Re: Another security bug, this time in MAC verification...

2014-06-13 Thread Matt Caswell
On 11/06/14 08:23, Matt Caswell wrote: On 11 June 2014 06:47, Otto Moerbeek o...@drijf.net wrote: On Tue, Jun 10, 2014 at 11:35:06PM +0100, Matt Caswell wrote: I can't see a way that this could be exploited. It is a bug though. I've just pushed a fix:

Re: Another security bug, this time in MAC verification...

2014-06-11 Thread Matt Caswell
On 11 June 2014 06:47, Otto Moerbeek o...@drijf.net wrote: On Tue, Jun 10, 2014 at 11:35:06PM +0100, Matt Caswell wrote: On 10 June 2014 21:52, Kurt Roeckx k...@roeckx.be wrote: As far as I can see this is SSLv3 only, and only about the Finish message. So it seems that function return

RE: Another security bug, this time in MAC verification...

2014-06-10 Thread Salz, Rich
http://opensslrampage.org/post/88383880093 The rampager is wrong; see Adam Langley's comments on twitter; https://twitter.com/agl__/status/476420434095648768 /r$ -- Principal Security Engineer Akamai Technologies, Cambridge, MA IM: rs...@jabber.me; Twitter: RichSalz

Re: Another security bug, this time in MAC verification...

2014-06-10 Thread Kurt Roeckx
On Tue, Jun 10, 2014 at 01:03:17PM -0700, Kyle Hamilton wrote: http://opensslrampage.org/post/88383880093 I don't know if this has in fact been given to the OpenSSL team yet. I am not jsing, and I am not involved in the OpenBSD audit. However, this is important. If MD5 passes, but SHA1

Re: Another security bug, this time in MAC verification...

2014-06-10 Thread Kurt Roeckx
On Tue, Jun 10, 2014 at 10:33:32PM +0200, Kurt Roeckx wrote: On Tue, Jun 10, 2014 at 01:03:17PM -0700, Kyle Hamilton wrote: http://opensslrampage.org/post/88383880093 I don't know if this has in fact been given to the OpenSSL team yet. I am not jsing, and I am not involved in the

Re: Another security bug, this time in MAC verification...

2014-06-10 Thread Matt Caswell
On 10 June 2014 21:52, Kurt Roeckx k...@roeckx.be wrote: As far as I can see this is SSLv3 only, and only about the Finish message. So it seems that function return the length of the digest, and in some error cases 0. We'll end up with a wrong value in (peer_)finish_md_len. It should then

Re: Another security bug, this time in MAC verification...

2014-06-10 Thread Otto Moerbeek
On Tue, Jun 10, 2014 at 11:35:06PM +0100, Matt Caswell wrote: On 10 June 2014 21:52, Kurt Roeckx k...@roeckx.be wrote: As far as I can see this is SSLv3 only, and only about the Finish message. So it seems that function return the length of the digest, and in some error cases 0. We'll