Are we talking about c2s, s2s or both?
I'm loving watching the results on http://xmpp.net/list.php and noticing
sites improving their security.
What I'd still like is a rolling security average. Something like
- average result in last 24 hours, 7 days, 30 days, year. (/me goes to log
a feature
On Fri, Nov 15, 2013 at 2:33 AM, Peter Saint-Andre stpe...@stpeter.imwrote:
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Matthew Wild has run some analytics on SSL/TLS versions negotiated
over a period of time at the jabber.org XMPP service. The percentages
were roughly as follows:
TLS
On Fri, Nov 15, 2013 at 09:54:01AM +0100, Simon Tennant wrote:
Are we talking about c2s, s2s or both?
I'm loving watching the results on http://xmpp.net/list.php and noticing
sites improving their security.
What I'd still like is a rolling security average. Something like
- average
On Thu, Nov 14, 2013 at 6:11 PM, Matt Miller linuxw...@outer-planes.netwrote:
On Nov 14, 2013, at 10:43 AM, Ralf Skyper Kaiser sky...@thc.org wrote:
On Thu, Nov 14, 2013 at 4:49 PM, Matt Miller linuxw...@outer-planes.net
wrote:
On Nov 14, 2013, at 9:34 AM, Ralf Skyper Kaiser
On Fri, Nov 15, 2013 at 8:55 AM, Kevin Smith ke...@kismith.co.uk wrote:
On Fri, Nov 15, 2013 at 2:33 AM, Peter Saint-Andre stpe...@stpeter.imwrote:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Matthew Wild has run some analytics on SSL/TLS versions negotiated
over a period of time at the
On 14-11-13 18:47, Ralf Skyper Kaiser wrote:
Hi,
d. How is the jabber server admin in control when everyone has to trust
the master root key and all subsequent keys up to the sub domain of the
jabber server? That's not in the control of the jabber admin.
Please take some time to study DNSSEC
On 15-11-13 10:30, Ralf Skyper Kaiser wrote:
Hi,
1. You are a gay person in Iran
2. An Atheist in Saudi Arabia (or a women)
3. Leonardo da Vinci and dare to suggest that the earth is round
4. A black person wishing to sit in the front row of a bus
5 ...
One of the lessons from Snowden is
On Fri, Nov 15, 2013 at 10:26 AM, Winfried Tilanus winfr...@tilanus.comwrote:
Now take a look at the manifesto. It states:
provide user or administrative interfaces showing:
(...)
o a warning about any changes to a server's certificate
that last point IS certificate pinning.
That's
On 11/15/2013 12:52 PM, Dave Cridland wrote:
Hi,
That's not quite what Ralf is asking for. He's asking for (one of the)
pinning mechanisms which allow a certificate transition to itself be
authenticated.
@Ralf: sorry for not misinterpreting your proposal.
@Dave: thanks for the correction.
Hi,
I agree that DNSSEC (and DANE) provides significant security advantages
compared to the status quo.
I note that with DNSSEC the trust is still with ROOT MASTER KEY which is
geopolitically aligned with US (and US policy).
I note that with pinning this problem goes away: The certificate no
Hi
On Fri, Nov 15, 2013 at 10:26 AM, Winfried Tilanus winfr...@tilanus.comwrote:
On 14-11-13 18:47, Ralf Skyper Kaiser wrote:
Hi,
d. How is the jabber server admin in control when everyone has to trust
the master root key and all subsequent keys up to the sub domain of the
jabber
Hi,
Definition:
- POST-Prism means the time after PRISM. What we know now. It does not
imply that PRISM ever carried out a DNSSEC or DNS attack. Sorry if this was
not clear.
- Khomeini: Sorry, you are right. He is dead. Use Khamenei. Sorry for the
typo. Makes zero difference.
Let's stay
On 15 November 2013 08:54, Simon Tennant si...@buddycloud.com wrote:
Are we talking about c2s, s2s or both?
These are c2s on 5222 only.
Regards,
Matthew
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