that
there's a more general version proposal that should really be the goal.
I'd like to do a second piece on his proposal, but as I'm not sure I'll
get to it soon, I'm posting it here just so it has some circulation.
Quoting him (inner text is his, outer text is my reaction):
Karl Fogel wrote:
Brian
Nick liberationt...@njw.me.uk writes:
The wonderful F-Droid already does this, as pointed out in the
article. So it doesn't seem like a proposal so much as an
explanation of why it's important.
F-Droid does a lot of this. I couldn't find a standard way to get the
exact source snapshot a
Thoughts welcome on the usefulness of this proposal:
https://twitter.com/OpenITP/status/514836088511537152
Quick summary is:
Today, app stores don't even clearly *distinguish* open-source from
closed-source apps, let alone do the builds themselves.
It would be great if app stores built
on it, and then be
surprised when the license bites them.
-K
On Fri Oct 4 12:02:11 2013, Karl Fogel wrote:
Petter Ericson pett...@acc.umu.se writes:
So, Silent Circle (well, Silent Phone) is finally open source!
Thank you, Petter -- it sounds like this release was a lot of hard work
Griffin Boyce grif...@cryptolab.net writes:
My feedback is that Tinfoil SMS will not gain much traction as its
name marginalizes its users. Wanting more security is not sketchy.
Wanting privacy is not a tinfoil hat situation. Cheekiness can be
good, but this is a space where you start out at
Petter Ericson pett...@acc.umu.se writes:
So, Silent Circle (well, Silent Phone) is finally open source!
Thank you, Petter -- it sounds like this release was a lot of hard work.
But it doesn't appear to be actually open source. At least, I couldn't
find a license file containing an open source
Andy Isaacson a...@hexapodia.org writes:
OneTime 2.0-beta is ready for review and testing, as threatened [1]. See
http://red-bean.com/onetime/
At a quick glance, it appears you have not added any message
authenticity to the system, correct? Do you have any thoughts on how to
add tamper
Tony Arcieri tony.arci...@gmail.com writes:
How? At the very least Alice/Bob need an authenticated/trusted channel
for this.
If Alice sends Bob her public key over an untrusted channel, it can
be intercepted by an MitM posing as Bob who can then intercept all
traffic between Alice/Bob
In the
Francisco Ruiz r...@iit.edu writes:
Scenario: you, Alice, realize you're under NSA surveillance. You need
to get a crucial bit of information to your friend Bob, right away.
You've been using PGP, but now you suspect the NSA may have installed
a bug on your machine. Your keystrokes are being
Jon Camfield j...@joncamfield.com writes:
Julian - this is an excellent and concise quickstart guide to Android
security -- have you considered posting it into
https://github.com/opensafermobile/materials ? Those materials which
were posted on the http://safermobile.org/ site (which is now
Moritz Bartl mor...@torservers.net writes:
Surespot looks like an open source alternative:
https://www.surespot.me/
https://www.surespot.me/documents/how_surespot_works.html
surespot's code may be excellent (I haven't looked at it), but their
front page at https://surespot.me/ makes a promise it
phryk in...@phryk.net writes:
No clue if it was already covered in this thread, but Estonia just
opened up the code of their e-voting system:
http://news.err.ee/politics/0233b688-b116-44c3-98ca-89a4057acad8
Note that while they released the code, it's not open source:
Paul Elliott pelli...@blackpatchpanel.com writes:
Are there any practical one time pad management systems out there,
GPLed for GNU/Linux?
Is anyone working on one?
If not, does anyone want to start?
Thank You for considering this question.
http://red-bean.com/onetime
I'm actively working on
Jens Christian Hillerup j...@hillerup.net writes:
So what do we do about this? Opening the source code as an argument
for security no longer suffices. How can we raise money for rigid and
independent quality assurance of software that in this case is
designed to potentially saving lives? And how
to create derivative works:
https://pressfreedomfoundation.org/sites/default/files/encryption_works.odt
Wonderful, thanks (and I see you put a link to the ODT at the bottom of
the web page too).
-Karl
On 07/02/2013 03:01 PM, Karl Fogel wrote:
Micah Lee micahf...@riseup.net writes:
Freedom
Justin Breithaupt usacomputert...@gmail.com writes:
I would like to know what services are available for e-mail that don't
share my private information, like Gmail does when it shares my info.
A simple answer is: riseup.net (and donate some money to them, if you
can afford to, by the way).
The
Micah Lee micahf...@riseup.net writes:
Freedom of the Press Foundation just published a whitepaper about how to
protect your communications from NSA (or any other) surveillance.
Micah, thanks ( nice job). Two quick questions:
1) The CC-BY license info is only visible on the PDF; any reason
Alireza Mahdian alireza.mahd...@gmail.com writes:
this is to prevent modifications that would render it as a malware. I
haven't signed the code yet so I am just protecting myself from such
liabilities.
Hi, Alireza Mahdian. Please don't call the code open source nor free
software when it's not.
Moritz Bartl mor...@torservers.net writes:
On 17.06.2013 21:06, micah wrote:
Do you have any suggestions for what Riseup can do to resolve that
concern for you? I don't disagree with you, I'm just curious about
solutions here.
I am happy to repeat myself, since the issues I have with Riseup
Hi. I thought this might be of interest here:
http://www.rants.org/2013/06/09/privacy-promises-and-client-side-betrayal/
Thesis: Apps that promise self-destructing data, promise emails that can
be un-sent, etc, are making promises they cannot keep -- at least not if
they are to work with
If we'd all stop using the verb publish when we really mean endorse,
much conversation on this topic would be clearer.
(Not aimed at anyone here, by the way; just a general observation :-) .)
-Karl
Richard Brooks r...@acm.org writes:
Part of the problem is the use of publications to
drive
Yosem Companys compa...@stanford.edu writes:
We voted on #2 because that was the issue Joseph Lorenzo Hall raised
(see:
http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/msg03767.
html). He specifically asked for the following:
Has the possibility of reconfiguring libtech to not
M. Fioretti mfiore...@nexaima.net writes:
Karl,
in this message from you there was one Reply-To header, set to:
Karl Fogel kfo...@red-bean.com,
liberationtech liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu
Thank you. Then we're at least avoiding the can't find my way back
home problem, which
Tom Ritter t...@ritter.vg writes:
Hi all - at the risk of shilling, my company has released an Open
Source tool called You'll Never Take Me Alive. If your encrypted
laptop has its screen locked, and is plugged into power or ethernet,
the tool will hibernate your laptop if either of those plugs
I vote that the list not munge the Reply-to header.
Some call this reply-to-poster, but it really means leave Reply-to
however the original poster set it. If OP set it to the list, that's
fine; usually the OP sets it to their preferred personal address, of
course.
fl...@pgm.com writes:
Thanks to Ali-Reza for reposting Dr. Dey's reply.
If you are looking for lowest-cost short to medium range
communications using ham radio, Android phones are not the answer. You
still need VHF or UHF radio hardware.
There are at least 20 radio manufacturers in China that
Gilson Schwartz gilson.schwa...@gmail.com writes:
I did install Cloudfogger but after a trial I just can´t find my way
out of the app.
Any hints? Their Help desk was unsupportive after a first mail asking
for help.
On the general topic of this thread:
FileRock just got open sourced. I haven't
Maxim Kammerer m...@dee.su writes:
On Fri, Jan 4, 2013 at 8:50 AM, Martin Johnson greatf...@greatfire.org wrote:
This latest move was fully controlled by Google and can as such only be
described as self-censorship.
The impression I am getting from my contacts at Google is that this is
not
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