Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
On 16 Mar 2014 23:36, T Imbrahim timbra...@techemail.com wrote: The thread read Google vulnerabilities with PoC. From my understanding it was a RFI vulnerability on YouTube, and I voiced my support that this is a vulnerability. I also explained a JSON Hijacking case as a follow up, and you said you didn't follow. So I am just saying that treating security that way, there are other parties like NSA who welcome them happily. I think these guys - Alfred, Kirschbaum and Imbrahim are the OP's sock puppets. They are all first time posters from unusual free email providers jumping to defend the OP out of nowhere. If you search Google for their emails you only find references to this thread. They present similar (false and /or incorrect) arguments, talk about their extensive work experience, bash Google and its security team and send repeated emails with exactly the same text. This is turning into a madhouse... I hope this guy doesn't have access to a gun. Regards Pedro ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Please stop changing hats, it's embarrasing. On Sat, Mar 15, 2014 at 7:36 PM, T Imbrahim timbra...@techemail.com wrote: Is this treated with the same way that says that Remote File Inclusion is not a security issue ? You don't follow? Implying ? I understand why nobody likes Google. If I 've found a vulnerability and been treated like that for trying to help, I would rather sell it to the black market or to some government. The NSA maybe is happy to buy a RFI on Google, im sure they could make good use of that. Google is very deceptive in security matters. --- lcam...@coredump.cx wrote: From: Michal Zalewski lcam...@coredump.cx To: timbra...@techemail.com Cc: pr...@yahoo.co.uk, full-disclosure full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC Date: Sat, 15 Mar 2014 10:59:40 -0700 A hacker exploits a JSON (javascript) object that has information of interest for example holding some values for cookies. A lot of times that exploits the same policy origin. The JSON object returned from a server can be forged over writing javascript function that create the object. This happens because of the same origin policy problem in browsers that cannot say if js execution it different for two different sites. To be honest, I'm not sure I follow, but I'm fairly confident that my original point stands. If you believe that well-formed JSON objects without padding can be read across origins within the browser, I would love to see more information about that. (In this particular case, it still wouldn't matter because the response doesn't contain secrets, but it would certainly break a good chunk of the Internet.) JSONP is a different animal. /mz _ Are you a Techie? Get Your Free Tech Email Address Now! Visit http://www.TechEmail.com ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ -- “There's a reason we separate military and the police: one fights the enemy of the state, the other serves and protects the people. When the military becomes both, then the enemies of the state tend to become the people.” ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
ROFL [image: Inline image 1] On Mon, Mar 17, 2014 at 11:07 AM, T Imbrahim timbra...@techemail.comwrote: What drugs are you on Pedro Ribeiro I wonder ...? I express my views, if you don't like don't watch them. You responses so far have only been assy speculations so don't tell me Im wrong , and please don't say thing like that. I don't know who the other people is, but what is true in security I support. Why you would Google my name ... ? Is the English language causing you ill effects? --- ped...@gmail.com wrote: From: Pedro Ribeiro ped...@gmail.com To: timbra...@techemail.com Cc: full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk, Michal Zalewski lcam...@coredump.cx, mvi...@gmail.com, gynv...@coldwind.pl Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC Date: Mon, 17 Mar 2014 09:24:08 + On 16 Mar 2014 23:36, T Imbrahim timbra...@techemail.com wrote: The thread read Google vulnerabilities with PoC. From my understanding it was a RFI vulnerability on YouTube, and I voiced my support that this is a vulnerability. I also explained a JSON Hijacking case as a follow up, and you said you didn't follow. So I am just saying that treating security that way, there are other parties like NSA who welcome them happily. I think these guys - Alfred, Kirschbaum and Imbrahim are the OP's sock puppets. They are all first time posters from unusual free email providers jumping to defend the OP out of nowhere. If you search Google for their emails you only find references to this thread. They present similar (false and /or incorrect) arguments, talk about their extensive work experience, bash Google and its security team and send repeated emails with exactly the same text. This is turning into a madhouse... I hope this guy doesn't have access to a gun. Regards Pedro -- Are you a Techie? Get Your Free Tech Email Address Now! Visit http://www.TechEmail.com -- “There's a reason we separate military and the police: one fights the enemy of the state, the other serves and protects the people. When the military becomes both, then the enemies of the state tend to become the people.” inline: 10iceb6.jpg___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
What drugs are you on Pedro RibeiroI wonder...?I express myviews, if you don't like don't watch them. You responses so farhave only been assy speculations so don't tell me Im wrong, and please don't say thing like that. I don't know who the other peopleis,but what is true in security I support. Why you would Google my name ... ?Is the English language causing you ill effects? --- ped...@gmail.com wrote:From: Pedro Ribeiro ped...@gmail.comTo: timbra...@techemail.comCc: full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk, Michal Zalewski lcam...@coredump.cx, mvi...@gmail.com, gynv...@coldwind.plSubject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoCDate: Mon, 17 Mar 2014 09:24:08 + On 16 Mar 2014 23:36, "T Imbrahim" timbra...@techemail.com wrote: The thread read Google vulnerabilities with PoC. From my understanding it was a RFI vulnerability on YouTube, and I voiced my support that this is a vulnerability. I also explained a JSON Hijacking case as a follow up, and you said you didn't follow. So I am just saying that treating security that way, there are other parties like NSA who welcome them happily. I think these guys - Alfred, Kirschbaum and Imbrahim are the OP's sock puppets. They are all first time posters from unusual free email providers jumping to defend the OP out of nowhere.If you search Google for their emails you only find references to this thread. They present similar (false and /or incorrect) arguments, talk about their extensive work experience, bash Google and its security team and send repeated emails with exactly the same text. This is turning into a madhouse... I hope this guy doesn't have access to a gun. Regards Pedro Are you a Techie? Get Your Free Tech Email Address Now! Visit http://www.TechEmail.com ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Ooh goodie, where and what happened to N3td3v, he used to crack me up :D :D On 3/17/14, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com wrote: ROFL [image: Inline image 1] On Mon, Mar 17, 2014 at 11:07 AM, T Imbrahim timbra...@techemail.comwrote: What drugs are you on Pedro Ribeiro I wonder ...? I express my views, if you don't like don't watch them. You responses so far have only been assy speculations so don't tell me Im wrong , and please don't say thing like that. I don't know who the other people is, but what is true in security I support. Why you would Google my name ... ? Is the English language causing you ill effects? --- ped...@gmail.com wrote: From: Pedro Ribeiro ped...@gmail.com To: timbra...@techemail.com Cc: full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk, Michal Zalewski lcam...@coredump.cx, mvi...@gmail.com, gynv...@coldwind.pl Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC Date: Mon, 17 Mar 2014 09:24:08 + On 16 Mar 2014 23:36, T Imbrahim timbra...@techemail.com wrote: The thread read Google vulnerabilities with PoC. From my understanding it was a RFI vulnerability on YouTube, and I voiced my support that this is a vulnerability. I also explained a JSON Hijacking case as a follow up, and you said you didn't follow. So I am just saying that treating security that way, there are other parties like NSA who welcome them happily. I think these guys - Alfred, Kirschbaum and Imbrahim are the OP's sock puppets. They are all first time posters from unusual free email providers jumping to defend the OP out of nowhere. If you search Google for their emails you only find references to this thread. They present similar (false and /or incorrect) arguments, talk about their extensive work experience, bash Google and its security team and send repeated emails with exactly the same text. This is turning into a madhouse... I hope this guy doesn't have access to a gun. Regards Pedro -- Are you a Techie? Get Your Free Tech Email Address Now! Visit http://www.TechEmail.com -- There's a reason we separate military and the police: one fights the enemy of the state, the other serves and protects the people. When the military becomes both, then the enemies of the state tend to become the people. -- -- Gichuki John Ndirangu, C.E.H , C.P.T.P, O.S.C.P I.T Security Analyst and Penetration Tester jgichuki at inbox d0t com {FORUM}http://lists.my.co.ke/pipermail/security/ http://chuksjonia.blogspot.com/ ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Hi, The only probable way of exploiting it I can see would be if the servers at Google where the files are uploaded would perform some specific tasks with such files that could result in exploiting a vulnerability in any of the used software (and this is something the discoverer failed to probe). An example: Google malware scans the uploaded file with some AV engine and the file is actually an exploit targeting one or more AV products. I don't think this is the case and, even in this case, there wouldn't be any Google's vulnerability but, rather, a vulnerability in another product from another company. So, in short: this conversation is stupid. There is no vulnerability we can see here and, if there is, it cannot be probed by the discoverer and he and his buddies attach to either ad hominem arguments or to statements like I am XXX with YYY years of experience doing ZZZ mistakenly thinking it could back any of their paranoias. What else do we need to discuss here? I think it's time to stop this conversation. And, yes, I know that sending an e-mail to ask for stopping a conversation on FD is stupid too. Regards, Joxean Koret signature.asc Description: This is a digitally signed message part ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Hey, At least to me I am security paranoid. Remote File Inclusion of files to a trusted network, seems like a well backed up vulnerability. I think we are talking about Google here not your favourite's pizza website. I personally congratulate to the author for finding it, whether probing it or not. And I have nothing to do with the authors, just supporting what is right. I definitely would patch my computer if I discovered that somebody could upload files to my computer, even thought if couldn't 'probe' them. --- joxeanko...@yahoo.es wrote: From: Joxean Koret joxeanko...@yahoo.es To: full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC Date: Mon, 17 Mar 2014 12:27:27 +0100 Hi, The only probable way of exploiting it I can see would be if the servers at Google where the files are uploaded would perform some specific tasks with such files that could result in exploiting a vulnerability in any of the used software (and this is something the discoverer failed to probe). An example: Google malware scans the uploaded file with some AV engine and the file is actually an exploit targeting one or more AV products. I don't think this is the case and, even in this case, there wouldn't be any Google's vulnerability but, rather, a vulnerability in another product from another company. So, in short: this conversation is stupid. There is no vulnerability we can see here and, if there is, it cannot be probed by the discoverer and he and his buddies attach to either ad hominem arguments or to statements like I am XXX with YYY years of experience doing ZZZ mistakenly thinking it could back any of their paranoias. What else do we need to discuss here? I think it's time to stop this conversation. And, yes, I know that sending an e-mail to ask for stopping a conversation on FD is stupid too. Regards, Joxean Koret ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ _ Are you a Techie? Get Your Free Tech Email Address Now! Visit http://www.TechEmail.com ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Especially considering that all three use Tor to post on the list. I wonder why. Other header/content details can be interesting as well... 2014-03-17 10:24 GMT+01:00 Pedro Ribeiro ped...@gmail.com: On 16 Mar 2014 23:36, T Imbrahim timbra...@techemail.com wrote: The thread read Google vulnerabilities with PoC. From my understanding it was a RFI vulnerability on YouTube, and I voiced my support that this is a vulnerability. I also explained a JSON Hijacking case as a follow up, and you said you didn't follow. So I am just saying that treating security that way, there are other parties like NSA who welcome them happily. I think these guys - Alfred, Kirschbaum and Imbrahim are the OP's sock puppets. They are all first time posters from unusual free email providers jumping to defend the OP out of nowhere. If you search Google for their emails you only find references to this thread. They present similar (false and /or incorrect) arguments, talk about their extensive work experience, bash Google and its security team and send repeated emails with exactly the same text. This is turning into a madhouse... I hope this guy doesn't have access to a gun. Regards Pedro ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
On Mon, Mar 17, 2014 at 2:25 PM, T Imbrahim timbra...@techemail.com wrote: I definitely would patch my computer if I discovered that somebody could upload files to my computer, even thought if couldn't 'probe' them. 1) I don't think you understood the meaning of the word probe in this context, Nikolas, 2) Does that mean you believe Dropbox is vulnerable to remote file upload too? -- “There's a reason we separate military and the police: one fights the enemy of the state, the other serves and protects the people. When the military becomes both, then the enemies of the state tend to become the people.” ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
On 17 Mar 2014 13:39, Źmicier Januszkiewicz ga...@tut.by wrote: Especially considering that all three use Tor to post on the list. I wonder why. Other header/content details can be interesting as well... Good catch, I didn't even remember checking the headers. Have a look at the comments posted in the softpedia article - I can smell more dirty socks in there. And for even more fun read his interview: http://m.softpedia.com/softpedia-interview-nicholas-lemonias-on-satellite-communication-vulnerabilities-420589.html He even posted it to this list but no one noticed it: http://marc.info/?l=full-disclosurem=139076233105401w=2 2014-03-17 10:24 GMT+01:00 Pedro Ribeiro ped...@gmail.com: On 16 Mar 2014 23:36, T Imbrahim timbra...@techemail.com wrote: The thread read Google vulnerabilities with PoC. From my understanding it was a RFI vulnerability on YouTube, and I voiced my support that this is a vulnerability. I also explained a JSON Hijacking case as a follow up, and you said you didn't follow. So I am just saying that treating security that way, there are other parties like NSA who welcome them happily. I think these guys - Alfred, Kirschbaum and Imbrahim are the OP's sock puppets. They are all first time posters from unusual free email providers jumping to defend the OP out of nowhere. If you search Google for their emails you only find references to this thread. They present similar (false and /or incorrect) arguments, talk about their extensive work experience, bash Google and its security team and send repeated emails with exactly the same text. This is turning into a madhouse... I hope this guy doesn't have access to a gun. Regards Pedro ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Let's try some scenarios and if those can be pulled out then I'd say it's safe to assume this is an issue: 1. Upload a webshell (in a war, php, asp[x], jsp or similar file) and have it executed by YouTube; 2. Upload a malicious file (pdf, swf, jar or similar file which exploits a known or unknown vulnerability in the respective aps) and have it served by YouTube; 3. Upload a file which alters the behavior of the YouTube application (i.e., a configuration file, HTML or Javascript template, even a UI image). Otherwise you just uploaded a file which went into a bitbucket, but you have no way of pulling this file out of said bitbucket in a way that can cause harm to either the application or its users. Should YouTube restrict file uploads to known valid mime types? Sure, but that's only how you got the data in there to begin with. It's what happens after the data is in that will make all the difference. On Mon, Mar 17, 2014 at 10:47 AM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com wrote: On Mon, Mar 17, 2014 at 2:25 PM, T Imbrahim timbra...@techemail.comwrote: I definitely would patch my computer if I discovered that somebody could upload files to my computer, even thought if couldn't 'probe' them. 1) I don't think you understood the meaning of the word probe in this context, Nikolas, 2) Does that mean you believe Dropbox is vulnerable to remote file upload too? -- “There's a reason we separate military and the police: one fights the enemy of the state, the other serves and protects the people. When the military becomes both, then the enemies of the state tend to become the people.” ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ -- “If debugging is the process of removing software bugs, then programming must be the process of putting them in.” - *Edsger Dijkstra* ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
On Mon, Mar 17, 2014 at 3:11 PM, Ulisses Montenegro ulisses.montene...@gmail.com wrote: Should YouTube restrict file uploads to known valid mime types? Sure, but that's only how you got the data in there to begin with. It's what happens after the data is in that will make all the difference. At this point I'm not even sure the data isn't being restricted - it just may be that the data type is checked again after it gets pulled out of the queue for processing, and if it's not a video it gets discarded. -- “There's a reason we separate military and the police: one fights the enemy of the state, the other serves and protects the people. When the military becomes both, then the enemies of the state tend to become the people.” ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Hello, I am a security professional and risk manager in UAE. I support that the remote file upload on YouTube is a vulnerability, and I am sure about this. Not the slightest doubts... There is a different between a vulnerability and an exploit. The vulnerability here is the lack of any file extension checks, content type verification “$_FILES['uploadedfile']['type']” holds the value of the MIME type. A hacker can easily upload files using a script that allows the sending or tampering of HTTP POST requests. e.g: ?php //Demo1.php if($_FILES['uploadedfile']['type'] != image/gif) { echo Sorry, we only allow uploading GIF images; exit; } $uploaddir = 'uploads/'; $uploadfile = $uploaddir . basename($_FILES['uploadedfile']['name']); if (move_uploaded_file($_FILES['uploadedfile']['tmp_name'], $uploadfile)) { echo File is valid, and was successfully uploaded.n; } else { echo File uploading failed.n; } ? Read this for more info if you like: http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/file-upload-vulnerabilities/ if not (rwx) and only (w) to a temporary file even, the spread of malware is real no matter if the file is executed at the time is upload. For the JSON reply: A hacker exploits a JSON (javascript) object that has information of interest for example holding some values for cookies. A lot of times that exploits the same policy origin. The JSON object returned from a server can be forged over writing javascript function that create the object. This happens because of the same origin policy problem in browsers that cannot say if js execution it different for two different sites. Sincerely , T. Imbrahim --- lcam...@coredump.cx wrote: From: Michal Zalewski lcam...@coredump.cx To: M Kirschbaum pr...@yahoo.co.uk Cc: full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC Date: Sat, 15 Mar 2014 09:46:27 -0700 As a professional penetration tester, [...] The JSON service responds to GET requests , and there is a good chance that the service is also vulnerable to JSON Hijacking attacks. That's... not how XSSI works. To have a script inclusion vulnerability, you need to have a vanilla GET response that contains some user-specific secrets that are returned to the caller based on HTTP cookies (or, less likely, other ambient credentials). For example, a script response that discloses the contents of your mailbox or the list of private contacts would be of concern. Further, the response must be in a format that can be not only loaded, but also inspected by another site opened in your browser; most types of JSONP fall into this category, but JSON generally does not, essentially because of how the meaning of { is overloaded in JS depending on where it appears in a block of code. Last but not least, the final piece of the puzzle is that the response must be served at a URL that can be guessed by third parties who don't have access to your account. /mz ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ _ Are you a Techie? Get Your Free Tech Email Address Now! Visit http://www.TechEmail.com ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Is this treated with the same way that says that Remote File Inclusion is not a security issue ? You don't follow? Implying ? I understand why nobody likes Google. If I 've found a vulnerability and been treated like that for trying to help, I would rather sell it to the black market or to some government. The NSA maybe is happy to buy a RFI on Google, im sure they could make good use of that. Google is very deceptive in security matters. --- lcam...@coredump.cx wrote: From: Michal Zalewski lcam...@coredump.cx To: timbra...@techemail.com Cc: pr...@yahoo.co.uk, full-disclosure full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC Date: Sat, 15 Mar 2014 10:59:40 -0700 A hacker exploits a JSON (javascript) object that has information of interest for example holding some values for cookies. A lot of times that exploits the same policy origin. The JSON object returned from a server can be forged over writing javascript function that create the object. This happens because of the same origin policy problem in browsers that cannot say if js execution it different for two different sites. To be honest, I'm not sure I follow, but I'm fairly confident that my original point stands. If you believe that well-formed JSON objects without padding can be read across origins within the browser, I would love to see more information about that. (In this particular case, it still wouldn't matter because the response doesn't contain secrets, but it would certainly break a good chunk of the Internet.) JSONP is a different animal. /mz _ Are you a Techie? Get Your Free Tech Email Address Now! Visit http://www.TechEmail.com ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
The thread read Google vulnerabilities with PoC. From my understanding it was a RFI vulnerability on YouTube, and I voiced my support that this is a vulnerability. I also explained a JSON Hijacking case as a follow up, and you said you didn't follow. So I am just saying that treating security that way, there are other parties like NSA who welcome them happily. --- lcam...@coredump.cx wrote: From: Michal Zalewski lcam...@coredump.cx To: timbra...@techemail.com Cc: M Kirschbaum pr...@yahoo.co.uk, full-disclosure full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC Date: Sat, 15 Mar 2014 11:47:19 -0700 Is this treated with the same way that says that Remote File Inclusion is not a security issue ? I'm not sure how RFI came into play on this thread - the original report wasn't about RFI. I don't have an agenda here; I'm just trying to get to the bottom of it and make sure that we converge on a common understanding of the issue. As in any argument, it's fairly likely that one of us is wrong, and I accept that it could very well be me - I have been wrong quite a few times in my life, and it's always a valuable learning opportunity. I think it's unfortunate that the thread has devolved into various accusations and credential-slinging, because it reduces the likelihood of such a productive outcome. Please feel free to ping me directly any time, though - I'm happy to chat. Cheers, /mz _ Are you a Techie? Get Your Free Tech Email Address Now! Visit http://www.TechEmail.com ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
You are so incompetent.. If you want proof why don't you do it yourself? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G4EkgJtjDvU - Here is proof that the file is saved and processed. If you want to question it come up with your real name, stop hiding behind fake emails. Are you a Google employee? What's your motive? Best On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:39 PM, R D rd.secli...@gmail.com wrote: You are trying to execute an sh script through a video player. That's an exec() command. No, it's not. That's an HTTP GET. Do you have such a poor understanding of how web applications work? Or did you just not read what I said? So its the wrong way about accessing the file. This way, which is the standard way to access files on youtube, tells me the file doesn't exist. You have yet to prove the file you uploaded can be accessed or executed by anyone. For that matter, you have still to prove it can be discovered by anyone. That URL is hard to guess. And you have still to answer all my other questions, and most of the questions asked to you on this list. The burden of proof is on you, and you are making a fool of yourself by answering all the questions here with the same statements, and links to your PoC that doesn't proves anything, while everybody asks you for more evidence. Keep on the (good?) work, --Rob' On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 9:22 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: You are trying to execute an sh script through a video player. That's an exec() command. So its the wrong way about accessing the file. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:20 PM, R D rd.secli...@gmail.com wrote: No it's not. As Chris and I are saying, you don't have proof your file is accessible to others, only that is was uploaded. Now, you see, when you upload a video to youtube, you get the adress where it will be viewable in the response. In your case : {sessionStatus:{state:FINALIZED,externalFieldTransfers:[{name:file,status:COMPLETED,bytesTransferred:113,bytesTotal:113,formPostInfo:{url: http://www.youtube.com/upload/rupio?authuser=0\u0026upload_id=AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aw\u0026file_id=000 ,cross_domain_url: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0\u0026upload_id=AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aw\u0026origin=CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw},content_type:text/x-sh}],additionalInfo:{uploader_service.GoogleRupioAdditionalInfo:{completionInfo:{status:SUCCESS,customerSpecificInfo:{status: ok, *video_id: KzKDtijwHFI* ,upload_id:AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aw}} And what do we get when we browse to https://youtube.com/watch?v=KzKDtijwHFI ? Nothing. Can you send me a link where I can access the file content of the arbitrary file you uploaded? Are you sure this json response, or this file, will be there in a month? Or in a year? Is the fact that this json response exists a threat to youtube? Can you quantify how of a threat? How much, in dollars, does it hurt their business? --Rob On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 9:08 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: My claim is now verified Cheers! On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:04 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0upload_id= AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1-- uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aworigin= CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw That information can be queried from the db, where the metadata are saved. The files are being saved persistently , as per the above example. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:04 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0upload_id=AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aworigin=CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw That information can be queried from the db, where the metadata are saved. The files are being saved persistently , as per the above example. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:00 PM, Chris Thompson christhom7...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Nikolas, Please do read (and understand) my entire email before responding - I understand your frustration trying to get your message across but maybe this will help. Please put aside professional pride for the time being - I know how it feels to be passionate about something yet have others simply not understand. Let me try and bring some sanity to the discussion and explain to you why people maybe not agreeing with you. You (rightly so) highlighted what you believe to be an issue in a Youtube whereby it appears (to you) than you can upload an arbitrary file. If you can indeed do this as you suspect then your points are valid and you
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
The thread starter is right about this. It is a vulnerability, and I think Google should start considering this. The JSON service responds to GET requests , and there is a good chance that the service is also vulnerable to JSON Hijacking attacks. As a professional penetration tester , I believe that Google was false not to award this.___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Same here... It's like a train wreck, you know you shouldn't watch but it's just so damned entertaining at this point that I can't stop... Sent from my iPhone On Mar 14, 2014, at 2:46 PM, Yvan Janssens i...@yvanj.me wrote: Does anybody still have some popcorn left? They ran out of it in the tax free zone in here due to this thread... Kind regards, Yvan Janssens Sent from my PDA - excuse me for my brevity On 14 Mar 2014, at 18:40, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: We have many PoC's including video clips. We may upload for the security world to see. However, this is not the way to treat security vulnerabilities. Attacking the researcher and bringing you friends to do aswell, won't mitigate the problem. ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
It's amazing how much dumber I feel for having read your drivel. Please for the love of $diety stop posting to this list. -- W. Scott Lockwood III AMST Tech (SPI) GWB2009033817 http://www.shadowplayinternational.org/ There are four boxes to be used in defense of liberty: soap, ballot, jury, and ammo. Please use in that order. -Ed Howdershelt (Author) On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 9:48 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Go to sleep. You have absolutely no understanding of the vulnerability, nor you have the facts. If you want a full report ask Softpedia, because we aint releasing them. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:39 PM, R D rd.secli...@gmail.com wrote: You are trying to execute an sh script through a video player. That's an exec() command. No, it's not. That's an HTTP GET. Do you have such a poor understanding of how web applications work? Or did you just not read what I said? So its the wrong way about accessing the file. This way, which is the standard way to access files on youtube, tells me the file doesn't exist. You have yet to prove the file you uploaded can be accessed or executed by anyone. For that matter, you have still to prove it can be discovered by anyone. That URL is hard to guess. And you have still to answer all my other questions, and most of the questions asked to you on this list. The burden of proof is on you, and you are making a fool of yourself by answering all the questions here with the same statements, and links to your PoC that doesn't proves anything, while everybody asks you for more evidence. Keep on the (good?) work, --Rob' On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 9:22 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: You are trying to execute an sh script through a video player. That's an exec() command. So its the wrong way about accessing the file. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:20 PM, R D rd.secli...@gmail.com wrote: No it's not. As Chris and I are saying, you don't have proof your file is accessible to others, only that is was uploaded. Now, you see, when you upload a video to youtube, you get the adress where it will be viewable in the response. In your case : {sessionStatus:{state:FINALIZED,externalFieldTransfers:[{name:file,status:COMPLETED,bytesTransferred:113,bytesTotal:113,formPostInfo:{url:http://www.youtube.com/upload/rupio?authuser=0\u0026upload_id=AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aw\u0026file_id=000,cross_domain_url:http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0\u0026upload_id=AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aw\u0026origin=CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw},content_type:text/x-sh}],additionalInfo:{uploader_service.GoogleRupioAdditionalInfo:{completionInfo:{status:SUCCESS,customerSpecificInfo:{status: ok, video_id: KzKDtijwHFI,upload_id:AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aw}} And what do we get when we browse to https://youtube.com/watch?v=KzKDtijwHFI ? Nothing. Can you send me a link where I can access the file content of the arbitrary file you uploaded? Are you sure this json response, or this file, will be there in a month? Or in a year? Is the fact that this json response exists a threat to youtube? Can you quantify how of a threat? How much, in dollars, does it hurt their business? --Rob On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 9:08 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: My claim is now verified Cheers! On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:04 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0upload_id=AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aworigin=CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw That information can be queried from the db, where the metadata are saved. The files are being saved persistently , as per the above example. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:04 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0upload_id=AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aworigin=CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw That information can be queried from the db, where the metadata are saved. The files are being saved persistently , as per the above example. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:00 PM, Chris Thompson christhom7...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Nikolas, Please do read (and understand) my entire email before responding - I understand your frustration trying to get your message across but maybe this will help. Please put aside professional pride for the time being - I know how it feels to be passionate about something yet have others simply not understand. Let me try and bring some sanity to the discussion
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Omg please for the love of all things human STFU!!! Sent from my iPhone On Mar 15, 2014, at 12:43 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: If you wish to talk seriously about the problem, please send me an email privately. And we can talk about what we have found so far, and perhaps present some more proof of concepts for this on going research. This is between the researcher and Google. People who do not have the facts have been, trying to attack the arguer, on the basis of their personal beliefs. We are not speaking from experience, but based on our findings which includes PoC media, images, codes - and based on academic literature and recognised practise. Please bear in mind that a lot of research is conducted in academia (those old papers you say) before finally released to the commercial markets. Regards, Nicholas Lemonias Information Security Expert Advanced Information Security Corp. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:49 PM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com wrote: Try learning how to properly send emails before critizicing anyone, pal. ;) On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:44 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you. -- Forwarded message -- From: Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:43 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you, with a good kick outta the door. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 3:55 PM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Jerome of Mcafee has made a very valid point on revisiting separation of duties in this security instance. Happy to see more professionals with some skills. Some others have also mentioned the feasibility for Denial of Service attacks. Remote code execution by Social Engineering is also a prominent scenario. Actually, people have been pointing out exactly the opposite. But if you insist on believing you can DoS an EC2 by uploading files, good luck to you then... If you can't tell that that is a vulnerability (probably coming from a bunch of CEH's), I feel sorry for those consultants. You're the only one throwing around certifications here. I can no longer tell if you're being serious or this is a massive prank. Nicholas. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: We are on a different level perhaps. We do certainly disagree on those points. I wouldn't hire you as a consultant, if you can't tell if that is a valid vulnerability.. Best Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com wrote: But do you have all the required EH certifications? Try this one from the Institute for Certified Application Security Specialists: http://www.asscert.com/ On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:41 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Thanks Michal, We are just trying to improve Google's security and contribute to the research community after all. If you are still on EFNet give me a shout some time. We have done so and consulted to hundreds of clients including Microsoft, Nokia, Adobe and some of the world's biggest corporations. We are also strict supporters of the ACM code of conduct. Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. AISec On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:29 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Hi Jerome, Thank you for agreeing on access control, and separation of duties. However successful exploitation permits arbitrary write() of any file of choice. I could release an exploit code in C Sharp or Python that permits multiple file uploads of any file/types, if the Google security team feels that this would be necessary. This is unpaid work, so we are not so keen on that job. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:04 AM, Jerome Athias athiasjer...@gmail.com wrote: Hi I concur that we are mainly discussing a terminology problem. In the context of a Penetration Test or WAPT, this is a Finding. Reporting this finding makes sense in this context. As a professional, you would have to explain if/how this finding is a Weakness*, a Violation (/Regulations, Compliance, Policies or Requirements[1]) * I would say Weakness + Exposure = Vulnerability. Vulnerability + Exploitability (PoC) = Confirmed Vulnerability that needs Business Impact and
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 On 03/15/2014 02:26, Nicholas Lemonias. wrote: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G4EkgJtjDvU - Here is proof that the file is saved and processed. disclaimer Compared to probably most of the folks on this list, I have absolutely no idea what I'm doing. /disclaimer However, at the time I accessed your latest URL (around 2:51 AM EST, or 6:51 GMT), I got a message saying The video is currently being processed. So, for all we know, the file is in some queue, waiting for Google to notice that it's invalid, at which point it will be deleted. Please get back to us when we are able to download your invalid file, via YouTube, on our various machines scattered across the globe. Also, please stop sending so many damn short emails in a row. Consolidation is nice. Thank you, BW - -- Brian M. Waters +1 (908) 380-8214 br...@brianmwaters.net -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (FreeBSD) iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJTI/v3AAoJEEYNFaEjEsGopDwH/R8q9+1wWsKg0j8Wg5zIdZZr tVNT0IIh9vyjC57WxxQ2SamKoEWsCSt4A8aQ60gup2ImT+XoRpSYMZKWAyKOwz// yiDjKKI9fsRRdXaBT3r8uWLftWA8WzASrMqrqMhayj06HNXjRXhyonJVdxxgrg/6 h+FaZYGlYdmrGtb02pve5i7in6OoYBQj4m85KVzq+Pnvfowqo6VHzlLwfK3vaD4a 8sEm+i63N02VT6ItO9y7fCcv52pU0sjepGIoYV2aTHkIR3BaNmyxSEVaOZclDY37 6HFSdkWZP0rvkQefNY6QcUvMfBszxFfecQ5cGfIcbScx35iLChXQMYJpH9dmPao= =Ngjk -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Just curious; what universities have hired you as a lecturer? On Sat, Mar 15, 2014 at 1:09 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: You are too vague. Please keep this to a level. Thank you. *Best Regards,* *Nicholas Lemonias* *Advanced Information Security Corporation.* On Sat, Mar 15, 2014 at 5:06 AM, Colette Chamberland cjchamberl...@gmail.com wrote: Omg please for the love of all things human STFU!!! Sent from my iPhone On Mar 15, 2014, at 12:43 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: If you wish to talk seriously about the problem, please send me an email privately. And we can talk about what we have found so far, and perhaps present some more proof of concepts for this on going research. This is between the researcher and Google. People who do not have the facts have been, trying to attack the arguer, on the basis of their personal beliefs. We are not speaking from experience, but based on our findings which includes PoC media, images, codes - and based on academic literature and recognised practise. Please bear in mind that a lot of research is conducted in academia (those old papers you say) before finally released to the commercial markets. Regards, *Nicholas Lemonias* *Information Security Expert* *Advanced Information Security Corp.* On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:49 PM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com wrote: Try learning how to properly send emails before critizicing anyone, pal. ;) On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:44 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you. -- Forwarded message -- From: Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:43 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you, with a good kick outta the door. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 3:55 PM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Jerome of Mcafee has made a very valid point on revisiting separation of duties in this security instance. Happy to see more professionals with some skills. Some others have also mentioned the feasibility for Denial of Service attacks. Remote code execution by Social Engineering is also a prominent scenario. Actually, people have been pointing out exactly the opposite. But if you insist on believing you can DoS an EC2 by uploading files, good luck to you then... If you can't tell that that is a vulnerability (probably coming from a bunch of CEH's), I feel sorry for those consultants. You're the only one throwing around certifications here. I can no longer tell if you're being serious or this is a massive prank. Nicholas. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: We are on a different level perhaps. We do certainly disagree on those points. I wouldn't hire you as a consultant, if you can't tell if that is a valid vulnerability.. Best Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.comwrote: But do you have all the required EH certifications? Try this one from the Institute for Certified Application Security Specialists: http://www.asscert.com/ On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:41 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Thanks Michal, We are just trying to improve Google's security and contribute to the research community after all. If you are still on EFNet give me a shout some time. We have done so and consulted to hundreds of clients including Microsoft, Nokia, Adobe and some of the world's biggest corporations. We are also strict supporters of the ACM code of conduct. Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. AISec On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:29 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Hi Jerome, Thank you for agreeing on access control, and separation of duties. However successful exploitation permits arbitrary write() of any file of choice. I could release an exploit code in C Sharp or Python that permits multiple file uploads of any file/types, if the Google security team feels that this would be necessary. This is unpaid work, so we are not so keen on that job. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:04 AM, Jerome Athias athiasjer...@gmail.com wrote: Hi I concur that we are mainly discussing a terminology problem. In the context of a Penetration Test or WAPT, this is a Finding. Reporting this finding makes
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Btw, not sure if someone already mentioned it, but you are really reaching the level of MustLive. That's actually a big achievement. Congratz. I'm not sure if you got what lcamtuf is saying (I'm impressed he still takes time to reply to you), apparently not. You're still trying to convince us that you're right. Maybe you can create the next LOIC specifically tailored to DoS Youtube with this serious bug, ROFL! Cheers antisnatchor Nicholas Lemonias. wrote: If you wish to talk seriously about the problem, please send me an email privately. And we can talk about what we have found so far, and perhaps present some more proof of concepts for this on going research. This is between the researcher and Google. People who do not have the facts have been, trying to attack the arguer, on the basis of their personal beliefs. We are not speaking from experience, but based on our findings which includes PoC media, images, codes - and based on academic literature and recognised practise. Please bear in mind that a lot of research is conducted in academia (those old papers you say) before finally released to the commercial markets. Regards, *Nicholas Lemonias* *Information Security Expert* *Advanced Information Security Corp.* On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:49 PM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com wrote: Try learning how to properly send emails before critizicing anyone, pal. ;) On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:44 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you. -- Forwarded message -- From: Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:43 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you, with a good kick outta the door. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 3:55 PM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Jerome of Mcafee has made a very valid point on revisiting separation of duties in this security instance. Happy to see more professionals with some skills. Some others have also mentioned the feasibility for Denial of Service attacks. Remote code execution by Social Engineering is also a prominent scenario. Actually, people have been pointing out exactly the opposite. But if you insist on believing you can DoS an EC2 by uploading files, good luck to you then... If you can't tell that that is a vulnerability (probably coming from a bunch of CEH's), I feel sorry for those consultants. You're the only one throwing around certifications here. I can no longer tell if you're being serious or this is a massive prank. Nicholas. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: We are on a different level perhaps. We do certainly disagree on those points. I wouldn't hire you as a consultant, if you can't tell if that is a valid vulnerability.. Best Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.comwrote: But do you have all the required EH certifications? Try this one from the Institute for Certified Application Security Specialists: http://www.asscert.com/ On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:41 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Thanks Michal, We are just trying to improve Google's security and contribute to the research community after all. If you are still on EFNet give me a shout some time. We have done so and consulted to hundreds of clients including Microsoft, Nokia, Adobe and some of the world's biggest corporations. We are also strict supporters of the ACM code of conduct. Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. AISec On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:29 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Hi Jerome, Thank you for agreeing on access control, and separation of duties. However successful exploitation permits arbitrary write() of any file of choice. I could release an exploit code in C Sharp or Python that permits multiple file uploads of any file/types, if the Google security team feels that this would be necessary. This is unpaid work, so we are not so keen on that job. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:04 AM, Jerome Athias athiasjer...@gmail.com wrote: Hi I concur that we are mainly discussing a terminology problem. In the context of a Penetration Test or WAPT, this is a Finding. Reporting this finding makes sense in this context. As a professional, you would have to explain if/how this finding is a
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
On Sat, Mar 15, 2014 at 5:43 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: People who do not have the facts have been, trying to attack the arguer, on the basis of their personal beliefs. Wow. I seriously can't tell if you're trolling or unbelievably narcissistic. Your work has serious flaws, and have been pointed out with facts over and over - but you think they're ad-hominem attacks based on the tone of their replies. Zalewski here is just trying to be nice and patient with you - but you somehow seem to believe he agrees with you based on the tone of his replies. You're either faking it and pulling a massive prank on all of us, or you're so self absorbed you can't get past your own emotional responses to people pointing out your mistakes. The actual contents of what they tell you are irrelevant to you, all that matters is if people praise or criticize you. I'm beginning to think you may have issues and we should all back off for a while. -- “There's a reason we separate military and the police: one fights the enemy of the state, the other serves and protects the people. When the military becomes both, then the enemies of the state tend to become the people.” ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
That is not what this email says. You can't reply correct to criticism and pretend it's praise. On Sat, Mar 15, 2014 at 6:11 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Correct. The mime type can be circumvented. We can confirm this to be a valid vulnerability. For the PoC's : http://news.softpedia.com/news/Expert-Finds-File-Upload-Vulnerability-in-YouTube-Google-Denies-It-s-a-Security-Issue-431489.shtml On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:40 PM, Krzysztof Kotowicz kkotowicz...@gmail.com wrote: 2014-03-14 20:28 GMT+01:00 Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com : Then that also means that firewalls and IPS systems are worthless. Why spend so much time protecting the network layers if a user can send any file of choice to a remote network through http... No, they are not worthless per se, but of course for an user content publishing service they need to allow file upload over HTTP/s. How far those files are inspected and later processed is another question - and that could lead to a vulnerability that you DIDN'T demonstrate. You just uploaded a .sh file. There's no harm in that as nowhere did you prove that that file is being executed. Similarly (and that has been pointed out in this thread) you could upload a PHP-GIF polyglot file to a J2EE application - no vulnerability in this. Prove something by overwriting a crucial file, tricking other user's browser to execute the file as HTML from an interesting domain (XSS), popping a shell, triggering XXE when the file is processed as XML, anything. Then that is a vulnerability. So far - sorry, it is not, and you've been told it repeatedly. As for the uploaded files being persistent, there is evidence of that. For instance a remote admin could be tricked to execute some of the uploaded files (Social Engineering). Come on, seriously? Social Engineering can make him download this file from pastebin just as well. That's a real stretch. IMHO it is not a security issue. You're uploading a file to some kind of processing queue that does not validate a file type, but nevertheless only processes those files as video - there is NO reason to suspect otherwise, and I'd like to be proven wrong here. Proven as in PoC. ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ -- “There's a reason we separate military and the police: one fights the enemy of the state, the other serves and protects the people. When the military becomes both, then the enemies of the state tend to become the people.” ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Some of the replies in this thread are very unfair to the original poster.I have read the news story and have thoroughly read the proof of concepts which in my opinion indicate that this is surely a security vulnerability. I have worked for Lumension as a security consultant for more than a decade. I have never thought that Google would have gone that far. Quite scary if you ask me... Do notbe discouraged, as a security researcher I have also been getting that. I can certainly certify that this is a security problem, no doubts about that.Big AlGet your free email @http://www.xtcmail.com ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
As a professional penetration tester, [...] The JSON service responds to GET requests , and there is a good chance that the service is also vulnerable to JSON Hijacking attacks. That's... not how XSSI works. To have a script inclusion vulnerability, you need to have a vanilla GET response that contains some user-specific secrets that are returned to the caller based on HTTP cookies (or, less likely, other ambient credentials). For example, a script response that discloses the contents of your mailbox or the list of private contacts would be of concern. Further, the response must be in a format that can be not only loaded, but also inspected by another site opened in your browser; most types of JSONP fall into this category, but JSON generally does not, essentially because of how the meaning of { is overloaded in JS depending on where it appears in a block of code. Last but not least, the final piece of the puzzle is that the response must be served at a URL that can be guessed by third parties who don't have access to your account. /mz ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
A hacker exploits a JSON (javascript) object that has information of interest for example holding some values for cookies. A lot of times that exploits the same policy origin. The JSON object returned from a server can be forged over writing javascript function that create the object. This happens because of the same origin policy problem in browsers that cannot say if js execution it different for two different sites. To be honest, I'm not sure I follow, but I'm fairly confident that my original point stands. If you believe that well-formed JSON objects without padding can be read across origins within the browser, I would love to see more information about that. (In this particular case, it still wouldn't matter because the response doesn't contain secrets, but it would certainly break a good chunk of the Internet.) JSONP is a different animal. /mz ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Is this treated with the same way that says that Remote File Inclusion is not a security issue ? I'm not sure how RFI came into play on this thread - the original report wasn't about RFI. I don't have an agenda here; I'm just trying to get to the bottom of it and make sure that we converge on a common understanding of the issue. As in any argument, it's fairly likely that one of us is wrong, and I accept that it could very well be me - I have been wrong quite a few times in my life, and it's always a valuable learning opportunity. I think it's unfortunate that the thread has devolved into various accusations and credential-slinging, because it reduces the likelihood of such a productive outcome. Please feel free to ping me directly any time, though - I'm happy to chat. Cheers, /mz ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
The thread read Google vulnerabilities with PoC. From my understanding it was a RFI vulnerability on YouTube, and I voiced my support that this is a vulnerability. I don't think this is accurate, at least based on the standard definition of RFI: a server-side scripting language - usually PHP - accidentally executing a script fetched from a remote server because it passed an attacker-controlled string to an API that allows both local file paths and remote URLs. The report talks about a different behavior: the ability for users to upload video and non-video content using legitimate functionality of the site, without a way to make the server do anything interesting with the received data. This may or may not be interesting on its own merit, but I think it's pretty far from RFI. I also explained a JSON Hijacking case as a follow up, and you said you didn't follow. Yup, I am genuinely not familiar with the attack vector that *I think* you are describing, or why it would matter in this context. My earlier message in this thread explains my reasoning (in essence, there are certain conditions that have to be met for a typical XSSI bug, and I don't think they are met here), but if my understanding is wrong, I'd really like to learn about the proposed attack. /mz ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
I will, it's late here, but I'm enjoying the show way too much. xD Instead of discussing why don't you show a client side attack with that thing that you call a vulnerability and make every one shut up?, oh wait...because you can't! ;-) A fail has thousand excuses, but success doesn't require any explaination. In this context a working client side exploit or a Server Shell proof is a success, any other thing is crap. Talking, complaining and showing certification don't work against a computer, a working exploit that gives you a shell does. Cheers, -- Sergio On Mar 14, 2014, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Go to sleep. -- Forwarded message -- From: Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 2:16 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: Sergio 'shadown' Alvarez shad...@gmail.com Go to sleep On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 1:50 PM, Sergio 'shadown' Alvarez shad...@gmail.com wrote: Dear Nicholas Lemonias, I don't use to get in these scrapy discussions, but yeah you are in a completetly different level if you compare yourself with Mario. You are definitely a Web app/metasploit-user guy and pick up a discussion with a binary and memory corruption ninja exploit writter like Mario. You should know your place and shut up. Period. Btw, if you dare discussing with a beast like lcamtuf, you are definitely out of your mind. Cheers, Sergio. -- Sergio On Mar 14, 2014, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: We are on a different level perhaps. We do certainly disagree on those points. I wouldn't hire you as a consultant, if you can't tell if that is a valid vulnerability.. Best Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com wrote: But do you have all the required EH certifications? Try this one from the Institute for Certified Application Security Specialists: http://www.asscert.com/ On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:41 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Thanks Michal, We are just trying to improve Google's security and contribute to the research community after all. If you are still on EFNet give me a shout some time. We have done so and consulted to hundreds of clients including Microsoft, Nokia, Adobe and some of the world's biggest corporations. We are also strict supporters of the ACM code of conduct. Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. AISec On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:29 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Hi Jerome, Thank you for agreeing on access control, and separation of duties. However successful exploitation permits arbitrary write() of any file of choice. I could release an exploit code in C Sharp or Python that permits multiple file uploads of any file/types, if the Google security team feels that this would be necessary. This is unpaid work, so we are not so keen on that job. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:04 AM, Jerome Athias athiasjer...@gmail.com wrote: Hi I concur that we are mainly discussing a terminology problem. In the context of a Penetration Test or WAPT, this is a Finding. Reporting this finding makes sense in this context. As a professional, you would have to explain if/how this finding is a Weakness*, a Violation (/Regulations, Compliance, Policies or Requirements[1]) * I would say Weakness + Exposure = Vulnerability. Vulnerability + Exploitability (PoC) = Confirmed Vulnerability that needs Business Impact and Risk Analysis So I would probably have reported this Finding as a Weakness (and not Vulnerability. See: OWASP, WASC-TC, CWE), explaining that it is not Best Practice (your OWASP link and Cheat Sheets), and even if mitigative/compensative security controls (Ref Orange Book), security controls like white listing (or at least black listing. see also ESAPI) should be 1) part of the [1]security requirements of a proper SDLC (Build security in) as per Defense-in-Depth security principles and 2) used and implemented correctly. NB: A simple Threat Model (i.e. list of CAPEC) would be a solid support to your report This would help to evaluate/measure the risk (e.g. CVSS). Helping the decision/actions around this risk PS: interestingly, in this case, I'm not sure that the Separation of Duties security principle was applied correctly by Google in term of Risk Acceptance (which could be another Finding) So in few words, be careful with the terminology. (don't always say vulnerability like the media say hacker, see RFC1392) Use a CWE ID (e.g. CWE-434, CWE-183, CWE-184 vs. CWE-616) My 2 bitcents Sorry if it is not edible :) Happy Hacking! /JA https://github.com/athiasjerome/XORCISM 2014-03-14 7:19 GMT+03:00 Michal Zalewski lcam...@coredump.cx: Nicholas, I remember my early years in the infosec community - and sadly, so do some of the more seasoned readers of this list :-) Back then, I
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Enough with this thread. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 2:37 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: I am too buy researching satellite security. Been doing that since the times of TESO, probably before you were born. Have a good night's sleep. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 2:33 PM, Sergio 'shadown' Alvarez shad...@gmail.com wrote: I will, it's late here, but I'm enjoying the show way too much. xD Instead of discussing why don't you show a client side attack with that thing that you call a vulnerability and make every one shut up?, oh wait...because you can't! ;-) A fail has thousand excuses, but success doesn't require any explaination. In this context a working client side exploit or a Server Shell proof is a success, any other thing is crap. Talking, complaining and showing certification don't work against a computer, a working exploit that gives you a shell does. Cheers, -- Sergio On Mar 14, 2014, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Go to sleep. -- Forwarded message -- From: Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 2:16 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: Sergio 'shadown' Alvarez shad...@gmail.com Go to sleep On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 1:50 PM, Sergio 'shadown' Alvarez shad...@gmail.com wrote: Dear Nicholas Lemonias, I don't use to get in these scrapy discussions, but yeah you are in a completetly different level if you compare yourself with Mario. You are definitely a Web app/metasploit-user guy and pick up a discussion with a binary and memory corruption ninja exploit writter like Mario. You should know your place and shut up. Period. Btw, if you dare discussing with a beast like lcamtuf, you are definitely out of your mind. Cheers, Sergio. -- Sergio On Mar 14, 2014, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: We are on a different level perhaps. We do certainly disagree on those points. I wouldn't hire you as a consultant, if you can't tell if that is a valid vulnerability.. Best Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.comwrote: But do you have all the required EH certifications? Try this one from the Institute for Certified Application Security Specialists: http://www.asscert.com/ On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:41 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Thanks Michal, We are just trying to improve Google's security and contribute to the research community after all. If you are still on EFNet give me a shout some time. We have done so and consulted to hundreds of clients including Microsoft, Nokia, Adobe and some of the world's biggest corporations. We are also strict supporters of the ACM code of conduct. Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. AISec On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:29 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Hi Jerome, Thank you for agreeing on access control, and separation of duties. However successful exploitation permits arbitrary write() of any file of choice. I could release an exploit code in C Sharp or Python that permits multiple file uploads of any file/types, if the Google security team feels that this would be necessary. This is unpaid work, so we are not so keen on that job. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:04 AM, Jerome Athias athiasjer...@gmail.com wrote: Hi I concur that we are mainly discussing a terminology problem. In the context of a Penetration Test or WAPT, this is a Finding. Reporting this finding makes sense in this context. As a professional, you would have to explain if/how this finding is a Weakness*, a Violation (/Regulations, Compliance, Policies or Requirements[1]) * I would say Weakness + Exposure = Vulnerability. Vulnerability + Exploitability (PoC) = Confirmed Vulnerability that needs Business Impact and Risk Analysis So I would probably have reported this Finding as a Weakness (and not Vulnerability. See: OWASP, WASC-TC, CWE), explaining that it is not Best Practice (your OWASP link and Cheat Sheets), and even if mitigative/compensative security controls (Ref Orange Book), security controls like white listing (or at least black listing. see also ESAPI) should be 1) part of the [1]security requirements of a proper SDLC (Build security in) as per Defense-in-Depth security principles and 2) used and implemented correctly. NB: A simple Threat Model (i.e. list of CAPEC) would be a solid support to your report This would help to evaluate/measure the risk (e.g. CVSS). Helping the decision/actions around this risk PS: interestingly, in this case, I'm not sure that the Separation of Duties security principle was applied correctly by Google in term of Risk Acceptance (which could be another Finding) So in few words, be careful with the terminology. (don't always say vulnerability like the media say hacker, see RFC1392) Use a
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
LOL you're hopeless. Good luck with your business. Brave customers! Cheers antisnatchor Nicholas Lemonias. wrote: People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you. -- Forwarded message -- From: *Nicholas Lemonias.* lem.niko...@googlemail.com mailto:lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:43 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com mailto:mvi...@gmail.com People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you, with a good kick outta the door. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 3:55 PM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com mailto:mvi...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com mailto:lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Jerome of Mcafee has made a very valid point on revisiting separation of duties in this security instance. Happy to see more professionals with some skills. Some others have also mentioned the feasibility for Denial of Service attacks. Remote code execution by Social Engineering is also a prominent scenario. Actually, people have been pointing out exactly the opposite. But if you insist on believing you can DoS an EC2 by uploading files, good luck to you then... If you can't tell that that is a vulnerability (probably coming from a bunch of CEH's), I feel sorry for those consultants. You're the only one throwing around certifications here. I can no longer tell if you're being serious or this is a massive prank. Nicholas. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com mailto:lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: We are on a different level perhaps. We do certainly disagree on those points. I wouldn't hire you as a consultant, if you can't tell if that is a valid vulnerability.. Best Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com mailto:mvi...@gmail.com wrote: But do you have all the required EH certifications? Try this one from the Institute for Certified Application Security Specialists: http://www.asscert.com/ On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:41 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com mailto:lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Thanks Michal, We are just trying to improve Google's security and contribute to the research community after all. If you are still on EFNet give me a shout some time. We have done so and consulted to hundreds of clients including Microsoft, Nokia, Adobe and some of the world's biggest corporations. We are also strict supporters of the ACM code of conduct. Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. AISec On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:29 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com mailto:lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Hi Jerome, Thank you for agreeing on access control, and separation of duties. However successful exploitation permits arbitrary write() of any file of choice. I could release an exploit code in C Sharp or Python that permits multiple file uploads of any file/types, if the Google security team feels that this would be necessary. This is unpaid work, so we are not so keen on that job. || On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:04 AM, Jerome Athias athiasjer...@gmail.com mailto:athiasjer...@gmail.com wrote: Hi I concur that we are mainly discussing a terminology
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
The full-disclosure mailing list has really changed. It's full of lamers nowdays aiming high. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers are FTSE 100. -- Forwarded message -- From: Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: antisnatchor antisnatc...@gmail.com Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers are FTSE 100. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:55 PM, antisnatchor antisnatc...@gmail.comwrote: LOL you're hopeless. Good luck with your business. Brave customers! Cheers antisnatchor Nicholas Lemonias. wrote: People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you. -- Forwarded message -- From: Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:43 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you, with a good kick outta the door. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 3:55 PM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Jerome of Mcafee has made a very valid point on revisiting separation of duties in this security instance. Happy to see more professionals with some skills. Some others have also mentioned the feasibility for Denial of Service attacks. Remote code execution by Social Engineering is also a prominent scenario. Actually, people have been pointing out exactly the opposite. But if you insist on believing you can DoS an EC2 by uploading files, good luck to you then... If you can't tell that that is a vulnerability (probably coming from a bunch of CEH's), I feel sorry for those consultants. You're the only one throwing around certifications here. I can no longer tell if you're being serious or this is a massive prank. Nicholas. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: We are on a different level perhaps. We do certainly disagree on those points. I wouldn't hire you as a consultant, if you can't tell if that is a valid vulnerability.. Best Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.comwrote: But do you have all the required EH certifications? Try this one from the Institute for Certified Application Security Specialists: http://www.asscert.com/ On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:41 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Thanks Michal, We are just trying to improve Google's security and contribute to the research community after all. If you are still on EFNet give me a shout some time. We have done so and consulted to hundreds of clients including Microsoft, Nokia, Adobe and some of the world's biggest corporations. We are also strict supporters of the ACM code of conduct. Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. AISec On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:29 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Hi Jerome, Thank you for agreeing on access control, and separation of duties. However successful exploitation permits arbitrary write() of any file of choice. I could release an exploit code in C Sharp or Python that permits multiple file uploads of any file/types, if the Google security team feels that this would be necessary. This is unpaid work, so we are not so keen on that job. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:04 AM, Jerome Athias athiasjer...@gmail.com wrote: Hi I concur that we are mainly discussing a terminology problem. In the context of a Penetration Test or WAPT, this is a Finding. Reporting this finding makes sense in this context. As a professional, you would have to explain if/how this finding is a Weakness*, a Violation (/Regulations, Compliance, Policies or Requirements[1]) * I would say Weakness + Exposure = Vulnerability. Vulnerability + Exploitability (PoC) = Confirmed Vulnerability that needs Business Impact and Risk Analysis So I would probably have reported this Finding as a Weakness (and not Vulnerability. See: OWASP, WASC-TC, CWE), explaining that it is not Best Practice (your OWASP link and Cheat Sheets), and even if mitigative/compensative security controls (Ref Orange Book), security controls like white listing (or at least black listing. see also ESAPI) should be 1) part of the [1]security requirements of a proper SDLC (Build security in) as per Defense-in-Depth
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
You can't even find a cross site scripting on google. Find a vuln on Google seems like a dream to some script kiddies. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:00 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: The full-disclosure mailing list has really changed. It's full of lamers nowdays aiming high. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers are FTSE 100. -- Forwarded message -- From: Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: antisnatchor antisnatc...@gmail.com Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers are FTSE 100. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:55 PM, antisnatchor antisnatc...@gmail.comwrote: LOL you're hopeless. Good luck with your business. Brave customers! Cheers antisnatchor Nicholas Lemonias. wrote: People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you. -- Forwarded message -- From: Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:43 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you, with a good kick outta the door. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 3:55 PM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Jerome of Mcafee has made a very valid point on revisiting separation of duties in this security instance. Happy to see more professionals with some skills. Some others have also mentioned the feasibility for Denial of Service attacks. Remote code execution by Social Engineering is also a prominent scenario. Actually, people have been pointing out exactly the opposite. But if you insist on believing you can DoS an EC2 by uploading files, good luck to you then... If you can't tell that that is a vulnerability (probably coming from a bunch of CEH's), I feel sorry for those consultants. You're the only one throwing around certifications here. I can no longer tell if you're being serious or this is a massive prank. Nicholas. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: We are on a different level perhaps. We do certainly disagree on those points. I wouldn't hire you as a consultant, if you can't tell if that is a valid vulnerability.. Best Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.comwrote: But do you have all the required EH certifications? Try this one from the Institute for Certified Application Security Specialists: http://www.asscert.com/ On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:41 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Thanks Michal, We are just trying to improve Google's security and contribute to the research community after all. If you are still on EFNet give me a shout some time. We have done so and consulted to hundreds of clients including Microsoft, Nokia, Adobe and some of the world's biggest corporations. We are also strict supporters of the ACM code of conduct. Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. AISec On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:29 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Hi Jerome, Thank you for agreeing on access control, and separation of duties. However successful exploitation permits arbitrary write() of any file of choice. I could release an exploit code in C Sharp or Python that permits multiple file uploads of any file/types, if the Google security team feels that this would be necessary. This is unpaid work, so we are not so keen on that job. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:04 AM, Jerome Athias athiasjer...@gmail.com wrote: Hi I concur that we are mainly discussing a terminology problem. In the context of a Penetration Test or WAPT, this is a Finding. Reporting this finding makes sense in this context. As a professional, you would have to explain if/how this finding is a Weakness*, a Violation (/Regulations, Compliance, Policies or Requirements[1]) * I would say Weakness + Exposure = Vulnerability. Vulnerability + Exploitability (PoC) = Confirmed Vulnerability that needs Business Impact and Risk Analysis So I would probably have reported this Finding as a Weakness (and not Vulnerability. See: OWASP, WASC-TC, CWE), explaining that it is not Best Practice (your OWASP link and Cheat Sheets), and even if mitigative/compensative security controls
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Ahah, I don't want to loose my time with public bug bounties, it's not even cost-effective. Sei proprio un nabbo Nicholas Lemonias. wrote: You can't even find a cross site scripting on google. Find a vuln on Google seems like a dream to some script kiddies. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:00 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com mailto:lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: The full-disclosure mailing list has really changed. It's full of lamers nowdays aiming high. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com mailto:lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers are FTSE 100. -- Forwarded message -- From: *Nicholas Lemonias.* lem.niko...@googlemail.com mailto:lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: antisnatchor antisnatc...@gmail.com mailto:antisnatc...@gmail.com Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers are FTSE 100. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:55 PM, antisnatchor antisnatc...@gmail.com mailto:antisnatc...@gmail.com wrote: LOL you're hopeless. Good luck with your business. Brave customers! Cheers antisnatchor Nicholas Lemonias. wrote: People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you. -- Forwarded message -- From: *Nicholas Lemonias.* lem.niko...@googlemail.com mailto:lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:43 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com mailto:mvi...@gmail.com People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you, with a good kick outta the door. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 3:55 PM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com mailto:mvi...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com mailto:lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Jerome of Mcafee has made a very valid point on revisiting separation of duties in this security instance. Happy to see more professionals with some skills. Some others have also mentioned the feasibility for Denial of Service attacks. Remote code execution by Social Engineering is also a prominent scenario. Actually, people have been pointing out exactly the opposite. But if you insist on believing you can DoS an EC2 by uploading files, good luck to you then... If you can't tell that that is a vulnerability (probably coming from a bunch of CEH's), I feel sorry for those consultants. You're the only one throwing around certifications here. I can no longer tell if you're being serious or this is a massive prank. Nicholas. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com mailto:lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: We are on a different level perhaps. We do certainly disagree on those points. I wouldn't hire you as a consultant, if you can't tell if that is a valid vulnerability.. Best Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com mailto:mvi...@gmail.com wrote: But do you have all the required EH certifications? Try this one
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
This is one of the most fun threads I've read in fd, and that's no small feat. Thanks for the laughs. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 3:00 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: The full-disclosure mailing list has really changed. It's full of lamers nowdays aiming high. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers are FTSE 100. -- Forwarded message -- From: Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: antisnatchor antisnatc...@gmail.com Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers are FTSE 100. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:55 PM, antisnatchor antisnatc...@gmail.comwrote: LOL you're hopeless. Good luck with your business. Brave customers! Cheers antisnatchor Nicholas Lemonias. wrote: People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you. -- Forwarded message -- From: Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:43 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you, with a good kick outta the door. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 3:55 PM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Jerome of Mcafee has made a very valid point on revisiting separation of duties in this security instance. Happy to see more professionals with some skills. Some others have also mentioned the feasibility for Denial of Service attacks. Remote code execution by Social Engineering is also a prominent scenario. Actually, people have been pointing out exactly the opposite. But if you insist on believing you can DoS an EC2 by uploading files, good luck to you then... If you can't tell that that is a vulnerability (probably coming from a bunch of CEH's), I feel sorry for those consultants. You're the only one throwing around certifications here. I can no longer tell if you're being serious or this is a massive prank. Nicholas. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: We are on a different level perhaps. We do certainly disagree on those points. I wouldn't hire you as a consultant, if you can't tell if that is a valid vulnerability.. Best Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.comwrote: But do you have all the required EH certifications? Try this one from the Institute for Certified Application Security Specialists: http://www.asscert.com/ On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:41 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Thanks Michal, We are just trying to improve Google's security and contribute to the research community after all. If you are still on EFNet give me a shout some time. We have done so and consulted to hundreds of clients including Microsoft, Nokia, Adobe and some of the world's biggest corporations. We are also strict supporters of the ACM code of conduct. Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. AISec On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:29 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Hi Jerome, Thank you for agreeing on access control, and separation of duties. However successful exploitation permits arbitrary write() of any file of choice. I could release an exploit code in C Sharp or Python that permits multiple file uploads of any file/types, if the Google security team feels that this would be necessary. This is unpaid work, so we are not so keen on that job. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:04 AM, Jerome Athias athiasjer...@gmail.com wrote: Hi I concur that we are mainly discussing a terminology problem. In the context of a Penetration Test or WAPT, this is a Finding. Reporting this finding makes sense in this context. As a professional, you would have to explain if/how this finding is a Weakness*, a Violation (/Regulations, Compliance, Policies or Requirements[1]) * I would say Weakness + Exposure = Vulnerability. Vulnerability + Exploitability (PoC) = Confirmed Vulnerability that needs Business Impact and Risk Analysis So I would probably have reported this Finding as a Weakness (and not Vulnerability. See: OWASP, WASC-TC, CWE), explaining that it is not Best Practice (your OWASP link and Cheat Sheets), and even if mitigative/compensative security controls (Ref Orange Book
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
No, you're saying something's a vulnerability without showing any indication of how it can be abused. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 11:00 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: The full-disclosure mailing list has really changed. It's full of lamers nowdays aiming high. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers are FTSE 100. -- Forwarded message -- From: Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: antisnatchor antisnatc...@gmail.com Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers are FTSE 100. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:55 PM, antisnatchor antisnatc...@gmail.com wrote: LOL you're hopeless. Good luck with your business. Brave customers! Cheers antisnatchor Nicholas Lemonias. wrote: People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you. -- Forwarded message -- From: Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:43 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you, with a good kick outta the door. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 3:55 PM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Jerome of Mcafee has made a very valid point on revisiting separation of duties in this security instance. Happy to see more professionals with some skills. Some others have also mentioned the feasibility for Denial of Service attacks. Remote code execution by Social Engineering is also a prominent scenario. Actually, people have been pointing out exactly the opposite. But if you insist on believing you can DoS an EC2 by uploading files, good luck to you then... If you can't tell that that is a vulnerability (probably coming from a bunch of CEH's), I feel sorry for those consultants. You're the only one throwing around certifications here. I can no longer tell if you're being serious or this is a massive prank. Nicholas. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: We are on a different level perhaps. We do certainly disagree on those points. I wouldn't hire you as a consultant, if you can't tell if that is a valid vulnerability.. Best Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com wrote: But do you have all the required EH certifications? Try this one from the Institute for Certified Application Security Specialists: http://www.asscert.com/ On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:41 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Thanks Michal, We are just trying to improve Google's security and contribute to the research community after all. If you are still on EFNet give me a shout some time. We have done so and consulted to hundreds of clients including Microsoft, Nokia, Adobe and some of the world's biggest corporations. We are also strict supporters of the ACM code of conduct. Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. AISec On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:29 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Hi Jerome, Thank you for agreeing on access control, and separation of duties. However successful exploitation permits arbitrary write() of any file of choice. I could release an exploit code in C Sharp or Python that permits multiple file uploads of any file/types, if the Google security team feels that this would be necessary. This is unpaid work, so we are not so keen on that job. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:04 AM, Jerome Athias athiasjer...@gmail.com wrote: Hi I concur that we are mainly discussing a terminology problem. In the context of a Penetration Test or WAPT, this is a Finding. Reporting this finding makes sense in this context. As a professional, you would have to explain if/how this finding is a Weakness*, a Violation (/Regulations, Compliance, Policies or Requirements[1]) * I would say Weakness + Exposure = Vulnerability. Vulnerability + Exploitability (PoC) = Confirmed Vulnerability that needs Business Impact and Risk Analysis So I would probably have reported this Finding as a Weakness (and not Vulnerability. See: OWASP, WASC-TC, CWE), explaining that it is not Best Practice (your OWASP link and Cheat Sheets), and even if mitigative/compensative security controls (Ref Orange Book
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Quite funnily, most erratic comments originate from a @gmail.com host. Does that mean that Google and Co are attacking the researcher ? On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:06 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Quite funnily, most erratic comments originate from a @gmail.com host. Does that mean that Google and Co are attacking the researcher ? On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:04 PM, Mike Hale eyeronic.des...@gmail.comwrote: No, you're saying something's a vulnerability without showing any indication of how it can be abused. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 11:00 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: The full-disclosure mailing list has really changed. It's full of lamers nowdays aiming high. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers are FTSE 100. -- Forwarded message -- From: Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: antisnatchor antisnatc...@gmail.com Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers are FTSE 100. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:55 PM, antisnatchor antisnatc...@gmail.com wrote: LOL you're hopeless. Good luck with your business. Brave customers! Cheers antisnatchor Nicholas Lemonias. wrote: People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you. -- Forwarded message -- From: Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:43 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you, with a good kick outta the door. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 3:55 PM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Jerome of Mcafee has made a very valid point on revisiting separation of duties in this security instance. Happy to see more professionals with some skills. Some others have also mentioned the feasibility for Denial of Service attacks. Remote code execution by Social Engineering is also a prominent scenario. Actually, people have been pointing out exactly the opposite. But if you insist on believing you can DoS an EC2 by uploading files, good luck to you then... If you can't tell that that is a vulnerability (probably coming from a bunch of CEH's), I feel sorry for those consultants. You're the only one throwing around certifications here. I can no longer tell if you're being serious or this is a massive prank. Nicholas. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: We are on a different level perhaps. We do certainly disagree on those points. I wouldn't hire you as a consultant, if you can't tell if that is a valid vulnerability.. Best Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com wrote: But do you have all the required EH certifications? Try this one from the Institute for Certified Application Security Specialists: http://www.asscert.com/ On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:41 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Thanks Michal, We are just trying to improve Google's security and contribute to the research community after all. If you are still on EFNet give me a shout some time. We have done so and consulted to hundreds of clients including Microsoft, Nokia, Adobe and some of the world's biggest corporations. We are also strict supporters of the ACM code of conduct. Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. AISec On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:29 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Hi Jerome, Thank you for agreeing on access control, and separation of duties. However successful exploitation permits arbitrary write() of any file of choice. I could release an exploit code in C Sharp or Python that permits multiple file uploads of any file/types, if the Google security team feels that this would be necessary. This is unpaid work, so we are not so keen on that job. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:04 AM, Jerome Athias athiasjer...@gmail.com wrote: Hi I concur that we are mainly discussing a terminology problem. In the context of a Penetration Test or WAPT, this is a Finding. Reporting this finding
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
LOL I don't work for Google and you can easily verify that. Also, your XSS PoCs suck, they don't even trigger automatically but the victim needs to go with the mouse over the element LOL: http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/125135/Visa-Europe-Cross-Site-Scripting.html Lame Nicholas Lemonias. wrote: Quite funnily, most erratic comments originate from a @gmail.com http://gmail.com/ host. Does that mean that Google and Co are attacking the researcher ? On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:06 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com mailto:lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Quite funnily, most erratic comments originate from a @gmail.com http://gmail.com host. Does that mean that Google and Co are attacking the researcher ? On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:04 PM, Mike Hale eyeronic.des...@gmail.com mailto:eyeronic.des...@gmail.com wrote: No, you're saying something's a vulnerability without showing any indication of how it can be abused. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 11:00 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com mailto:lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: The full-disclosure mailing list has really changed. It's full of lamers nowdays aiming high. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com mailto:lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers are FTSE 100. -- Forwarded message -- From: Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com mailto:lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: antisnatchor antisnatc...@gmail.com mailto:antisnatc...@gmail.com Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers are FTSE 100. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:55 PM, antisnatchor antisnatc...@gmail.com mailto:antisnatc...@gmail.com wrote: LOL you're hopeless. Good luck with your business. Brave customers! Cheers antisnatchor Nicholas Lemonias. wrote: People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you. -- Forwarded message -- From: Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com mailto:lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:43 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com mailto:mvi...@gmail.com People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you, with a good kick outta the door. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 3:55 PM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com mailto:mvi...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com mailto:lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Jerome of Mcafee has made a very valid point on revisiting separation of duties in this security instance. Happy to see more professionals with some skills. Some others have also mentioned the feasibility for Denial of Service attacks. Remote code execution by Social Engineering is also a prominent scenario. Actually, people have been pointing out exactly the opposite. But if you insist on believing you can DoS an EC2 by uploading files, good luck to you then... If you can't tell that that is a vulnerability (probably coming from a bunch of CEH's), I feel sorry for those consultants. You're the only one throwing around certifications here. I can no longer tell if you're being serious or this is a massive prank. Nicholas. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com mailto:lem.niko
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
That's why its called proof of concept, you lamer. Google and Co on the counter attack. hahaha On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:07 PM, antisnatchor antisnatc...@gmail.comwrote: LOL I don't work for Google and you can easily verify that. Also, your XSS PoCs suck, they don't even trigger automatically but the victim needs to go with the mouse over the element LOL: http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/125135/Visa-Europe-Cross-Site-Scripting.html Lame Nicholas Lemonias. wrote: Quite funnily, most erratic comments originate from a @gmail.com host. Does that mean that Google and Co are attacking the researcher ? On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:06 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Quite funnily, most erratic comments originate from a @gmail.com host. Does that mean that Google and Co are attacking the researcher ? On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:04 PM, Mike Hale eyeronic.des...@gmail.comwrote: No, you're saying something's a vulnerability without showing any indication of how it can be abused. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 11:00 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: The full-disclosure mailing list has really changed. It's full of lamers nowdays aiming high. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers are FTSE 100. -- Forwarded message -- From: Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: antisnatchor antisnatc...@gmail.com Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers are FTSE 100. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:55 PM, antisnatchor antisnatc...@gmail.com wrote: LOL you're hopeless. Good luck with your business. Brave customers! Cheers antisnatchor Nicholas Lemonias. wrote: People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you. -- Forwarded message -- From: Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:43 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you, with a good kick outta the door. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 3:55 PM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Jerome of Mcafee has made a very valid point on revisiting separation of duties in this security instance. Happy to see more professionals with some skills. Some others have also mentioned the feasibility for Denial of Service attacks. Remote code execution by Social Engineering is also a prominent scenario. Actually, people have been pointing out exactly the opposite. But if you insist on believing you can DoS an EC2 by uploading files, good luck to you then... If you can't tell that that is a vulnerability (probably coming from a bunch of CEH's), I feel sorry for those consultants. You're the only one throwing around certifications here. I can no longer tell if you're being serious or this is a massive prank. Nicholas. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: We are on a different level perhaps. We do certainly disagree on those points. I wouldn't hire you as a consultant, if you can't tell if that is a valid vulnerability.. Best Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com wrote: But do you have all the required EH certifications? Try this one from the Institute for Certified Application Security Specialists: http://www.asscert.com/ On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:41 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Thanks Michal, We are just trying to improve Google's security and contribute to the research community after all. If you are still on EFNet give me a shout some time. We have done so and consulted to hundreds of clients including Microsoft, Nokia, Adobe and some of the world's biggest corporations. We are also strict supporters of the ACM code of conduct. Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. AISec On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:29 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Hi Jerome, Thank you for agreeing on access control, and separation of duties. However successful exploitation permits arbitrary write() of any file
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Too bad the findings were manual.. no tools used. raw http communication. Took me less than 2 minutes to find, following an initial conv I had with Google Sec Team. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:02 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: You can't even find a cross site scripting on google. Find a vuln on Google seems like a dream to some script kiddies. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:00 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: The full-disclosure mailing list has really changed. It's full of lamers nowdays aiming high. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers are FTSE 100. -- Forwarded message -- From: Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: antisnatchor antisnatc...@gmail.com Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers are FTSE 100. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:55 PM, antisnatchor antisnatc...@gmail.comwrote: LOL you're hopeless. Good luck with your business. Brave customers! Cheers antisnatchor Nicholas Lemonias. wrote: People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you. -- Forwarded message -- From: Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:43 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you, with a good kick outta the door. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 3:55 PM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Jerome of Mcafee has made a very valid point on revisiting separation of duties in this security instance. Happy to see more professionals with some skills. Some others have also mentioned the feasibility for Denial of Service attacks. Remote code execution by Social Engineering is also a prominent scenario. Actually, people have been pointing out exactly the opposite. But if you insist on believing you can DoS an EC2 by uploading files, good luck to you then... If you can't tell that that is a vulnerability (probably coming from a bunch of CEH's), I feel sorry for those consultants. You're the only one throwing around certifications here. I can no longer tell if you're being serious or this is a massive prank. Nicholas. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: We are on a different level perhaps. We do certainly disagree on those points. I wouldn't hire you as a consultant, if you can't tell if that is a valid vulnerability.. Best Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.comwrote: But do you have all the required EH certifications? Try this one from the Institute for Certified Application Security Specialists: http://www.asscert.com/ On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:41 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Thanks Michal, We are just trying to improve Google's security and contribute to the research community after all. If you are still on EFNet give me a shout some time. We have done so and consulted to hundreds of clients including Microsoft, Nokia, Adobe and some of the world's biggest corporations. We are also strict supporters of the ACM code of conduct. Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. AISec On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:29 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Hi Jerome, Thank you for agreeing on access control, and separation of duties. However successful exploitation permits arbitrary write() of any file of choice. I could release an exploit code in C Sharp or Python that permits multiple file uploads of any file/types, if the Google security team feels that this would be necessary. This is unpaid work, so we are not so keen on that job. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:04 AM, Jerome Athias athiasjer...@gmail.com wrote: Hi I concur that we are mainly discussing a terminology problem. In the context of a Penetration Test or WAPT, this is a Finding. Reporting this finding makes sense in this context. As a professional, you would have to explain if/how this finding is a Weakness*, a Violation (/Regulations, Compliance, Policies or Requirements[1]) * I would say Weakness + Exposure = Vulnerability. Vulnerability + Exploitability (PoC) = Confirmed Vulnerability that needs Business Impact
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Security vulnerabilities need to be published and reported. That's the spirit. Attacking the researcher, won't make it go away. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:12 PM, Julius Kivimäki julius.kivim...@gmail.comwrote: Dude, seriously. Just stop. 2014-03-14 20:02 GMT+02:00 Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com : You can't even find a cross site scripting on google. Find a vuln on Google seems like a dream to some script kiddies. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:00 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: The full-disclosure mailing list has really changed. It's full of lamers nowdays aiming high. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers are FTSE 100. -- Forwarded message -- From: Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: antisnatchor antisnatc...@gmail.com Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers are FTSE 100. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:55 PM, antisnatchor antisnatc...@gmail.comwrote: LOL you're hopeless. Good luck with your business. Brave customers! Cheers antisnatchor Nicholas Lemonias. wrote: People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you. -- Forwarded message -- From: Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:43 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you, with a good kick outta the door. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 3:55 PM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Jerome of Mcafee has made a very valid point on revisiting separation of duties in this security instance. Happy to see more professionals with some skills. Some others have also mentioned the feasibility for Denial of Service attacks. Remote code execution by Social Engineering is also a prominent scenario. Actually, people have been pointing out exactly the opposite. But if you insist on believing you can DoS an EC2 by uploading files, good luck to you then... If you can't tell that that is a vulnerability (probably coming from a bunch of CEH's), I feel sorry for those consultants. You're the only one throwing around certifications here. I can no longer tell if you're being serious or this is a massive prank. Nicholas. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: We are on a different level perhaps. We do certainly disagree on those points. I wouldn't hire you as a consultant, if you can't tell if that is a valid vulnerability.. Best Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.comwrote: But do you have all the required EH certifications? Try this one from the Institute for Certified Application Security Specialists: http://www.asscert.com/ On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:41 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Thanks Michal, We are just trying to improve Google's security and contribute to the research community after all. If you are still on EFNet give me a shout some time. We have done so and consulted to hundreds of clients including Microsoft, Nokia, Adobe and some of the world's biggest corporations. We are also strict supporters of the ACM code of conduct. Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. AISec On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:29 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Hi Jerome, Thank you for agreeing on access control, and separation of duties. However successful exploitation permits arbitrary write() of any file of choice. I could release an exploit code in C Sharp or Python that permits multiple file uploads of any file/types, if the Google security team feels that this would be necessary. This is unpaid work, so we are not so keen on that job. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:04 AM, Jerome Athias athiasjer...@gmail.com wrote: Hi I concur that we are mainly discussing a terminology problem. In the context of a Penetration Test or WAPT, this is a Finding. Reporting this finding makes sense in this context. As a professional, you would have to explain if/how this finding is a Weakness*, a Violation (/Regulations, Compliance, Policies or Requirements[1]) * I would say Weakness + Exposure = Vulnerability. Vulnerability
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Google is a great service, but according to our proof of concepts (images, poc's, codes) presented to Softpedia, and verified by a couple of recognised experts including OWASP - that was a serious vulnerability. Now you can say whatever you like, and argue about it. You can argue about the impact and whatsoever , but that's not the way to deal with security issues. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:13 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Security vulnerabilities need to be published and reported. That's the spirit. Attacking the researcher, won't make it go away. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:12 PM, Julius Kivimäki julius.kivim...@gmail.com wrote: Dude, seriously. Just stop. 2014-03-14 20:02 GMT+02:00 Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com : You can't even find a cross site scripting on google. Find a vuln on Google seems like a dream to some script kiddies. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:00 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: The full-disclosure mailing list has really changed. It's full of lamers nowdays aiming high. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers are FTSE 100. -- Forwarded message -- From: Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: antisnatchor antisnatc...@gmail.com Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers are FTSE 100. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:55 PM, antisnatchor antisnatc...@gmail.comwrote: LOL you're hopeless. Good luck with your business. Brave customers! Cheers antisnatchor Nicholas Lemonias. wrote: People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you. -- Forwarded message -- From: Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:43 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you, with a good kick outta the door. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 3:55 PM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.comwrote: On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Jerome of Mcafee has made a very valid point on revisiting separation of duties in this security instance. Happy to see more professionals with some skills. Some others have also mentioned the feasibility for Denial of Service attacks. Remote code execution by Social Engineering is also a prominent scenario. Actually, people have been pointing out exactly the opposite. But if you insist on believing you can DoS an EC2 by uploading files, good luck to you then... If you can't tell that that is a vulnerability (probably coming from a bunch of CEH's), I feel sorry for those consultants. You're the only one throwing around certifications here. I can no longer tell if you're being serious or this is a massive prank. Nicholas. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: We are on a different level perhaps. We do certainly disagree on those points. I wouldn't hire you as a consultant, if you can't tell if that is a valid vulnerability.. Best Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.comwrote: But do you have all the required EH certifications? Try this one from the Institute for Certified Application Security Specialists: http://www.asscert.com/ On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:41 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Thanks Michal, We are just trying to improve Google's security and contribute to the research community after all. If you are still on EFNet give me a shout some time. We have done so and consulted to hundreds of clients including Microsoft, Nokia, Adobe and some of the world's biggest corporations. We are also strict supporters of the ACM code of conduct. Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. AISec On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:29 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Hi Jerome, Thank you for agreeing on access control, and separation of duties. However successful exploitation permits arbitrary write() of any file of choice. I could release an exploit code in C Sharp or Python that permits multiple file uploads of any file/types, if the Google security team feels that this would be necessary. This is unpaid work, so we are not so keen on that job. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:04 AM
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Google is a great service, but according to our proof of concepts (images, poc's, codes) presented to Softpedia, and verified by a couple of recognised experts including OWASP - that was a serious vulnerability. Now you can say whatever you like, and argue about it. You can argue about the impact and whatsoever , but that's not the way to deal with security issues. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:16 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Google is a great service, but according to our proof of concepts (images, poc's, codes) presented to Softpedia, and verified by a couple of recognised experts including OWASP - that was a serious vulnerability. Now you can say whatever you like, and argue about it. You can argue about the impact and whatsoever , but that's not the way to deal with security issues. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:13 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Security vulnerabilities need to be published and reported. That's the spirit. Attacking the researcher, won't make it go away. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:12 PM, Julius Kivimäki julius.kivim...@gmail.com wrote: Dude, seriously. Just stop. 2014-03-14 20:02 GMT+02:00 Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com: You can't even find a cross site scripting on google. Find a vuln on Google seems like a dream to some script kiddies. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:00 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: The full-disclosure mailing list has really changed. It's full of lamers nowdays aiming high. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers are FTSE 100. -- Forwarded message -- From: Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: antisnatchor antisnatc...@gmail.com Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers are FTSE 100. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:55 PM, antisnatchor antisnatc...@gmail.com wrote: LOL you're hopeless. Good luck with your business. Brave customers! Cheers antisnatchor Nicholas Lemonias. wrote: People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you. -- Forwarded message -- From: Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:43 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you, with a good kick outta the door. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 3:55 PM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.comwrote: On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Jerome of Mcafee has made a very valid point on revisiting separation of duties in this security instance. Happy to see more professionals with some skills. Some others have also mentioned the feasibility for Denial of Service attacks. Remote code execution by Social Engineering is also a prominent scenario. Actually, people have been pointing out exactly the opposite. But if you insist on believing you can DoS an EC2 by uploading files, good luck to you then... If you can't tell that that is a vulnerability (probably coming from a bunch of CEH's), I feel sorry for those consultants. You're the only one throwing around certifications here. I can no longer tell if you're being serious or this is a massive prank. Nicholas. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: We are on a different level perhaps. We do certainly disagree on those points. I wouldn't hire you as a consultant, if you can't tell if that is a valid vulnerability.. Best Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.comwrote: But do you have all the required EH certifications? Try this one from the Institute for Certified Application Security Specialists: http://www.asscert.com/ On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:41 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Thanks Michal, We are just trying to improve Google's security and contribute to the research community after all. If you are still on EFNet give me a shout some time. We have done so and consulted to hundreds of clients including Microsoft, Nokia, Adobe and some of the world's biggest corporations. We are also strict supporters of the ACM code of conduct. Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. AISec On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:29 AM, Nicholas Lemonias
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Jerome of MacAfee has made a very valid point on revisiting separation of duties in this security instance. Remote code execution by Social Engineering is also a prominent scenario. If you can't tell that that is a vulnerability (probably coming from a bunch of CEH's), I feel sorry for those consultants, whether employed by Google or other companies. It's usual for incompetent consultants to cover up each others asses - speaking from experience. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:30 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Jerome of Mcafee has made a very valid point on revisiting separation of duties in this security instance. Remote code execution by Social Engineering is also a prominent scenario. If you can't tell that that is a vulnerability (probably coming from a bunch of CEH's), I feel sorry for those consultants, whether employed by Google or other companies. Nicholas. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:26 PM, Thomas MacKenzie tho...@tmacuk.co.ukwrote: You have a Googlemail account. How do we know you don't work for Google too... Inception type stuff going on here. Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com 14 March 2014 18:17 Google is a great service, but according to our proof of concepts (images, poc's, codes) presented to Softpedia, and verified by a couple of recognised experts including OWASP - that was a serious vulnerability. Now you can say whatever you like, and argue about it. You can argue about the impact and whatsoever , but that's not the way to deal with security issues. ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com 14 March 2014 18:16 Google is a great service, but according to our proof of concepts (images, poc's, codes) presented to Softpedia, and verified by a couple of recognised experts including OWASP - that was a serious vulnerability. Now you can say whatever you like, and argue about it. You can argue about the impact and whatsoever , but that's not the way to deal with security issues. ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com 14 March 2014 18:13 Security vulnerabilities need to be published and reported. That's the spirit. Attacking the researcher, won't make it go away. ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com 14 March 2014 15:55 On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Jerome of Mcafee has made a very valid point on revisiting separation of duties in this security instance. Happy to see more professionals with some skills. Some others have also mentioned the feasibility for Denial of Service attacks. Remote code execution by Social Engineering is also a prominent scenario. Actually, people have been pointing out exactly the opposite. But if you insist on believing you can DoS an EC2 by uploading files, good luck to you then... If you can't tell that that is a vulnerability (probably coming from a bunch of CEH's), I feel sorry for those consultants. You're the only one throwing around certifications here. I can no longer tell if you're being serious or this is a massive prank. Nicholas. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: We are on a different level perhaps. We do certainly disagree on those points. I wouldn't hire you as a consultant, if you can't tell if that is a valid vulnerability.. Best Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com wrote: But do you have all the required EH certifications? Try this one from the Institute for Certified Application Security Specialists: http://www.asscert.com/ On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:41 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Thanks Michal, We are just trying to improve Google's security and contribute to the research community after all. If you are still on EFNet give me a shout some time. We have done so and consulted to hundreds of clients including Microsoft, Nokia, Adobe and some of the world's biggest corporations. We are also strict supporters of the ACM code of conduct. Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. AISec On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:29 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Hi Jerome, Thank you for agreeing on access control, and separation of duties. However successful exploitation permits
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Laughing at the incompetency of some people, who wish to discredit OWASP and their reports. Say that to any serious professional, and they will laugh at you. Writing arbitrary files to a remote network is a serious risk, irrelevantly of how good and reputable that service is. Best, ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
We have many PoC's including video clips. We may upload for the security world to see. However, this is not the way to treat security vulnerabilities. Attacking the researcher and bringing you friends to do aswell, won't mitigate the problem. ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Google research not awarded. http://www.techworm.net/2014/03/security-research-finds-flaws-in.html ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
You are wrong, because we do have proof of concepts. If we didn't have them, then there would be no case. But if there are video clips, images demonstrating impact - in which case arbitrary file uploads (which is a write() call ) to a remote network, then it is a vulnerability. It is not about the bounty, but rather about not defying academic literature and widely recognised practise. Attacking the arguer, won't make the bug to go away. Best, Nicholas. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:01 PM, Krzysztof Kotowicz kkotowicz...@gmail.comwrote: Nicholas, seriously, just stop. You have found an 'arbitrary file upload' in a file hosting service and claim it is a serious vulnerability. With no proof that your 'arbitrary file' is being used anywhere in any context that would lead to code execution - on server or client side. You cite OWASP documents (which are unrelated to the case), academia papers from 1975 just to find a reason it's theoretically serious, not paying any attention to what service you're actually attacking and what have you really achieved in that (which is demonstrating a filtering weakness at best, low risk). Everyone on this list so far explains why you're wrong, but you just won't stop. So you start throwing out certificates, your academia experience and your respected company. Then - name calling everyone else. Seriously, it's just a good laugh for most of us. Dude, please, just because you did not qualify for a bounty, there's no point in launching a whole campaign like you are. You're essentially following the path of Khalil Shreateh (the guy who posted on Zuckerberg FB wall) - he DID find a vuln though. Do you really want that? Go ahead, start a crowdsourcing campaign! 2014-03-14 19:40 GMT+01:00 Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com : We have many PoC's including video clips. We may upload for the security world to see. However, this is not the way to treat security vulnerabilities. Attacking the researcher and bringing you friends to do aswell, won't mitigate the problem. ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
We are not asking for a payment. But at least a thank you for our efforts would do. Saying that it is not an issue, to upload remotely any file of choice, that is ridiculous for the organisation they represent. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:09 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: You are wrong, because we do have proof of concepts. If we didn't have them, then there would be no case. But if there are video clips, images demonstrating impact - in which case arbitrary file uploads (which is a write() call ) to a remote network, then it is a vulnerability. It is not about the bounty, but rather about not defying academic literature and widely recognised practise. Attacking the arguer, won't make the bug to go away. Best, Nicholas. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:01 PM, Krzysztof Kotowicz kkotowicz...@gmail.com wrote: Nicholas, seriously, just stop. You have found an 'arbitrary file upload' in a file hosting service and claim it is a serious vulnerability. With no proof that your 'arbitrary file' is being used anywhere in any context that would lead to code execution - on server or client side. You cite OWASP documents (which are unrelated to the case), academia papers from 1975 just to find a reason it's theoretically serious, not paying any attention to what service you're actually attacking and what have you really achieved in that (which is demonstrating a filtering weakness at best, low risk). Everyone on this list so far explains why you're wrong, but you just won't stop. So you start throwing out certificates, your academia experience and your respected company. Then - name calling everyone else. Seriously, it's just a good laugh for most of us. Dude, please, just because you did not qualify for a bounty, there's no point in launching a whole campaign like you are. You're essentially following the path of Khalil Shreateh (the guy who posted on Zuckerberg FB wall) - he DID find a vuln though. Do you really want that? Go ahead, start a crowdsourcing campaign! 2014-03-14 19:40 GMT+01:00 Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com : We have many PoC's including video clips. We may upload for the security world to see. However, this is not the way to treat security vulnerabilities. Attacking the researcher and bringing you friends to do aswell, won't mitigate the problem. ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
And I am not referring just to Google. But for those people who support that remote uploads to a trusted network is not an issue. Then that also means that firewalls and IPS systems are worthless. Why spend so much time protecting the network layers if a user can send any file of choice to a remote network... On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:15 PM, Krzysztof Kotowicz kkotowicz...@gmail.comwrote: Care to report the same to Dropbox and Pastebin? It's a gold mine, you know... 2014-03-14 20:09 GMT+01:00 Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com : You are wrong, because we do have proof of concepts. If we didn't have them, then there would be no case. But if there are video clips, images demonstrating impact - in which case arbitrary file uploads (which is a write() call ) to a remote network, then it is a vulnerability. It is not about the bounty, but rather about not defying academic literature and widely recognised practise. Attacking the arguer, won't make the bug to go away. Best, Nicholas. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:01 PM, Krzysztof Kotowicz kkotowicz...@gmail.com wrote: Nicholas, seriously, just stop. You have found an 'arbitrary file upload' in a file hosting service and claim it is a serious vulnerability. With no proof that your 'arbitrary file' is being used anywhere in any context that would lead to code execution - on server or client side. You cite OWASP documents (which are unrelated to the case), academia papers from 1975 just to find a reason it's theoretically serious, not paying any attention to what service you're actually attacking and what have you really achieved in that (which is demonstrating a filtering weakness at best, low risk). Everyone on this list so far explains why you're wrong, but you just won't stop. So you start throwing out certificates, your academia experience and your respected company. Then - name calling everyone else. Seriously, it's just a good laugh for most of us. Dude, please, just because you did not qualify for a bounty, there's no point in launching a whole campaign like you are. You're essentially following the path of Khalil Shreateh (the guy who posted on Zuckerberg FB wall) - he DID find a vuln though. Do you really want that? Go ahead, start a crowdsourcing campaign! 2014-03-14 19:40 GMT+01:00 Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com: We have many PoC's including video clips. We may upload for the security world to see. However, this is not the way to treat security vulnerabilities. Attacking the researcher and bringing you friends to do aswell, won't mitigate the problem. ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
And I am not referring just to Google. But for those people who support that remote uploads to a trusted network is not an issue. Then that also means that firewalls and IPS systems are worthless. Why spend so much time protecting the network layers if a user can send any file of choice to a remote network through http. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:20 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: And I am not referring just to Google. But for those people who support that remote uploads to a trusted network is not an issue. Then that also means that firewalls and IPS systems are worthless. Why spend so much time protecting the network layers if a user can send any file of choice to a remote network... On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:15 PM, Krzysztof Kotowicz kkotowicz...@gmail.com wrote: Care to report the same to Dropbox and Pastebin? It's a gold mine, you know... 2014-03-14 20:09 GMT+01:00 Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com : You are wrong, because we do have proof of concepts. If we didn't have them, then there would be no case. But if there are video clips, images demonstrating impact - in which case arbitrary file uploads (which is a write() call ) to a remote network, then it is a vulnerability. It is not about the bounty, but rather about not defying academic literature and widely recognised practise. Attacking the arguer, won't make the bug to go away. Best, Nicholas. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:01 PM, Krzysztof Kotowicz kkotowicz...@gmail.com wrote: Nicholas, seriously, just stop. You have found an 'arbitrary file upload' in a file hosting service and claim it is a serious vulnerability. With no proof that your 'arbitrary file' is being used anywhere in any context that would lead to code execution - on server or client side. You cite OWASP documents (which are unrelated to the case), academia papers from 1975 just to find a reason it's theoretically serious, not paying any attention to what service you're actually attacking and what have you really achieved in that (which is demonstrating a filtering weakness at best, low risk). Everyone on this list so far explains why you're wrong, but you just won't stop. So you start throwing out certificates, your academia experience and your respected company. Then - name calling everyone else. Seriously, it's just a good laugh for most of us. Dude, please, just because you did not qualify for a bounty, there's no point in launching a whole campaign like you are. You're essentially following the path of Khalil Shreateh (the guy who posted on Zuckerberg FB wall) - he DID find a vuln though. Do you really want that? Go ahead, start a crowdsourcing campaign! 2014-03-14 19:40 GMT+01:00 Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com: We have many PoC's including video clips. We may upload for the security world to see. However, this is not the way to treat security vulnerabilities. Attacking the researcher and bringing you friends to do aswell, won't mitigate the problem. ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Then that also means that firewalls and IPS systems are worthless. Why spend so much time protecting the network layers if a user can send any file of choice to a remote network through http... As for the uploaded files being persistent, there is evidence of that. For instance a remote admin could be tricked to execute some of the uploaded files (Social Engineering). So our report sent as part of Google's security program, should not be treated as a non-security issue. Thanks, On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:23 PM, R D rd.secli...@gmail.com wrote: I'm going to try to spell it out clearly. You don't have unrestricted file upload[1]. Keep in mind you're trying to abuse youtube, which is essentially a video file upload service. So the fact that you can upload files is not surprising. Now you're uploading non-video files. Cool. But not earth-shattering. They are not accessible to anyone but you, as far as I can tell, and I don't even think you can access the file contents on the remote server, but please prove me wrong on both points. You are still, as far as I can tell, bound by the per-file and per-account quota on disk occupation, so you don't have a DoS by resource exhaustion. You can't force server-side file path, so you don't have RFI or DoS by messing with the remote file system. You can't execute the files you uploaded, so you don't have arbitrary code execution. But you are right about what your PoC does. You bypassed a security control, you uploaded crap on youtube servers, and by that you exhausted their resources by a fraction of the quota they allow you when signing up. BTW, I don't think they keep invalid video files for an indefinite period of time in a user account, but I might be wrong. The burden of proof is still on your side as to whether or not the bug you found has any impact that was not already accepted by youtube allowing registered users to upload whatever crap they see fit as long as it is video. You failed to provide this proof, and please be sure the audience of fulldisclosure is not attacking the researcher but working with you to have a better understanding of the bug you found, even though you kinda acted like a fool in this thread. Please keep on searching and finding vulns, please keep on publishing them, and use this as a learning experience that not all bugs or control bypasses are security vulnerabilities. --Rob' [1] As per OWASP (https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Unrestricted_File_Upload ): There are really two classes of problems here. The first is with the file metadata, like the path and file name. These are generally provided by the transport, such as HTTP multi-part encoding. This data may trick the application into overwriting a critical file or storing the file in a bad location. You must validate the metadata extremely carefully before using it. Your POC doesn't demonstrate that. The other class of problem is with the file size or content. The range of problems here depends entirely on what the file is used for. See the examples below for some ideas about how files might be misused. To protect against this type of attack, you should analyze everything your application does with files and think carefully about what processing and interpreters are involved. Your POC kinda does that, but you didn't provide proof it's possible to execute what you uploaded, either using social engineering or any other method. Also, please don't say verified by a couple of recognised experts including OWASP unless you actually spoke with someone @owasp and she validated your findings. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:40 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: We have many PoC's including video clips. We may upload for the security world to see. However, this is not the way to treat security vulnerabilities. Attacking the researcher and bringing you friends to do aswell, won't mitigate the problem. ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
It is an example, citing that there has been a security hole on Youtube that needs patching. End of Story. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:32 PM, Julius Kivimäki julius.kivim...@gmail.comwrote: Wait, so remote code execution by social engineering wasn't a troll? I'm confused. 2014-03-14 21:28 GMT+02:00 Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com : Then that also means that firewalls and IPS systems are worthless. Why spend so much time protecting the network layers if a user can send any file of choice to a remote network through http... As for the uploaded files being persistent, there is evidence of that. For instance a remote admin could be tricked to execute some of the uploaded files (Social Engineering). So our report sent as part of Google's security program, should not be treated as a non-security issue. Thanks, On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:23 PM, R D rd.secli...@gmail.com wrote: I'm going to try to spell it out clearly. You don't have unrestricted file upload[1]. Keep in mind you're trying to abuse youtube, which is essentially a video file upload service. So the fact that you can upload files is not surprising. Now you're uploading non-video files. Cool. But not earth-shattering. They are not accessible to anyone but you, as far as I can tell, and I don't even think you can access the file contents on the remote server, but please prove me wrong on both points. You are still, as far as I can tell, bound by the per-file and per-account quota on disk occupation, so you don't have a DoS by resource exhaustion. You can't force server-side file path, so you don't have RFI or DoS by messing with the remote file system. You can't execute the files you uploaded, so you don't have arbitrary code execution. But you are right about what your PoC does. You bypassed a security control, you uploaded crap on youtube servers, and by that you exhausted their resources by a fraction of the quota they allow you when signing up. BTW, I don't think they keep invalid video files for an indefinite period of time in a user account, but I might be wrong. The burden of proof is still on your side as to whether or not the bug you found has any impact that was not already accepted by youtube allowing registered users to upload whatever crap they see fit as long as it is video. You failed to provide this proof, and please be sure the audience of fulldisclosure is not attacking the researcher but working with you to have a better understanding of the bug you found, even though you kinda acted like a fool in this thread. Please keep on searching and finding vulns, please keep on publishing them, and use this as a learning experience that not all bugs or control bypasses are security vulnerabilities. --Rob' [1] As per OWASP ( https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Unrestricted_File_Upload): There are really two classes of problems here. The first is with the file metadata, like the path and file name. These are generally provided by the transport, such as HTTP multi-part encoding. This data may trick the application into overwriting a critical file or storing the file in a bad location. You must validate the metadata extremely carefully before using it. Your POC doesn't demonstrate that. The other class of problem is with the file size or content. The range of problems here depends entirely on what the file is used for. See the examples below for some ideas about how files might be misused. To protect against this type of attack, you should analyze everything your application does with files and think carefully about what processing and interpreters are involved. Your POC kinda does that, but you didn't provide proof it's possible to execute what you uploaded, either using social engineering or any other method. Also, please don't say verified by a couple of recognised experts including OWASP unless you actually spoke with someone @owasp and she validated your findings. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:40 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: We have many PoC's including video clips. We may upload for the security world to see. However, this is not the way to treat security vulnerabilities. Attacking the researcher and bringing you friends to do aswell, won't mitigate the problem. ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0upload_id= AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1-- uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aworigin= CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw That information can be queried from the db, where the metadata are saved. The files are being saved persistently , as per the above example. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:04 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0upload_id=AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aworigin=CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw That information can be queried from the db, where the metadata are saved. The files are being saved persistently , as per the above example. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:00 PM, Chris Thompson christhom7...@gmail.comwrote: Hi Nikolas, Please do read (and understand) my entire email before responding - I understand your frustration trying to get your message across but maybe this will help. Please put aside professional pride for the time being - I know how it feels to be passionate about something yet have others simply not understand. Let me try and bring some sanity to the discussion and explain to you why people maybe not agreeing with you. You (rightly so) highlighted what you believe to be an issue in a Youtube whereby it appears (to you) than you can upload an arbitrary file. If you can indeed do this as you suspect then your points are valid and you may be able to cause various issues associated with it such as DOS etc - especially if the uploaded files cannot or are not tracked. However... Consider than you are talking to an API and what you are getting back (the JSON response) in your example is simply a response from the API to say the file you uploaded has been received and saved. Now, as you no doubt know, when you upload a regular movie to YouTube, once uploaded it goes away and does some post-processing, converting it to flash for example. What's to say that there isn't some verification aspect to this post-processing that checks if the file is intact a valid movie and if not removes it. If you could for example demonstrate that the file was indeed persistent, by being able to retrieve it for example then again, you would have solid ground to claim an issue however your claims at this point are based on an assumption Let me explain. 1. You have demonstrated than you can send any file to an API and the API returned an acknowledgment of receiving (and saving) the file. 2. You / we don't know what Google do with files once they have been received from the API - maybe they process them and validate them - we simply don't know. 3. You have hypothesized that you can retrieve the file by manipulating tokens etc and you may be right, but you have not demonstrated it as such. Because of this, you seem to have made a CLAIM that you can upload arbitrary files to Google however SHOWN that you can simply send files to an API and an API responds in a certain way. I am NOT saying you haven't found an issue, what I am saying is that you need to demonstrate that the issue is real and thus can be abused. If the Google service simply verifies all uploaded files once they are uploaded and discards them if invalid, then you haven't really found anything. If you were to prove that you were able to retrieve this uploaded file then how could anyone dispute your bug. Hope this helps Cheers! ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
My claim is now verified Cheers! On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:04 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0upload_id= AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1-- uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aworigin= CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw That information can be queried from the db, where the metadata are saved. The files are being saved persistently , as per the above example. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:04 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0upload_id=AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aworigin=CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw That information can be queried from the db, where the metadata are saved. The files are being saved persistently , as per the above example. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:00 PM, Chris Thompson christhom7...@gmail.comwrote: Hi Nikolas, Please do read (and understand) my entire email before responding - I understand your frustration trying to get your message across but maybe this will help. Please put aside professional pride for the time being - I know how it feels to be passionate about something yet have others simply not understand. Let me try and bring some sanity to the discussion and explain to you why people maybe not agreeing with you. You (rightly so) highlighted what you believe to be an issue in a Youtube whereby it appears (to you) than you can upload an arbitrary file. If you can indeed do this as you suspect then your points are valid and you may be able to cause various issues associated with it such as DOS etc - especially if the uploaded files cannot or are not tracked. However... Consider than you are talking to an API and what you are getting back (the JSON response) in your example is simply a response from the API to say the file you uploaded has been received and saved. Now, as you no doubt know, when you upload a regular movie to YouTube, once uploaded it goes away and does some post-processing, converting it to flash for example. What's to say that there isn't some verification aspect to this post-processing that checks if the file is intact a valid movie and if not removes it. If you could for example demonstrate that the file was indeed persistent, by being able to retrieve it for example then again, you would have solid ground to claim an issue however your claims at this point are based on an assumption Let me explain. 1. You have demonstrated than you can send any file to an API and the API returned an acknowledgment of receiving (and saving) the file. 2. You / we don't know what Google do with files once they have been received from the API - maybe they process them and validate them - we simply don't know. 3. You have hypothesized that you can retrieve the file by manipulating tokens etc and you may be right, but you have not demonstrated it as such. Because of this, you seem to have made a CLAIM that you can upload arbitrary files to Google however SHOWN that you can simply send files to an API and an API responds in a certain way. I am NOT saying you haven't found an issue, what I am saying is that you need to demonstrate that the issue is real and thus can be abused. If the Google service simply verifies all uploaded files once they are uploaded and discards them if invalid, then you haven't really found anything. If you were to prove that you were able to retrieve this uploaded file then how could anyone dispute your bug. Hope this helps Cheers! ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
So you can query a file that I uploaded, and you can see that is uploaded successfully and saved. That information does not require the user to be logged in. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:08 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: My claim is now verified Cheers! On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:04 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0upload_id= AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1-- uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aworigin= CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw That information can be queried from the db, where the metadata are saved. The files are being saved persistently , as per the above example. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:04 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0upload_id=AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aworigin=CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw That information can be queried from the db, where the metadata are saved. The files are being saved persistently , as per the above example. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:00 PM, Chris Thompson christhom7...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Nikolas, Please do read (and understand) my entire email before responding - I understand your frustration trying to get your message across but maybe this will help. Please put aside professional pride for the time being - I know how it feels to be passionate about something yet have others simply not understand. Let me try and bring some sanity to the discussion and explain to you why people maybe not agreeing with you. You (rightly so) highlighted what you believe to be an issue in a Youtube whereby it appears (to you) than you can upload an arbitrary file. If you can indeed do this as you suspect then your points are valid and you may be able to cause various issues associated with it such as DOS etc - especially if the uploaded files cannot or are not tracked. However... Consider than you are talking to an API and what you are getting back (the JSON response) in your example is simply a response from the API to say the file you uploaded has been received and saved. Now, as you no doubt know, when you upload a regular movie to YouTube, once uploaded it goes away and does some post-processing, converting it to flash for example. What's to say that there isn't some verification aspect to this post-processing that checks if the file is intact a valid movie and if not removes it. If you could for example demonstrate that the file was indeed persistent, by being able to retrieve it for example then again, you would have solid ground to claim an issue however your claims at this point are based on an assumption Let me explain. 1. You have demonstrated than you can send any file to an API and the API returned an acknowledgment of receiving (and saving) the file. 2. You / we don't know what Google do with files once they have been received from the API - maybe they process them and validate them - we simply don't know. 3. You have hypothesized that you can retrieve the file by manipulating tokens etc and you may be right, but you have not demonstrated it as such. Because of this, you seem to have made a CLAIM that you can upload arbitrary files to Google however SHOWN that you can simply send files to an API and an API responds in a certain way. I am NOT saying you haven't found an issue, what I am saying is that you need to demonstrate that the issue is real and thus can be abused. If the Google service simply verifies all uploaded files once they are uploaded and discards them if invalid, then you haven't really found anything. If you were to prove that you were able to retrieve this uploaded file then how could anyone dispute your bug. Hope this helps Cheers! ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
You are trying to execute an sh script through a video player. That's an exec() command. So its the wrong way about accessing the file. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:20 PM, R D rd.secli...@gmail.com wrote: No it's not. As Chris and I are saying, you don't have proof your file is accessible to others, only that is was uploaded. Now, you see, when you upload a video to youtube, you get the adress where it will be viewable in the response. In your case : {sessionStatus:{state:FINALIZED,externalFieldTransfers:[{name:file,status:COMPLETED,bytesTransferred:113,bytesTotal:113,formPostInfo:{url: http://www.youtube.com/upload/rupio?authuser=0\u0026upload_id=AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aw\u0026file_id=000 ,cross_domain_url: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0\u0026upload_id=AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aw\u0026origin=CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw},content_type:text/x-sh}],additionalInfo:{uploader_service.GoogleRupioAdditionalInfo:{completionInfo:{status:SUCCESS,customerSpecificInfo:{status: ok, *video_id: KzKDtijwHFI* ,upload_id:AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aw}} And what do we get when we browse to https://youtube.com/watch?v=KzKDtijwHFI ? Nothing. Can you send me a link where I can access the file content of the arbitrary file you uploaded? Are you sure this json response, or this file, will be there in a month? Or in a year? Is the fact that this json response exists a threat to youtube? Can you quantify how of a threat? How much, in dollars, does it hurt their business? --Rob On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 9:08 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: My claim is now verified Cheers! On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:04 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0upload_id= AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1-- uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aworigin= CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw That information can be queried from the db, where the metadata are saved. The files are being saved persistently , as per the above example. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:04 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0upload_id=AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aworigin=CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw That information can be queried from the db, where the metadata are saved. The files are being saved persistently , as per the above example. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:00 PM, Chris Thompson christhom7...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Nikolas, Please do read (and understand) my entire email before responding - I understand your frustration trying to get your message across but maybe this will help. Please put aside professional pride for the time being - I know how it feels to be passionate about something yet have others simply not understand. Let me try and bring some sanity to the discussion and explain to you why people maybe not agreeing with you. You (rightly so) highlighted what you believe to be an issue in a Youtube whereby it appears (to you) than you can upload an arbitrary file. If you can indeed do this as you suspect then your points are valid and you may be able to cause various issues associated with it such as DOS etc - especially if the uploaded files cannot or are not tracked. However... Consider than you are talking to an API and what you are getting back (the JSON response) in your example is simply a response from the API to say the file you uploaded has been received and saved. Now, as you no doubt know, when you upload a regular movie to YouTube, once uploaded it goes away and does some post-processing, converting it to flash for example. What's to say that there isn't some verification aspect to this post-processing that checks if the file is intact a valid movie and if not removes it. If you could for example demonstrate that the file was indeed persistent, by being able to retrieve it for example then again, you would have solid ground to claim an issue however your claims at this point are based on an assumption Let me explain. 1. You have demonstrated than you can send any file to an API and the API returned an acknowledgment of receiving (and saving) the file. 2. You / we don't know what Google do with files once they have been received from the API - maybe they process them and validate them - we simply don't know. 3. You have hypothesized that you can retrieve the file by manipulating tokens etc and you may be right, but you have not demonstrated it as such. Because of this, you seem to have
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Are you sure this json response, or this file, will be there in a month? Or in a year? Is the fact that this json response exists a threat to youtube? Can you quantify how of a threat? How much, in dollars, does it hurt their business? This file may be here if the admins don't delete it. Now they may do ;@) So where do you think that information is coming from? The metadata and tags, and headers are contained in a database. The files are stored persistently , since they can be quoted. So the API works both ways. The main thing here is that the files are there, otherwise there metadata information would be deleted from the db aswell. http://gdata.youtube.com/demo/index.html?utm_source= twitterfeedutm_medium=twitter Youtube DATA API is unique.. the commands can be send through that interface... So we do definitely know that that is coming from a database. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:22 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: You are trying to execute an sh script through a video player. That's an exec() command. So its the wrong way about accessing the file. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:20 PM, R D rd.secli...@gmail.com wrote: No it's not. As Chris and I are saying, you don't have proof your file is accessible to others, only that is was uploaded. Now, you see, when you upload a video to youtube, you get the adress where it will be viewable in the response. In your case : {sessionStatus:{state:FINALIZED,externalFieldTransfers:[{name:file,status:COMPLETED,bytesTransferred:113,bytesTotal:113,formPostInfo:{url: http://www.youtube.com/upload/rupio?authuser=0\u0026upload_id=AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aw\u0026file_id=000 ,cross_domain_url: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0\u0026upload_id=AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aw\u0026origin=CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw},content_type:text/x-sh}],additionalInfo:{uploader_service.GoogleRupioAdditionalInfo:{completionInfo:{status:SUCCESS,customerSpecificInfo:{status: ok, *video_id: KzKDtijwHFI* ,upload_id:AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aw}} And what do we get when we browse to https://youtube.com/watch?v=KzKDtijwHFI ? Nothing. Can you send me a link where I can access the file content of the arbitrary file you uploaded? Are you sure this json response, or this file, will be there in a month? Or in a year? Is the fact that this json response exists a threat to youtube? Can you quantify how of a threat? How much, in dollars, does it hurt their business? --Rob On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 9:08 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: My claim is now verified Cheers! On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:04 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0upload_id= AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1-- uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aworigin= CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw That information can be queried from the db, where the metadata are saved. The files are being saved persistently , as per the above example. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:04 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0upload_id=AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aworigin=CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw That information can be queried from the db, where the metadata are saved. The files are being saved persistently , as per the above example. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:00 PM, Chris Thompson christhom7...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Nikolas, Please do read (and understand) my entire email before responding - I understand your frustration trying to get your message across but maybe this will help. Please put aside professional pride for the time being - I know how it feels to be passionate about something yet have others simply not understand. Let me try and bring some sanity to the discussion and explain to you why people maybe not agreeing with you. You (rightly so) highlighted what you believe to be an issue in a Youtube whereby it appears (to you) than you can upload an arbitrary file. If you can indeed do this as you suspect then your points are valid and you may be able to cause various issues associated with it such as DOS etc - especially if the uploaded files cannot or are not tracked. However... Consider than you are talking to an API and what you are getting back (the JSON response) in your example is simply a response from the API to say the file you uploaded has been received and saved. Now, as you no doubt know, when you upload a regular movie to YouTube, once uploaded it goes away and
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
So where do you think that information is coming from? The metadata and tags, and headers are contained in a database. The files are stored persistently , since they can be quoted. So the API works both ways. The main thing here is that the files are there, otherwise there metadata information would be deleted from the db aswell. http://gdata.youtube.com/demo/index.html?utm_source= twitterfeedutm_medium=twitter Youtube DATA API is unique.. the commands can be send through that interface... So we do definitely know that that is coming from a database. That same video id can be queried through the above link. Having done so, I confirmed that the information originate from a direct connection to the db, where the data are stored. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:20 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: So where do you think that information is coming from? The metadata and tags, and headers are contained in a database. The files are stored persistently , since they can be quoted. So the API works both ways. The main thing here is that the files are there, otherwise there metadata information would be deleted from the db aswell. http://gdata.youtube.com/demo/index.html?utm_source=twitterfeedutm_medium=twitter Youtube DATA API is unique.. the commands can be send through that interface... So we do definitely know that that is coming from a database. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:16 PM, Chris Thompson christhom7...@gmail.comwrote: Hi Nicholas, Again, you hypothesize that you are getting a response from the database, but you really don't know that. You have no idea when the code is doing behind the endpoint. upload.youtube.com is simple an endpoint that you are sending a request to and getting a response from - Can you upload a ZIP file for example and then get that same ZIP file from another machine? If you can do that, then who can question your bug. Again, i'm not trying to be a dick - just trying to help! Cheers... On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 4:08 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: My claim is now verified Cheers! On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:04 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0upload_id= AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1-- uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aworigin= CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw That information can be queried from the db, where the metadata are saved. The files are being saved persistently , as per the above example. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:04 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0upload_id=AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aworigin=CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw That information can be queried from the db, where the metadata are saved. The files are being saved persistently , as per the above example. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:00 PM, Chris Thompson christhom7...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Nikolas, Please do read (and understand) my entire email before responding - I understand your frustration trying to get your message across but maybe this will help. Please put aside professional pride for the time being - I know how it feels to be passionate about something yet have others simply not understand. Let me try and bring some sanity to the discussion and explain to you why people maybe not agreeing with you. You (rightly so) highlighted what you believe to be an issue in a Youtube whereby it appears (to you) than you can upload an arbitrary file. If you can indeed do this as you suspect then your points are valid and you may be able to cause various issues associated with it such as DOS etc - especially if the uploaded files cannot or are not tracked. However... Consider than you are talking to an API and what you are getting back (the JSON response) in your example is simply a response from the API to say the file you uploaded has been received and saved. Now, as you no doubt know, when you upload a regular movie to YouTube, once uploaded it goes away and does some post-processing, converting it to flash for example. What's to say that there isn't some verification aspect to this post-processing that checks if the file is intact a valid movie and if not removes it. If you could for example demonstrate that the file was indeed persistent, by being able to retrieve it for example then again, you would have solid ground to claim an issue however your claims at this point are based on an assumption Let me explain. 1. You have demonstrated than you can send any file to an API and the API returned an acknowledgment of receiving (and saving) the file. 2. You / we don't know what Google do with files once they have been received from the API - maybe they process
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
In my expertise, that is a vulnerability. Now if Google doesn't want to fix patch that, it's their choice. However I have already disclosed that to them. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:25 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: So where do you think that information is coming from? The metadata and tags, and headers are contained in a database. The files are stored persistently , since they can be quoted. So the API works both ways. The main thing here is that the files are there, otherwise there metadata information would be deleted from the db aswell. http://gdata.youtube.com/demo/index.html?utm_source= twitterfeedutm_medium=twitter Youtube DATA API is unique.. the commands can be send through that interface... So we do definitely know that that is coming from a database. That same video id can be queried through the above link. Having done so, I confirmed that the information originate from a direct connection to the db, where the data are stored. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:20 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: So where do you think that information is coming from? The metadata and tags, and headers are contained in a database. The files are stored persistently , since they can be quoted. So the API works both ways. The main thing here is that the files are there, otherwise there metadata information would be deleted from the db aswell. http://gdata.youtube.com/demo/index.html?utm_source=twitterfeedutm_medium=twitter Youtube DATA API is unique.. the commands can be send through that interface... So we do definitely know that that is coming from a database. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:16 PM, Chris Thompson christhom7...@gmail.comwrote: Hi Nicholas, Again, you hypothesize that you are getting a response from the database, but you really don't know that. You have no idea when the code is doing behind the endpoint. upload.youtube.com is simple an endpoint that you are sending a request to and getting a response from - Can you upload a ZIP file for example and then get that same ZIP file from another machine? If you can do that, then who can question your bug. Again, i'm not trying to be a dick - just trying to help! Cheers... On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 4:08 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: My claim is now verified Cheers! On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:04 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0upload_id= AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1-- uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aworigin= CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw That information can be queried from the db, where the metadata are saved. The files are being saved persistently , as per the above example. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:04 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0upload_id=AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aworigin=CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw That information can be queried from the db, where the metadata are saved. The files are being saved persistently , as per the above example. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:00 PM, Chris Thompson christhom7...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Nikolas, Please do read (and understand) my entire email before responding - I understand your frustration trying to get your message across but maybe this will help. Please put aside professional pride for the time being - I know how it feels to be passionate about something yet have others simply not understand. Let me try and bring some sanity to the discussion and explain to you why people maybe not agreeing with you. You (rightly so) highlighted what you believe to be an issue in a Youtube whereby it appears (to you) than you can upload an arbitrary file. If you can indeed do this as you suspect then your points are valid and you may be able to cause various issues associated with it such as DOS etc - especially if the uploaded files cannot or are not tracked. However... Consider than you are talking to an API and what you are getting back (the JSON response) in your example is simply a response from the API to say the file you uploaded has been received and saved. Now, as you no doubt know, when you upload a regular movie to YouTube, once uploaded it goes away and does some post-processing, converting it to flash for example. What's to say that there isn't some verification aspect to this post-processing that checks if the file is intact a valid movie and if not removes it. If you could for example demonstrate that the file was indeed persistent, by being able to retrieve it for example then again, you would have solid ground to claim an issue however your claims at this point are based on an assumption Let
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
[image: Inline image 1] On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:07 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Quite funnily, most erratic comments originate from a @gmail.com host. Does that mean that Google and Co are attacking the researcher ? On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:06 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Quite funnily, most erratic comments originate from a @gmail.com host. Does that mean that Google and Co are attacking the researcher ? On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:04 PM, Mike Hale eyeronic.des...@gmail.comwrote: No, you're saying something's a vulnerability without showing any indication of how it can be abused. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 11:00 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: The full-disclosure mailing list has really changed. It's full of lamers nowdays aiming high. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers are FTSE 100. -- Forwarded message -- From: Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: antisnatchor antisnatc...@gmail.com Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers are FTSE 100. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:55 PM, antisnatchor antisnatc...@gmail.com wrote: LOL you're hopeless. Good luck with your business. Brave customers! Cheers antisnatchor Nicholas Lemonias. wrote: People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you. -- Forwarded message -- From: Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:43 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you, with a good kick outta the door. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 3:55 PM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Jerome of Mcafee has made a very valid point on revisiting separation of duties in this security instance. Happy to see more professionals with some skills. Some others have also mentioned the feasibility for Denial of Service attacks. Remote code execution by Social Engineering is also a prominent scenario. Actually, people have been pointing out exactly the opposite. But if you insist on believing you can DoS an EC2 by uploading files, good luck to you then... If you can't tell that that is a vulnerability (probably coming from a bunch of CEH's), I feel sorry for those consultants. You're the only one throwing around certifications here. I can no longer tell if you're being serious or this is a massive prank. Nicholas. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: We are on a different level perhaps. We do certainly disagree on those points. I wouldn't hire you as a consultant, if you can't tell if that is a valid vulnerability.. Best Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com wrote: But do you have all the required EH certifications? Try this one from the Institute for Certified Application Security Specialists: http://www.asscert.com/ On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:41 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Thanks Michal, We are just trying to improve Google's security and contribute to the research community after all. If you are still on EFNet give me a shout some time. We have done so and consulted to hundreds of clients including Microsoft, Nokia, Adobe and some of the world's biggest corporations. We are also strict supporters of the ACM code of conduct. Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. AISec On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:29 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Hi Jerome, Thank you for agreeing on access control, and separation of duties. However successful exploitation permits arbitrary write() of any file of choice. I could release an exploit code in C Sharp or Python that permits multiple file uploads of any file/types, if the Google security team feels that this would be necessary. This is unpaid work, so we are not so keen on that job. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:04 AM, Jerome Athias athiasjer...@gmail.com wrote: Hi I concur that we are mainly
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
So if you can upload a file to Google Drive and trick someone to run it, you'd call that a vulnerability too? Hey, I've got another one. I can upload a video on Youtube telling people to download and install a virus. I'll claim a prize too! Keep at it man, you're hilarious! xDDD /me goes grab more popcorn On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:28 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Then that also means that firewalls and IPS systems are worthless. Why spend so much time protecting the network layers if a user can send any file of choice to a remote network through http... As for the uploaded files being persistent, there is evidence of that. For instance a remote admin could be tricked to execute some of the uploaded files (Social Engineering). So our report sent as part of Google's security program, should not be treated as a non-security issue. Thanks, On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:23 PM, R D rd.secli...@gmail.com wrote: I'm going to try to spell it out clearly. You don't have unrestricted file upload[1]. Keep in mind you're trying to abuse youtube, which is essentially a video file upload service. So the fact that you can upload files is not surprising. Now you're uploading non-video files. Cool. But not earth-shattering. They are not accessible to anyone but you, as far as I can tell, and I don't even think you can access the file contents on the remote server, but please prove me wrong on both points. You are still, as far as I can tell, bound by the per-file and per-account quota on disk occupation, so you don't have a DoS by resource exhaustion. You can't force server-side file path, so you don't have RFI or DoS by messing with the remote file system. You can't execute the files you uploaded, so you don't have arbitrary code execution. But you are right about what your PoC does. You bypassed a security control, you uploaded crap on youtube servers, and by that you exhausted their resources by a fraction of the quota they allow you when signing up. BTW, I don't think they keep invalid video files for an indefinite period of time in a user account, but I might be wrong. The burden of proof is still on your side as to whether or not the bug you found has any impact that was not already accepted by youtube allowing registered users to upload whatever crap they see fit as long as it is video. You failed to provide this proof, and please be sure the audience of fulldisclosure is not attacking the researcher but working with you to have a better understanding of the bug you found, even though you kinda acted like a fool in this thread. Please keep on searching and finding vulns, please keep on publishing them, and use this as a learning experience that not all bugs or control bypasses are security vulnerabilities. --Rob' [1] As per OWASP ( https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Unrestricted_File_Upload): There are really two classes of problems here. The first is with the file metadata, like the path and file name. These are generally provided by the transport, such as HTTP multi-part encoding. This data may trick the application into overwriting a critical file or storing the file in a bad location. You must validate the metadata extremely carefully before using it. Your POC doesn't demonstrate that. The other class of problem is with the file size or content. The range of problems here depends entirely on what the file is used for. See the examples below for some ideas about how files might be misused. To protect against this type of attack, you should analyze everything your application does with files and think carefully about what processing and interpreters are involved. Your POC kinda does that, but you didn't provide proof it's possible to execute what you uploaded, either using social engineering or any other method. Also, please don't say verified by a couple of recognised experts including OWASP unless you actually spoke with someone @owasp and she validated your findings. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:40 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: We have many PoC's including video clips. We may upload for the security world to see. However, this is not the way to treat security vulnerabilities. Attacking the researcher and bringing you friends to do aswell, won't mitigate the problem. ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ -- “There's a reason we separate military and the police: one fights the enemy of the state, the other serves and protects the people. When the military becomes both, then the enemies of the
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Please provide an attack scenario. Can you do that? On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 9:23 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Are you sure this json response, or this file, will be there in a month? Or in a year? Is the fact that this json response exists a threat to youtube? Can you quantify how of a threat? How much, in dollars, does it hurt their business? This file may be here if the admins don't delete it. Now they may do ;@) So where do you think that information is coming from? The metadata and tags, and headers are contained in a database. The files are stored persistently , since they can be quoted. So the API works both ways. The main thing here is that the files are there, otherwise there metadata information would be deleted from the db aswell. http://gdata.youtube.com/demo/index.html?utm_source= twitterfeedutm_medium=twitter Youtube DATA API is unique.. the commands can be send through that interface... So we do definitely know that that is coming from a database. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:22 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: You are trying to execute an sh script through a video player. That's an exec() command. So its the wrong way about accessing the file. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:20 PM, R D rd.secli...@gmail.com wrote: No it's not. As Chris and I are saying, you don't have proof your file is accessible to others, only that is was uploaded. Now, you see, when you upload a video to youtube, you get the adress where it will be viewable in the response. In your case : {sessionStatus:{state:FINALIZED,externalFieldTransfers:[{name:file,status:COMPLETED,bytesTransferred:113,bytesTotal:113,formPostInfo:{url: http://www.youtube.com/upload/rupio?authuser=0\u0026upload_id=AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aw\u0026file_id=000 ,cross_domain_url: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0\u0026upload_id=AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aw\u0026origin=CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw},content_type:text/x-sh}],additionalInfo:{uploader_service.GoogleRupioAdditionalInfo:{completionInfo:{status:SUCCESS,customerSpecificInfo:{status: ok, *video_id: KzKDtijwHFI* ,upload_id:AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aw}} And what do we get when we browse to https://youtube.com/watch?v=KzKDtijwHFI ? Nothing. Can you send me a link where I can access the file content of the arbitrary file you uploaded? Are you sure this json response, or this file, will be there in a month? Or in a year? Is the fact that this json response exists a threat to youtube? Can you quantify how of a threat? How much, in dollars, does it hurt their business? --Rob On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 9:08 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: My claim is now verified Cheers! On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:04 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0upload_id= AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1-- uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aworigin= CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw That information can be queried from the db, where the metadata are saved. The files are being saved persistently , as per the above example. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:04 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0upload_id=AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aworigin=CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw That information can be queried from the db, where the metadata are saved. The files are being saved persistently , as per the above example. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:00 PM, Chris Thompson christhom7...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Nikolas, Please do read (and understand) my entire email before responding - I understand your frustration trying to get your message across but maybe this will help. Please put aside professional pride for the time being - I know how it feels to be passionate about something yet have others simply not understand. Let me try and bring some sanity to the discussion and explain to you why people maybe not agreeing with you. You (rightly so) highlighted what you believe to be an issue in a Youtube whereby it appears (to you) than you can upload an arbitrary file. If you can indeed do this as you suspect then your points are valid and you may be able to cause various issues associated with it such as DOS etc - especially if the uploaded files cannot or are not tracked. However... Consider than you are talking to an API and what you are getting back (the JSON response) in your example is simply a response from the API
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Dude, seriously. Just stop. 2014-03-14 20:02 GMT+02:00 Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com: You can't even find a cross site scripting on google. Find a vuln on Google seems like a dream to some script kiddies. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:00 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: The full-disclosure mailing list has really changed. It's full of lamers nowdays aiming high. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers are FTSE 100. -- Forwarded message -- From: Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: antisnatchor antisnatc...@gmail.com Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers are FTSE 100. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:55 PM, antisnatchor antisnatc...@gmail.comwrote: LOL you're hopeless. Good luck with your business. Brave customers! Cheers antisnatchor Nicholas Lemonias. wrote: People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you. -- Forwarded message -- From: Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:43 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you, with a good kick outta the door. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 3:55 PM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Jerome of Mcafee has made a very valid point on revisiting separation of duties in this security instance. Happy to see more professionals with some skills. Some others have also mentioned the feasibility for Denial of Service attacks. Remote code execution by Social Engineering is also a prominent scenario. Actually, people have been pointing out exactly the opposite. But if you insist on believing you can DoS an EC2 by uploading files, good luck to you then... If you can't tell that that is a vulnerability (probably coming from a bunch of CEH's), I feel sorry for those consultants. You're the only one throwing around certifications here. I can no longer tell if you're being serious or this is a massive prank. Nicholas. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: We are on a different level perhaps. We do certainly disagree on those points. I wouldn't hire you as a consultant, if you can't tell if that is a valid vulnerability.. Best Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.comwrote: But do you have all the required EH certifications? Try this one from the Institute for Certified Application Security Specialists: http://www.asscert.com/ On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:41 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Thanks Michal, We are just trying to improve Google's security and contribute to the research community after all. If you are still on EFNet give me a shout some time. We have done so and consulted to hundreds of clients including Microsoft, Nokia, Adobe and some of the world's biggest corporations. We are also strict supporters of the ACM code of conduct. Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. AISec On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:29 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Hi Jerome, Thank you for agreeing on access control, and separation of duties. However successful exploitation permits arbitrary write() of any file of choice. I could release an exploit code in C Sharp or Python that permits multiple file uploads of any file/types, if the Google security team feels that this would be necessary. This is unpaid work, so we are not so keen on that job. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:04 AM, Jerome Athias athiasjer...@gmail.com wrote: Hi I concur that we are mainly discussing a terminology problem. In the context of a Penetration Test or WAPT, this is a Finding. Reporting this finding makes sense in this context. As a professional, you would have to explain if/how this finding is a Weakness*, a Violation (/Regulations, Compliance, Policies or Requirements[1]) * I would say Weakness + Exposure = Vulnerability. Vulnerability + Exploitability (PoC) = Confirmed Vulnerability that needs Business Impact and Risk Analysis So I would probably have reported this Finding as a Weakness (and not Vulnerability. See: OWASP, WASC-TC, CWE), explaining
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
You have a Googlemail account. How do we know you don't work for Google too... Inception type stuff going on here. Nicholas Lemonias. 14 March 2014 18:17 Google is a great service, but according to our proof of concepts (images, poc's, codes) presented to Softpedia, and verifiedbya couple of recognised experts including OWASP - that was a serious vulnerability. Now you can say whatever you like, and argue about it. You can argue about the impact and whatsoever, but that's not the way to deal with security issues. ___Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.htmlHosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ Nicholas Lemonias. 14 March 2014 18:16 Google is a great service, but according to our proof of concepts (images, poc's, codes) presented to Softpedia, and verifiedbya couple of recognised experts including OWASP - that was a serious vulnerability. Now you can say whatever you like, and argue about it. You can argue about the impact and whatsoever, but that's not the way to deal with security issues. ___Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.htmlHosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ Nicholas Lemonias. 14 March 2014 18:13 Security vulnerabilities need to be published and reported. That's the spirit.Attacking the researcher, won't make it go away. ___Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.htmlHosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ Mario Vilas 14 March 2014 15:55 On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Jerome of Mcafeehas made a very valid point on revisitingseparation of duties in this security instance. Happy to see more professionals with some skills. Some others have also mentioned the feasibility for Denial of Service attacks. Remote code execution by Social Engineering is also a prominent scenario. Actually, people have been pointing out exactly the opposite. But if you insist on believing you can DoS an EC2 by uploading files, good luck to you then... If you can't tell that that is a vulnerability (probably coming from a bunch of CEH's), I feel sorry for those consultants.You're the only one throwing around certifications here. I can no longer tell if you're being serious or this is a massive prank. Nicholas. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote:We are on a different level perhaps. We do certainly disagree on those points.I wouldn't hire you as a consultant, if you can't tell if that is a valid vulnerability.. Best Regards,Nicholas Lemonias. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com wrote: But do you have all the required EH certifications? Try this one from the Institute for Certified Application Security Specialists:http://www.asscert.com/ On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:41 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Thanks Michal, We are just trying to improve Google's security and contribute to the research community after all. If you are still on EFNet give me a shout some time. We have done so and consultedto hundreds of clients including Microsoft, Nokia, Adobe and some of the world's biggest corporations. We are also strict supporters of the ACM code of conduct. Regards,Nicholas Lemonias.AISec On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:29 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Hi Jerome,Thank you for agreeing on access control, and separation of duties. However successful exploitation permits arbitrary write() of any file of choice. I couldrelease an exploit code in C Sharp or Python that permits multiple file uploads of any file/types, if the Google security team feels that this would be necessary. This is unpaid work, so we are notso keen on that job. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:04 AM, Jerome Athias athiasjer...@gmail.com wrote: Hi I concur that we are mainly discussing a terminology problem. In the context of a Penetration Test or WAPT, this is a Finding. Reporting this finding makes sense in this context. As a professional, you would have to explain if/how this finding is a Weakness*, a Violation (/Regulations, Compliance, Policies or Requirements[1]) * I would say Weakness + Exposure = Vulnerability. Vulnerability + Exploitability (PoC) = Confirmed Vulnerability that needs Business Impact and Risk Analysis So I would probably have reported this Finding as a Weakness (and not Vulnerability. See: OWASP, WASC-TC, CWE), explaining that it is not Best Practice (your OWASP link and Cheat Sheets), and even if
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Nicholas, seriously, just stop. You have found an 'arbitrary file upload' in a file hosting service and claim it is a serious vulnerability. With no proof that your 'arbitrary file' is being used anywhere in any context that would lead to code execution - on server or client side. You cite OWASP documents (which are unrelated to the case), academia papers from 1975 just to find a reason it's theoretically serious, not paying any attention to what service you're actually attacking and what have you really achieved in that (which is demonstrating a filtering weakness at best, low risk). Everyone on this list so far explains why you're wrong, but you just won't stop. So you start throwing out certificates, your academia experience and your respected company. Then - name calling everyone else. Seriously, it's just a good laugh for most of us. Dude, please, just because you did not qualify for a bounty, there's no point in launching a whole campaign like you are. You're essentially following the path of Khalil Shreateh (the guy who posted on Zuckerberg FB wall) - he DID find a vuln though. Do you really want that? Go ahead, start a crowdsourcing campaign! 2014-03-14 19:40 GMT+01:00 Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com: We have many PoC's including video clips. We may upload for the security world to see. However, this is not the way to treat security vulnerabilities. Attacking the researcher and bringing you friends to do aswell, won't mitigate the problem. ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
congrats for your discover, get you prize [image: 24167992.jpg (1024×768)] On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 3:56 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Google research not awarded. http://www.techworm.net/2014/03/security-research-finds-flaws-in.html ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ -- Grato, J. Tozo _ °v° /(S)\SLACKWARE ^ ^ Linux _ because it works ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Care to report the same to Dropbox and Pastebin? It's a gold mine, you know... 2014-03-14 20:09 GMT+01:00 Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com: You are wrong, because we do have proof of concepts. If we didn't have them, then there would be no case. But if there are video clips, images demonstrating impact - in which case arbitrary file uploads (which is a write() call ) to a remote network, then it is a vulnerability. It is not about the bounty, but rather about not defying academic literature and widely recognised practise. Attacking the arguer, won't make the bug to go away. Best, Nicholas. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:01 PM, Krzysztof Kotowicz kkotowicz...@gmail.com wrote: Nicholas, seriously, just stop. You have found an 'arbitrary file upload' in a file hosting service and claim it is a serious vulnerability. With no proof that your 'arbitrary file' is being used anywhere in any context that would lead to code execution - on server or client side. You cite OWASP documents (which are unrelated to the case), academia papers from 1975 just to find a reason it's theoretically serious, not paying any attention to what service you're actually attacking and what have you really achieved in that (which is demonstrating a filtering weakness at best, low risk). Everyone on this list so far explains why you're wrong, but you just won't stop. So you start throwing out certificates, your academia experience and your respected company. Then - name calling everyone else. Seriously, it's just a good laugh for most of us. Dude, please, just because you did not qualify for a bounty, there's no point in launching a whole campaign like you are. You're essentially following the path of Khalil Shreateh (the guy who posted on Zuckerberg FB wall) - he DID find a vuln though. Do you really want that? Go ahead, start a crowdsourcing campaign! 2014-03-14 19:40 GMT+01:00 Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com : We have many PoC's including video clips. We may upload for the security world to see. However, this is not the way to treat security vulnerabilities. Attacking the researcher and bringing you friends to do aswell, won't mitigate the problem. ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Wait, so remote code execution by social engineering wasn't a troll? I'm confused. 2014-03-14 21:28 GMT+02:00 Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com: Then that also means that firewalls and IPS systems are worthless. Why spend so much time protecting the network layers if a user can send any file of choice to a remote network through http... As for the uploaded files being persistent, there is evidence of that. For instance a remote admin could be tricked to execute some of the uploaded files (Social Engineering). So our report sent as part of Google's security program, should not be treated as a non-security issue. Thanks, On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:23 PM, R D rd.secli...@gmail.com wrote: I'm going to try to spell it out clearly. You don't have unrestricted file upload[1]. Keep in mind you're trying to abuse youtube, which is essentially a video file upload service. So the fact that you can upload files is not surprising. Now you're uploading non-video files. Cool. But not earth-shattering. They are not accessible to anyone but you, as far as I can tell, and I don't even think you can access the file contents on the remote server, but please prove me wrong on both points. You are still, as far as I can tell, bound by the per-file and per-account quota on disk occupation, so you don't have a DoS by resource exhaustion. You can't force server-side file path, so you don't have RFI or DoS by messing with the remote file system. You can't execute the files you uploaded, so you don't have arbitrary code execution. But you are right about what your PoC does. You bypassed a security control, you uploaded crap on youtube servers, and by that you exhausted their resources by a fraction of the quota they allow you when signing up. BTW, I don't think they keep invalid video files for an indefinite period of time in a user account, but I might be wrong. The burden of proof is still on your side as to whether or not the bug you found has any impact that was not already accepted by youtube allowing registered users to upload whatever crap they see fit as long as it is video. You failed to provide this proof, and please be sure the audience of fulldisclosure is not attacking the researcher but working with you to have a better understanding of the bug you found, even though you kinda acted like a fool in this thread. Please keep on searching and finding vulns, please keep on publishing them, and use this as a learning experience that not all bugs or control bypasses are security vulnerabilities. --Rob' [1] As per OWASP ( https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Unrestricted_File_Upload): There are really two classes of problems here. The first is with the file metadata, like the path and file name. These are generally provided by the transport, such as HTTP multi-part encoding. This data may trick the application into overwriting a critical file or storing the file in a bad location. You must validate the metadata extremely carefully before using it. Your POC doesn't demonstrate that. The other class of problem is with the file size or content. The range of problems here depends entirely on what the file is used for. See the examples below for some ideas about how files might be misused. To protect against this type of attack, you should analyze everything your application does with files and think carefully about what processing and interpreters are involved. Your POC kinda does that, but you didn't provide proof it's possible to execute what you uploaded, either using social engineering or any other method. Also, please don't say verified by a couple of recognised experts including OWASP unless you actually spoke with someone @owasp and she validated your findings. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:40 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: We have many PoC's including video clips. We may upload for the security world to see. However, this is not the way to treat security vulnerabilities. Attacking the researcher and bringing you friends to do aswell, won't mitigate the problem. ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Then that also means that firewalls and IPS systems are worthless. Why spend so much time protecting the network layers if a user can send any file of choice to a remote network through http... well, if you are running a file upload system, or any webserver, you really should block any incoming traffic to port 80, and if you can't of course your IPS knows what a video file is and can whitelist that /s That's why server-side controls are in place, and your POC doesn't show you circumventing them. As for the uploaded files being persistent, there is evidence of that. No. You have evidence they were uploaded. You don't have evidence they will stay forever. When reporting a vulnerability, please try to not include hyperbole, the reporters will do that for you. For instance a remote admin could be tricked to execute some of the uploaded files As I said, your uploaded files are not accessible to any user, unless you prove me wrong. They are not executable (in the context of the webserver) for any remote user, unless you can prove me wrong. They are not executable in the context of an admin browsing the server content, unless the guys at youtube made a major mistake, and you can't tell if they are, and neither can I. (Social Engineering). Ohai, youtube admin, could you please copy that file I can't give you the path of, or even the server where it resides, to your home folder and please chmod it 777 and then run it? For debugging purposes obviously http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oOqJ1F44_-Y Have a nice day, and may the bug elves fill your socks with awesome presents, --Rob' On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:28 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Then that also means that firewalls and IPS systems are worthless. Why spend so much time protecting the network layers if a user can send any file of choice to a remote network through http... As for the uploaded files being persistent, there is evidence of that. For instance a remote admin could be tricked to execute some of the uploaded files (Social Engineering). So our report sent as part of Google's security program, should not be treated as a non-security issue. Thanks, On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:23 PM, R D rd.secli...@gmail.com wrote: I'm going to try to spell it out clearly. You don't have unrestricted file upload[1]. Keep in mind you're trying to abuse youtube, which is essentially a video file upload service. So the fact that you can upload files is not surprising. Now you're uploading non-video files. Cool. But not earth-shattering. They are not accessible to anyone but you, as far as I can tell, and I don't even think you can access the file contents on the remote server, but please prove me wrong on both points. You are still, as far as I can tell, bound by the per-file and per-account quota on disk occupation, so you don't have a DoS by resource exhaustion. You can't force server-side file path, so you don't have RFI or DoS by messing with the remote file system. You can't execute the files you uploaded, so you don't have arbitrary code execution. But you are right about what your PoC does. You bypassed a security control, you uploaded crap on youtube servers, and by that you exhausted their resources by a fraction of the quota they allow you when signing up. BTW, I don't think they keep invalid video files for an indefinite period of time in a user account, but I might be wrong. The burden of proof is still on your side as to whether or not the bug you found has any impact that was not already accepted by youtube allowing registered users to upload whatever crap they see fit as long as it is video. You failed to provide this proof, and please be sure the audience of fulldisclosure is not attacking the researcher but working with you to have a better understanding of the bug you found, even though you kinda acted like a fool in this thread. Please keep on searching and finding vulns, please keep on publishing them, and use this as a learning experience that not all bugs or control bypasses are security vulnerabilities. --Rob' [1] As per OWASP ( https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Unrestricted_File_Upload): There are really two classes of problems here. The first is with the file metadata, like the path and file name. These are generally provided by the transport, such as HTTP multi-part encoding. This data may trick the application into overwriting a critical file or storing the file in a bad location. You must validate the metadata extremely carefully before using it. Your POC doesn't demonstrate that. The other class of problem is with the file size or content. The range of problems here depends entirely on what the file is used for. See the examples below for some ideas about how files might be misused. To protect against this type of attack, you should analyze everything your application does with files and think carefully about what processing and interpreters are
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Hi Nicholas, Again, you hypothesize that you are getting a response from the database, but you really don't know that. You have no idea when the code is doing behind the endpoint. upload.youtube.com is simple an endpoint that you are sending a request to and getting a response from - Can you upload a ZIP file for example and then get that same ZIP file from another machine? If you can do that, then who can question your bug. Again, i'm not trying to be a dick - just trying to help! Cheers... On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 4:08 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: My claim is now verified Cheers! On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:04 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0upload_id= AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1-- uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aworigin= CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw That information can be queried from the db, where the metadata are saved. The files are being saved persistently , as per the above example. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:04 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0upload_id=AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aworigin=CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw That information can be queried from the db, where the metadata are saved. The files are being saved persistently , as per the above example. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:00 PM, Chris Thompson christhom7...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Nikolas, Please do read (and understand) my entire email before responding - I understand your frustration trying to get your message across but maybe this will help. Please put aside professional pride for the time being - I know how it feels to be passionate about something yet have others simply not understand. Let me try and bring some sanity to the discussion and explain to you why people maybe not agreeing with you. You (rightly so) highlighted what you believe to be an issue in a Youtube whereby it appears (to you) than you can upload an arbitrary file. If you can indeed do this as you suspect then your points are valid and you may be able to cause various issues associated with it such as DOS etc - especially if the uploaded files cannot or are not tracked. However... Consider than you are talking to an API and what you are getting back (the JSON response) in your example is simply a response from the API to say the file you uploaded has been received and saved. Now, as you no doubt know, when you upload a regular movie to YouTube, once uploaded it goes away and does some post-processing, converting it to flash for example. What's to say that there isn't some verification aspect to this post-processing that checks if the file is intact a valid movie and if not removes it. If you could for example demonstrate that the file was indeed persistent, by being able to retrieve it for example then again, you would have solid ground to claim an issue however your claims at this point are based on an assumption Let me explain. 1. You have demonstrated than you can send any file to an API and the API returned an acknowledgment of receiving (and saving) the file. 2. You / we don't know what Google do with files once they have been received from the API - maybe they process them and validate them - we simply don't know. 3. You have hypothesized that you can retrieve the file by manipulating tokens etc and you may be right, but you have not demonstrated it as such. Because of this, you seem to have made a CLAIM that you can upload arbitrary files to Google however SHOWN that you can simply send files to an API and an API responds in a certain way. I am NOT saying you haven't found an issue, what I am saying is that you need to demonstrate that the issue is real and thus can be abused. If the Google service simply verifies all uploaded files once they are uploaded and discards them if invalid, then you haven't really found anything. If you were to prove that you were able to retrieve this uploaded file then how could anyone dispute your bug. Hope this helps Cheers! ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
No it's not. As Chris and I are saying, you don't have proof your file is accessible to others, only that is was uploaded. Now, you see, when you upload a video to youtube, you get the adress where it will be viewable in the response. In your case : {sessionStatus:{state:FINALIZED,externalFieldTransfers:[{name:file,status:COMPLETED,bytesTransferred:113,bytesTotal:113,formPostInfo:{url: http://www.youtube.com/upload/rupio?authuser=0\u0026upload_id=AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aw\u0026file_id=000 ,cross_domain_url: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0\u0026upload_id=AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aw\u0026origin=CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw},content_type:text/x-sh}],additionalInfo:{uploader_service.GoogleRupioAdditionalInfo:{completionInfo:{status:SUCCESS,customerSpecificInfo:{status: ok, *video_id: KzKDtijwHFI* ,upload_id:AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aw}} And what do we get when we browse to https://youtube.com/watch?v=KzKDtijwHFI? Nothing. Can you send me a link where I can access the file content of the arbitrary file you uploaded? Are you sure this json response, or this file, will be there in a month? Or in a year? Is the fact that this json response exists a threat to youtube? Can you quantify how of a threat? How much, in dollars, does it hurt their business? --Rob On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 9:08 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: My claim is now verified Cheers! On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:04 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0upload_id= AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1-- uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aworigin= CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw That information can be queried from the db, where the metadata are saved. The files are being saved persistently , as per the above example. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:04 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0upload_id=AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aworigin=CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw That information can be queried from the db, where the metadata are saved. The files are being saved persistently , as per the above example. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:00 PM, Chris Thompson christhom7...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Nikolas, Please do read (and understand) my entire email before responding - I understand your frustration trying to get your message across but maybe this will help. Please put aside professional pride for the time being - I know how it feels to be passionate about something yet have others simply not understand. Let me try and bring some sanity to the discussion and explain to you why people maybe not agreeing with you. You (rightly so) highlighted what you believe to be an issue in a Youtube whereby it appears (to you) than you can upload an arbitrary file. If you can indeed do this as you suspect then your points are valid and you may be able to cause various issues associated with it such as DOS etc - especially if the uploaded files cannot or are not tracked. However... Consider than you are talking to an API and what you are getting back (the JSON response) in your example is simply a response from the API to say the file you uploaded has been received and saved. Now, as you no doubt know, when you upload a regular movie to YouTube, once uploaded it goes away and does some post-processing, converting it to flash for example. What's to say that there isn't some verification aspect to this post-processing that checks if the file is intact a valid movie and if not removes it. If you could for example demonstrate that the file was indeed persistent, by being able to retrieve it for example then again, you would have solid ground to claim an issue however your claims at this point are based on an assumption Let me explain. 1. You have demonstrated than you can send any file to an API and the API returned an acknowledgment of receiving (and saving) the file. 2. You / we don't know what Google do with files once they have been received from the API - maybe they process them and validate them - we simply don't know. 3. You have hypothesized that you can retrieve the file by manipulating tokens etc and you may be right, but you have not demonstrated it as such. Because of this, you seem to have made a CLAIM that you can upload arbitrary files to Google however SHOWN that you can simply send files to an API and an API responds in a certain way. I am NOT saying you haven't found an issue, what I am saying is that you need
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Does anybody still have some popcorn left? They ran out of it in the tax free zone in here due to this thread... Kind regards, Yvan Janssens Sent from my PDA - excuse me for my brevity On 14 Mar 2014, at 18:40, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: We have many PoC's including video clips. We may upload for the security world to see. However, this is not the way to treat security vulnerabilities. Attacking the researcher and bringing you friends to do aswell, won't mitigate the problem. ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
I'm going to try to spell it out clearly. You don't have unrestricted file upload[1]. Keep in mind you're trying to abuse youtube, which is essentially a video file upload service. So the fact that you can upload files is not surprising. Now you're uploading non-video files. Cool. But not earth-shattering. They are not accessible to anyone but you, as far as I can tell, and I don't even think you can access the file contents on the remote server, but please prove me wrong on both points. You are still, as far as I can tell, bound by the per-file and per-account quota on disk occupation, so you don't have a DoS by resource exhaustion. You can't force server-side file path, so you don't have RFI or DoS by messing with the remote file system. You can't execute the files you uploaded, so you don't have arbitrary code execution. But you are right about what your PoC does. You bypassed a security control, you uploaded crap on youtube servers, and by that you exhausted their resources by a fraction of the quota they allow you when signing up. BTW, I don't think they keep invalid video files for an indefinite period of time in a user account, but I might be wrong. The burden of proof is still on your side as to whether or not the bug you found has any impact that was not already accepted by youtube allowing registered users to upload whatever crap they see fit as long as it is video. You failed to provide this proof, and please be sure the audience of fulldisclosure is not attacking the researcher but working with you to have a better understanding of the bug you found, even though you kinda acted like a fool in this thread. Please keep on searching and finding vulns, please keep on publishing them, and use this as a learning experience that not all bugs or control bypasses are security vulnerabilities. --Rob' [1] As per OWASP (https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Unrestricted_File_Upload): There are really two classes of problems here. The first is with the file metadata, like the path and file name. These are generally provided by the transport, such as HTTP multi-part encoding. This data may trick the application into overwriting a critical file or storing the file in a bad location. You must validate the metadata extremely carefully before using it. Your POC doesn't demonstrate that. The other class of problem is with the file size or content. The range of problems here depends entirely on what the file is used for. See the examples below for some ideas about how files might be misused. To protect against this type of attack, you should analyze everything your application does with files and think carefully about what processing and interpreters are involved. Your POC kinda does that, but you didn't provide proof it's possible to execute what you uploaded, either using social engineering or any other method. Also, please don't say verified by a couple of recognised experts including OWASP unless you actually spoke with someone @owasp and she validated your findings. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:40 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: We have many PoC's including video clips. We may upload for the security world to see. However, this is not the way to treat security vulnerabilities. Attacking the researcher and bringing you friends to do aswell, won't mitigate the problem. ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Hi Nikolas, Please do read (and understand) my entire email before responding - I understand your frustration trying to get your message across but maybe this will help. Please put aside professional pride for the time being - I know how it feels to be passionate about something yet have others simply not understand. Let me try and bring some sanity to the discussion and explain to you why people maybe not agreeing with you. You (rightly so) highlighted what you believe to be an issue in a Youtube whereby it appears (to you) than you can upload an arbitrary file. If you can indeed do this as you suspect then your points are valid and you may be able to cause various issues associated with it such as DOS etc - especially if the uploaded files cannot or are not tracked. However... Consider than you are talking to an API and what you are getting back (the JSON response) in your example is simply a response from the API to say the file you uploaded has been received and saved. Now, as you no doubt know, when you upload a regular movie to YouTube, once uploaded it goes away and does some post-processing, converting it to flash for example. What's to say that there isn't some verification aspect to this post-processing that checks if the file is intact a valid movie and if not removes it. If you could for example demonstrate that the file was indeed persistent, by being able to retrieve it for example then again, you would have solid ground to claim an issue however your claims at this point are based on an assumption Let me explain. 1. You have demonstrated than you can send any file to an API and the API returned an acknowledgment of receiving (and saving) the file. 2. You / we don't know what Google do with files once they have been received from the API - maybe they process them and validate them - we simply don't know. 3. You have hypothesized that you can retrieve the file by manipulating tokens etc and you may be right, but you have not demonstrated it as such. Because of this, you seem to have made a CLAIM that you can upload arbitrary files to Google however SHOWN that you can simply send files to an API and an API responds in a certain way. I am NOT saying you haven't found an issue, what I am saying is that you need to demonstrate that the issue is real and thus can be abused. If the Google service simply verifies all uploaded files once they are uploaded and discards them if invalid, then you haven't really found anything. If you were to prove that you were able to retrieve this uploaded file then how could anyone dispute your bug. Hope this helps Cheers! ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
2014-03-14 20:28 GMT+01:00 Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com: Then that also means that firewalls and IPS systems are worthless. Why spend so much time protecting the network layers if a user can send any file of choice to a remote network through http... No, they are not worthless per se, but of course for an user content publishing service they need to allow file upload over HTTP/s. How far those files are inspected and later processed is another question - and that could lead to a vulnerability that you DIDN'T demonstrate. You just uploaded a .sh file. There's no harm in that as nowhere did you prove that that file is being executed. Similarly (and that has been pointed out in this thread) you could upload a PHP-GIF polyglot file to a J2EE application - no vulnerability in this. Prove something by overwriting a crucial file, tricking other user's browser to execute the file as HTML from an interesting domain (XSS), popping a shell, triggering XXE when the file is processed as XML, anything. Then that is a vulnerability. So far - sorry, it is not, and you've been told it repeatedly. As for the uploaded files being persistent, there is evidence of that. For instance a remote admin could be tricked to execute some of the uploaded files (Social Engineering). Come on, seriously? Social Engineering can make him download this file from pastebin just as well. That's a real stretch. IMHO it is not a security issue. You're uploading a file to some kind of processing queue that does not validate a file type, but nevertheless only processes those files as video - there is NO reason to suspect otherwise, and I'd like to be proven wrong here. Proven as in PoC. ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Hey dude just give up! You can convince a lot of journalists without professional skills but if you cant convince Google or at least the community, so you doing it wrong. by the way you can upload everything to youtube just tricking the file's magic number but you cant retrieve it back. so what? How can you assure that your proof isnt just a log for the application? If you have the expertise you said, i have a challenge to you: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0upload_id=AEnB2Uox6eWMN_LyrVQZdsCdQkDezvvNwpthROQn1SRe7idjqRFiez7SKVMd1t-rkCb7_CalkGc2oOJmdrnfxho2FNQt5aIjQworigin=CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw Its not a 3gp file, just has the magic number. if you retrieve the contents of its file and show it to us. i will start agreeing with you that it can be security issue. otherwise stop annoyin everyone, get back to your desk and do your job. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:27 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: In my expertise, that is a vulnerability. Now if Google doesn't want to fix patch that, it's their choice. However I have already disclosed that to them. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:25 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: So where do you think that information is coming from? The metadata and tags, and headers are contained in a database. The files are stored persistently , since they can be quoted. So the API works both ways. The main thing here is that the files are there, otherwise there metadata information would be deleted from the db aswell. http://gdata.youtube.com/demo/index.html?utm_source= twitterfeedutm_medium=twitter Youtube DATA API is unique.. the commands can be send through that interface... So we do definitely know that that is coming from a database. That same video id can be queried through the above link. Having done so, I confirmed that the information originate from a direct connection to the db, where the data are stored. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:20 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: So where do you think that information is coming from? The metadata and tags, and headers are contained in a database. The files are stored persistently , since they can be quoted. So the API works both ways. The main thing here is that the files are there, otherwise there metadata information would be deleted from the db aswell. http://gdata.youtube.com/demo/index.html?utm_source=twitterfeedutm_medium=twitter Youtube DATA API is unique.. the commands can be send through that interface... So we do definitely know that that is coming from a database. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:16 PM, Chris Thompson christhom7...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Nicholas, Again, you hypothesize that you are getting a response from the database, but you really don't know that. You have no idea when the code is doing behind the endpoint. upload.youtube.com is simple an endpoint that you are sending a request to and getting a response from - Can you upload a ZIP file for example and then get that same ZIP file from another machine? If you can do that, then who can question your bug. Again, i'm not trying to be a dick - just trying to help! Cheers... On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 4:08 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: My claim is now verified Cheers! On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:04 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0upload_id= AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1-- uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aworigin= CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8t dXBsb2Fkcw That information can be queried from the db, where the metadata are saved. The files are being saved persistently , as per the above example. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:04 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0upload_id=AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aworigin=CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw That information can be queried from the db, where the metadata are saved. The files are being saved persistently , as per the above example. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:00 PM, Chris Thompson christhom7...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Nikolas, Please do read (and understand) my entire email before responding - I understand your frustration trying to get your message across but maybe this will help. Please put aside professional pride for the time being - I know how it feels to be passionate about something yet have others simply not understand. Let me try and bring some sanity to the discussion and explain to you why people maybe not agreeing with you. You (rightly so) highlighted what you believe to be an issue in a Youtube whereby it appears (to you) than you can upload an arbitrary file. If
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Go to sleep. You have absolutely no understanding of the vulnerability, nor you have the facts. If you want a full report ask Softpedia, because we aint releasing them. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:39 PM, R D rd.secli...@gmail.com wrote: You are trying to execute an sh script through a video player. That's an exec() command. No, it's not. That's an HTTP GET. Do you have such a poor understanding of how web applications work? Or did you just not read what I said? So its the wrong way about accessing the file. This way, which is the standard way to access files on youtube, tells me the file doesn't exist. You have yet to prove the file you uploaded can be accessed or executed by anyone. For that matter, you have still to prove it can be discovered by anyone. That URL is hard to guess. And you have still to answer all my other questions, and most of the questions asked to you on this list. The burden of proof is on you, and you are making a fool of yourself by answering all the questions here with the same statements, and links to your PoC that doesn't proves anything, while everybody asks you for more evidence. Keep on the (good?) work, --Rob' On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 9:22 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: You are trying to execute an sh script through a video player. That's an exec() command. So its the wrong way about accessing the file. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:20 PM, R D rd.secli...@gmail.com wrote: No it's not. As Chris and I are saying, you don't have proof your file is accessible to others, only that is was uploaded. Now, you see, when you upload a video to youtube, you get the adress where it will be viewable in the response. In your case : {sessionStatus:{state:FINALIZED,externalFieldTransfers:[{name:file,status:COMPLETED,bytesTransferred:113,bytesTotal:113,formPostInfo:{url: http://www.youtube.com/upload/rupio?authuser=0\u0026upload_id=AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aw\u0026file_id=000 ,cross_domain_url: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0\u0026upload_id=AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aw\u0026origin=CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw},content_type:text/x-sh}],additionalInfo:{uploader_service.GoogleRupioAdditionalInfo:{completionInfo:{status:SUCCESS,customerSpecificInfo:{status: ok, *video_id: KzKDtijwHFI* ,upload_id:AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aw}} And what do we get when we browse to https://youtube.com/watch?v=KzKDtijwHFI ? Nothing. Can you send me a link where I can access the file content of the arbitrary file you uploaded? Are you sure this json response, or this file, will be there in a month? Or in a year? Is the fact that this json response exists a threat to youtube? Can you quantify how of a threat? How much, in dollars, does it hurt their business? --Rob On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 9:08 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: My claim is now verified Cheers! On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:04 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0upload_id= AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1-- uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aworigin= CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw That information can be queried from the db, where the metadata are saved. The files are being saved persistently , as per the above example. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:04 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: http://upload.youtube.com/?authuser=0upload_id=AEnB2UqVZlaog3GremriQEGDoUK3cdGGPu9MVIfyObgYajjo6i1--uQicn6jhbwsdNrqSF4ApbUbhCcwzdwe4xf_XTbL_t5-aworigin=CiNodHRwOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL3VwbG9hZC9ydXBpbxINdmlkZW8tdXBsb2Fkcw That information can be queried from the db, where the metadata are saved. The files are being saved persistently , as per the above example. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:00 PM, Chris Thompson christhom7...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Nikolas, Please do read (and understand) my entire email before responding - I understand your frustration trying to get your message across but maybe this will help. Please put aside professional pride for the time being - I know how it feels to be passionate about something yet have others simply not understand. Let me try and bring some sanity to the discussion and explain to you why people maybe not agreeing with you. You (rightly so) highlighted what you believe to be an issue in a Youtube whereby it appears (to you) than you can upload an arbitrary file. If you can indeed do this as you suspect then your points are valid and you may be able to cause various issues associated with it such as DOS etc - especially if the uploaded files cannot or are not tracked.
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Happy trolling... On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:49 PM, R D rd.secli...@gmail.com wrote: Then that also means that firewalls and IPS systems are worthless. Why spend so much time protecting the network layers if a user can send any file of choice to a remote network through http... well, if you are running a file upload system, or any webserver, you really should block any incoming traffic to port 80, and if you can't of course your IPS knows what a video file is and can whitelist that /s That's why server-side controls are in place, and your POC doesn't show you circumventing them. As for the uploaded files being persistent, there is evidence of that. No. You have evidence they were uploaded. You don't have evidence they will stay forever. When reporting a vulnerability, please try to not include hyperbole, the reporters will do that for you. For instance a remote admin could be tricked to execute some of the uploaded files As I said, your uploaded files are not accessible to any user, unless you prove me wrong. They are not executable (in the context of the webserver) for any remote user, unless you can prove me wrong. They are not executable in the context of an admin browsing the server content, unless the guys at youtube made a major mistake, and you can't tell if they are, and neither can I. (Social Engineering). Ohai, youtube admin, could you please copy that file I can't give you the path of, or even the server where it resides, to your home folder and please chmod it 777 and then run it? For debugging purposes obviously http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oOqJ1F44_-Y Have a nice day, and may the bug elves fill your socks with awesome presents, --Rob' On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:28 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Then that also means that firewalls and IPS systems are worthless. Why spend so much time protecting the network layers if a user can send any file of choice to a remote network through http... As for the uploaded files being persistent, there is evidence of that. For instance a remote admin could be tricked to execute some of the uploaded files (Social Engineering). So our report sent as part of Google's security program, should not be treated as a non-security issue. Thanks, On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:23 PM, R D rd.secli...@gmail.com wrote: I'm going to try to spell it out clearly. You don't have unrestricted file upload[1]. Keep in mind you're trying to abuse youtube, which is essentially a video file upload service. So the fact that you can upload files is not surprising. Now you're uploading non-video files. Cool. But not earth-shattering. They are not accessible to anyone but you, as far as I can tell, and I don't even think you can access the file contents on the remote server, but please prove me wrong on both points. You are still, as far as I can tell, bound by the per-file and per-account quota on disk occupation, so you don't have a DoS by resource exhaustion. You can't force server-side file path, so you don't have RFI or DoS by messing with the remote file system. You can't execute the files you uploaded, so you don't have arbitrary code execution. But you are right about what your PoC does. You bypassed a security control, you uploaded crap on youtube servers, and by that you exhausted their resources by a fraction of the quota they allow you when signing up. BTW, I don't think they keep invalid video files for an indefinite period of time in a user account, but I might be wrong. The burden of proof is still on your side as to whether or not the bug you found has any impact that was not already accepted by youtube allowing registered users to upload whatever crap they see fit as long as it is video. You failed to provide this proof, and please be sure the audience of fulldisclosure is not attacking the researcher but working with you to have a better understanding of the bug you found, even though you kinda acted like a fool in this thread. Please keep on searching and finding vulns, please keep on publishing them, and use this as a learning experience that not all bugs or control bypasses are security vulnerabilities. --Rob' [1] As per OWASP ( https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Unrestricted_File_Upload): There are really two classes of problems here. The first is with the file metadata, like the path and file name. These are generally provided by the transport, such as HTTP multi-part encoding. This data may trick the application into overwriting a critical file or storing the file in a bad location. You must validate the metadata extremely carefully before using it. Your POC doesn't demonstrate that. The other class of problem is with the file size or content. The range of problems here depends entirely on what the file is used for. See the examples below for some ideas about how files might be misused. To protect against this type of attack, you should
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Oh, wow :-) To put things in perspective, it probably helps to understand that virtually all video hosting sites perform batch, queue-based conversions of uploaded content. There is a good reason for this design: video conversions are extremely CPU-intensive - and an orderly, capped-throughput queue gives you much better resilience to DoS attacks. Alas, this model is not very user-friendly: it may take good 20 minutes to upload a clip to Vimeo over my lowly DSL connection, and then another 40 to wait my turn in the conversion queue. If the video I uploaded turns out to be in an unsupported format (I'm still using MS-CRAM), I have just wasted an hour of my time. A simple workaround would be for Vimeo to have a client-side check that flags obvious problems before sending any data to the server. It's not a security feature, but it minimizes my pain. Does it make sense to duplicate this check on the server, too? You could, but I don't think it adds real value: after all, the converter will sooner or later perform the same check anyway. And for users who want to take Vimeo down, uploading tons of cat videos makes more sense: after all, converting them will cost more than just bailing out early on an invalid file. As for other attacks you mention: it's fairly easy to construct valid videos that also work as file archives, HTML documents, or shell scripts. Ultimately, sites that deal with user-supplied content often have to make tough decisions that don't fit in the neat defitions of ISO standards or academic papers of the old. Mechanisms such as quotas, various abuse-detection heuristics, rapid scalability - and even user education and good UX design - go hand-in-hand with more traditional approaches to minimizing risk. /mz ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
If you wish to talk seriously about the problem, please send me an email privately. And we can talk about what we have found so far, and perhaps present some more proof of concepts for this on going research. This is between the researcher and Google. People who do not have the facts have been, trying to attack the arguer, on the basis of their personal beliefs. We are not speaking from experience, but based on our findings which includes PoC media, images, codes - and based on academic literature and recognised practise. Please bear in mind that a lot of research is conducted in academia (those old papers you say) before finally released to the commercial markets. Regards, *Nicholas Lemonias* *Information Security Expert* *Advanced Information Security Corp.* On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:49 PM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com wrote: Try learning how to properly send emails before critizicing anyone, pal. ;) On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:44 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you. -- Forwarded message -- From: Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:43 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you, with a good kick outta the door. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 3:55 PM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Jerome of Mcafee has made a very valid point on revisiting separation of duties in this security instance. Happy to see more professionals with some skills. Some others have also mentioned the feasibility for Denial of Service attacks. Remote code execution by Social Engineering is also a prominent scenario. Actually, people have been pointing out exactly the opposite. But if you insist on believing you can DoS an EC2 by uploading files, good luck to you then... If you can't tell that that is a vulnerability (probably coming from a bunch of CEH's), I feel sorry for those consultants. You're the only one throwing around certifications here. I can no longer tell if you're being serious or this is a massive prank. Nicholas. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: We are on a different level perhaps. We do certainly disagree on those points. I wouldn't hire you as a consultant, if you can't tell if that is a valid vulnerability.. Best Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.comwrote: But do you have all the required EH certifications? Try this one from the Institute for Certified Application Security Specialists: http://www.asscert.com/ On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:41 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Thanks Michal, We are just trying to improve Google's security and contribute to the research community after all. If you are still on EFNet give me a shout some time. We have done so and consulted to hundreds of clients including Microsoft, Nokia, Adobe and some of the world's biggest corporations. We are also strict supporters of the ACM code of conduct. Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. AISec On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:29 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Hi Jerome, Thank you for agreeing on access control, and separation of duties. However successful exploitation permits arbitrary write() of any file of choice. I could release an exploit code in C Sharp or Python that permits multiple file uploads of any file/types, if the Google security team feels that this would be necessary. This is unpaid work, so we are not so keen on that job. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:04 AM, Jerome Athias athiasjer...@gmail.com wrote: Hi I concur that we are mainly discussing a terminology problem. In the context of a Penetration Test or WAPT, this is a Finding. Reporting this finding makes sense in this context. As a professional, you would have to explain if/how this finding is a Weakness*, a Violation (/Regulations, Compliance, Policies or Requirements[1]) * I would say Weakness + Exposure = Vulnerability. Vulnerability + Exploitability (PoC) = Confirmed Vulnerability that needs Business Impact and Risk Analysis So I would probably have reported this Finding as a Weakness (and not Vulnerability. See: OWASP, WASC-TC, CWE), explaining that it is not Best Practice (your OWASP link and Cheat Sheets), and even if mitigative/compensative security
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
You are too vague. Please keep this to a level. Thank you. *Best Regards,* *Nicholas Lemonias* *Advanced Information Security Corporation.* On Sat, Mar 15, 2014 at 5:06 AM, Colette Chamberland cjchamberl...@gmail.com wrote: Omg please for the love of all things human STFU!!! Sent from my iPhone On Mar 15, 2014, at 12:43 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: If you wish to talk seriously about the problem, please send me an email privately. And we can talk about what we have found so far, and perhaps present some more proof of concepts for this on going research. This is between the researcher and Google. People who do not have the facts have been, trying to attack the arguer, on the basis of their personal beliefs. We are not speaking from experience, but based on our findings which includes PoC media, images, codes - and based on academic literature and recognised practise. Please bear in mind that a lot of research is conducted in academia (those old papers you say) before finally released to the commercial markets. Regards, *Nicholas Lemonias* *Information Security Expert* *Advanced Information Security Corp.* On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:49 PM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com wrote: Try learning how to properly send emails before critizicing anyone, pal. ;) On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:44 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you. -- Forwarded message -- From: Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:43 PM Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Google vulnerabilities with PoC To: Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things like reading a vulnerability report? Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you, with a good kick outta the door. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 3:55 PM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Jerome of Mcafee has made a very valid point on revisiting separation of duties in this security instance. Happy to see more professionals with some skills. Some others have also mentioned the feasibility for Denial of Service attacks. Remote code execution by Social Engineering is also a prominent scenario. Actually, people have been pointing out exactly the opposite. But if you insist on believing you can DoS an EC2 by uploading files, good luck to you then... If you can't tell that that is a vulnerability (probably coming from a bunch of CEH's), I feel sorry for those consultants. You're the only one throwing around certifications here. I can no longer tell if you're being serious or this is a massive prank. Nicholas. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: We are on a different level perhaps. We do certainly disagree on those points. I wouldn't hire you as a consultant, if you can't tell if that is a valid vulnerability.. Best Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Mario Vilas mvi...@gmail.comwrote: But do you have all the required EH certifications? Try this one from the Institute for Certified Application Security Specialists: http://www.asscert.com/ On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:41 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Thanks Michal, We are just trying to improve Google's security and contribute to the research community after all. If you are still on EFNet give me a shout some time. We have done so and consulted to hundreds of clients including Microsoft, Nokia, Adobe and some of the world's biggest corporations. We are also strict supporters of the ACM code of conduct. Regards, Nicholas Lemonias. AISec On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:29 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Hi Jerome, Thank you for agreeing on access control, and separation of duties. However successful exploitation permits arbitrary write() of any file of choice. I could release an exploit code in C Sharp or Python that permits multiple file uploads of any file/types, if the Google security team feels that this would be necessary. This is unpaid work, so we are not so keen on that job. On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:04 AM, Jerome Athias athiasjer...@gmail.com wrote: Hi I concur that we are mainly discussing a terminology problem. In the context of a Penetration Test or WAPT, this is a Finding. Reporting this finding makes sense in this context. As a professional, you would have to explain if/how this finding is a Weakness*, a Violation (/Regulations, Compliance, Policies or
Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Correct. The mime type can be circumvented. We can confirm this to be a valid vulnerability. For the PoC's : http://news.softpedia.com/news/Expert-Finds-File-Upload-Vulnerability-in-YouTube-Google-Denies-It-s-a-Security-Issue-431489.shtml On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:40 PM, Krzysztof Kotowicz kkotowicz...@gmail.comwrote: 2014-03-14 20:28 GMT+01:00 Nicholas Lemonias. lem.niko...@googlemail.com : Then that also means that firewalls and IPS systems are worthless. Why spend so much time protecting the network layers if a user can send any file of choice to a remote network through http... No, they are not worthless per se, but of course for an user content publishing service they need to allow file upload over HTTP/s. How far those files are inspected and later processed is another question - and that could lead to a vulnerability that you DIDN'T demonstrate. You just uploaded a .sh file. There's no harm in that as nowhere did you prove that that file is being executed. Similarly (and that has been pointed out in this thread) you could upload a PHP-GIF polyglot file to a J2EE application - no vulnerability in this. Prove something by overwriting a crucial file, tricking other user's browser to execute the file as HTML from an interesting domain (XSS), popping a shell, triggering XXE when the file is processed as XML, anything. Then that is a vulnerability. So far - sorry, it is not, and you've been told it repeatedly. As for the uploaded files being persistent, there is evidence of that. For instance a remote admin could be tricked to execute some of the uploaded files (Social Engineering). Come on, seriously? Social Engineering can make him download this file from pastebin just as well. That's a real stretch. IMHO it is not a security issue. You're uploading a file to some kind of processing queue that does not validate a file type, but nevertheless only processes those files as video - there is NO reason to suspect otherwise, and I'd like to be proven wrong here. Proven as in PoC. ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/