Re: [liberationtech] NSA flag terms
FYI, this keyword list is at least about 12/13 years old. See: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/05/31/what_are_those_words/ On 18 June 2013 15:59, Yosem Companys compa...@stanford.edu wrote: From: Khannea Suntzu khannea.sun...@gmail.com This is an (admittedly huge) list of words that supposedly cause the NSA to flag you as a potential terrorist if you over-use them in an email. We found this on Reddit, where James Bamford, a veteran reporter with 30 years experience covering the NSA, is answering questions from the community. This list comes from Reddit user GloriousDawn, who found it on Attrition.org, a site that very closely follows the security industry. You may want to peruse this entire list yourself, but here are some of our favourites that stick out: · dictionary · sweeping · ionosphere · military intelligence · Steve Case · Scully And the full list for your browsing pleasure: Waihopai, INFOSEC, Information Security, Information Warfare, IW, IS, Privacy, Information Terrorism, Terrorism Defensive Information, defence Information Warfare, Offensive Information, Offensive Information Warfare, National Information Infrastructure, InfoSec, Reno, Compsec, Computer Terrorism, Firewalls, Secure Internet Connections, ISS, Passwords, DefCon V, Hackers, Encryption, Espionage, USDOJ, NSA, CIA, S/Key, SSL, FBI, Secert Service, USSS, Defcon, Military, White House, Undercover, NCCS, Mayfly, PGP, PEM, RSA, Perl-RSA, MSNBC, bet, AOL, AOL TOS, CIS, CBOT, AIMSX, STARLAN, 3B2, BITNET, COSMOS, DATTA, E911, FCIC, HTCIA, IACIS, UT/RUS, JANET, JICC, ReMOB, LEETAC, UTU, VNET, BRLO, BZ, CANSLO, CBNRC, CIDA, JAVA, Active X, Compsec 97, LLC, DERA, Mavricks, Meta-hackers, ^?, Steve Case, Tools, Telex, Military Intelligence, Scully, Flame, Infowar, Bubba, Freeh, Archives, Sundevil, jack, Investigation, ISACA, NCSA, spook words, Verisign, Secure, ASIO, Lebed, ICE, NRO, Lexis-Nexis, NSCT, SCIF, FLiR, Lacrosse, Flashbangs, HRT, DIA, USCOI, CID, BOP, FINCEN, FLETC, NIJ, ACC, AFSPC, BMDO, NAVWAN, NRL, RL, NAVWCWPNS, NSWC, USAFA, AHPCRC, ARPA, LABLINK, USACIL, USCG, NRC, ~, CDC, DOE, FMS, HPCC, NTIS, SEL, USCODE, CISE, SIRC, CIM, ISN, DJC, SGC, UNCPCJ, CFC, DREO, CDA, DRA, SHAPE, SACLANT, BECCA, DCJFTF, HALO, HAHO, FKS, 868, GCHQ, DITSA, SORT, AMEMB, NSG, HIC, EDI, SAS, SBS, UDT, GOE, DOE, GEO, Masuda, Forte, AT, GIGN, Exon Shell, CQB, CONUS, CTU, RCMP, GRU, SASR, GSG-9, 22nd SAS, GEOS, EADA, BBE, STEP, Echelon, Dictionary, MD2, MD4, MDA, MYK, 747,777, 767, MI5, 737, MI6, 757, Kh-11, Shayet-13, SADMS, Spetznaz, Recce, 707, CIO, NOCS, Halcon, Duress, RAID, Psyops, grom, D-11, SERT, VIP, ARC, S.E.T. Team, MP5k, DREC, DEVGRP, DF, DSD, FDM, GRU, LRTS, SIGDEV, NACSI, PSAC, PTT, RFI, SIGDASYS, TDM. SUKLO, SUSLO, TELINT, TEXTA. ELF, LF, MF, VHF, UHF, SHF, SASP, WANK, Colonel, domestic disruption, smuggle, 15kg, nitrate, Pretoria, M-14, enigma, Bletchley Park, Clandestine, nkvd, argus, afsatcom, CQB, NVD, Counter Terrorism Security, Rapid Reaction, Corporate Security, Police, sniper, PPS, ASIS, ASLET, TSCM, Security Consulting, High Security, Security Evaluation, Electronic Surveillance, MI-17, Counterterrorism, spies, eavesdropping, debugging, interception, COCOT, rhost, rhosts, SETA, Amherst, Broadside, Capricorn, Gamma, Gorizont, Guppy, Ionosphere, Mole, Keyhole, Kilderkin, Artichoke, Badger, Cornflower, Daisy, Egret, Iris, Hollyhock, Jasmine, Juile, Vinnell, B.D.M.,Sphinx, Stephanie, Reflection, Spoke, Talent, Trump, FX, FXR, IMF, POCSAG, Covert Video, Intiso, r00t, lock picking, Beyond Hope, csystems, passwd, 2600 Magazine, Competitor, EO, Chan, Alouette,executive, Event Security, Mace, Cap-Stun, stakeout, ninja, ASIS, ISA, EOD, Oscor, Merlin, NTT, SL-1, Rolm, TIE, Tie-fighter, PBX, SLI, NTT, MSCJ, MIT, 69, RIT, Time, MSEE, Cable Wireless, CSE, Embassy, ETA, Porno, Fax, finks, Fax encryption, white noise, pink noise, CRA, M.P.R.I., top secret, Mossberg, 50BMG, Macintosh Security, Macintosh Internet Security, Macintosh Firewalls, Unix Security, VIP Protection, SIG, sweep, Medco, TRD, TDR, sweeping, TELINT, Audiotel, Harvard, 1080H, SWS, Asset, Satellite imagery, force, Cypherpunks, Coderpunks, TRW, remailers, replay, redheads, RX-7, explicit, FLAME, Pornstars, AVN, Playboy, Anonymous, Sex, chaining, codes, Nuclear, 20, subversives, SLIP, toad, fish, data havens, unix, c, a, b, d, the, Elvis, quiche, DES, 1*, NATIA, NATOA, sneakers, counterintelligence, industrial espionage, PI, TSCI, industrial intelligence, H.N.P., Juiliett Class Submarine, Locks, loch, Ingram Mac-10, sigvoice, ssa, E.O.D., SEMTEX, penrep, racal, OTP, OSS, Blowpipe, CCS, GSA, Kilo Class, squib, primacord, RSP, Becker, Nerd, fangs, Austin, Comirex, GPMG, Speakeasy, humint, GEODSS, SORO, M5, ANC, zone, SBI, DSS, S.A.I.C., Minox, Keyhole, SAR, Rand Corporation, Wackenhutt, EO, Wackendude, mol, Hillal, GGL, CTU, botux, Virii, CCC,
Re: [liberationtech] Twitter reappearing message documentation..
On 16 April 2013 20:50, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc wrote: Hmm. I for one experience reappearing DMs/a variety of similar DM glitches (unread DMs marked as read, read DMs marked as unread) on a weekly basis. Perhaps it's more common than originally thought? NK It may be to do with the fact that you can only store 100 DMs at any one time. So when you reach capacity the oldest messages drop out of your inbox automatically and are replaced by new ones. Then when you delete some messages the old ones that previously dropped out suddenly reappear, and can sometimes display as new messages. It happened to me a while ago and I looked into it. I also sometimes get these issues while accessing Twitter on different computers/browsers (messages I've recently read appearing as new). The theory that it has anything to do with NSLs strikes me as far-fetched to say the least, in the same vein as the bizarre theory circulated recently about how Google asking you to approve terms of usage on your account is actually a secret discreet way of letting you know you're subject to an NSL. -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: Launch Date!
It's had much wider coverage that just the Register the Verge (see a selection below). I expect there will be a few more tomorrow, too, and there will also be follow-ups when (if?) Microsoft substantively responds. CNET: http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57565610-83/surveillance-a-la-skype-eff-others-seek-answers/ Forbes: http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/01/24/letter-from-forty-four-digital-rights-groups-demands-skype-detail-its-surveillance-practices/ NBC: http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/technolog/skype-prodded-privacy-advocates-over-transparency-vulnerabilities-1C8103618 Huffington Post: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/24/skype-surveillance-microsoft_n_2545646.html Slate: http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/01/24/skype_urged_to_come_clean_on_eavesdropping_capabilities_and_policies_in.html ReadWriteWeb: http://readwrite.com/2013/01/24/microsoft-needs-to-come-clean-on-skype-privacy ZDNet: http://www.zdnet.com/eff-others-to-microsoft-whos-requesting-our-skype-data-710268/ PCAdvisor: http://www.pcadvisor.co.uk/news/photo-video/3422347/groups-raise-questions-about-privacy-on-skype/ On 25 January 2013 02:32, Kate Krauss ka...@critpath.org wrote: First press hit: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/01/25/activists_demand_skype_transparency/ -- Kate Krauss Executive Director AIDS Policy Project www.AIDSPolicyProject.org On Thu, Jan 24, 2013 at 8:31 PM, Martin Johnson greatf...@greatfire.orgwrote: Thanks a lot Nadim! Great work! Now let's spread this widely and force Microsoft to respond. Martin Johnson Founder https://GreatFire.org - Monitoring Online Censorship In China. https://FreeWeibo.com - Uncensored, Anonymous Sina Weibo Search. https://Unblock.cn.com - We Can Unblock Your Website In China. On Fri, Jan 25, 2013 at 9:22 AM, Fran Parker lilba...@gmail.com wrote: No worries, Nadim! What a great job as noted earlier! Thanks! Nadim Kobeissi wrote: My mistake! We do not have an HTTPS version. NK On Thu, Jan 24, 2013 at 8:39 AM, Fran Parkerlilba...@gmail.com wrote: 8:36 AM EST and https://skypeopenletter.com will not load. Times out. However, http://www.skypeopenletter.com/http://www.** skypeopenletter.com/ http://www.skypeopenletter.com/loads fine. https not working I guess. Nadim Kobeissi wrote: It's out, everyone! NK On Wed, Jan 23, 2013 at 10:00 PM, Nadim Kobeissina...@nadim.cc wrote: The Open Letter to Skype is launching *Thursday, January 23rd 2013 at 9:00AM Eastern Time.* Thanks to everyone who helped, with special thanks to Eva Galperin from EFF. The petition will be available at: *https://skypeopenletter.com* Share widely! (Facebook and Twitter Share buttons will be embedded onto the site at launch.) For the Internet! NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtechhttps://mailman.stanford.edu/**mailman/listinfo/**liberationtech https://**mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/**listinfo/liberationtechhttps://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtechhttps://mailman.stanford.edu/**mailman/listinfo/**liberationtech https://**mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/**listinfo/liberationtechhttps://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/**mailman/listinfo/**liberationtechhttps://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/**mailman/listinfo/**liberationtechhttps://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES
On 16 January 2013 17:31, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc wrote: It's already open for individuals. Excellent, thanks Nadim. -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Call for Open Letter on Skype
Chris, I think you're right to express a note of caution with regards jumping to conclusions about the patent. However, the patent is still relevant to the discussion at hand here. At the very least, the patent is contributing to a sense of mistrust and that is why it needs to be addressed. The questions I want answers to are really quite simple. Can Skype facilitate a lawful interception request of user calls when presented with an applicable warrant/court order? If not, does Skype have any plans to integrate lawful intercept capabilities in the future? What types of data can Skype hand over to LEAs where presented with a valid warrant/court order? Has the Microsoft VoIP intercept patent been integrated into the Skype architecture? If not, are there any plans to integrate the Microsoft VoIP intercept patent with Skype at any time in the future? (Other pertinent questions have been asked by others; see here: https://www.privacyinternational.org/blog/skype-please-act-like-the-responsible-global-citizen-you-claim-to-be ) As I previously mentioned to you in a separate email, I also think it's worth noting that although the patent was originally filed in 2009, Microsoft was still actively pursing the patent as of September 2011, four months after it acquired Skype, filing various amendments and a request for continued examination following the publication of the patent in June 2011. I do not think this constitutes evidence that the patent is being or has been integrated into Skype, but I do think it illustrates why the patent is of continuing relevance to any discussion around Skype's security. Ultimately, Skype has more than 600 million users. As I see it, those users -- many of whom are citizens, activists or journalists operating in sensitive environments -- should have a right to know exactly what Skype can and cannot do with their communications. All I'd like to see is a bit of transparency. Best, Ryan On Thu, Dec 27, 2012 at 4:34 AM, Christopher Soghoian ch...@soghoian.netwrote: I can't believe that I am saying this, but can we tone down the paranoia a bit please? Large US technology companies are stockpiling patents, left, right and center, primarily because of the costly patent wars that are ravaging the industry. Back in 2011, Microsoft (and a consortium of other companies, including Apple) bought telecom giant Nortel's portfolio of patents for 4.5 billion. I guarantee you there are a few surveillance related technologies in that portfolio of 6000 telco patents. That doesn't mean Microsoft wanted to implement Nortel's patented surveillance technologies - but rather, that it thought a partial share in that portfolio would give it leverage in its war against Google and others. If you want a good primer on this toxic aspect to the american legal system and the IT industry, I can't think of anything better than this episode of This American Life: http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/441/when-patents-attack Microsoft filed the Skype interception patent (which really isn't directed at Skype - the word Skype appears twice, in a patent filing that is over 9000 words) in 2009, two years before the company bought Skype. Companies file patents all the time for technologies they don't intend to ever use. Now, don't get me wrong, there are lots of things that Microsoft does that concern me. The total silence from the C-level suite about Stuxnet and Flame is shocking, while their continued refusal to include disk encryption functionality in the consumer version of Windows that comes with most new PCs is absolutely disgraceful. However, the mere filing of a patent for an interception technology, without any evidence to suggest that Microsoft has implemented it Skype, is simply not a good reason to get out the pitchforks. Regards, Chris On Wed, Dec 26, 2012 at 2:53 PM, The Doctor dr...@virtadpt.net wrote: There is no reason to expect that anything good for anyone other than them will come from such a letter. Not with this on deck: http://appft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO2Sect2=HITOFFp=1u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsearch-bool.htmlr=1f=Gl=50co1=ANDd=PG01s1=20110153809OS=20110153809RS=20110153809 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/06/29/microsoft_skype/ https://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9218002/Microsoft_seeks_patent_for_spy_tech_for_Skype It would make no sense at all for them to do the work to file a patent on CALEA intercept of Skype traffic and then not do anything with it. -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Call for Open Letter on Skype
Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc wrote: Isn't it time for an open letter regarding Skype? I think this is a great idea. I tried and failed back in July to get straight answers from Skype regarding the data it is in a position to hand over to authorities. I found the level of obfuscation extremely frustrating. Skype has since denied that its architecture changes had anything to do with enabling comms interception ( http://blogs.skype.com/en/2012/07/what_does_skypes_architecture_do.html); however, it has failed to respond to other crucial questions, such as: why did Microsoft file a patent for a legal intercept technology specifically designed to help intercept Skype VoIP calls? Is the eventual aim to integrate this technology into the Skype architecture? I think Skype's 600 million users around the world have a right to know the answer to that question. As far as an open letter is concerned, it's worth noting that Eric King at Privacy International previously wrote to Skype asking some pertinent questions: https://www.privacyinternational.org/blog/skype-please-act-like-the-responsible-global-citizen-you-claim-to-be I'm not sure what response (if any) Eric received. Either way, I'm pretty sure he'd be willing to get involved with a fresh open letter effort. Personally speaking, I think any open letter should be endorsed by as diverse an array of groups as possible to reflect the broad range of stakeholders with legitimate concerns over Skype's security. This issue is extremely important to people working in my line of work (journalism), and of course it also matters not only to activists but to everyday citizens who want to know exactly what Skype can and can't do with their data. Feel free to get in touch with me if you are pushing forward with this, Nadim. I'd be more than happy to try to get on board some groups that represent the interests of journalists. Best, Ryan -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Censorship hardware - BLUECOAT IN SYIA
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 01/12/2012 19:44, Bernard Tyers wrote: I also wonder what happened with that Dubai distributor? Last I heard was that, about a year ago, the US dept of commerce put restrictions on a man called Waseem Jawad who was operating in the UAE under the company name Info Tech. He was put on an entity list, designed to restrict him from receiving controlled exports from the US in the future. Source: http://www.bis.doc.gov/news/2011/bis_press12152011.htm On 01/12/2012 19:44, Bernard Tyers wrote: And reading that article now, I wonder what ever happened to that internal investigation Blue coat were running. I also wonder what happened with that Dubai distributor? Something tells me they're still doing business. Restrictions make no difference in these cases when you have one company who will provide a partner service provider who will then provide a service to the persona non grata, possibly or possibly not with the knowledge of the original company. Bernard Connected by Motorola Jillian C. York jilliancy...@gmail.com wrote: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203687504577001911398596328.html /Blue Coat Systems http://online.wsj.com/public/quotes/main.html?type=djnsymbol=BCSI Inc. of Sunnyvale, Calif., says it shipped the Internet filtering devices to Dubai late last year, believing they were destined for a department of the Iraqi government. However, the devices—which can block websites or record when people visit them—made their way to Syria, a country subject to strict U.S. trade embargoes. / On Sat, Dec 1, 2012 at 10:39 AM, Rafal Rohozinski r.rohozin...@psiphon.ca mailto:r.rohozin...@psiphon.ca wrote: This pic has just been posted on twitter. It was picked up by the Secdev Syria Operation Group. It is allegeldy a picture of internet censorship hardware taken inside a telecom hub (exchange) in Damascus, http://twitter.com/AmaraaBaghdad/status/274919986399703040/photo/1 It looks like the ProxySG 9000 ( http://www.bluecoat.com/products/proxysg) Rafal -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- US: +1-857-891-4244 | NL: +31-657086088 site: jilliancyork.com http://jilliancyork.com/*| *twitter: @jilliancyork* * We must not be afraid of dreaming the seemingly impossible if we want the seemingly impossible to become a reality - /Vaclav Havel/ -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2.0.17 (MingW32) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJQumzbAAoJEOYbWlT/pqR6fSwH/0e/BRhTEuRjb1BsbdxMRyl7 +GuVLeZNHBXVfdrr1CoVTxgNWQeevvy+IdQsSS+cH0oCV1xO9/eWyr0VCxc+GSW7 7iqeBv68gaq1bkLC45U+b9Jl69Ilaj5TbK6vF6emZI2NIrMsVJ2FTmxYkxryZv3k EU1pCeaN8E7ZzOZcmawUUwk8i/DP6IgwPSLrjImdl87dfV7oNETOlKGiiYnuCvfA M6XJKrYDe6XSASLRSrTgjkmqJZ2n596PlJLsCGG9LgCSvuqVRf5TBXOf7wg1Jylx k+p4BITy2j7BBxwtrc8pOfe6SIrztqKmh6s/gNvYKNZ57wJUT50F1FN8/0jjt04= =XUek -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Silent Circle to publish source code?
On 10/11/2012 18:26 PM, Nadim Kobeissi wrote: I sincerely apologize if my post is jumping the gun a bit, but aside from reassurances in private press conferences, Silent Circle hasn't made any statement that supports their releasing their code as open source. In fact, they have been very ambiguous on this issue prior to their alleged private statements yesterday and today. Hmm. It says on the SC website that it will use Open Source Peer-Reviewed Encryption, Peer Reviewed Encryption and Hashing Algorithms, and also says we believe in open source. Is that very ambiguous? Date: Thu, 11 Oct 2012 18:26:28 -0400 From: na...@nadim.cc To: liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Silent Circle to publish source code? On 10/11/2012 5:51 PM, Ryan Gallagher wrote: To Nadim: I'm interested to know, did you contact anyone at SC before writing your blog post? Seems to me you arrived at your rather scathing conclusion largely on the basis of an assumption. A sort of shoot first, ask questions later approach. It actually says on the SC website that SC will use Open Source Peer-Reviewed Encryption. It also says, unambiguously, /We believe in open source/. It's almost impossible to develop the software Silent Circle is attempting to develop without using at least one open source library - this is in fact accentuated in my blog post. I sincerely apologize if my post is jumping the gun a bit, but aside from reassurances in private press conferences, Silent Circle hasn't made any statement that supports their releasing their code as open source. In fact, they have been very ambiguous on this issue prior to their alleged private statements yesterday and today. I will update my blog post the moment they announce that Silent Circle will be open source. I don't mean to shoot first, ask questions later, but rather highlight serious potential dangers. From: compa...@stanford.edu Date: Thu, 11 Oct 2012 12:48:03 -0700 To: liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Silent Circle to publish source code? We both received the same messages from Ryan Gallagher and Dan Gillmor: @rj_gallagher: @kaepora FYI I met with SC's CEO today for piece I'm doing + he told me they'll be making everything open source. That's why I added the question mark, in case someone on the list knew anymore (for example, when -- what date? -- do they plan to publish the code). I've contacted @Silent_Circle via Twitter and invited them on to Liberationtech. If anyone knows how to reach someone on the team directly, please let me know. It'd be nice to send them a personal invitation, so we can talk to the team directly rather than have a secondhand conversation. Best, Yosem On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 12:35 PM, Nadim Kobeissi na...@nadim.cc wrote: It would have been much nicer to create this thread based on real source code, instead of a tweet based on word of mouth. We'll see. NK On 10/11/2012 3:27 PM, Yosem Companys wrote: Dan Gillmor @dangillmor: @kaepora Phil Zimmerman told me yesterday that Silent Circle (contrary to what you say in your post) will publish source code. -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
