Re: [PATCH v4 01/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init

On Thu, Jun 8, 2017 at 1:58 AM, Theodore Ts'o wrote: > Thanks, applied. This will be on the for_stable that I will be > sending to Linus sometime during 4.12-rcX. I think you might have just missed the kbuild test robot complaining about an incorrect compiler warning, when using

Re: [PATCH v4 01/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init

On Tue, Jun 06, 2017 at 07:47:52PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote: > It's possible that get_random_{u32,u64} is used before the crng has > initialized, in which case, its output might not be cryptographically > secure. For this problem, directly, this patch set is introducing the > *_wait variety

[PATCH v4 01/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init

It's possible that get_random_{u32,u64} is used before the crng has initialized, in which case, its output might not be cryptographically secure. For this problem, directly, this patch set is introducing the *_wait variety of functions, but even with that, there's a subtle issue: what happens to