a solution. If you are dealing with sets, the the operation is the > union of sets, which is different. But you specifically state that > your projection operator acting on the ensemble produces a single > outcome psi_a = \P_{a}*psi, so you are dealing with addition of > numbers or functions, not the union of sets. > No, you are just dealing with a function from whatever set the ψ and ψ_α are drawn from to that same set. There's never been an assumption that ψ are numbers or functions, and initialy not even vectors, as that later follows by derivation. > Thus, for the sum to make sense you must assume linearity. If you are objecting that the use of the symbol '+' implies linearity where no such thing is assumed, then feel free to replace it with the symbol of your choice. Then once linearity is established, feel free to replace it back again to + so that the formulae following D.8 have a more usual notation. Fine - that is a presentational quibble. My taste is that it is unnecessarily cumbersome, but if you find it helps prevent confusion in your mind, please do so. > Now > linearity is at the bottom of most distinctive quantum behaviour > such as superposition, interference, and entanglement. It is not > surprising, therefore, that if you assume linearity at the start, > you can get QM with minimal further effort. > Except that I don't assume linearity from the outset. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: “Could a Quantum Computer Have Subjective Experience?”
For me, what needs to be established, is can we ever 'transact' with sister universes, in a true way? Being nicely pessimistic for the moment, let us shout "Hell No!" Thus, the discussion becomes wonderful for readers of fantasy and scifi, but unimportant as in boring, for people who want to see science and the philosophy of science, mathematics, improve human life. Physicist David Deutsch at Oxford, has long proposed that quantum computing actions would flip and flop back and forth between 1+ more universes. Better, would be trade with other universes with information and goods. I wish would could do this in the Galaxy, but unless ya like Tabby's Star, things appear dead as a door nail. -Original Message- From: John ClarkTo: everything-list Sent: Mon, Jun 26, 2017 1:23 pm Subject: Re: “Could a Quantum Computer Have Subjective Experience?” On Mon, Jun 26, 2017 at 1:57 AM, Russell Standish wrote: > I've started with a different set of metaphysical assumptions, namely that we live in a Multiverse, Do you assume the number of universes are denumerable ? > and that observer moments are drawn from a much more general measure than classical probability theory allows. Infinite sets can cause problems with probability even if you can count the elements, and if you can't it certainly doesn't help. If you stab the number line at random with an infinitely sharp needle your chances of hitting a rational number, or even a computable number, are zero even though there are a infinite number of them. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: “Could a Quantum Computer Have Subjective Experience?”
On 26/06/2017 3:57 pm, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Jun 26, 2017 at 11:50:45AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: That is not what is normally meant by the '+' symbol. You have simply defined a conjunction to be a disjunction! We are constructively defining +. I would not be so cruel as to use + if the end point were not the usual group operation. Yes, the endpoint is that the '+' is simple addition. It seems to me that if you actually wrote psi_a v psi_b, where 'v' stands for disjunction, or 'or', you would not have got very far with your derivation. By writing the sum psi_a + psi_b = psi_{ab} you have, in fact, simply assumed linearity. A significant property of linear systems is that if you have two solutions, the sum is also a solution. If you are dealing with sets, the the operation is the union of sets, which is different. But you specifically state that your projection operator acting on the ensemble produces a single outcome psi_a = \P_{a}*psi, so you are dealing with addition of numbers or functions, not the union of sets. Thus, for the sum to make sense you must assume linearity. Now linearity is at the bottom of most distinctive quantum behaviour such as superposition, interference, and entanglement. It is not surprising, therefore, that if you assume linearity at the start, you can get QM with minimal further effort. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: What lead to free-will denial?
On Mon, Jun 26, 2017 at 2:22 PM, Bruno Marchalwrote: > > I think free-will is a key concept "Free will" is not a key concept, it's not even a trivial concept, its a sequence of letters that lots of people on the internet like to type and nothing more. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: What lead to free-will denial?
On 26 Jun 2017, at 09:08, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Mon, 26 Jun 2017 at 2:42 pm, Adrian Chirawrote: A discussion of what contributed to free-will denial: Is Free Will an Illusion? Part 1 - The Origins of Free-Will Denial. -- I await Part 2. My response to Part 1: The claim that free will does not exist is not due to materialism, reductionism, scientism, logical positivism or determinism. It is due to the fact that, as commonly conceived, "free will" is a logically impossible concept, like "square circle" or "married bachelor". Even an omnipotent God could not make free will exist. Inconsistent theories of free-will are inconsistent. I agree, but that does not say much. Yet, I think free-will is a key concept in the development of high level competence. It appears when consciousness is reflexive enough to become conscience and ponder on the consequence of its and other actions, with permit to have an idea of partial responsibility, or of the lack of it. It emerges from the "real/accurate" feeling that we cannot predict our acts completely, and is independent of tha fact that some super-alien creature might be able to determine my acts (from outside and without interfering with me). You need free-will to smoke the first cigarette, and you need free- will to smoke the last one, (in case you want it), or to continue. Free-will is partial self-determination. It is indeed, like Adrian Chira wrote, an ability to do what you want, modulo what is possible. It can make the parents nervous, as the kids will try to explore the limit of their free-will/freedom, which is on the frontier between liberty and security. Orwell gave my favorite definition of freedom: the right to say 2+2+4. Free will, similarly, in the same vein, would be the ability to follow laws, but like in a game of Chess or Go, it is the complexity constraints and the goal which gives a role to consciousness, conscience and free-will. That is used in a game and in life, for the best and/or the worst. The idea that free will needs randomness does not make sense, no more that it would need magic or ether/stuff. The position that free-will makes sense in a deterministic context is named compatibilism, and seems to me rather widespread. There is a danger, I think, in claiming that free-will does not exist, because it can lead people to fatalism, including in front of their own negative pulsion, leading in more sufferings. Free-will might not exist in God eyes, but God see that each 1p, if a bit complex, is confronted to free will, bad conscience and many things like that, and that it can make relative sense (even badly exploited, because that *is* complex, and like all weapon against suffering can become itself a torture tool). I think that if free will did not exist, pain and pleasure would not exist. But, that is a current intuition (not yet a theorem of arithmetic!). Bruno -- Stathis Papaioannou -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: “Could a Quantum Computer Have Subjective Experience?”
On 26 Jun 2017, at 03:50, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 26/06/2017 2:14 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: Keep in mind that to refute Mechanism (in cognitive science), it is not enough to show that a piece of matter is not Turing emulable. You need mainly to show that its behavior is not retrievable from the statistics of the first person indeterminacy on all computations. I do not accept this reversal of the burden of proof. I do not have to prove a universal negative: you have to prove the positive by actually deriving physics from the statistics of the first person indeterminacy on all computations. I was just saying that to refute computationalism by invoking infinite matters does not work, as computationalism predicts infinities in the material domain. You need to show that there are *special* infinities, not recovered by the global First Person Indeterminacy. It is a not a reversal of the burden of the proof, it is just a question of validity. If not that would beg the question (as shown by the UDA). You give a criteria of verification, which I accept and indeed, if nature violate Z1*, we will know that the classical computationalist theory of mind and matter of the computationalist universal (Löbian) machine is wrong. But until today it is rather confirmed (even in the startling aspects), and it is to my knowledge the only clear account of the 1p relation with the 3p relations (measurable or not). The reversal of the burden of the proof is the main basic first result. It shows that using an universal extrapolation of the physical laws from a finite number of number measurements cannot be invoked to prevent the need to address the infinite renormalization procedure that the arithmetical reality provides when seen from the (true, consistent, provable, and conjunctions) possible points of view of the universal numbers. I do not criticize the theory which would assume a primitive physical reality. I criticized its misuse in the "philosophy of mind", especially when both a (primitive) matter and mechanism are assumed. With mechanism, we need to make *infinite sum* on the histories (computations 1p-filtrated), the reason why we get "negative probabilities" might be related to the fact that 1+2+3+4+5+... "=" -1/12. It is just because I am not enough competent in algebra that I am unable to make clear the general "Galois theory" of (mechanical) consciousness. Consciousness is on the side of truth, and semantics, and meanings, and thus of models. Like in number equation, the more you have equation, resp. axioms, the less you have solutions, resp. models (in the mathematical sense of the logicians). So I still don't know if (assuming mechanism) consciousness increase or decrease with the number of neurons, the 1p spectrum grow, and consciousness is related to relative "spectrum anticipation". Around 2000, I read the book by William Seager, which encourages me in the belief that in the Theaetetus "[]p & p" (I believe p & it is the case that p), the consciousness/knowledge still relied in the key role of the machine's body/representation/3p encapsulated in the box []p, or Bp, (Gödel's provability predicate). But today, I think consciousness is more on the side of "p" or "Dt". It is not unrelated with Brent's insistence to call up an environment. The machine "understand" this already (arguably, in some precise technical sense using the many modal logics of "self" reference). My current theories, written in G, is that consciousness is Dt v t. D is the diamond of G (consistency) and Dp v p is the diamond of S4Grz(1). A very good book, btw, that William Seager (even if physicalist by default). You might need to read/study at least Smullyan Forever undecided, and well, also "To mock a Mocking Bird" to study G, G*, S4Grz1, X1*, etc. Or better, Mendelson and/or Boolos' 1979 book. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: “Could a Quantum Computer Have Subjective Experience?”
On Mon, Jun 26, 2017 at 1:57 AM, Russell Standishwrote: > > I've started with a different set of metaphysical assumptions, > > namely that we live in a Multiverse, Do you assume the number of universes are denumerable ? > > > and that observer moments are > > drawn from a much more general measure than classical probability > > theory allows. Infinite sets can cause problems with probability even if you can count the elements, and if you can't it certainly doesn't help. If you stab the number line at random with an infinitely sharp needle your chances of hitting a rational number, or even a computable number, are zero even though there are a infinite number of them. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.