Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Power to the People !
CB: Note the last question is in recognition of the issue we are debating here,usage of mode of production. And , yes, I know that Marx is ambiguous in that usage. However, he does use it to refer to especially property relations in one of those double usages, and that is the usage connected to feudalism == capitalism ==socialism. The division of labor/ organization of technology/technological regime goes through revolutions all the time, or at least the bourgeoisie are constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production. Reply WL: The issue was never if Marx did or did not use property or property relations in his description of the mode of production. I merely stated several time that the mode of production does not mean a set of property relations in my reading of Marx. But rather a historically specific state of development of the material power of production - productive forces with a definable technological regime, with the property relations within. I of course disagree with the Marxists that infer that Karl Marx use the concept mode of production to mean a set of property relations as it is connected to feudalism == capitalism ==socialism - specifically. I do not see the feudalism == capitalism ==socialism implication (inference) in Karl Marx writings. Marx describes a given state of development of the material power of production with the property relations within. I call this given state of development of the material power of production with the property relations within the mode of production and there is a political and theory reason to this formulation. Now The General - Engels popularized the concept of socialism (feudalism == capitalism ==socialism) as the first stage of communism for some very specific reasons, but let not get ahead of ourselves. Karl Marx speaks of a communistic mode of producing and appropriating - in this language, in the Communist Manifesto. A whole section is devoted to Communist and Socialist literature and the difference between the two. The reason Marx speaks of communistic mode of producing and appropriating (my opinion in as much as I continue to speak for myself exclusively) is because he presents the question of mode of production on the basis of primitive communism then the emergence of private property and its negation or the negation of the negation as communism in the broad historical sense. Marx does not outline the historical process - in my opinion, as feudalism == capitalism ==socialism - specifically but rather primitive communism -- class society - abolition of classes, bringing with it the end of the prehistory of man. Property relations emerge after the instruments and tools + human labor and energy source combines to create the mode of production. Property relations does not mean a system of cultural inheritance of private possession of things. Property relations means the rights and ability of a section of society to compel another section to labor for it and the institutional means to appropriate all or a part of the social product. Property is transitory. The mode of production in material life is not transitory. Hence, it is not blasphemy to speak of the mode of production in material life with the property relations within. The destruction of primitive communism was not possible until new means of production - a development of the material power of production, or a qualitative change in the mode of production, making private property possible, and more than that having an excess of material things to appropriate or making private appropriation possible. The underlying theory issue has a philosophic side. One can of course make any change a negation or negation of the negation but socialism is not a qualitative change in property. Socialism is a change in the form of property and at best a transition to a negation. Socialism and Soviet Industrial socialism was not even a qualitative change in property relations. What quality of property changed? Property relations and private property means the right of a part of society to appropriate the social product. This right was not destroyed uner Soviet socialism nor was it possible. The change in the form of property was to prepare that way for its dissolution. Two things in my opinion prove this: the state was the acknowledged property holder and secondly the Soviet Union was a value producing society. In other words I reject the concept that socialism is a negation of capitalism or bourgeois property because negating the bourgeoisie still leaves the property or what is the same a rejection that socialism is a negation of the negation when view from the standpoint of feudalism. Such a view is an inference and misunderstanding of Marx approach in my opinion. If socialism was in fact a qualitative different mode of production, which it is not and cannot be by definition, then it would be a negation of a
[Marxism-Thaxis] Banks and Bonds
Friends, what are our choices in modifying our position on making these scandalous payments? This is the same position of power and theft that the World Bank and IMF holds over the subjugated countries of the South. Thanks to Diane and Bankole for their reporting and editing on these articles. Charles S _- Banks, state bleed DPS By Diane Bukowski The Michigan Citizen DETROIT While Detroit Public Schools CEO Kenneth Burnley pushes for the closing of 110 schools and the lay-offs of 5,400 employees by 2008, banks are profiting handsomely off the districts deficit. In 2005 alone, according to the districts Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for 2004, banks will be paid nearly $156 million for DPS bond issues. Almost 62 percent of that amount, or $113 million, is interest. In addition, the district borrowed $210 million in state aid anticipation notes from the Michigan Municipal Bond Authority in August 2004, according to a memorandum from Gary Olson, director of the Senate Fiscal Agency. That amount, which was to help cover the 2004 deficit, is to be repaid by August of this year. If the DPS does default on the $210 million of borrowing, Olson said, the State Treasurer could extend the re-payment of these notes. This scenario would provide the DPS with additional FY 2005 revenues of $210 million. This is approximately the amount of additional revenue need by DPS to close out the school year without additional budget reductions. Olson said State Treasurer Jay Rising could exercise the default option without approval by the state legislature, but said extending repayment of the bonds would require additional interest payments determined by the state. School activists have opposed the issuance of such state bonds because they are repaid out of per-pupil funding to the district, further depleting funds already cut because of enrollment losses. They say Rising and the banks have the option to forgive at least the interest on the DPS debt, to stave off mass lay-offs and school shutdowns. E-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] By Diane Bukowski The Michigan Citizen DETROIT Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick marshaled financial executives to the table during a council public hearing Jan. 31 in a last-ditch attempt to get the body to approve a bond to fund pensions. It took a lot to get them here, said the citys chief financial officer, Sean Werdlow. Werdlow objected loudly when Councilwoman Sharon McPhail got a representative of Fitch Ratings, a bond rating agency, to admit his company had frequently been apprised of the citys plan to use layoffs and service cutbacks to deal with a $300 million budget deficit. The representative, Joe OKeefe, said his agency currently rates the citys credit as A, with a negative outlook, unless the city enacts those cuts. In 1992, Wall Street bond rating agencies drastically downgraded the citys credit after city unions voted down a ten-percent pay cut. Werdlow said 2,000 to 3,000 city employees would be laid off unless the bond deal is approved. He said it would save the city $160 million in this years budget, and compared the deal to refinancing a home mortgage, from a current rate of 7.8 percent to a lower rate of 5.6 percent. Werdlow added that the city could not borrow only the money owed to the pension funds this year, but the entire $1.2 billion in liabilities owed over the next 14 years. He was directly contradicted at various times by the bond executives, who said the citys pension debt is a soft liability, not a hard liability like a home mortgage, and could be borrowed in annual allotments. Stephen Murphy of Standard and Poors, however, said it would be financially prudent to make the debt a hard liability. Councilwoman Sharon McPhail and George Orzech, who both sit on the citys Police and Fire Retirement System Board, pointed out that a soft liability can vary to the citys advantage. In previous years, Orzech said, that system was over-funded due to successful investments, eliminating the citys liability. Addressing Murphy, Councilwoman JoAnn Watson said, If the transaction is approved but the stock market goes south in the following years, what would that do to the citys bond rating? Watson cited negative factors influencing the nations economy, including competition from automakers in China and elsewhere, and the war in Iraq. Murphy responded, That would be a significant problem. He stressed that for the deal to succeed, pension boards would have to resist demands for better retiree benefits and distribution of excess profits, as with the 13th check city retirees used to receive. Werdlow said the elected retiree boards would still control the distribution of proceeds from the bonds. The city council is deliberating not only on the bond issue, but also on an ordinance to form two non-profit corporations that would oversee the funds, doling them out to the boards on an
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Power to the People !
Communism - not socialism, is impossible unless one has the economic legs to stand on or a revolution in the mode of production (not simply the property relations) that destroys value by qualitatively reconfiguring the labor process where the great mass of humanity's labor is not needed in the production process. CORRECTION Communism - not socialism, is impossible unless one has the economic legs to stand on. A revolution in the mode of production (not simply the property relations) that destroys value by qualitatively reconfiguring the labor process. ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
[Marxism-Thaxis] Van Heijenoort's critique of Engels
Of course, the SU's sciences and math was not without errors,etc. In fact , trial and error as a process of the development of anything, including science, is what Marxism expects. This is some of that same rhetoric and ideology, Marxist rhetoric and ideology , that you refer to below. It comes from Marx, not just Engels. I'm sure you are familiar with the Theses on Feuerbach, 2nd Thesis especially. The emphasis on unity of theory and practice comes from Marx. Marx intends this unity of theory and practice, including practice as the test of theory to be a distinguishing characteristic of Marxist epistemology /theory of knowledge from bourgeois epistemology. The errors of the SU and Stalinism in executing Marxism are well within the margin ( or wide, wide column) of error we would expect for non-geniuses in trying to practice Marxism. If you are not prepared for regular, crude people to make this level of error in trying to do Marxism, you are not ready for Marxism to really change the world, which is to say you are not ready for Marxism as Marx taught it. I don't quite agree with you that all that has gone on in bourgeois natural science, mathematics etc. has been good for humanity, and therefore I don't agree that it is the standard by which Soviet science is to be judged. In many ways, Soviet science is the standard by which bourgeois science is to be judged. The history of bourgeois science, especially in the 20th Century, has not been turning things-in-themselves into things-for-us. A lot of it is effectively and practically making things-against-us. I develop Engels' ideas a bit ( if what I am saying is not already contained in what he says), and I find it not to be a crude philosophical developing on my part :) By it I develop an extremely stringent moral standard by which scientists are judged, a practicality standard, perhaps stronger than you have thought. It's a results standard. Even Einstein is judged harshly by it. For, to the extent that all this new physics has helped the bourgeoisie in its struggle to prevent socialism, it is not ok, for lack of a less crude term. The development of nuclear weapons is a gigantic step backwards for humanity, and the fact that Soviet science did not initiate it is to Soviet science's credit. In other words, there should be no pure pursuit of science that does not take into account the world context of that scientific work, how it will be used in a practical way is not ok. Lysenko is not quite the pariah you suggest. The exploration of possible avenues of LaMarckian evolution is not so anti-science as you suggest, although it contradicts genetics' central dogma of no inheritance of acquired charateristics, and therefore to discuss it is destabilizing. Of course, Lysenkoism's motive was exactly pure theory. Your problem with Lysenkoism has to be that it did not link theory with practice and facts enough, that it was too purely _theoretical_, not subordinating theory to practicality. It was wishful thinking, and insufficient practical test of theory. So, I can argue that my rhetoric actually is on the opposite side of Lysenkoism. You explain the successes of Soviet science by a miracle. Maybe, there is a more material explanation like the negative impact of Stalinism was not quite as heavy as you portray it. That would be a more scientific way to explain the data we have on advance of Soviet science. The notion that theoretical science was totally suppressed seems exaggerated. Lysenkoism is a theoretical attitude. The idea is unity of theory and practice, _not_ exclusion of theory. Any claim that Engels is not theoretical is not accurate. Charles Ralph Dumain rdumain at igc.org You are correct about Lenin as well as Marx and Engels. Lenin was careful about communists' overstepping their bounds of competence. However, even during the 1920s, when activity in all areas was quite creative before Stalin's clampdown, certain bad habits got established. I don't recall exactly when interference in the sciences began. There was of course the notorious meddling in Soviet genetics, which resulted in Lysenkoism and severe consequences for Soviet agriculture. But the theory of relativity was also denounced as not conforming to principles of dialectical materialism, which occasioned some mockery from Einstein. (After the Post-Stalin thaw, Einstein was held up as an exemplar of dialectical materialist thought.) Mathematicians also suffered during this period. Kolman testifies to the ineptitude imposed on a number of areas. No, there was no lack of scientific enterprise in the USSR, but it's a miracle that the incompetence and despotism of the leadership didn't sink the whole country completely, ironic in view of the crash program of industrialization which was dubbed building socialism. It is also important to recognize that the ideological rhetoric used was similar to yours: This aspect is also interesting because Engels' theory
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Van Heijenoort's critique of Engels
Have been following your discussion with considerable interest. Sorry to lurk so long, but I was occupied in finishing up a paper. I was particularly interested in your earlier discussion on emergence. I agree strongly with Jay Gould that dialectics; Hegelian and Marxist alike, describe what I suppose would now be called emergent functions. I have many reservations about Engel's representation of the dialectic and his three so-called laws appear to me to be a snobbish attempt to present Dialectics for the Working Class. Certainly Llyod Spencer and Andrzej Krauze's Hegel for Beginners and Andy Blunden's Getting to Know Hegel are much more successful representations of dialectical theory. A search for emergentism in Marxism would be better served by reinvestigating the methods of Hegel (his Logics) and of Marx (Practice, or, better, labour practice) for the mechanics and process whereby they derive emergent complex moments from simpler prior conditions. I suspect that the concretisation of abstraction through successive negation, unity of labour practice and extant condition in the productive process, and sublation of prior syntheses in extant dialectical moments will have more significance for understanding emergence in human history than the hierarchy theories of Salthe, Swenson, and O'Neil, the emergent semiotics of Hoffmeyer and so on. That is not to say that systems, even cybernetic systems, are not relevant to the investigation, but, we must remember that despite Engel's (sometimes brilliant and sometimes embarrassing) adventures in the dialectics of Nature, that Hegel and Marx theoretical interests were exclusively focussed on human activity and human history and were only interested in Nature as a derived function of human inteaction with material conditions. Even Hegel's dialectics on Nature concerned the Natural Sciences and not Nature as such (as the subject of human contemplation). Which bring us to the problem of Natural science and Marxism. Certainly the Natural sciences are a component of modern history. They more or less emerge in late Mediaeval Europe together with the development of powerful urban commercial and industrial institutions. From the point of view of Marxist theory, the interesting thing about the Natural sciences is the relation between the moment of their emergence and the concurrent developments of European society in all its aspects. For example, the optical and astronomical discoveries of the earliest Natural scientists were most useful for the long-range navigation needs of Europe's commercial and colonial enterprises while the mathematical developments in geometry, trigonometry and the calculus were important for the development of improved techniques for the prompt and accurate estimations of volume, mass, and weight of goods as well as managing cannon fire. Even the origin of the Social Sciences can be traced to this period; Machiavelli and de Seyselle's practical analyses of government as well as the contemporary development of double entry accounting and . But, note, that the Marxist interest in these developments is in their practical relations to the needs growing out of the urbanization and commercialization of human life and not as representations of contemplated Nature. Mathematics and the Natural sciences can contribute to the development of Marxist theory, but only in a form that contributes to the objectives of the dialectical explication of historical conditions and events. After all, in Capital, Marx exploits and develops the practices of contemporary accounting to provide mechanical mathematical objectifications of the relations between productive and commercial processes that are critical to the aims of his theory. Marx also demonstrates considerable interest in the physics of machine engineering, but not as an objective description of Nature, but specifically as it relates to the historical development of human productive and social practice. Marx and Engels also adapt contemporary thinking on organism and on pre- and proto-human, behaviour to describe the fundamental material conditions for the development of human practice. In short, the objectives of the practice of the Natural Sciences are distinct from those of Marxist theory, and their products satisfy needs different from those that engender social historical theory. Even the methods are different insofar as the natural scientist enjoys a bit more distance from the subject of his research (except for quantum indeterminism)than the social-historian. Natural Science can be the subject of investigation by social historical scientists and some of its products can, with suitable modifications, be adopted to the objects of social history, but social history has no more qualifications for determining the practices (theory and activity) of Natural science than do the natural scientists for the determination of the practices of social historical science
[Marxism-Thaxis] Big Jesse on Malcolm X
The princely paradox of Malcolm X Forty years on, his legacy offers an example to people of all ethnicities Jesse Jackson Tuesday February 22, 2005 The Guardian As I reflect on the life of Malcolm X 40 years after his assassination, I do so with a keen understanding of the political, social and economic condition in America. Like other great leaders, Malcolm - who later accepted the name Haj Malik El Shabaaz - was influenced by his environment and the social conditions of his time. In 1903, WEB Dubois penned the Souls of Black Folk, in which he prophesied that the central issue of the 20th century would be race. Following the rise of domestic terrorism, represented by the cowardly nightriders of the Ku Klux Klan, the organised movement to resist racism began to flourish among African-Americans. By the end of the century, two paths of resistance had emerged, led by the Rev Dr Martin Luther King Jr and Malcolm X. Although their paths had parallel ends, each was distinct. Dr King, having studied the philosophies of Jesus and Mahatma Gandhi, focused on non-violent direct action to achieve a shift in the paradigm of public policy. He employed liberation theology to frame racism as a national moral sin. Malcolm X studied the philosophy of Marcus Garvey as a young man and developed a black nationalist perspective in response to racial bigotry. He viewed appeals to the US government for redress as taking the criminal to his own court. He gained national notoriety as the no-nonsense voice of the Nation of Islam, imploring people to revolutionary change by any means necessary. Malcolm X's perspective had a great appeal among college students and those adults unwilling to turn the other cheek. Yet his legacy centres not around his defiance and fiery oratory, but his intellectual evolution. Let us not forget that Malcolm Little was elected president of his eighth-grade class. But after his father's brutal murder at the hands of white racists, and the mental breakdown of his mother, Malcolm was drawn to street life, which resulted in a prison term. While in prison he returned to the discipline of academic study and joined the Nation of Islam. After returning from Islam's holy site of Mecca, Malcolm changed his philosophy from the perspective that the Anglo-Saxon was the embodiment of evil to a global understanding of humanity which encompassed good and evil within all ethnicities. As it had been in the turbulent 1960s, the perceived political authenticity of Malcolm X was praised by college students in the 1990s following Spike Lee's film Malcolm X. Malcolm's image was immortalised on clothing, artwork and building murals, and by popular rap groups such as Public Enemy on the theme of anti-establishment defiance of the status quo. Today, the life of Malcolm Little, Malcolm X, Haj Malik El Shabaaz, is instructive in three poignant ways. His academic studiousness is a brilliant example to youth who, in many cases, define what is cool as non-academic. As we seek to reclaim our youth as a nation, we must transform their values to embrace academic excellence and civil participation. Malcolm's rebelliousness after his father's murder is an example in the negative of the need to keep one's eyes on the prize of scholastic achievement. Second, Malcolm X's rejection of destructive behaviour is instructive as a set of values which places dignity above designer clothes. We should not forget that while in Boston, Malcolm dressed like a pimp, acted like a thug and was jailed. However, during his enlightenment while incarcerated, he realised that his purpose in life was not to pimp, peddle and plunder, but rather to be clean and upright in his attitude. It is a fact that in many instances one's dress determines the perception of others. Lastly, Haj Malik El Shabaaz is a glowing example of the individual need to seek a higher understanding. Proverbs 4:7 advises the faithful to seek wisdom. As a devout Muslim, he journeyed to the holiest of holy places in Islam on a pilgrimage to develop a deeper understanding of his faith and his role in the world. After Mecca, Malik El Shabaaz viewed Anglo-Saxons as brothers in humanity, provided they were clean and upright. Malcolm's life and legacy in study and practice illuminate our path today: his defiance, determination and dignity have made us all better. Like Dr King, he was assassinated when he was 39. The noble Ossie Davis delivered the famous phrase in his eulogy that Malcolm X as Haj Malik El Shabaaz was our black shining prince. The princely paradox of Malcolm X's life was that he was inflexible on the question of dignity, yet very flexible to intellectual growth, and people of all ethnicities will be well served to emulate his shining example. ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
[Marxism-Thaxis] Re: Marxism-Thaxis Digest, Vol 17, Issue 4
1. Re: Van Heijenoort's critique of Engels (Ralph Dumain) 2. Van Heijenoort's critique of Engels (Hans G. Ehrbar) 3. Van Heijenoort's critique of Engels (Charles Brown) 4. Re: Van Heijenoort's critique of Engels (Ralph Dumain) 5. Re: Van Heijenoort's critique of Engels (Ralph Dumain) 6. Re: Van Heijenoort's critique of Engels (Choppa Morph) 7. Van Heijenoort's critique of Engels (Charles Brown) 8. Barkley Rosser's Home Page: Aspects of Dialectics and Nonlinear Dynamics (Charles Brown) 9. (no subject) (Fred Feldman) 10. Re: Van Heijenoort's critique of Engels (Ralph Dumain) 11. Re: Van Heijenoort's critique of Engels (Ralph Dumain) 12. Re: Power to the People ! ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) 13. Banks and Bonds ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) 14. Re: Power to the People ! ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) 15. Van Heijenoort's critique of Engels (Charles Brown) 16. Power to the People ! (Charles Brown) 17. Re: Van Heijenoort's critique of Engels (Oudeyis) Mathematics is always founded in practice and reality one way or the other. It is necessarily dialectical because all human reasoning can be seen as a dialectical process. It is the extent to which one makes it dialectical is what is more important. Actually I work on formal dialectical logics and the measures of the 'more important' too. ..and there is a lot still to be done. Coming to Marx's mathematics, I did know about the connections with nonstandard analysis also (not my field). But the connections with constructivism are also fairly obvious. In fact Marx can be seen as somebody involved in founding the back-bone of modern computer science. During Stalin's time they had free access to all the mathematics of the world, but some publications were restricted from going to the west. Their performance in research was very good. A. Mani Member, Cal. Math. Soc ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
[Marxism-Thaxis] Particleless process
I have been reading Ralph Dumain's notes. The notion of everything as process /nothing is a particle seems a neo-Hericlitean one. Charles ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Dialectics and systems theory (was Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Van Heijenoort's critique of Engels)
I wrote the following back in 1998 for Proyect's Marxmail list. Jim F. -- The Fall 1998 issue of SCIENCE SOCIETY is a special issue devoted to dialectics: The New Frontier. It features noted Marxist scholars, Bertell Ollman and Tony Smith, as the guest editors and includes articles by such noted Marxists as Frederic Jameson, Richard Levins, Nancy Hartsock, Istevan Meszaros and Joel Kovel amongst others. This issue attempts to cover many of the important questions concerning dialectics why Marxism needs dialectics in the first place, whether Marx's dialectic constitutes a reflection of what the world really is (ontological dialectics)or is it a method for investigating the world (epistemological dialectics)or both. Does the dialectic apply just to history and society or does it apply to nature in general (dialectics of nature)? Is dialectical analysis applicable just to organic interactions within capitalism or is it generally applicable to historical change? Was dialectics for Marx primarily a method of exposition (especially for *Capital*) or was it also a method of inquiry as well? Also, which dialectical categories: contradictions, internal relations, the negation of the negation etc. were of central importance for Marx? One interesting article is the one by Richard Levins, Dialectics and Systems Theory. Levins attempts to answer the question of whether or not the development of a rigorous, quantitative mathematical systems theory makes dialectics obsolete. That is a question that Barkley Rosser and others here (if not on this list then on earlier lists like the old M-I and M-SCI) have dealt with. As Levins notes, his friend the evolutionary biologist, John Maynard Smith, had argued that systems theory has made dialectics obsolete because it offers a set of concepts like feedback in place of Engels' notion of the interchange between cause and effect; the threshold effect in place of the mysterious transformation of quantity into quality and that the notion of the negation of the negation is one that he never could make sense of. Levin, however, disagreed with Maynard Smith and he contended that dialectics should not be subsumed into systems theory while at the same time acknowledging that in his opinion contemporary systems theory does constitute an important example of modern science becoming more dialectical albeit in an incomplete, halting and inconsistent manner. As he pointed out systems theory is a moment in the investigation of complex systems which facilitates the formulation of problems and the interpretation of solutions so that mathematical models can be constructed that will make the obscure obvious. At the same time, Levins stresseed that systems theory is still a product of the reductionist tradition in modern science which emerged out of that tradition's struggle to come to terms with complexity, non-linearity and change through the use of sophisticated mathematical models. Richard Levins in beginning his article with an account of his exchanges with John Maynard Smith over whether or not mathematical systems theory can replace dialectics raises in my mind some interesting questions. First, it is worth noting that Maynard Smith, himself, was best known for his work in the application of game theory to elucidating Darwinian theory. John Maynard Smith has along with other evolutionists like William Hamilton, George Williams, and Richard Dawkins elaborated an interpretation of Darwinism that takes a gene's eye view of evolution - that in other words treats not organisms but individual genes within the gene pool of a given population as the units of selection. This conception arose out of Hamilton's work in developing Darwinian explanations of altruism. Hamilton concluded that altruism could not be explained if we took individual organisms as the basic units of selection since altruistic behavior almost by definition impairs the reproductive fitness of the individual organism by acting in the interests of other organisms at the expense of its own interests. Hamilton argued that such behavior becomes explicable once we realize that it is individual genes that are the units of selection. Thus, if an organism sacrifices itself to protect the lives of its siblings or offspring it is in fact ensuring that its own genes survive into future generations through its siblings or offspring so natural section will favor such behavior. Hamilton and fellow theorists like George Williams argued that it is possible to understand evolution at the gene level if we postulate that genes are acting like rational self-interested actors or what Dawkins call selfish genes. Maynard Smith has taken this a few steps further by using game theory to show what kinds of strategies that genes (conceived of as being rational and self-interested) will adopt to ensure their survival either in competition or in cooperation with other genes. Thus he has given to evolutionary biology
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Van Heijenoort's critique of Engels
I'm substantially in agreement with you here. Now, if one wants to unify the marxist and natural-scientific perspectives, in place of relegating them to separate perspectives, then one has to rise to that level of abstraction to construct a unified account of both. This ridiculous meme theory is a noteworthy example of the failure of natural scientists to encompass the social. They've still learned nothing. And Marxists also have their work to do. (I just ran into Sohn-Rethel's first blunder: his account of Galileo's concept of inertia.) BTW, what do you think of this biosemiotics business. The one theoretical biologist I know who is into this is full of crackpot ideas. Im very distrustful: Claus Emmeche Taking the semiotic turn, or how significant philosophy of biology should be done http://mitdenker.at/life/life09.htm Also at this url: http://www.nbi.dk/~emmeche/cePubl/2002b.Wit.Sats.html Note this key passage: More and more biologists are beginning to understand that the essence of life is to mean something, to mediate significance, to interpret signs. This already seems to be implicitly present even in orthodox Neo-Darwinism and its recurrent use of terms like code, messenger, genetic information, and so on. These concepts substitute the final causes Darwinists believed to have discarded 150 years ago, they have become firmly established in molecular biology with specific scientific meanings; and yet they the semiotic content or connotations are rarely taken serious by the scientists to the extant that there is a tendency to devaluate their status as being merely metaphors when confronted with the question about their implied intentionality or semioticity (cf. Emmeche 1999). This secret language, where code seems to be a code for final cause, points to the fact that it might be more honest and productive to attack the problem head-on and to formulate an explicit biological theory taking these recurrent semiotics metaphors serious and discuss them as pointing to real scientific problems. This means that a principal task of biology will be to study signs and sign processes in living systems. This is biosemiotics -- the scientific study of biosemiosis. Semiotics, the general science of signs, thus becomes a reservoir of concepts and principles when it is recognized that biology, being about living systems, at the same time is about sign systems. Moreover, semiotics will probably not remain the same after this encounter with biology: both sciences will be transformed fundamentally while gradually being melded into one more comprehensive field. While many of the ideas adumbrated in this review seem to be quite fruitful, this paragraph is the tipoff that something is rotten in the state of Denmark. At 05:28 PM 3/4/2005 +0200, Oudeyis wrote: Have been following your discussion with considerable interest. Sorry to lurk so long, but I was occupied in finishing up a paper. I was particularly interested in your earlier discussion on emergence. I agree strongly with Jay Gould that dialectics; Hegelian and Marxist alike, describe what I suppose would now be called emergent functions. I have many reservations about Engel's representation of the dialectic and his three so-called laws appear to me to be a snobbish attempt to present Dialectics for the Working Class. Certainly Llyod Spencer and Andrzej Krauze's Hegel for Beginners and Andy Blunden's Getting to Know Hegel are much more successful representations of dialectical theory. A search for emergentism in Marxism would be better served by reinvestigating the methods of Hegel (his Logics) and of Marx (Practice, or, better, labour practice) for the mechanics and process whereby they derive emergent complex moments from simpler prior conditions. I suspect that the concretisation of abstraction through successive negation, unity of labour practice and extant condition in the productive process, and sublation of prior syntheses in extant dialectical moments will have more significance for understanding emergence in human history than the hierarchy theories of Salthe, Swenson, and O'Neil, the emergent semiotics of Hoffmeyer and so on. That is not to say that systems, even cybernetic systems, are not relevant to the investigation, but, we must remember that despite Engel's (sometimes brilliant and sometimes embarrassing) adventures in the dialectics of Nature, that Hegel and Marx theoretical interests were exclusively focussed on human activity and human history and were only interested in Nature as a derived function of human inteaction with material conditions. Even Hegel's dialectics on Nature concerned the Natural Sciences and not Nature as such (as the subject of human contemplation). Which bring us to the problem of Natural science and Marxism. Certainly the Natural sciences are a component of modern history. They more or less emerge in late Mediaeval Europe together with the development of powerful urban commercial
