On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 07:12:24PM -0400, Tom Ritter wrote:
On 14 August 2013 18:01, Richard r...@linux-m68k.org wrote:
On the other end of the paranoia scale I would like to remind folks of the
the mixmaster remailer chaining technique which does much more than plain
encryption - as far as I
On 9 August 2013 18:16, Seth David Schoen sch...@eff.org wrote:
If you think governments are likely to use their own CAs for spying by
issuing fraudulent certificates, you want to remove trust for those
CAs _in your web browser_. Having a valid, correct, and publicly issued
certificate from
Hi Tom
Aside from StartCom (free) most CAs have roughly the same price and
service. Since service is equivalent, you're free to choose a CA
based on your political opinion, and not worry about missing out on
'features'. It's basically like voting in an election - elections are
won by tens
On 14 August 2013 18:01, Richard r...@linux-m68k.org wrote:
On the other end of the paranoia scale I would like to remind folks of the
the mixmaster remailer chaining technique which does much more than plain
encryption - as far as I can see it is theoretically completely untraceable.
That
Griffin,
The more this gets fleshed out on list - the more it departs from any
vestige of email and then you're basically talking about shoe-horning
a different architectural beast into a transport protocol we happen to
know. (I'm not saying ~you~ are planning that - just making an
observation of
On Fri, Aug 09, 2013 at 05:07:26PM -0400, Tim Prepscius wrote:
If you'd like to help me that would be cool..
My take on this is this: (these are are not all my ideas, can't take
full credit)
We want to get to a state where an e-mail server is easy to set up.
And runs with *non
I think there would be some value to a system like that. It would address a
lot of real world threats but it will not address large scale government
monitoring systems, which many governments have (US, China, UK, Iran, etc).
Sounds like you should team up with Tim Prepscius with his system
If you'd like to help me that would be cool..
My take on this is this: (these are are not all my ideas, can't take
full credit)
We want to get to a state where an e-mail server is easy to set up.
And runs with *non governmental* issued ssl certificates.
Where it provides web-mail (think
On Fri, Aug 09, 2013 at 02:07:25PM -0400, Griffin Boyce wrote:
This probably sounds very strange, but *what if* someone ran an email
service that required that all mails be GPG encrypted?
I did long wish for a system that would send every non-GPG message
to the spamfolder.
Richard
---
Name
ooh, I love this discussion. I'll drop in my quick points, and would love to
hear other perspectives.
2 points:
1) Is there a milter that could be plugged into existing SMTP servers
(sendmail, postfix, ...) that could require OpenPGP encapsulation, and
immediately reject messages back to
Tim Prepscius writes:
We want to get to a state where an e-mail server is easy to set up.
And runs with *non governmental* issued ssl certificates.
I think this might reflect a misperception of the threat model around
misissuance of certificates.
If you think governments are likely to use
I'd like to respond to this just a bit.
1. requiring PGP without giving a user centric means of using PGP
doesn't actually solve anything.
It's like telling an adult they have to eat stinky tofu. If they love
stinky tofu then fine, but if they don't, there is no way it's going
to happen.
I
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