Re: the book edit portal - I do not have control over the platform it is
being edited on. The handbook project was launched by people in Berlin's
CryptoParty, and I was brought on board at a later point.
On 9/10/12 9:30 AM, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
@samthetechie
Why were you offended?
Did
My biggest concern is with getting insecure suggestion out of the book
asap. Jake, if the entire chapter is worse than useless, please delete it?
x. Asher
On 9/10/12 9:36 AM, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
The chapter that talked about using PPTP is straight up crazy talk.
Anyone using PPTP is worse
On 9/10/12 9:46 AM, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
I'm sorry to say it but a lot of the users have been here for a while -
most people that use crypto just don't know they're doing it.
Ironically, if users don't get good advice, they'll just be in the same
spot - thinking they're safe when they're
On Fri, Oct 05, 2012 at 05:43:46AM +0200, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
Did anyone try this with devices that are supposed to be resistant to
file shredding due to wear leveling? I tried the following on two USB
keys, one ~12 years old, another ~6 years old, both formatted as
FAT32:
echo
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
On 7 Oct 2012, at 22:35, Brian Conley wrote:
Greg its called orbot and it runs on Android. Secondly I used to agree with
you, but I'm increasingly coming to the conclusion that user education, not
simplification, is the more important piece of
I still haven't understood the canonical url for editing - can you tell
me where the main book editing page is? I agree with Adam that Github
won't involve the right people but if that is the only interface, I'll
fork the book and send a pull request.
Thanks, please list issues here:
Maxim Kammerer:
On Wed, Oct 3, 2012 at 2:41 PM, D J Capelis djcape...@cs.ucsc.edu wrote:
I like the part where you say the problem is easy and then point to a
solution with issues that make it anything but easy, tenable or workable.
Why? The solution (if you refer to cables in Liberté) is
On 9/10/12 10:36 PM, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
I did not work on the technical aspects of the book. I cannot. I do not
have the right skill set.
This attitude, I think, is a key issue this community and many others
face. You cannot? Or you will not?
I believe that you are totally able to
Best practices for traveling to an internet-hostile regime.
There is a lot of variance - obviously the regime's capabilities as well as
one's own visibility come into play.
And, if it isn't obvious, I'm not a security expert. This is not official,
legal advice. Everyone needs to research this on
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Hi Katy,
Excellent list. Sorry I'm late to the game, but if you're traveling to
one Internet hostile regime in particular -- and here, I'm referring
to the US -- you or others may find this EFF whitepaper on border
crossing to be useful.
Thanks Parker! I was hoping someone would post some of these best
practices as an article or white paper link.
On 10/9/12 1:28 PM, Parker Higgins wrote:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Hi Katy,
Excellent list. Sorry I'm late to the game, but if you're traveling to
one Internet
Bernard Tyers - ei8fdb:
On 8 Oct 2012, at 23:46, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
Asher Wolf:
The argument everyone is politely avoiding - while pondering the
numerous ways CryptoParty will expose already compromised
individuals - is whether the masses SHOULD use crypto.
I'm not ignoring it
Asher Wolf:
On 9/10/12 10:36 PM, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
I did not work on the technical aspects of the book. I cannot. I do not
have the right skill set.
This attitude, I think, is a key issue this community and many others
face. You cannot? Or you will not?
I believe that you are
On Tue, Oct 9, 2012 at 7:24 AM, Jacob Appelbaum ja...@appelbaum.net wrote:
Maxim Kammerer:
Even the CryptoHeaven solution that I criticized above is good,
discarding minor issues that can be easily fixed, and discarding
what's apparently a security-usability tradeoff decision: not
On Tue, 9 Oct 2012 09:23:58 -0700
Katy P katyca...@gmail.com wrote:
Best practices for traveling to an internet-hostile regime.
There is a lot of variance - obviously the regime's capabilities as
well as one's own visibility come into play.
https://ssd.eff.org/ is a fine start for most
On Tue, Oct 9, 2012 at 5:01 AM, Maxim Kammerer m...@dee.su wrote:
On Wed, Oct 3, 2012 at 2:41 PM, D J Capelis djcape...@cs.ucsc.edu wrote:
I like the part where you say the problem is easy and then point to a
solution with issues that make it anything but easy, tenable or
workable.
Why?
On 12-10-09 10:41 AM, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
ttscanada:
On 12-10-09 4:23 AM, Bernard Tyers - ei8fdb wrote:
Sending a PGP encrypted e-mail to you mom, should be as easy as
sending an un-encrypted e-mail to your mom. But the education of
why you should be sending an e-mail encrypted should also
Case in point: I received an invitation under the names of five separate
organizations I am affiliated with (none of which are OWS related) to
fill this out. It originally said real name required, was changed to
alias after I objected publicly, but the rest still stands.
Nick Daly:
On Tue, Oct 9, 2012 at 7:24 AM, Jacob Appelbaum ja...@appelbaum.net wrote:
Maxim Kammerer:
Even the CryptoHeaven solution that I criticized above is good,
discarding minor issues that can be easily fixed, and discarding
what's apparently a security-usability tradeoff decision: not
Thanks for the interesting discussion, but its gone far afield from the
original question.
Does cryptoheaven seem like a reasonable tool to depend on for journalists
or businesses requiring security for their communications?
Is it notably better or worse than gmail if you are not concerned about
On Tue, Oct 9, 2012 at 9:03 PM, Lindsay Beck lb...@ndi.org wrote:
Disclosure: TAILS relies on BIOS for operability, and thus can have
challenges functioning on newer computers that utilize UEFI without legacy
support for BIOS.
For anyone interested: Liberté Linux already has full UEFI support
I hadn't seen Tails before and don't know how baked it is as a project. I
just tried it out and found an exploitable vulnerability in their
configuration that would allow someone to compromise the system. It's a
corner case and not likely to impact many systems, but is a well known
problem. I've
Maxim Kammerer:
On Tue, Oct 9, 2012 at 9:03 PM, Lindsay Beck lb...@ndi.org wrote:
Disclosure: TAILS relies on BIOS for operability, and thus can have
challenges functioning on newer computers that utilize UEFI without legacy
support for BIOS.
For anyone interested: Liberté Linux already has
On 12-10-09 1:53 PM, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
Heather Marsh:
Yes, you are outlining two cases where you are communicating with people
you know as a person known to them. I am suggesting we (as in large
scale movements around the world) need to look more closely at data
driven (as opposed to
On Tue, Oct 9, 2012 at 4:18 PM, Brian Conley wrote:
Thanks for the interesting discussion, but its gone far afield from the
original question.
Does cryptoheaven seem like a reasonable tool to depend on for journalists
or businesses requiring security for their communications?
The answer to
Correction. I completely misspoke: I read public as private, and
need to completely re-analyze cryptoheaven's setup. If you're the
only custodian of your private key, then you're probably fairly safe.
Again, I need to completely review and revise what I wrote.
On Tue, Oct 9, 2012 at 7:55 PM,
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