I noticed a Stanford project for setting up browser-based, ephemeral Tor
proxies. In their words, the purpose of this project is to create many,
generally ephemeral bridge IP addresses, with the goal of outpacing a
censor's ability to block them.
The core idea is that volunteers outside a
On 1/3/13 5:25 PM, Steve Weis wrote:
I noticed a Stanford project for setting up browser-based, ephemeral
Tor proxies. In their words, the purpose of this project is to
create many, generally ephemeral bridge IP addresses, with the goal
of outpacing a censor's ability to block them.
I'm
Here's a perspective on the project and its current challenges from
Jacob Appelbaum and Roger Dingledine's Tor ecosystem talk at 29C3:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rnbc_9JnVtcfeature=youtu.bet=1h8s
gf
On 1/3/13 7:25 PM, Steve Weis wrote:
I noticed a Stanford project for setting up
Yes, the system is vulnerable to client enumeration if there are few
facilitators and proxies. If there are many facilitators and proxies, then
the adversary needs to discover facilitators, constantly poll them, and
compete with legitimate proxies to learn client IPs.
They won't discover every
