Re: [Mailman-Developers] Proposed: remove address-obfuscation code from Mailman 3

2009-08-28 Thread Rich Kulawiec
On Wed, Aug 26, 2009 at 10:57:06AM +0100, Ian Eiloart wrote: There's recently published research which suggests that simple obfuscation can be effective. Concealment, presumably, is more effective. At http://www.ceas.cc/ you can download Spamology: A Study of Spam Origins

Re: [Mailman-Developers] Proposed: remove address-obfuscation code from Mailman 3

2009-12-06 Thread Rich Kulawiec
On Tue, Aug 25, 2009 at 06:39:29AM -0400, Barry Warsaw wrote: So you can explain why, in theory and in practice, obfuscation doesn't work. But the user base will (stubbornly, if you like) refuse to accept your logic. As usual, Stephen hits the nail on the head. I can't disagree with much

Re: [Mailman-Developers] spammers harvesting email'ids [was] UI for Mailman 3.0 update

2010-06-08 Thread Rich Kulawiec
On Mon, Jun 07, 2010 at 02:28:22PM -0400, Barry Warsaw wrote: We can try to make it more difficult to harvest email address from mailing list archives and posts, but some of that is fairly difficult without disrupting the usability of the mailing list. Agreed, and as I pointed out last year,

Re: [Mailman-Developers] UI for Mailman 3.0 update

2010-06-08 Thread Rich Kulawiec
On Sun, Jun 06, 2010 at 04:29:14PM -0400, Crist?bal Palmer wrote: The ability to use reCAPTCHA or other CAPTCHA systems as part of the web signup would also significantly reduce spammy signups, so if we could have MM3 ship with a CAPTCHA system and/or support for a class of CAPTCHA systems in

Re: [Mailman-Developers] Gitlab integration, GSOC'16

2016-03-21 Thread Rich Kulawiec
On Mon, Feb 29, 2016 at 05:41:27AM -0800, Terri Oda wrote: > The tweet linked talks about moving a discussion from a mailing list > to a bug tracker. An easy way to do that (while leaving the mailing list discussion intact and not requiring that people have accounts on the bug tracking site in

Re: [Mailman-Developers] CAPTCHA support

2016-03-05 Thread Rich Kulawiec
On Sat, Mar 05, 2016 at 04:27:31PM +0530, Aditya Divekar wrote: > I was looking around the mailman code, and could not find the functionality > for captcha in the mailing lists subscription pages. As someone who has been studying email abuse for 30+ years, I strongly recommend against captchas

Re: [Mailman-Developers] Encrypted lists predictable difficulties and implementation needs

2017-03-16 Thread Rich Kulawiec
On Wed, Mar 15, 2017 at 11:31:44PM -0500, J.B. Nicholson wrote: > I understand there are more insecure devices on the Internet all the time > and that's unfortunate, but I don't think it's avoidable. What do you > suggest we do about this using Mailman (since this is Mailman-developers)? I

Re: [Mailman-Developers] Encrypted lists predictable difficulties and implementation needs

2017-03-18 Thread Rich Kulawiec
On Fri, Mar 17, 2017 at 09:54:48AM +1100, Morgan Reed wrote: > I'd submit that this is tantamount to saying "it's impossible to make a > 100% secure system so why bother even trying". Then you're not grasping my point. Let me try again. I suggest that you re-read what I've written *and*

Re: [Mailman-Developers] Encrypted lists predictable difficulties and implementation needs

2017-03-18 Thread Rich Kulawiec
On Thu, Mar 16, 2017 at 08:10:03PM +0100, Norbert Bollow wrote: > Even if not every device is secure, the difficulty, and likely cost, > for an attacker to snoop on the communications is much greater for an > encrypted mailing list is than for a non-encrypted one. The difficulty is greater -- but

Re: [Mailman-Developers] Encrypted lists predictable difficulties and implementation needs

2017-03-18 Thread Rich Kulawiec
On Thu, Mar 16, 2017 at 05:30:36PM -0400, Barry Warsaw wrote: > On Mar 15, 2017, at 09:47 PM, Rich Kulawiec wrote: > > >What all of this means is that once a list passes N members, where > >we can debate about N, the probability that at least one of those > >members has

Re: [Mailman-Developers] Encrypted lists predictable difficulties and implementation needs

2017-03-15 Thread Rich Kulawiec
All of these proposals overlook significant known, current threats -- none of which they're capable of addressing, but some of which badly undercut the suggested approaches. To list just one of those -- albeit a rather prominent one -- the Internet's population of hijacked systems (aka bots or

Re: [Mailman-Developers] Encrypted lists predictable difficulties and implementation needs

2017-03-21 Thread Rich Kulawiec
On Tue, Mar 21, 2017 at 04:04:20PM +0100, johny wrote: > Shifting the attacker to actively compromise devices is an overall > improvement. If "compromising devices" was difficult, I might agree. But it's not. Devices of all descriptions have been and are being compromised in enormous numbers on

Re: [Mailman-Developers] Encrypted lists predictable difficulties and implementation needs

2017-03-21 Thread Rich Kulawiec
On Sun, Mar 19, 2017 at 07:33:24AM -0400, Richard Damon wrote: > I would say that the problem that is being attempted to solve is > fundamentally impossible to do perfectly. It is impossible to distribute > messages in a secure manner to a number of recipients that you don't have > total control

Re: [Mailman-Developers] Encrypted lists predictable difficulties and implementation needs

2017-04-17 Thread Rich Kulawiec
On Sun, Mar 19, 2017 at 06:14:22PM +0100, Norbert Bollow wrote: > That is true, if the attacker already knows whose communications they > want to snoop on. However one of the main benefit of using encrypted > communications is in the area of making it much more expensive and > politically risky