Re: Questions about IRR best practices

2021-11-12 Thread Adam Korab
Jay Hennigan wrote: > Long story short, we consolidated acquisitions into a single AS, returned > the old AS to ARIN, and a 2006 RADB entry that looks to have been > auto-generated by Level 3 with the old AS is still hanging around, causing > other to question it. If it's source: LEVEL3, drop a

Re: Questions about IRR best practices

2021-11-12 Thread George Michaelson
Well, if you use a ROA as your only signed object, then yes. But really I was hinting at RTA or RSC: use the mechanism to countersign an instruction to RADB or any other IRR specifically about the RPSL you want to eject. Not "because ROA do this" but "do this specific thing I command because I

Re: Questions about IRR best practices

2021-11-12 Thread Rubens Kuhl
On Fri, Nov 12, 2021 at 9:56 PM George Michaelson wrote: > Wouldn't it be cool if we had a cryptographic mechanism to sign an > authority to the IRR publisher to eject old data. > > Some way you could prove you have control of the asset, and the let the > RADB people know you repudiated some

Re: Questions about IRR best practices

2021-11-12 Thread George Michaelson
Wouldn't it be cool if we had a cryptographic mechanism to sign an authority to the IRR publisher to eject old data. Some way you could prove you have control of the asset, and the let the RADB people know you repudiated some old data, made under somebody else's authority which you can't remove

Re: Questions about IRR best practices

2021-11-12 Thread Jay Hennigan
Tagging onto this thread as it's relevant to me. Is there any mechanism for removing stale cruft that someone else has added to IRR? Two of our subnets have some cruft from an automated script that was accurate in 2006 when they were created, but are no longer valid. Long story short, we

Re: DNS hijack?

2021-11-12 Thread Robert L Mathews
On 11/12/21 8:33 AM, Jeff Shultz wrote: I still think that this is not the correct way for NetSol to handle this situation, particularly since the pages they put up look like phishbait designed by Austin Powers. I didn't see the page, but for what it's worth, this is governed by this ICANN

Re: DNS hijack?

2021-11-12 Thread William Herrin
On Fri, Nov 12, 2021 at 3:09 PM Rubens Kuhl wrote: >> DNSSEC would help here. NetSol's rogue nameserver wouldn't be able to >> produce >> the signed zone if validation were required. > > Nope, they could just remove the DS since they are the registrar for that > domain. DNSSEC only protects

Re: DNS hijack?

2021-11-12 Thread Rubens Kuhl
> > > > > DNSSEC would help here. NetSol's rogue nameserver wouldn't be able to > produce > the signed zone if validation were required. > > Nope, they could just remove the DS since they are the registrar for that domain. DNSSEC only protects against a DNS provider going rogue, not your own

Re: DNS hijack?

2021-11-12 Thread Jim
On Fri, Nov 12, 2021 at 1:29 PM Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote: > On Thu, Nov 11, 2021 at 09:44:04PM +, [..] > It depends on where you are (from my resolver, I get > 64.130.197.11). This is because the name voyager.viser.net is not > stable yet. Depending on your resolver, it points to

Re: Validating multi-path in production?

2021-11-12 Thread Jeff Tantsura
LAG - Micro BFD (RFC7130) provides per constituent livability. MLAG is much more complicated (there’s a proposal in IETF but not progressing), so LACP is pretty much the only option. ECMP could use old/good single hop BFD per pair. Practically - if you introduce enough flows with one of the hash

Re: Questions about IRR best practices

2021-11-12 Thread Adam Korab
Job Snijders via NANOG wrote: > Dear Lee, Hi Job, > *ring ring* - "IRR/RPKI helpdesk how may I help you today?" :-) What a fantastic helpdesk it is, too! ;-) > Another way to satisfy this request is to ask the organization's > provider to create an AS-SET (preferably RIR-operatored IRR such as

Re: DNS hijack?

2021-11-12 Thread Jeff Shultz
On Fri, Nov 12, 2021 at 11:30 AM Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote: > On Thu, Nov 11, 2021 at 09:44:04PM +, > Richard wrote > a message of 37 lines which said: > > > The second of these is returning the 208.nnn IPnumber for your > > a-record: > > > >dig @VOYAGER.VISER.NET 2dpnr.org > > > >

Re: DNS hijack?

2021-11-12 Thread Stephane Bortzmeyer
On Thu, Nov 11, 2021 at 09:44:04PM +, Richard wrote a message of 37 lines which said: > The second of these is returning the 208.nnn IPnumber for your > a-record: > >dig @VOYAGER.VISER.NET 2dpnr.org > >2dpnr.org. 300 IN A 208.91.197.132 It depends on where you are (from my

RE: Geolocation for Disney Plus

2021-11-12 Thread Kevin McCormick
I the past I have found that Disney+ and HBO MAX both use Digital Envoy/Digital Element. Thank you, Kevin McCormick From: NANOG On Behalf Of Norman Jester Sent: Friday, November 12, 2021 12:05 PM To: Dave Bell Cc: nanog@nanog.org Subject: Re: Geolocation for Disney Plus The contacts on

Re: Geolocation for Disney Plus

2021-11-12 Thread Jim Troutman
It took me several months to get a Disney+ geolocation issue resolved recently. I sent emails to the known contacts. Got one response saying the issue would be investigated. Later, no response to additional follow-ups over several weeks. Phone calls to their consumer hell desk told me that they

Re: Geolocation for Disney Plus

2021-11-12 Thread Norman Jester
The contacts on that brotherwisp page for Disney+ do not respond. I have had success only with peeringdb contacts. As recently as two days ago they resolved a similar issue for me as peeringdb listed contacts. Norman Jester 619-319-7055 (whatsapp ok!) > On Nov 12, 2021, at 9:39 AM, Dave Bell

Weekly Global IPv4 Routing Table Report

2021-11-12 Thread Routing Table Analysis Role Account
This is an automated weekly mailing describing the state of the Internet Global IPv4 Routing Table as seen from APNIC's router in Japan. The posting is sent to APOPS, NANOG, AfNOG, SANOG, PacNOG, SAFNOG TZNOG, MENOG, BJNOG, SDNOG, CMNOG, LACNOG and the RIPE Routing WG. Daily listings are sent to

Re: Geolocation for Disney Plus

2021-11-12 Thread Dave Bell
Check out this link. https://thebrotherswisp.com/index.php/geo-and-vpn/ On Fri, 12 Nov 2021 at 15:51, Drew Weaver wrote: > We’ve had a few complaints that users are getting redirected to the EN-GB > version of Disney+ whenever they try to visit the site. > > > > I have tried very hard to figure

Re: DNS hijack?

2021-11-12 Thread Richard
> Date: Thursday, November 11, 2021 13:28:07 -0800 > From: Jeff Shultz > > Okay, so this is anecdotal, but since the domain belongs to me it's > more than a little annoying. > > I got some calls that one of my domains, 2dpnr.org was going to a > page that said it was Network Solutions and

Re: DNS hijack?

2021-11-12 Thread Jeff Shultz
On Fri, Nov 12, 2021 at 7:07 AM Matthew Petach wrote: > > I suspect it's more a case of > > domain foo.com provides DNS service for several other domains, > including bar.com. > > bar.com is fully paid up. > > foo.com doesn't get paid up on time; expires, but is quickly > re-claimed and paid up

Validating multi-path in production?

2021-11-12 Thread Adam Thompson
Hello all. Over time, we've run into occurrences of both bugs and human error, both in our own gear and in our partner networks' gear, specifically affecting multi-path forwarding, at pretty much all layers: Multi-chassis LAG, ECMP, and BGP MP. (Yes, I am a corner-case magnet. Lucky me.)

Geolocation for Disney Plus

2021-11-12 Thread Drew Weaver
We've had a few complaints that users are getting redirected to the EN-GB version of Disney+ whenever they try to visit the site. I have tried very hard to figure out which geolocation service they are using to come to that conclusion but have yet to be able to figure it out. Does anyone know

Re: DNS hijack?

2021-11-12 Thread Matthew Petach
On Fri, Nov 12, 2021 at 5:55 AM William Herrin wrote: > On Thu, Nov 11, 2021 at 6:36 PM Jeff Shultz > wrote: > > > > > > Yeah, apparently when a domain expires, a lot of DNS queries to domains > in that domain's DNS server... get redirected to a Network Solutions "this > is expired" website at

Re: DNS hijack?

2021-11-12 Thread William Herrin
On Thu, Nov 11, 2021 at 6:36 PM Jeff Shultz wrote: > > > Yeah, apparently when a domain expires, a lot of DNS queries to domains in > that domain's DNS server... get redirected to a Network Solutions "this is > expired" website at that IP. > Even though those domains are perfectly legit and

Re: DNS hijack?

2021-11-12 Thread Stephane Bortzmeyer
On Thu, Nov 11, 2021 at 01:36:58PM -0800, Jeff Shultz wrote a message of 122 lines which said: > Never mind, looks like an expired domain issue. Someone didn't remind > someone else. To avoid such a problem: * some registries allow for multi-year registration, * some registrars allow for